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Quia fecisti nos ad Te 
et inquietum est cor nostrum 
donec requiescat in Te 
(5) 
'By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not 
acting, according to the determinations of the will; that is, if we choose to 
remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now this 
hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to everyone who is not a 
prisoner and in chains. Here, then, is no subject of dispute.' 
(David Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 
(1775), §VIII.1) 
'It does not seem to be self contradictory to suppose that [the 
acceptance of determinism could lead to the decay or repudiation of participant 
reactive attitudes]... But I am strongly inclined to think that it is, for us as we 
are, practically inconceivable. The human commitment to participation in ordinary 
inter -personal relationships is too thoroughgoing and too deeply rooted for us to 
take seriously the thought that a general theoretical conviction might so change 
our world that, in it, there were no longer any such things as interpersonal 
relationships as we normally understand them.' 
(Peter Strawson, Proceedings of the British Academy, 1962) 
(c) 
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Aristotle's remarks on free will suggest, not so much an argument for the 
existence of free will, as an account of its nature. This account depends on his 
making no hard distinction between what we call 'free action' and 'voluntary 
action'. For him, these would be interchangeable terms. The Aristotelian can, 
then, point out that, if we give up our belief in free will, we must give up many 
other natural beliefs too. In particular, we must stop believing in voluntary action. 
There are, in Aristotelian terms, three conditions (not two, as Aristotle 
himself evidently supposed), which any behaviour must satisfy to count as free/ 
voluntary action. The behaviour (i) must not be compelled, but must be 
performed by the agent's own power and desire; (ii) must not be done in 
ignorance, but must be action on relevant knowledge; and (iii) must not be 
irrational, but must result from the combination of the agent's own power and 
desire with the agent's relevant knowledge. (i) leads me to discuss Aristotle's 
account of what he calls kineseis; (ii) leads me into epistemology; (iii) into an 
account of Aristotle's theory of proairesis and practical reasoning as the cause of 
voluntary action. 
One problem for Aristotle's account of the causation of voluntary action is 
posed by akrasia, deliberate choice of what I sincerely believe I should not 
choose. This seems to be voluntary action which is not caused as Aristotle says 
voluntary action should be. But the three conditions of voluntary action which I 
say Aristotle should be committed to can be used to show that the existing forms 
of akrasia make no counter example to Aristotle's theory, but rather an 
interesting adjunct to it. 
My study of Augustine's theory of freedom begins with a survey of a crucial 
text, the de Libero Arbitrio (Ch.5). I then apply an analogous schema to that 
found in Aristotle. Augustine too depends on the idea that to analyse free action 
is to analyse voluntary action; he also equates these two types with responsible 
action. He too believes (i) that ignorance usually makes for involuntariness, and 
(ii) that there can be no voluntary action which is compelled or which the agent 
could not have done otherwise. In his later works, these doctrines are often 
obscured by his interest in original sin and predestination (neither of which topics, 
be it noted, are focuses of this thesis). But they remain his doctrines. 
Does Augustine have (iii) any doctrine that voluntary action must be rational? 
While he does not develop any theory of practical reasoning like Aristotle's, he 
does develop a theory of practical wisdom. It is an essential feature of all human 
desire, and hence of all voluntary action, that it aims at happiness, which 
properly understood is identical with possession of The Good, i.e. of God. From 
this Augustine draws the conclusion that, to explain any behaviour as a voluntary 
action or choice, it is necessary and sufficient to specify some good at which it is 
to be understood as aiming. 
This sets up for Augustine a problem analogous to Aristotle's problem about 
akrasia. How is a voluntary choice of evil explicable? Augustine's reply is that 
human desires have been disordered by the Fall, and so we often choose, not 
evils per se, but lesser goods than we ought. But this prompts the question: How 
is a first voluntary choice of evil explicable? Augustine's reply is simply that it is 
not. Since a voluntary action or choice must be explained by reference to some 
good at which it aims, a voluntary choice of evil per se cannot be explained at 
all. This does not mean that there was no voluntary choice of evil; but it does 
mean that, in principle, that choice is inexplicable- a mystery. Thus Augustine, 
unlike Aristotle, in this one exceptional case (but in no others) affirms that there 
can be genuinely voluntary action which is not, in the relevant sense, rational. 
(9) 
Chapter 1 
Aristotle on the Less than Fully Voluntary 
1. 'Positive' and 'Negative' Theories of Freedom 
2. Compulsion, Duress, Persuasion, and Free Action 
3. The Varieties of Ignorance 
4. Irrationality 
'While it has been the tradition to present [freedom] as the 
positive term requiring elucidation, there is little doubt that 
to say we acted "freely "... is to say only that we acted not 
un- freely... Like "real ", "free" is only used to rule out the 
suggestion of some or all of its recognised antitheses... 
Aristotle has often been chidden for overlooking "the real 
problem ": in my own case, it was when I began to see the 
injustice of this charge that I first became interested in 
excuses.' 
(Austin, 1956 -7) 
1. 'Positive' and 'Negative' Theories of Freedom 
Austin's famous remarks suggest a view of Aristotle's theory 
of freedom to act which is worth taking seriously on at least two 
counts. First, Austin takes it that 'freedom' is not something 
(10) 
arcane and mysterious, but as near and familiar to us as 
voluntary action. Thus, developing an adequate theory of the 
nature of voluntariness is both necessary and sufficient for 
developing an adequate theory of the nature of freedom to act. 
But a caveat is necessary to the stating of this 
methodological assumption. This caveat is that an adequate theory 
of the nature of freedom to act is not a proof of the existence 
of freedom to act. Austin seems to obscure this point when he 
says that 'In examining all the ways in which it will not do to 
say simply "X did A ", we may hope to dispose of the problem of 
freedom' Cloc.cit.). This thesis does not aim to show that there 
is free will, so much as to show, like Strawson in 'Freedom and 
Resentment', how many other beliefs would have to be abandoned 
along with a belief in free will, if we were to abandon that 
belief. In particular, as already suggested, we would have to 
stop believing in the existence of any genuinely voluntary 
action. 
Second, Austin argues that free action is not a 'positive 
term requiring elucidation', but (in effect) a paradigm case. 
When we talk about action sans phrase (he says), we mean free 
action. Austin explicitly equates 'all the ways in which each 
action may not be free' with 'all the ways in which it will not 
do to say simply "X did A "' (Austin, loc. cit.). For him, 
qualifications are only added when the action is in some way or 
other less than fully free. Therefore we arrive at our definition 
of free action, according to Austin, by a kind of subtraction. If 
you imagine a case of human action, then take away from it all 
the possible factors that could militate against its being an 
ordinary case of human action, what you are left with is typical 
action. And (he argues) typical action, as normally understood, 
just is free action. 
I shall call any theory of this Austinian sort a negative 
theory of free action. Austin rightly points out that the claim 
that Aristotle himself has a negative theory of free action is 
readily supportable from the ethical writings: 
eSaa Nev ot3v ecp' OUT óv pr) npáTTE L V npáTTE L µr} &yvoiliv KaL 
bL' aÚTÓV, ÉKOLJOLa TOOT' Ó(VáyKrj aVaL, KaL TO ÉKOÚOLOV TOOT' 
tOTÌ,V. (EE 1225b7-10) 
óVTOS ó' UKOUOLOU TOO Vo KaL SL' áyvoLav, TÓ tKOÚOLOV 
SÓEELEV av a'VaL OU fi apXfj tV 00T45 EL'bÓTL TÓl KOIA' ËKOOTa tv OLÇ Isl 
npáELS. (NE 1111a22-24) 
My first job in this thesis is to give an account of this 
negative theory, which is to say an account of the cases which 
for Aristotle constitute what I call 'the less than fully 
voluntary'. 
But first, a comment on the very idea of a purely negative 
theory of free action such as Austin proposes. I agree with 
Austin that, if we want to understand what 'freedom to act' 
means, the cases where it is impeded are revealing. But how 
(12) 
simple a matter is it to 'say simply "X did A "'? Does that fact 
of x's doing A, once arrived at, really require no further 
explanation? Iris Murdoch noted that 'Oxford philosophy' (by 
which I think she meant chiefly Austin himself) 'has developed no 
serious theory of motivation' (Murdoch 1970, p.53). Is there 
really nothing of interest or importance to be said which might 
contribute towards the development of a positive theory of free 
action? If it turns out that there is anything non -trivial and 
plausible to say towards such a positive account, then it follows 
that a negative theory alone is incomplete. 
And indeed (as I will argue), besides his undoubted interest 
in what free action isn't, Aristotle also has plenty to say about 
what free action is. Aristotle does have a well developed 
negative theory about what kinds of opposing factors count as 
impairments or suspensions of normal freedom to act. But he has 
an even better developed positive theory about what typical 
action consists in, what it is for an agent to have a normal 
freedom to act. It is unfortunate that Aristotle's positive 
doctrine is frequently overlooked (as here, I suspect, by 
Austin), or else treated as if it had no bearing on the issue of 
freedom. 
In this thesis I present both negative and positive aspects 
of Aristotle's theory of free action. It will turn out that the 
negative and positive conditions of free action which we can 
supply from Aristotle are corollaries of each other. 
(13) 
But- against Austin- it is Aristotle's positive theory which 
is prior and more fundamental. For to define and enumerate the 
kinds of obstacles that there are to free action is to list the 
varieties of ill formed free action that there are. But this can 
only prompt the prior question: 'What is the normal "form" of 
free action ?'. And Aristotle does believe- unlike, perhaps, 
Sartre (v. Sartre 1949)- that we can answer this, can define 
freedom of action by giving it a certain structure. His positive 
theory describes that structure. 
But I start with the negative theory. What, for Aristotle, 
must not be the case regarding an agent, if he is to do a free or 
voluntary action? The passage normally considered vital has been 
cited already: 
gvroS 5' àKOU6l.OU TOO ßCp Kaì Si' eiYvoi.av... (NE 1111a22) 
On the basis of these undeniably very explicit words, it is 
standardly assumed that Aristotle believes there to be two, and 
only two, negative conditions of free or voluntary action: 
(i) Voluntary action must not be compelled. 
(ii) Voluntary action must not be done in ignorance. 
But does NE 1111a22 give us all the kinds of involuntariness 
that there are? In §4 I shall argue that Aristotle himself 
sometimes hints at a separate third negative condition, which, in 
the logic of his own position, really requires further 
(14) 
development than he gives it. This third negative condition, the 
sense of which will be explained in g4, is this: 
(iii) Voluntary action must not be irrational behaviour. 
Two comments are in order before I begin exegesis of the 
evidence for these conditions: 
A. I use 'behaviour' to include all human performances, movements 
and physical manifestations, without prejudice to the question 
whether such performances count either as action or as free 
action. 
B. As Austin noted, most of Aristotle's account of the negative 
conditions of the voluntary is concerned with exculpation from 
responsibility for bad deeds, with blame rather than with praise. 
As I have noted, this does not necessarily mean that Aristotle is 
only, or even mainly, concerned with excuses. Whatever he says 
about exculpation from blame I believe applies, mutatis mutandis, 
to exclusion from praise. 
2. Compulsion, Duress, Persuasion, and Free Action 
It is an obvious intuition that I cannot act freely or 
voluntarily if I am under compulsion: 
(15) 
Tà TE Op VaLOV àKOÚOLOV KaL TÓ aKOÚOLOV nay VaLOV (pauKv. 
(EE 1224b11 -12) 
bOKEL br) àKOÚOLa aVaL Tà Va... YLvópEva... (NE 1109b35) 
The distinctions which Aristotle goes on to draw concerning 
compulsion and its relation to the voluntary are all 
qualifications or dilutions of the meaning of Co ß (or àváyKtl). 
What, then, is the basic theme on which the variations are to be 
played: what is to count as a case of straightforward compulsion? 
2a. Straightforward Compulsion: Within and Outside the Agent 
Aristotle opens his discussions of voluntariness and 
compulsion in the EE with a plausible generalisation: What 
something is compelled to do is whatever is unnatural (napà 
[cpúotv], EE 1224a20) for it to do. Correspondingly, what 
something does freely or spontaneously is whatever is natural 
(KOTà TTjV (pÚOEL KaL T?V K00' aÚT(5t áppfv, EE 1224a18) for it to 
do. This opposition napà (púoiv/ KaTÒ cpúoiv can be given fairly 
precise sense. The movement or process (KCvfloLS) which is natural 
to x, is whatever K(vnaiç originates within x. The K(vno1S which 
is unnatural to x, is whatever KCvnaLS originates outside x: 
VaLOV be OÚ li àp)(,) gE(ilBEV, TOLaÚTfl O00a p1lbeV 
ouußáXXETaL ó npáTTwv náoXwv... (NE 1110a1-3) 
(16) 
óTay [ley yap TL T(ilv a(il6E V nape( TO eV 06-00 dp4Jr}V K L Vrj Tj 
fijpE4JCCu, ßCg cpalav, órav SÈ 4Jti, oú ßCQ. (EE 1224b7-9) 
Three examples of this kind of compulsion. (i) Aristotle 
reports an interesting linguistic fact: that the movement of a 
stone thrown upwards, or of a flame made to burn 'upside down', 
were called 'forced' movements by Greeks of his time: 
Kai yap TdV XCeoy ay(il KaL TÓ núp KáT(il ßCg Kai avayKaCóuEVa 
(pepEOeaL cpaNev. (EE 1224a17) 
This kind of movement is contrasted by Aristotle with the 
oppposite movements (downwards for a stone, upwards for a flame), 
the movements KaTI TO (pÚOEL Kai. TO KOO' OÚTà óp410 (EE 
1224a18). These (he reports) were not called forced movements 
(a19)- though admittedly they were not called voluntary movements 
either (OÚ 4J1iV OÚ6' E`KOÚOLa xÉyETaL, àññ' àv6vu4JOS li ävTl.eEOLS, 
a20). These movements are 'natural' for these things because they 
are the movements which, according to Aristotle's physics, these 
things will display if left to their own devices, the movements 
which originate within these things 6TaV b' EYo(ilOEV >i àpv), oú ßCg 
(EE 1224b15). 
This general point is applicable to human beings, whose 
'natural' movement, as we shall see further in Ch.2, is voluntary 
action. Thus Aristotle tells us that an 'origin (áp)i') outside 
the agent' means an ápX f which is TO nape( TO ÒPp iv fl 
t4Jno5C(ouoav ij KLvoûoav àvayKily (EE 1224b13). For example, (ii), 
(17) 
...66nEp Er TLS ñaßLilV TO XErpa TÚnTOL TLVá pVTLTELVOVTOS KaL 
Trp ßoúaE69aL. Ka?. Tep* tnLBuuEtv. (EE 1224b13-15; cp. NE 1135a27) 
Where I cannot prevent my limbs being utilised for another's 
purposes, I am straightforwardly compelled to perform whatever 
movements that other wishes. But the impetus to action (óppf) 
does not arise within me. Hence I am not responsible for whatever 
is so done, because in such a case I do not act voluntarily. 
(iii) In the NE there is the more famous example of the 
captain in his ship: ...otoV EL' nvcûpo KopCoaL not. fl av9pcnoL 
KÚpLOL gVTES (NE 1110a3). The captain is not responsible for the 
movements of his ship unless they are the results of his own 
óppat: that is, unless they are under his control, which they are 
not if typhoons or brigands commandeer his sails. He too is 
straightforwardly compelled, and therefore exonerated. 
2b. Non -Compulsions from Outside 
The plausible generalisation is, then, that I am responsible 
for all my behaviour which originates within me, but for none of 
it which originates outside me. However, as before, this 
generalisation is only a starting point for Aristotle. He thinks 
that, before it can be accepted (if it can), this statement 
should be tested against obvious objections, some more compelling 
than others. This procedure will allow us both to elaborate the 
original rule of thumb, and to note any exceptions to it. 
(18) 
The first objection to the rule of thumb is this. If 
compulsions arise only without and free actions only within, why 
not say that I am compelled (e.g.) by what is pleasant (perhaps 
in the case of an unrestrained or wicked action), or by what is 
noble (perhaps in the case of a virtuous action)? 
Aristotle's response is as follows. Of course it is true that 
'what is pleasant' and 'what is noble' are things- states of 
affairs conceived by me as desirable goals- outside me. But one 
cannot legitimately move from the rule of thumb to the claim that 
any outside influence on my behaviour, since it is outside me, 
must be a compulsion. To do so would destroy the very idea of a 
contrast between the voluntary and the involuntary which 
Aristotle is trying to establish: 
EL' be TLS Td r}bÉa Kaì, Tà Kañà (paCrl Vaia aVaL (ävayKáCeLv 
yàp Mil gVTa) návTa av Ern oüT(il ß Ca La. ToúT(ilv yap Xáp L V náVTES 
náVTa npáTTOU6LV. (NE 1110b9-11) 
It may be true that when, say, I seduce my neighbour's wife, 
I act on an external influence, namely her beauty. But does this 
look like a case of compulsion (which is supposed to be 
unpleasant, b12)? Since I am clearly not physically pained by the 
experience, but the opposite (b12 -13), doesn't the plea of 
compulsion just look like a rather flimsy pretext (b14 -15)? 
More importantly, we should distinguish (although Aristotle 
does not, explicitly) between something's being an influence on 
(19) 
an agent's behaviour, and its being the àpyrì of that behaviour. 
The seduction case is not assimilable to the case in which the 
sea captain finds himself, because the àpyrì of the sea captain's 
movement is the winds (or the pirates). If the captain can do 
anything at all, he may hope, at best, to influence his ship's 
movements, but (as the case is described) he cannot be the àpxrì 
of those movements. In the seduction case, as I have described 
it, it is the other way round. The àpxrl of my behaviour is not 
the lady's beauty, but my desire to seduce her. Her beauty is an 
influence on, and no doubt a necessary condition for, my 
behaviour; but it is not the àpyì of that behaviour. Hence my 
behaviour's àpxrl is not, in truth, outside me, and so cases like 
this provide no counter -example to Aristotle's rule of thumb. 
A note is needed here on hedonism and the voluntary in 
Aristotle. Some recent writers, such as Kenny (1979), have taken 
Aristotle to argue quite seriously, at least sometimes, for an 
identification of the pleasant and the voluntary. But I doubt 
that the hedonistic strand in Aristotle's theory of the voluntary 
is more than a Protagoras- inspired distraction from the main 
events. 
Aristotle does, sometimes, seem inclined to hedonism of this 
sort (e.g. NE 1110b12 -13: K016 oL peV ß(Qi KOIL (OIKOVTEg Xunrip6S, of 
be FiLà rò 00 Kof KoW v pE6'rì5ov?Ç). But three possible theses 
should be distinguished here. From the strongest to the weakest: 
(i) When I make a voluntary choice, my criterion is some 
'hedonistic calculus'. (ii) My actions and experiences (npÖEELS 
(20) 
and náBr) can be assessed as more or less voluntary in 
proportion to how much pleasure or pain they give me. (iii) A 
discomfort (whether great or small) is always occasioned in me by 
something's happening to me against my will; a pleasure (whether 
great or small) is always occasioned by something's happening to 
me as I choose. 
All three theses seem to me both false and counter to the 
general tendency of Aristotle's philosophy. (i) is clearly not 
compatible with Aristotle's belief that npäELS is motivated not 
by desire, nor by reasoning about the best course of action, but 
by desire plus reasoning about the best course (where 'best' does 
not just equal 'most pleasant') (NE 1139a18 -b6). It follows that 
an agent who npÓTTEI will not necessarily always do what gives 
him the most pleasure, at least not in any non -trivial sense. 
(ii) also is unpromising, (a) because I obviously can choose, 
quite voluntarily, many things that I know will give me no 
pleasure at all, and indeed much pain, such as to die horribly 
for my country; and (b) because 'X is a pleasant experience which 
is happening to me against my will' is a perfectly intelligible 
remark, as anyone who has been tickled can testify. If (iii) 
means that there is always the same experience of pleasure (pain) 
when what happens to me is voluntary (involuntary), then 
Wittgenstein's arguments against the possibility of reidentifying 
any private experience apply (Wittgenstein 1967). Anyway, whether 
(iii) means this or just the weaker claim that there is always 
some experience of pleasure (pain) when what happens to me is 
voluntary (involuntary), the claim seems empirically dubious, and 
(21) 
not very interesting even if true. For- for obvious reasons- no 
such experience could provide any criterion of voluntariness. 
Nor, in fact, does Aristotle ever seriously threaten to use the 
pleasantness of voluntary actions as such a criterion. The truth 
is that the identification of the pleasant and the voluntary, for 
Aristotle, is no more than a 86E0 WEE LE b' ay nay TÓ KaT' 
tniOupCav gKOÚOLOV E ?vaL, EE 1223a28), and a bóZa which he 
rejects (ÖTL peV TOCVUV OÚK É6TL Td ÉKOÚOLOV TÓ KaTà ópEELV 
npÓITTELV o68' äKOÚOLOV Tò napà TO gpEELV tpavEpóv, EE 
1223b37-38). 
(Incidentally, it follows at once from this that Aristotle 
ought to say that the sense in which actions under duress are 
involuntary is not as important as the sense in which they are 
voluntary. See §2d below.) 
2c. Compulsions from Within 
So the rule of thumb survives the first objection, if it is 
modified to say that 'Voluntary action is behaviour that finds 
its àpxñ, and not just some of the influences on its occurrence, 
within the agent; compelled behaviour is behaviour that finds its 
àpxf, and not just some of the influences on its occurrence, 
outside the agent'. But what if the objector now goes on the 
other tack? He has attempted to argue that no behaviour truly 
originates within the agent, and hence that no behaviour is 
voluntary. He may now attempt to argue a second objection: that 
(22) 
even behaviour which does truly originate within the agent is 
not necessarily voluntary. 
This is a problem which Aristotle notes at EE 1224a23 ff., 
drawing a contrast between things like stones and things like 
human beings. Things like stones either undergo 'natural' 
movement (according to the (5ppl) which is ápyf1 within them) or 
'unnatural' movement (according to some other óppfl, outside 
them). For things like human beings, however, this simple 
contrast is not available: ev uev TOLÇ ótuúXoi.S äpyr}, v be 
Tots Ëpw6yotq nAeovae1 (EE 1224a28). The simple contrast between 
ópxñ outside and ftlisi within is not available for Tà eu1púxa, 
because at least some 'animate creatures' (if that is how to 
translate the phrase) do not have one and only one kind of äpxrl 
within them: they have two, Xóyoq and ópcELS (1224a26). This is 
the case, at any rate, with humans ( v b' äv6pcnc £vsßTLV 54igo, 
a28). (Aristotle seems unsure whether or not to say the same of 
other animals, drawing first a distinction between the 'animate' 
as having more than one àpyl) in them and the 'inanimate' as 
having only one, and then a second distinction between humans as 
having more than one ap)Tf in them and the rest, both animals and 
objects, as having only one.) 
Can an agent's behaviour genuinely have its äpyil within that 
agent, and yet be not voluntary action but compelled behaviour? 
Aristotle's answer to this in the NE is markedly different from 
that in the EE. In the NE, his position is quite clearly that any 
óppij which originates in me is entirely my responsibility: 
(23) 
e'OLKE 5r1 Tò ßí.aiov £LvaL oú rEW9£v àpXr4, µrIF,ev 
oupßaXXopevou Toc ßtaoe vTog. (NE 1110b16 -17) 
In the NE, the only true compulsion is external compulsion, 
that which is applied to me against my wishes by other agents or 
outside forces. It is a sufficient criterion of voluntariness 
that the agent should be the àpxrí of his action, that the action 
should originate in him. On this criterion of compulsion, the 
question of whether I can help obeying the pull of my own desires 
towards certain objects is strictly irrelevant. Thus oú KaÀ3ç 
X(y£TaL àKoúoLa £?val. Tá SLà euuòv tnLeuuíav (1111a24-25). 
However, if we accept the EE's point about there being more 
than one kind of àpyl) in humans (as the Aristotle of the NE 
undoubtedly did: NE 1102a29 ff.), a more tolerant approach is 
suggested, which indeed, in the EE, Aristotle adopts; most 
explicitly at EE 1225a25 -33. Here Aristotle virtually contradicts 
the teaching of NE 1111a24 -25. He compares those who act under 
desire (gnieupí.a) with those who are possessed by spirits 
(£0ouaL 5vTaç): 
OÚ (pa4!£V aÚTO(,C £?vai OÚT' £'Ln£l.v a EZnOV OÚTE npäEai a 
EnpaEav. àaXà µrjv oúbt: SL' tnLeu4JLav... (EE 1225a30-31) 
In the case of desire -led action, too, it now appears, it can 
sometimes be true that we can lack control, either over some of 
our thoughts and emotions (ö15voLaC TLV£S Kaì, nden, a32), or over 
the actions resulting from our thoughts and reasonings (KaTÒ TÒS 
(24) 
ToLoOTaç biavo(aç Kcx xoyiapoúç, a33). In what cases, then, can 
this loss of control of one's beliefs, wants or behaviour be said 
to occur? For unless we can give a clear answer to that question, 
this excuse of being overpowered by desire will be available to 
every scoundrel for every indulgence. Aristotle remarks that the 
crucial question (EIS ô áváycTal SÀov, a26) is that of what a 
nature is able to bear (6 A ailToO cpú6Lq ora TE q pELV, a27). But 
what a person's nature can and cannot bear is not up to him 
(a28). Hence (in Philolaus' words), E ?vaC TLVaq Xóyouç KpECTTouç 
ñpSv (a34). 
So it seems that, in the EE at least, Aristotle does allow 
for a breach of his rule of thumb: there can, on this account, be 
internal compulsions. (The only place in the NE where Aristotle 
definitely entertains the idea that internal compulsion can 
diminish voluntariness is NE 1148a18 -22.) Action on such a 
compulsion will contrast both with action on an external 
compulsion (where the ópxf, as we have seen, is not within the 
agent); and also with action on an internal urge which, however, 
does not count as a compulsion (where there will be a conscious 
assent, on the agent's part, to acting in this way: v. EE 
1225a26-27, 6 se pr) ora TE Nrib' ËaTì. TrjS ÉKECVOU CpúaEL ópEEwS ñ 
Xoyiopoû, OAK éCp' oÔTW. 
The criterion of an internal compulsion, then, is given by 
the answer to the question 'Is this urge too strong for this 
nature to resist ?' (EE 1225a27). This, of course, is a question 
to which (even given the same strength of urge) the answer will 
(25) 
vary from one nature to another. Hence the assignment of 
responsibility and exculpation, in cases where a plea of internal 
compulsion is entered, will be a subtle matter. But this 
subtilising of the account need not mean that carte blanche has 
been given to every scoundrel for every indulgence. It might, 
rather, seem an advantage of the EE account over the NE account 
that this kind of being overpowered is here allowed as an excuse. 
(It is curious, incidentally, that Kenny (1979), which inter alia 
is far and away the most distinguished recent commentary on the 
EE, makes no mention of this important point of difference 
between the EE and the NE. Especially if its allowance of 
internal compulsion is considered to be an advantage of the EE's 
account over the NE's, one might have thought that Kenny would 
want to stress this point.) 
The rule of thumb, then, needs to be modified again, to read: 
'Voluntary action is behaviour that finds its äpyij, and not just 
some of the influences on its occurrence, within the agent and to 
which the agent consents without being overpowered; compelled 
behaviour is either (i) behaviour that finds its apxf, and not 
just some of the influences on its occurrence, outside the agent; 
or else (ii) behaviour that finds its apxf within the agent, but 
to which the agent does not consent because he is overpowered'. 
2d. Duress (External) 
This, I think, completes Aristotle's remarks on compulsion 
(26) 
strictly so called. But he does have something to say about an 
obvious close relation of compulsion, which I will call 'duress': 
xéYOVTaL bÉ KaT' 6XXoV Tpónov 131:9 KaL ävaYKa66ÉvTES npáEaL... 
VTav npÓITT(ilOLV ö KaL Aunppòv Kai cpaúXOv únoXapßávouOLV, Waà pr) 
TOLJTO npÓ1TTOUOLV n001Yaì. T} SEOpoL A eciVaToL 6OLV, (EE 1225a3-6) 
Compulsion is physical necessity; duress is practical 
necessity. Action under duress is exemplified by action under a 
threat, like the tyrant's threat to one's family if one does not 
comply with his wishes (NE 1110a6 -7), or the threat perceived 
from the storm by the sailor who jettisons the cargo (NE 
1110a8 -9). Aristotle says that there is some doubt about whether 
action under duress is voluntary or involuntary (NE 1110a7 -8), 
and indeed his own remarks seem to illustrate this àpcPLOßfjTr1OLS. 
In the NE, Aristotle begins with puzzles and moves towards a 
simpler account. He begins by calling actions under duress pLKTOL 
(NE 1110a11), half voluntary and half involuntary. His reason for 
calling actions under duress involuntary is, apparently, to do 
with considerations about second order choice. It is clear that 
no one would choose to choose between having their relatives 
slaughtered and cooperating in a tyrant's atrocities: no one 
would voluntarily enter a situation where these were the only 
options on offer for voluntary choice. Neither option is the kind 
of thing that one would ever choose to do ánX6q, considered in 
its own right. Hence action under duress is (he says), in one 
sense, 'perhaps (rowq) involuntary': 
(27) 
ÉKOÚOLa bTj Ta ToLaÚTa, ánV5S se rOWS aKOÚßLa' OÚbELÇ yap aV 
aOLTO Kae' aÚTÓ T6V TOLOÚTWV 0666V. (NE 1110a18-20) 
On the other hand, he goes on to say, actions under duress 
can also be seen as voluntary: (i) because they are chosen 
(capEToa, a13) at the time they are done (TÓTE ÖTE nPÓTTOVTOL), 
even if not at any other time. But it is the chosenness or 
otherwise of an action at the time it is done which counts for 
its (in)voluntariness (a14). And (ii) because the rule of thumb 
applies to them: the äpXfi of an action under duress is within the 
agent. Hence such actions are µLKTG although EOCKaoL pdXXov 
LKOUOCOL (NE 1110a12). 
In the EE, by contrast, Aristotle begins with a simpler 
account and introduces more and more difficulties for it. (This 
contrast, incidentally, seems rather good evidence for dating at 
least this part of the EE earlier than the corresponding part of 
the NE. If an early essay on a subject starts well then runs into 
perplexities, it is natural when returning to the topic to start 
by re- examining those perplexities.) At first he seems to be in 
much less doubt than in the NE about the status of actions under 
duress. He does not start by calling them uLKT0117. or raising 
considerations about second order choice. He simply says that all 
actions under duress must be voluntary, because in every case of 
duress it is true that -E£OTL yap IA noLELV aXX' ÉKCtvo únopEtvaL 
Td nóüoç (EE 1225a7 -8). However, unfortunately, he then goes on 
to complicate this picture, in three ways. 
(28) 
(i) If (he says) it was up to the agent (step' aúTCS, a10) to 
avoid or not avoid the situation of choice under duress, then the 
agent is responsible for being in that situation, and so his 
choice, however painful, is voluntary (EE 1225a9 -12). If, 
however (a12 -14), he had no chance of avoiding that situation, 
then one may say that his action is under compulsion of a sort 
(ßCQl nSS, a13), though not full -blown (ánXeç) compulsion. 
(Compare NE 1110a18's tooç â(oÔoLc.) 
(ii) Furthermore, the agent's action under duress is now said 
to be less than fully voluntary because he does not choose the 
action which he does for its own sake, but for some further 
purpose, e.g. saving his family's lives: 00K 00-rd TOI'JTo 
npoaLpEtTaL 8 npÓTTEL, aXÀ' Oú ÉVEKa (EE 1225a14). (This remark 
seems to bring out another side of what Aristotle said at NE 
1110a19 -20: O06Etq yap &V XOLTO Kae' ailT(5 TWV TOLOÚTWV OÚFÉV.) 
(iii) Finally, Aristotle simply contradicts EE 1225a7 -8: 
oÚT(il yap óvayKaCNEVOS Kat fl npaEL fi oÚ (p06EL 6TaV KaKÒV 
ayaeoü tYVEKa 4JE(COVOS KaKOIJ ÓInOñÚQE4)C npáTTj], Kat tjIKcoV yE OÚ 
yap 4' aúTe¡) TaúTa. ( EE 1225a18-20) 
But surely it is the simpler remarks, at the beginning of the 
EE account and the end of the NE account, which are more correct. 
Actions done under duress are done voluntarily and not, strictly 
speaking, under any sort of compulsion, as application of the 
doubly modified rule of thumb clearly shows. The ape? of an 
(29) 
action done under duress is within, not outside, the agent, who 
consents to what he does and is not overpowered by any urge like 
hnOupí.a. Hence actions under duress are not pLKTaí but simply 
voluntary. As for considerations about second order choice: 
Aristotle's own observation (NE 1110a13) that it is the 
chosenness of the action at the time at which it is done seems to 
render these irrelevant. The question whether one would choose to 
be confronted with such choices is a question about the nature, 
not of voluntariness, but of cúbaLuov(a. 
It follows that action under duress is more sharply distinct 
than Aristotle recognises from action under compulsion, for one 
is a species of involuntary, the other of voluntary, action. That 
this distinction is not sharp for Aristotle is evident from the 
fact that he does not, in the NE or EE, even have separate terms 
for 'compulsion' and 'duress'. In EE 2.8, Aristotle does 
regularly use two words for 'compulsion and duress', ßía Kaí 
do/41<n (whereas, in NE 3.1, the talk is almost all of ßía, apart 
from avayKáaavTa at 1110a28). But even when Aristotle uses both 
words, he uses both for both phenomena. So EE 1225a2 (where he 
switches from talking about compulsion to talking about duress): 
aéyovTaL be KaT' áaxov Tpónov Kaì, avayKa6OvTCq npaat... 
(cp. EE 1224a11 -12). (In the Magna Moralia, however, it is 
interesting to note that this distinction is drawn by the author 
(who is not necessarily Aristotle): v. MM 1188a37 -b28.) 
(30) 
2e. Internal Duress 
I quoted EE 1225a25 -33 above in discussing internal 
compulsion, but the keen eyed reader will have seen that the 
immediately preceding passage, a23 -25, is not about internal 
compulsion at all, but internal duress: 
Kat pQlXñov &v óóEELE pLQI Kat (5KWV npárTEiv tva ui) áXYñ 
l6Xup6S il rva [A >'lapa, Kat óXwS rva pi) áXyfj fl i'va Xatpn. (EE 
1225a23 -25) 
It seems clear from this passage that (in the EE at least) 
Aristotle would admit, under the heading of duress, not only the 
possibility of acting so as avoid torture by another, but also 
the possibility of acting so as to avoid torture by (e.g.) one's 
own unsatisfied longings. EE 1225a25 -28, then, would give 
Aristotle's rationalisation of this 66E0: there can be such 
internal duress, and hence it can be admissible to act so as to 
avoid a worse alternative which one's own constitution presents. 
This will only be true in some cases, of course. Only some 
internal urges will genuinely leave one with no practical 
alternative to acting on them. Other urges may make it 
practically very difficult to do otherwise than act on them; yet 
giving into them will not be in any sense a practical necessity. 
Therefore such giving in will be a proper subject neither of 
ÉnaLvoq nor even of auyyv6pri (NE 1110a24). (Aristotle would 
harldy agree with William Blake's Proverb of Hell that it is 
'better to murder an infant in its cradle than nurse unacted 
(31) 
desires'.) 
(If, incidentally, a25 -28 is really about internal duress, 
then it might be said that a25 -28 cannot be relevant in the 
context of internal compulsion in which I quoted it above. 
However, given Aristotle's lack of an adequate distinction 
between compulsion and duress in general, and his toing and 
froing between the two topics at EE 1225a3 -33 in particular, 
there is no good reason why a25 -28 cannot be relevant to both 
cases.) 
2f. Duress and Persuasion 
Duress, then, is not very like compulsion. It is much more 
like something else to which Aristotle also alludes very briefly 
in the same context, persuasion: 
SOKEL STj TÓ ßCoLOV Kat TÓ ävayKaLOV dIVTLKCLOBaL, KaL fi ßC0( 
KaL ñ ÓIVÓIyKTl, T45 ÉKOuOC(1) Kai' T( nELBoL Lit TWV npaTTOµÉV(JV, (EE 
1224a13-16) 
It might at first sight be thought from this remark that 
Aristotle has the following spectrum of cases in mind: 
Td ßí.aLov / Td àlvayKaLOV // Td neL9óS / Td ÉKOÚOLOv 
There would be a spectrum from entirely voluntary action (Tò 
(32) 
ÉKoúcLov), through voluntary action under persuasion (TO ncieóç) 
and under duress (Tò (WayKaiov), to entirely compelled 'action' 
(Tò ß(aLov). But clearly Aristotle is not thinking of such a 
spectrum. As we have already seen, he makes no distinction in 
sense between ß(a and òváyKf. Given which, it seems probable that 
no important distinction is made at EE 1224a13 -16 between TO 
neLOÓS and TO ÉKOÚYLOV either. This also is a distinction which 
Aristotle should have made. Action at another's instigation 
through persuasion is, it seems clear, quite often distinct as to 
its voluntariness from action which an agent simply instigates 
himself. That 'I was persuaded to do as I did' can perfectly well 
be a partially exonerating factor of a kind. 
A second reason why the above spectrum will not work as a 
tool of analysis is that there is no easy gradation between 
compulsion and duress; they are not elements of the same spectrum 
at all. The same, however, is not true of the other three 
components. For (notoriously) being persuaded can take many 
forms, some of which are very like choosing to act purely on 
one's own initiative, while others are so compelling and unfair 
as to be close to duress. On the one side, emotional blackmail 
does not seem very different from any other sort of blackmail. On 
the other, there is evidently a close similarity between acting 
on another's presentation to me of reasons for action, and acting 
on my own presentation to myself of reasons for action. So then 
persuasion shades into duress on the one side, and into 
spontaneous voluntary action on the other. However- pace 
Aristotle- there is no such slide from compulsion to 
(33) 
duress. For in the range from duress, via persuasion, to 
uninfluenced original action, it remains true that the ópxft of 
the agent's behaviour is within the agent himself- however strong 
the influences which are brought to bear on that behaviour. In 
the case of compulsion, however, the ópxi) of the agent's 
behaviour is (by definition) outside the agent; the agent is, at 
best, only an influence upon that behaviour and not its àpyf. 
Then if duress is so different from compulsion, should 
Aristotle have discussed it at all in these contexts? The answer 
to that is, I believe, Yes. But this is not because action under 
duress is a species of action under compulsion; nor yet because 
action under duress is a species of the involuntary. As I hope I 
have shown, action under duress is neither of these. It is 
because action under duress is a species of action having limited 
responsibility. What the existence of the class 'actions done 
under duress' illustrates, rightly understood, is that an action 
can be fully voluntary, yet not fully responsible. This is a 
remarkable and counter- intuitive fact, and perhaps it was 
discomfort with this idea which caused Aristotle to try to fit 
duress under the heading of compulsion. Under that heading, 
however, it gets more and more anomalous the more one looks at 
it. 
But if it is true that action under duress is voluntary, yet 
has limited responsibility, does it follow that all duress 
exonerates? Apparently not: in both NE and EE Aristotle notes 
that, just as there can be degrees of forceful influence on my 
(34) 
behaviour which yet do not amount to compulsion because they are 
not irresistible, so there can be degrees of duress which are not 
sufficient to justify the action performed under that duress. So 
at EE 1225a14 -16, Aristotle remarks that it would be absurd 
(yEXotoç) for a person to say that he had killed someone under 
duress because, had he not done so, he would have lost a game of 
blind man' s buff: (300,6 SE T, paCov KaKòv Ka a aunflpóTEpov ETva L ô 
nECGETaL pi noirloaç (a17). And again at NE 1110a27 -29, Tòv 
Eüpinióou 'AXKpaCCLva yEXoEa (POCVETaL Tà ävayKáoavTa 
prlTpoKTovilaa L . In general, 'It is the mark of a small spirit to 
endure what is shameful for the sake of nothing noble or 
proportionate' (NE 1110a23). If one is to go through some painful 
or despicable course to some desired end, the end must be worth 
the pain or shame of the course. In cases where it is worth it, 
there can even be praise for the person who takes the necessary 
course (NE 1110a20). But some courses are so shameful that 
nothing at all could make them worth taking (NE 1110a26 -27)- 
Alcmaeon's action in Euripides being a case in point. All of this 
evidence tends to reinforce my suggestion that action under 
duress is indeed voluntary action. 
3. The Varieties of Ignorance 
Tò SÉ 5L' (lyvoLav Ol'JX ÉKOÚOLOV av áínav e,oTCv (NE 1110b18). 
Aristotle's method in discussing ignorance and the voluntary too 
is to begin with a very plausible general rule, and then note a 
whole list of exceptions to it. 
(35) 
The plausible generalisation here is: What is done in 
ignorance cannot be voluntary. But this bald observation is 
patient of much refinement and qualification, for it is set (as 
the last quotation is set) in the midst of an impressive variety 
of both broad and subtle distinctions. 
What tends to emerge from the drawing of these distinctions 
is that knowledge and ignorance are not set in binary opposition 
for Aristotle. There is a wide range of degrees of knowledge/ 
ignorance, set between extremes which Aristotle (to an extent) 
defines for us. Hence, insofar as they depend upon knowledge/ 
ignorance, neither are voluntariness/ involuntariness in binary 
opposition. 
The first distinction which, strictly speaking, we should 
make about ignorance is one which Aristotle does not make. 
Aristotle uses the word áyvoia for 'ignorance'; but, as Kenny 
rightly notes, 'It is clear that áyvoLa includes not just lack of 
knowledge, but also positively mistaken belief' (Aristotle's 
Theory of the Will, p.48). dyvoca covers both <believing that 
not -p when p is true> and <not believing that p when p is true>. 
It is áyvoLa if (say) I switch off the lights on the mistaken 
belief that there is no one else in the room. It is also áyvoi.a 
if I simply switch off the lights without considering whether 
there is anyone else there. 
The first distinction which Aristotle makes excludes a large 
class of cases of ignorance, as being of a kind which is not 
(36) 
relevant to the (in)voluntariness of any behaviour. This is 
Aristotle's distinction between what I shall call principle 
ignorance and particular ignorance. 
3a. Principle and Particular Ignorance 
This distinction is most clearly drawn at NE 1110b27 ff.. 
Aristotle admits the Platonist view that it is proper to speak 
cognitively of moral beliefs. We can indeed say that 
àyvOEL µtV 03V npS ó µOXBnpòS a bEL npáTTELV Kat óv àpEKTov, 
Kat 5Là TtjV TOLOÚTnV àNOpTLaV ábLKOL Kai Óñ(JS KOKOt yeVOVTaL. (NE 
1110b27-29) 
However, the Platonist is wrong, in this case, to draw the 
normally permissible inference from the povOnpòç' -being ignorant 
(to some degree) to his being involuntary (to the same degree). 
Tò 5' àKOÚOLOV ßOÚXETaL ñÉyE08011, OÚK Er TLS àyVOEL Tà ouµ(pépovTa 
(NE 1110b30). Ignorance of TO oup(p«povTa, or 'ignorance in the 
proairesis' (f ÉV Tñ npoOLp aci (Nyvoia, b31), is not the cause of 
involuntariness, but of wickedness (oú yàp atTLa ToG àKOUOCou, 
OXA(It Tfç poy0npCaç, b32). And Aristotle immediately makes it 
clear that by ñ eV -rib' npoaLpeoEL áyvota he means precisely 
ignorance of principle as opposed to ignorance of particulars: 
...o05' ñ KaBÓxou [áyvoLa atTea TOO äKOUOLOU] (LpéyovraL yàp 
51,6 yE TaLíTnv), WA' fi Ka9' ÉKaoTa, tv orS Kat nEpt a fi npaELS... 
(NE 1110b34-1111a1) 
(37) 
Principle ignorance, then, h KaOóXou 6yvoLa, is mistaken or 
absent belief about what is good. Does this imply that Aristotle 
has any hard and fast prescriptive rules to offer us about what 
is good- any universal moral rules? I believe that the answer to 
that is No: Aristotle's moral principles are more like virtues 
than rules (NE 1178a18). But the argument for that conclusion 
will have to wait until Ch.2. 
What about particular ignorance, rj '<GO' -KaOTa áyvoLa? At NE 
1111a2 -19 Aristotle distinguishes six respects of particular 
ignorance: 
(a) T(ç (ignorance of the agent), 
(b) T( (ignorance of the act), 
(c) nepL Tl. 
I 
£v T(VL nOTTEL (ignorance of the scope of the 
act), 
(d) T(vL, otov bpyávc) (ignorance of the means for the act), 




(ignorance of the result of the 
nc3S, otov flp ua il ocpóöpa (ignorance of the manner of the 
I think it would be implausible to suggest that this was 
meant as an exhaustive and definitive list, in spite of NE 1111a3 
T(va KaL nóoo EOT(. It might be doubted whether any list of 
respects in which one might possibly experience particular 
ignorance could be either. (Compare EE 1225b1 -8, where Aristotle 
distinguishes only 8v (= c), (= d), and oú EvEKa (= e).) 
(38) 
Aristotle's purpose is simply to give examples of the kind of 
accidental unawareness of specific circumstances which counts as 
particular ignorance. 
For consider the objection to this account that we could 
redescribe most cases of particular ignorance as exemplifying any 
one (or all) of Aristotle's respects of ignorance. Thus fencing 
with a sharp foil under the mistaken impression that it has a 
button on the end fits most obviously into Aristotle's respect 
(d). But we can also call it (a) ignorance that I am an agent 
with a sharp foil, (b) ignorance that my act is fencing with a 
sharp foil, (c) ignorance that the victim of my thrust is being 
stabbed, not touched, (e) ignorance that my act will result in 
death, not exercise, and (f) ignorance that I am fencing too 
hard. 
Hence it seems that action in ignorance is more to do with 
mistakes of one type- namely, about the extension of terms- than 
with six types of ignorance. But this is not a very important 
objection. Aristotle's main point is not (implausibly) that there 
are rigidly separable kinds of problems about the extensional 
knowledge relevant to any behaviour, but simply that there may at 
one time be a great variety of different problems (of whatever 
kind) about that extensional knowledge. What matters is not the 
number of (somehow ?) individuable respects in which the agent can 
truly be described as ignorant, but the number of relevant true 
propositions of which that agent is ignorant. 
(39) 
Two questions arise about this distinction between particular 
and principle ignorance. First, is it genuinely Aristotle's? 
Second, why should we say, with Aristotle and against some sorts 
of Platonist, that blame attaches to all actions on principle 
ignorance, but only to some actions on particular ignorance? 
On the first question: Amélie Rorty has argued that Aristotle 
does not, in fact, have a hard distinction between principle and 
particular ignorance. 
'Aristotle's position is far more subtle. He does not draw a 
sharp distinction between fact and value... For instance, the 
failure of knowledge in the minor premiss may be a failure of 
knowledge about what kind of man one is (dA 434a16- 21)... but 
this means forgetting what is good for that type of constitution. 
To forget, in the face of sweets, that one is diabetic is to 
forget what is good for oneself.' 
(Rorty 1980a, p.273) 
However, (i) Rorty does not discuss NE 1110b27 ff., cited 
above, where Aristotle does (to my mind) make a sharp distinction 
between principle and particular ignorance, and hence a 
distinction (of his own sort) between fact and value. Anyway, 
(ii) this distinction is crucial to, and at least implicit 
throughout, Aristotle's whole theory of practical reasoning. 
Further (iii), Rorty's claim (loc.cit.) that 'the failure of 
knowledge in the minor premiss may be a failure of knowledge 
(40) 
about what kind of man one is' is based on the (not very 
decisive) evidence of dA 434a16 -21. But this passage has to be 
weighed against Aristotle's claim (NE 1111a7) that only a 
polvópEvoq could be ignorant of herself as agent. The decisive 
difficulty with Rorty's claim- if indeed she means it as a 
general claim- remains. This is that surely, on Aristotle's view, 
the awareness that one is a diabetic is particular knowledge; 
while the awareness of what one ought to do or not do qua 
diabetic is principle knowledge. Aristotle's claim would be that 
knowing this piece of particular knowledge entails (or should 
entail) knowing this piece of principle knowledge. It would not 
be that the two pieces of knowledge are identical. 
The second question was: Why should we take Aristotle's line 
about ignorance of principle? His line is, apparently, that 
particular ignorance normally excuses, but principle ignorance 
never does. I can always be blamed for my ignorance of right 
principle; I always ought to have had this sort of knowledge. 
Does this requirement seem unreasonable? Then consider these two 
exchanges: 
(1) A. You shot my father! 
B. Oh, sorry- is killing wrong, then? 
(2) A. You stole my watch! 
B. Oh, sorry- I forgot that stealing is wrong! 
Are either of B's responses conceivable as excuses? We can 
(41) 
understand B excusing himself with 'But I didn't mean to', or 'I 
didn't know it was your watch' (etc.); but how could 1B and 2B 
ever count as excuses, rather than as lunacy or as frank 
admission of guilt? 
There is one analogy for knowledge of moral principle which 
Aristotle clearly has in mind at NE 1142a27 ff., and also at 
1147a21, a27; though, as we shall see in Ch.2, §2, this analogy 
is heavily qualified by Aristotle, e.g. at NE 1140b23 -24. This is 
the analogy between knowledge of moral principle and mathematical 
knowledge. No one calls me hopeless at mathematics if I don't 
happen to know what Goldbach's conjecture is; but they do call me 
hopeless at mathematics if I am incapable of learning what 
Goldbach's conjecture is. I may lack all sorts of factual 
mathematical knowledge, yet still be a genius at applying the 
principles of mathematics. But if I have lots of factual 
knowledge about maths, but no understanding of mathematical 
principle, then there is something radically wrong with me as a 
mathematician. Likewise, in ethical matters, to lack particular 
knowledge may affect my voluntariness, but will not affect my 
virtue. Whereas to lack principle knowledge will not affect my 
voluntariness, but will affect my virtue- for I will, ipso facto, 
be wicked. (Hence all the remaining distinctions which Aristotle 
makes apply only to particular and not to principle ignorance.) 
In short, there is a strong contrast in Aristotle between 
mere knowledge of facts- whether learnt by definition or by 
perception (see Ch.2)- and knowledge of what to do with facts. 
(42) 
And this brings us to the next distinction drawn by Aristotle. 
3b. Active Ignorance and Passive Knowledge 
This distinction is apparent at EE 1225b11 -12: 
...gnEi be Tò gnCaTa68aL KaC Tò abévai ÖLTT6V, EV (Èv Tò 
gXELv, Ev bÈ Tò Xpfio6aL Tt tnLaTfjµn... 
Aristotle argues here (a point of some importance, as we 
shall see in Ch.4, for Aristotle's discussion of akrasia) that 
when some item of knowledge is only potential and not actual, it 
is all right to say that the agent acts in ignorance of it. This 
is surely true. Relevant knowledge which is not accessible to me 
at the time of action- even if it is then 'there in my head' in 
some potential form- is not properly speaking knowledge which I 
have. The agent who 'has' merely passive knowledge of a relevant 
particular is, then, exculpated- unless, says Aristotle, the 
agent could have actualised it (EE 1225b16 -17). Which brings us 
to 
3c. Action on and in Ignorance. 
A third distinction about ignorance which Aristotle makes (NE 
1110b25 -30) is between Tò bi' 6iyvoLav npdTTELV ('acting in 
ignorance') and Tò âyvoCav npÓTTELV ('acting on ignorance'): 
(43) 
ó yap NE6Líov öpyLopEvoS OÚ óoKEL bL' dyvoLav npáTTELv àXAà 
SLà TL T(JV Etpriuvwv, oúK Et56S bg, (51aX' àyvo6v. (NE 1110b26-27). 
The point of difference here, which my translation is 
designed to bring out, is this. An ordinarily ignorant agent (ó 
SL' óiyvoiav npáEaç, b20), acts in ignorance. When he acts, he is 
unaware of some fact or other which is relevant to his action. 
Since he (of course) does not know that he is so ignorant, a 
fortiori he never chose to be so ignorant, and so deserves EÀEOS 
Kat ouyyv pn (NE 1111a2). A drunkard or a man in a fury, in 
contrast, acts on ignorance. Not only does he act under 
influences which are liable to blind him to relevant facts; 
normally, he also knows, when so acting, that he is acting under 
influences which are liable to blind him to relevant facts; or at 
any rate he knew that it was going to be so when he began to 
allow himself to become drunk or enraged. 
Hence, at least to a degree, á äyvocv npáTTov has chosen his 
state of ignorance. He has allowed himself to get in a state 
where there is a real danger that his actions will be importantly 
compromised by ignorance. And such voluntary ignorance or risking 
of ignorance is, according to Aristotle, culpable (because- note 
well- it is voluntary): 
óµOCWS SÉ Kat 1.J1) G)(ú)V TLS [TO bnLOTr¡µpv] wÉyOLTO C'SIV, Et S 
1566LOV àvayKatov gXEL bL' áEJXELav rjóovO I XLínrly. (EE 
1225b14-17; cp. NE 1114a2-3) 
(44) 
3d. Repentance and Disowning 
The fourth and last of Aristotle's distinctions about under 
what circumstances an action in ignorance may be excused, applies 
only to actions done in ignorance, and in particular ignorance: 
TOO 51) KOT T>>v ToLaúTnv áyvoLav dIKOÚ6LOU AEyopevou ÉTL 5E17 
TrjV npáELV Xunnpàv EZvaL KaL tv p£TapEñECg. (NE 1111a21) 
If an action done 51.' ilyvo L av is not followed by Xunfl and 
pETapEXECa, then it may be oüX £KOÚOLOV, not voluntary, but it is 
not dtKOúcLOV, involuntary (1110b18 -25). This use of pETapEXECa 
does not refer to an emotion of repentance or regret; it marks a 
logical distinction resting on a counterfactual. If A does x in 
ignorance of p, then 
P; 
A does x àKoúcrwS if A would not have done x if A had known 
but A does x oüX Koilotwq if A would still have done x even 
if A had known p. 
For practical purposes, therefore, the question is: will A 
disown the deed x? If A will disown x, then A did x fully 
involuntarily, and so, ceteris paribus, is exculpated. But if A 
refuses to disown x, then A is not only not exculpated; A is 
actually incriminated to a degree. For the fact that A will not 
disown the deed suggests something about A's character. It 
(45) 
suggests that A is, in general, the kind of person to do this 
sort of thing, even though A's doing of x was not (on this 
occasion) a voluntary action. Hence, where A shows no JETapEXE(a 
for having done x 5L' dyvoLav, A is not as fully culpable for x 
as if A had actually meant to do x. But neither is A as fully 
exculpated from x as A would be if A's doing of x had been 
involuntary rather than non -voluntary. Aristotle's emphasis on 
the development of character shows here. If x is blameworthy, 
then to be the kind of person who would have done x is itself to 
be a proper subject of a degree of blame- but not of the same 
degree of blame as the person who actually does x. Aristotle 
marks the difference in degree of voluntariness between Tò oúX 
tKOÚOLOV and Tò óxoúoiov precisely because he wants to mark a 
corresponding difference in degree of responsibility. (John Lucas 
has argued (in unpublished lectures on 'Responsibility', given at 
Oxford in Trinity Term 1991 and 1992) that what Aristotle was 
expounding at NE 1110b18 -24 was a doctrine of 'retrospective 
culpability' seen as a case of 'Cambridge change'. I can agree 
provided it is not assumed that TÓ oúX tKOúo6OV is just as 
culpable as Td A 1 olov.) 
Aristotle's decision procedure for determining whether an 
agent who acts in some kind of ignorance is or is not a voluntary 
agent, and so is or is not to be exculpated, can be summarised in 
this flow chart: 
A. Is the ignorance of principle(s) or of particular(s)? 
Al. Of principle(s): agent acts voluntarily and hence culpably. 
(46) 
A2. Of particular(s): proceed to B. 
B. Is the apparent 'particular ignorance' in fact active 
ignorance which the agent could have helped? Or is it a case of 
passive knowledge? Or neither? 
B1. Active ignorance: agent acts voluntarily and hence culpably. 
B2. Passive knowledge: proceed to D. 
B3. Neither: proceed to C. 
C. Is the action action in particular ignorance or on particular 
ignorance? 
Cl. On: agent acts voluntarily and hence culpably. 
C2. In: proceed to D. 
D. Does the agent show icrapEXECa? 
Dl. No: agent acts semi -voluntarily and hence semi -culpably. 
D2. Yes: agent is exculpated. 
This concludes my exegesis of Aristotle's treatment of the 
relation of free action to (i) compulsion and (ii) ignorance. By 
now certain broad themes of this thesis are emerging. One is 
that, although the desire to ascribe praise and blame is not (on 
my view of Aristotle) the only possible motivation for an inquiry 
into what factors make for (in)voluntariness, it is evident that, 
for him, voluntariness and responsibility stand in direct 
proportion. Another is that there can be degrees to ignorance, 




I come to the third negative condition of voluntary action 
which, I said, the logic of Aristotle's position requires. Saying 
that 'the logic of Aristotle's position requires' this third 
negative condition means, of course, that I am going to argue for 
it myself, because Aristotle does not, at least not directly. But 
that there is here a hole which Aristotle should have filled is 
not too difficult to show. 
Compare his negative conditions of voluntary action with his 
positive account. In this (exegesis of which is yet to come, in 
Chs.2 -3), Aristotle will tell us that voluntary action is 
(i) action which originates within the agent in a particular way 
(a condition corresponding to the negative condition about 
compulsion); 
(ii) action on certain sorts of knowledge and information 
(a condition corresponding to the negative condition about 
ignorance); 
and 
(iii) action which is rational behaviour. 
The negative condition to which this third part of the 
positive account corresponds is the condition that voluntary 
action must not be irrational behaviour, a phrase the sense of 
which I now hope to make clearer. The argument for positing this 
third negative condition spills over unavoidably into the 
(48) 
forthcoming positive account; but here it is, prolepses and all. 
To put the point in a slogan: Belief plus want does not equal 
voluntary action; but belief in combination with want does. On 
Aristotle's own theory, there is in the constitution of a 
voluntary action more than just the absence of ignorance (which 
implies, positively, the presence of true belief(s) relevant to 
the manifested behaviour) and the absence of compulsion (which 
implies, positively, the presence of unhindered desire(s) 
relevant to the manifested behaviour). It is neither sufficient 
nor necessary for the occurrence of a voluntary action that the 
agent's true belief(s) and unhindered desire(s) should be 
relevant to the performance of the manifested behaviour. What is 
sufficient and necessary for a voluntary action is that those 
belief(s) and desire(s) should be seen by the agent herself to be 
relevant to the performance of the manifested behaviour. 
Consider a person A who exhibits some behaviour B. Let us 
suppose (i) that there is nothing in the situation to impede B. 
Let us also say (ii) that, in every important respect relevant to 
B, A is not ignorant. Does it follow, from the stipulation of 
these two conditions alone, that B is a voluntary action? If it 
does follow, then my negative conditions (i) and (ii) are both 
necessary and sufficient for voluntary action. But if it does not 
follow, then (i) and (ii) may be necessary, but they are not 
necessary- and -sufficient for voluntary action. 
My argument for negative condition (iii) is that it does not 
(49) 
follow. For if A, in the situation described, is to do B as a 
voluntary action, this condition is not necessary- and -sufficient: 
(C1) that A should do B while feeling unimpeded relevant 
desire(s), and while holding some relevant belief(s) not subject 
to any kind of ignorance. 
What is necessary- and -sufficient for A's performance of B as 
a voluntary action is this: 
(C2) that A should do B because of the combination of some 
unimpeded desire(s) which A feels, and some relevant belief(s), 
not subject to any kind of ignorance, which A holds. 
As my stresses indicate, the crucial difference between (C1) 
and (C2) is in the words 'because of the combination of'. To say 
that A does B because of the combination of desire D and belief P 
is to say something quite different from, and not implicit in, 
saying that A does B while feeling desire D and while holding 
belief P. All my negative conditions of voluntary action (i) and 
(ii) entitle us to say is the latter and not the former. 
This is why, on their own, (i) and (ii) cannot be the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of voluntary action. For the 
satisfaction of (i) and (ii) by some piece of behaviour is no 
guarantee that that piece of behaviour can plausibly be seen as a 
voluntary action rather than as just a piece of (random) 
behaviour. I might want some toast, and believe rightly that this 
(50) 
thing here is toast, and go ahead to eat the toast without being 
compelled to do so. Yet, in this case as described, it could 
still be true that I did not eat the toast because I wanted toast 
and believed this thing to be toast. There might be no connection 
at all between my beliefs and desires and my toast -eating 
behaviour. That behaviour might be purely coincidental to those 
beliefs and desires. 
Of course (it may be replied), someone for whom there was no 
such connection would be counted, by most people, as an idiot or 
lunatic. But that is precisely the point: that negative 
conditions (i) and (ii), taken on their own, give us no means 
whatever of distinguishing the chance, random movements of a 
lunatic (or certain sorts of machine) from the voluntary actions 
of a rational agent. To make that distinction, we need to 
postulate a third negative condition of voluntary action: that it 
should not be irrational behaviour. 
Note that behaviour which is irrational, in this sense, is 
not simply a sub -class of behaviour which is compelled- although 
that seems to be Aristotle's implication when he writes of the 
tveouo1cavTcç that, even though their behaviour is actually 
intelligent (Ka(nep öLavoCaç tpyov noLoúvraç, EE 1225a29), 'still 
we do not say that it is up to them to say what they say or do 
what they do'. Likewise, Aristotle describes incontinent people 
as being like actors (Toûç únoKpLvopevouÇ, NE 1147a23), and as 
being like the sleepwalker or the madman or the drunkard 
(uaivóµevoç, Kaeeúóc&v, otvoutvov, NE 1147a14). Now he says 
(51) Ai,l, a 
11: 
(rightly, I think) that the behaviour of people in such states 
is not fully voluntary; but he seems to be implying (wrongly, I 
suggest) that such behaviour is not fully voluntary because it is 
compelled. In the case at least of the sleepwalker and the 
madman, it would have been much more plausible for him to say 
rather that such behaviour is not fully voluntary because it is 
irrational. In such cases, that is, the connections which we 
would look for, in a voluntary action, between wants and beliefs 
and the manifested behaviour are simply absent. 
For irrational behaviour differs from compelled behaviour (as 
that is described in Aristotle's own account) for the following 
reasons. Compelled behaviour, we have seen, may (a) originate 
outside the agent. But irrational behaviour can perfectly well 
originate within the agent, and still be irrational; hence 
irrational behaviour is not externally compelled. Otherwise it 
may (b) originate within the agent, against the overpowered 
agent's consent. But that formula implies that something like a 
normal process of combining wants and beliefs towards an action 
goes on in the agent, but is frustrated by an overriding force - 
otherwise there would be no consent for the compelled behaviour 
to be against. If no such process occurs, as (by definition) it 
does not in irrational behaviour, then there is no such consent 
for the resulting behaviour to override; hence irrational 
behaviour is not internally compelled either. 
Nor is irrational behaviour a sub -class of action in 
ignorance. That might seem to be Aristotle's implication when he 
(52) 
describes the person who fears nothing as a paivópcvoç (NE 
1115b27). Fearlessness might be thought to count as a case of 
ignorance -like irrationality in the context of Socrates' famous 
argument (Caches 194c -d) that courage was a species of knowledge. 
Again, Aristotle calls a paLvópevoç the person who is ignorant of 
every aspect of his own action (NE 1111a7). 
Now no doubt crazy courage, and such radical ignorance as 
Aristotle means, are cases which do deserve the name pavla. But 
that does not mean that ignorance of either of these sorts is 
equivalent to what I mean by 'irrationality'. In a case of 
irrational behaviour in my sense, the problem is not what it is 
in a case of ignorance (as that is described in Aristotle's own 
account). It is not that the agent has no beliefs, nor that the 
agent has wrong beliefs. The problem is that the agent's beliefs 
fail to connect in any conceivably appropriate way with the 
agent's behaviour. 
It is because irrational behaviour will not fit under either 
of Aristotle's own headings of ignorance or of compulsion that I 
say he needs to postulate a third negative condition of voluntary 
action. Does Aristotle himself ever recognise the need for that 
third negative condition? 
The answer to that seems to be: hardly at all. It is well 
known that Aristotle has a theory of practical reason (to which I 
shall be coming shortly) in which a certain form of voluntary 
action, action on what is called npoatpeaiç by Aristotle, plays a 
(53) 
starring role. Action on npoaCpEalç is, evidently, voluntary 
action which is rational; but it is also sharply distinguished by 
Aristotle from the voluntary in general (T(5 tKOúcLOV). Moreover, 
at first sight it looks as if the point of distinction between Tò 
tKOÚcLOV and action on npoaípEaLS is exactly that action on 
npoaCpEaLS is necessarily rational, while Tò tKOúO6ov is not. 
(So, e.g., NE 1112a13 -17.) 
But my claim is not about action on npoaCpcotç; it is about 
Tò tKOÚcLOV. The claim I have just argued for is that, contrary 
to the apparent sense of passages like NE 1112a13 -17, Tò tKOÚOLOV 
too is necessarily rational (in the sense defined above). (What, 
then, is the right way to distinguish between Tò tKOÚoLOV and 
action on npoaCpEOlç? I will answer that question in Ch.3, §2.) 
For the explicit making of this claim there is little or no 
evidence in Aristotle's ethical writings. The best evidence is to 
be found in the MM, but this is of dubious authorship. At MM 
1188b25 -28, the author does indeed give three conditions of 
voluntariness, not two: 
Tò yàp àKOÚaióV tari TÓ TE KaT' àVáyKnV Kai KaTà Vow 
yiyvóNEVov, Kai TpCTOV ó ui µETà biavoCaS yCyverai. 
But clearly the three conditions of a voluntary action given 
here are not my three. They are the conditions that the action 
should involve (a) no compulsion, (b) no duress, and (c) the 
presence of 'understanding': meaning what? öLavoCa might easily 
be the Greek for 'rationality' (in a loose sense); but it becomes 
(54) 
clear, when we read MM 1188b29 -35, that what the author means by 
requiring the presence of btavoCa in a voluntary agent is very 
little different from what Aristotle means by requiring that a 
voluntary agent should be Eìbtç. 
The only places in the writings generally accepted as 
genuinely Aristotle's to which one might, tenuously, point for 
direct evidence of my third condition would be these two: 
XEKTÉOV b' rO0S ßouñEUTÒV oft úntp oÚ ßoUXEúQa6T' àv TLS 
TWAioS ij paLvópEvoS, &X' óntp 6v ó voúv tXwv. (NE 1112a20) 
[TO BnpCa] oü yàp ExEL npoaCpEOLv oúbE XoyLapóv, àOW 
tEéoTIIKE TfiS cRú6EaS, 6anEp oC paivópEVOL T65v àv8p6nav. (NE 
1149b35) 
The first passage might be adduced to support the claim that 
it is only the paLvópEVOS, meaning the irrational agent in my 
sense of 'irrational', who does not reason in his voluntary 
action. But this will not do. (i) The passage says rather that 
the paLvópEVOS does reason, but not about the right things; 
clearly then this kind of paivópsvoç cannot be the 'irrational 
agent' of my terminology. (ii) The passage is taken from the 
beginning of Aristotle's discussion of ßouX>5, which is for him an 
ingredient of npoa(pcalç (NE 1112a15). 
The second passage might be taken to mean that what the 
animals have in common with the paLvópcvoç (again, meaning the 
(55) 
irrational agent in my sense of 'irrational') is that neither 
acts voluntarily because neither reasons: the animals because 
they act on instinct or the like, the paivópsvoç because he is a 
paLvópEvoç. But this will not do either. (i) The passage, 
explicitly, is talking about exceptions from npoaCpcoLS, not from 
Tò EKOÚOLOV. (ii) Aristotle says at NE 1111b8 -10 that animals, 
like children, do share in the voluntary, but not in action on 
proairesis: TOO pev yàp eKOUOLou Kai, narbES KaL TdiXAa C45a 
KOLV(JVEL, npoaLpÉOEwq ó' oú. 
So neither of these passages can be used to give direct 
support to the claim, which I nonetheless have argued for, that 
Aristotle is or should be committed to the doctrine that all 
voluntary action is rational (in my sense of that word). (This 
second passage, moreover, returns my analysis to the question 
raised above: What, on my reading, is the right way to 
distinguish between TO LKOÚGLOV and action on npoaCpcoiç? V. 
Ch.3.) However, this absence of 'direct' support, such as would 
be given by the discovery of an Aristotelian term meaning 
'rational' in my sense, is no problem. As Ch.3 will show, my 
claim is not short of other, less immediately obvious forms of 
grounding. 
Let me conclude this chapter by noting that, in explanation 
of my third negative condition of the voluntary, I can now essay 
a tentative definition of rational and irrational behaviour. The 
definition is this: An agent's rational behaviour is such of that 
agent's behaviour as is susceptible to explanation by reference 
(56) 
to the efficient causal influence of the combination of that 
agent's wants and beliefs, where that combination has an 
efficient causal influence over the behaviour because it provides 
a reason for the action. 
Irrational behaviour, then, is just behaviour which cannot be 
explained in the above way: human movement or doing for which 
there is no contrast between two ways of describing it, as 
behaviour, with its efficient causes (on the one side), and as 
action, with the reasons for which it is done (on the other). And 
if behaviour which satisfies the other two conditions of 
voluntary action is, nonetheless, irrational behaviour, there 
seems, as we have seen, to be no good reason to describe it as 
voluntary behaviour rather than (say) random, accidental, 
instinctive, or automatic behaviour. This doctrine of the 
necessary rationality of voluntary action is one for which I 
would claim the support of Donald Davidson. In his words: 
'Central to the relation between a reason and the action it 
explains is the idea that the agent performed the action because 
he had the reason... When we ask why someone acted as he did, we 
want to be provided with an interpretation. His behaviour seems 
strange, alien, outré, pointless, out of character; perhaps we 
cannot even recognise an action in it. When we learn his reason, 
we have an interpretation, a new description of what he did, 
which fits it into a familiar picture [which]... includes some of 
the agent's beliefs and attitudes... To learn that the agent 
conceived his action as a lie, a repayment of a debt, an insult, 
(57) 
the fulfilment of an avuncular obligation, or a knight's gambit 
is to grasp the point of the action in its setting of rules, 
practices, expectations, and conventions... And there is no 
denying that... when we explain an action, by giving the reason, 
we do redescribe the action.' 
(Donald Davidson, 'Actions, Reasons and Causes', in Davidson 
1980, pp.9 -10; emphases added) 
(58) 
Chapter 2 
Freedom, Ability and Knowledge 
1. Function, Process, and 'Ability to do Otherwise' 
2. Aristotle's Epistemology 
'It seems clear, at the outset, that Aristotle analysed 
voluntary action in terms of efficient causality and knowledge... 
These two elements are central to Aristotle's account: neither 
causation nor knowledge alone is sufficient to analyse the 
concept; both causal and teleological considerations may play a 
role in it without inconsistency. Most recent work [e.g. Anscombe 
(1957), von Wright (1971), Stoutland (1970, 1976)] has sought to 
analyse voluntary action in terms either of causation or of 
knowledge and teleology (but not both). Aristotle's theory (if it 
proves defensible) may avoid those difficulties which undermine 
contemporary accounts which take one of these features alone as 
the analysans; for it would yield a (partially) causal account of 
intentional action and the basis for a (partially) causal 
analysis of freedom to act.' 
(Charles 1984, p.59) 
In the last chapter, in my account of the three negative 
conditions of voluntary action to which Aristotle is committed, I 
(59) 
remarked that each of these conditions has a corollary which is 
a part of Aristotle's positive account of voluntary action. In 
this chapter, I begin my exegesis of that positive account by 
examining the positive corollaries of these negative conditions 
about (i) compulsion and (ii) ignorance. Treatment of the 
corollaries of (iii), the condition about irrationality, will 
come in Ch.3. 
1. Function, Process, and 'Ability to do Otherwise' 
If any human behaviour, to count as voluntary action, must be 
uncompelled, what does Aristotle think will count as such 
uncompelled behaviour? We have already glanced at his brief 
answer to this at EE 1224a16 -20. The opposite of compelled 
behaviour, for any item, is whatever behaviour is natural for 
that item. Thus an uncompelled stone falls towards the centre of 
the earth because there is nothing in the situation to prevent it 
doing what it is natural for stones to do; and a flame, under 
normal conditions, rises away from the centre of the earth for 
the same sort of reason. Now as for flames and stones, so for 
humans: the way to understand what Aristotle thinks counts as 
uncompelled human behaviour is to ask:- What does he think counts 
as natural human behaviour? 
To answer this question properly, we must look at Aristotle's 
theory of human nature. This theory leads Aristotle to a detailed 
answer to that question. It also offers us an understanding of 
(60) 
the place of humanity within the cosmos, and underlies a good 
deal of what Aristotle has to say, both about political or social 
man (the subject of the ethical discourses: NE 1094b7 -10, 
1097b8 -11), and also about women, children, barbarians, animals, 
plants, and other genera even further removed in type from the 
Aristotelian ideal. It is only in the context of that wider view 
that the specific answer is given. We ought then to start with 
the wider view. 
la. Function 
The starting -point for understanding Aristotle's theory of 
human nature is the concept of the Kpvov or function which he 
took over from Plato (Republic 352e- 353a). Aristotle's doctrine 
of function is given at NE 1097b22- 1098a20. Here Aristotle is 
seeking a more precise answer than 'Happiness' to the question 
'What is the human good ?'. He suggests that Tdva br) vevoLT' av 
TOUT', £C Xrp8£ífl Tà tpyov TOG àv0periou (1097b25). The idea is 
that, if we look at what humanity characteristically and by 
nature does or is, then this will give us a clearer view of what 
it might be good for humanity to do: 
aOn£p yàp aNr]Tp KaC äyaXparonoL(¿) Kaì, navTì. T£)(vÍ,Tj), KaL ïíXcJ 
6V £QTLV tpyov KaL npaELS, tv T45 tpycp bOKEL TàyaBÓv aVaL KoL TÓ 
£a, OÚT4) bÓE£L£v av Kaì àv0pdincp, £Cn£p ff6TL TL tpyov aùTOG. (NE 
1097b26-28) 
(61) 
It is an obvious feature of human life that it includes many 
different particular kinds of TEXvaì, skills, in which a person 
might display apET1I, excellence. Now we can provide a simple and 
non -circular analysis of the meaning of 'excellence' for each of 
these particular skills. For excellence at (e.g.) harp- playing is 
indeed, in Aristotle's phrase, eV Tïp gpycp, 'implicit in the 
activity' as we might translate it (note the useful ambiguities 
of the Greek word gpyov). That is: the knowledge of what counts 
as excellence in harp -playing is directly deducible from the 
knowledge of what counts as harp -playing, tout court: Tò b' OÛTó 
cpapEV .pyov ETvac T() yevEL TOME KaL Tof'JSE 6nou5aCou (NE 
1098a8 -9). To define what performing a function (gpyov) is, just 
is to define what performing that function well is. Aristotle 
wants to suggest that human life itself is a function- or, to use 
a related Aristotelian term, an activity ( v pycta)- of this 
sort. Defining what that activity is will enable us to deduce 
what doing that activity well is. And this will be the human 
good. 
Aristotle's claim that humans, qua humans, must have an 
rpYov, is here supported by two distinct arguments a fortiori: 
(i) Humans have EpYa (even) qua carpenters, cobblers or whatever; 
so how can we suppose that Humanity Itself doesn't have an pyov? 
(The examples are deliberately chosen for their banausic 
lowliness: cp. Plato, Republic 434b -d.) (ii) Parts of humans have 
EPYa; so how can we suppose that Humanity Itself doesn't have an 
Epyov? 
(62) 
These two arguments connect clearly enough with a much more 
general claim of Aristotle's, that the whole of nature displays 
purpose: Tò op pfi TUydvTG)S ÓXX' ËVEKÓ TLVOS ÉV Totq TñÇ CpLIOEWS 
pyoiç t;OTL KEd p& LOTa (dPA 645a24 -5); cp. dGA 744a16, which 
Ross (1925) translates as 'Nature, like a good householder, 
throws away nothing of which anything useful may be made'. 
Aristotle also believes that the whole of nature displays economy 
of design. At Pol 1252b1 -5, he gives us the 'Delphic knife' 
principle, that every distinct species made by nature has a 
single gpyov: 
oü6EV yàp li TOOLS nOLEr TOLOLITOV OfoV XaXKOTÚnoL TO A£ñCpLKO 
uáxaLpav nEvLXpc3S, áxx' v npòS V OiíTW yap äv 6nOTEñoITO 
KáAxLOTa T(ilV dpyávcav ËKoOTOV, µrj noXXor.S tPyoLS a00%' '' 
botA£Gov. (Pol 1252b1-5) 
From this argument to the conclusion that humans, qua humans, 
have an gpyov, Aristotle turns to the question of what that gpyov 
could be. In line with his general theory of classification by 
genus and species, Aristotle tells us (NE 1097b35) that what is 
sought when one is looking for some thing's function is Tò rbiov, 
what is characteristic of that thing or unique to it. Thus the 
human function cannot be given by the mere fact that humans are 
alive (Tò Cfiv, b35), nor can it be the life of nourishing and the 
life of growth (TO TE OpEnTLKTjv Kai TO OÚEnTLK)jV (WO, 1098a1). 
For these we have in common (KOLVòv, b35) even with plants. Nor, 
for similar reasons, can the human function be 'some kind of life 
of sensation' (aìoOnTLKri TLS, 1098a2 -3); for this also is shared, 
(63) 
'with horses and cows and every kind of animal'. Hence it 
follows, or at least Aristotle thinks it follows, that Xc(nETat, 
5) npaKTLKI1 TLS TOG Xóyov gyovTOS (1098a4; cp. dA 413a21 -b11). 
What humans have which they share with no other creature is the 
ability to partake of a life of rational action. Thus, in the NE 
and the Politics at least, the way to find the gpyov of x is to 
look for the one thing which that x characteristically does or is 
that differentiates x from y and z. But there are at least two 
problems with this. 
Firstly, an exegetical problem: at dPA 642b5- 643b26, 
Aristotle argues forcefully against the taxonomical method of 
dichotomy by a single differentia (he may, or may not, have in 
mind Plato's demonstration of taxonomical method at the start of 
the Sophist (219a ff.)). Inter alia, Aristotle objects (dPA 
642b7 -10) that some differences are more significant than others; 
and that normal, pretheoretical taxonomy KaTà yÉVII is more 
satisfactory than any other kind (dPA 643b10 -12: a typically 
Aristotelian verdict in favour of the gvboEa; cp. NE 1098b16 -18, 
27 -30). Thus, in the biological writings, the division of animals 
by species is, for Aristotle, logically prior to the assignment 
of an gpyov to each species. The y voç determines the gpyov, not 
vice versa. Moreover Aristotle presents strong arguments for not 
assuming that the assignment of trpYa is a simple and mechanical 
procedure. 
Secondly, a logical problem. In the NE, Aristotle clearly 
works on the assumption that, if x, y and z all cp, then Ting 
(64) 
cannot be the Epyov of any of them. A notorious problem follows, 
from this account and an examination of NE X.8, about what the 
pyov of the gods could be. Assuming that the human gpyov is, 
roughly, npdEtç, the natural answer to this is apparently that 
8scop(a is the divine function. But humans are capable of Becùp(o 
as well as npaELç: so nothing is left over to be distinctive to 
the gods. 
But the problem is wider than that. The same problem could be 
raised about any creature at all, other than (presumably) the 
human being. If rpyov means 'what x characteristically and 
uniquely does or is', then plants have no pyov, because 
everything they do or are (viz., whatever is entailed by 'the 
life of nourishing and the life of growth') is also done by or 
involved in the nature of other, more sophisticated creatures. 
But the same will be true of, say, horses. For while they are 
different from plants in as much as they not only have 'the life 
of nourishing and the life of growth', but also 'some sort of 
life of sensation', they do not (according to Aristotle) have 
anything like 'a [life] of action of the part that has reason'. 
So on this understanding of gpyov, it turns out that in fact only 
humans have an pyov; it is not just the gods who are excluded. 
But this hardly accords with Aristotle's doctrine of the 
purposefulness of all nature, mentioned above. 
How are we to tidy this up? One way of producing a solution 
of a kind, which will not square with every piece of evidence but 
will make sense of a fair number of them, would be to attend more 
(65) 
closely to the role played in Aristotle's thinking by the 
concept of a hierarchy of nature. 
lb. The Hierarchy of Nature 
Aristotle never explicitly argues for this concept, except 
perhaps at dA 413a21 -b11; he seems to feel entitled to take it 
for granted. But it is clear enough that the idea of a hierarchy 
of nature is at work in such a passage as the opening of NE VII 
(1145a15 -33). Here Aristotle, 6XXrty noLrjoaIÉVoç ápy'jv, suggests 
that 'there are three forms in respect of character which are to 
be avoided, wickedness, akrasia and beastliness' (OrjpLóTrìç, a17). 
What is OnpLÓTfÇ, and what is its opposite? Aristotle replies: 
uÓIñLOT' aV ÓIpNóTTOL ñÉyELV [Tò gVOVTCOV] TO únep AuaS dpETfjV, 
fijp[)LK1 V TLVa Kat BE(av (a19 -20), and quotes Homer, Iliad 24.258: 
oúst NKE L 
ävbpóS yE BvrjToú náLS tµµEVaL (WC( BEOI'.O. 
It seems entirely natural to Aristotle to say that the 
opposite disposition (ZLS) to BrjpLÓTnq is heroic or godlike 
virtue. Beastliness, for him, is 'below' humanity, and 
godlikeness is 'above' it; he even quotes the common opinion that 
a àv0ptnwv yCvovraL BEOt ÖL' ÓpeTtlq únepßoXrjv (NE 1145a23), a 
pregnant remark to which I shall return below. The opposite is 
also true: one can become bestial through over -abundance of 
badness (a23 -25). Further, Aristotle notes, barbarians (and, Pol 
(66) 
1252b8 -9 tells us, slaves too) are more likely to be bestial than 
Greeks (a31 -32). Finally, maimed or diseased or brain -damaged 
persons are less than fully human, and sometimes so much so as to 
be bestial (a32 -33). (By this, nasty as it sounds, Aristotle need 
only mean that to be so crippled is to be unable to perform the 
human 4pyov properly, or at all; not necessarily that to be in 
such a state is to be a fit object of contempt.) 
All this, I think, is very clear evidence that Aristotle 
believed in a hierarchy of nature, in which some creatures are 
'higher' (and therefore superior) and others 'lower' (and 
therefore inferior). We can add to this evidence that of various 
other passages, all of which, I suggest, will continue to fill 
out the picture of an Aristotelian doctrine of a hierarchy of 
nature. 
(i) Internal to the person, there are, for Aristotle just as much 
as for Plato, inferior and superior parts: 
Pol 1254b5-7, 8: `H pÈv yàp tUUX]I TOIJ O(5p01TOC, ápXEL bEOnOTLdlV 
äpXrlV Ó se voúS TfiS öpaEwS nOALTLKTjV KOIL KOT 
(Ú:1V Ka6 OU1(pÉpOV TO ÓpXE08aL Teti O(JIaTL ÚnÓ TIjS wuXrÌS... (cp. 
Plato, Republic 443d-e; NE 1102a26-1103a1, 1113a5-9; VV 1249a31 
ff.). 
(ii) Likewise there are inferior and superior parts within the 
human race: 
(67) 
(a) Men /husbands superior to women /wives: Pol 1254b13 -15: Tò 
óppEV npdS TO BññU (VOGEL TÓ µeV KpELTTOV TÓ St XELpOV, TÓ Ntv 
ópXov Td S' äpXÓUEvov. 
(b) Masters superior to slaves: Pol 1254b13-15. 
(c) Greeks superior to barbarians: Pol 1252b8, quoting Euripides' 
ßapßópov S' 'EXXnvaç (5pyELv EìKóq (Iphigeneia in Aulis 1400); Pol 
1255a28 -32. 
(dl) Fathers superior to children: Pol 1259b2 -5, NE 1134b8 -12. 
(d2) Children, like animals, not full moral agents: NE 1111b8 -10; 
cp. NE 1153a27 -31. 
(e) God -like, ordinary and bestial humans ranked as above. 
(iii) And, lastly, there are inferior and superior parts in 
nature generally: 
(a) Tame animals superior to wild ones: Pol 1254b10 -13 (because, 
perhaps, they are closer to being ruled by reason; cp. NE 1102b29 
ff.). 
(b) Animals, like children, not (full ?) moral agents: NE 
1111b8 -10. 
For the next rungs on the ladder, we may refer to NE 
1097b34- 1098a4, or to dA 413a21 -b11. It seems that the 'hierarchy 
of nature' is ordered as follows: 
(c) Animals capable of all of these: voú5, aroOnoiç, KCvnOLS Kat 
OTeOLS 7) KaTá TÓnOV, eTL KCVnOLS fi KaTQ TpOpjV KaL cpBCOLS TE KaC 
aCIEnOLS (dA 413a23 -25); eg. ( ?) humans; 
(68) 
(d) animals capable of all of these except one: e.g. horses (NE 
1098a3) are incapable of exercising voüç; 
(e) animals capable of all of these except two: e.g. a barnacle 
is incapable of exercising voúç or Krvr6r.ç KOfl Tónov; 
(f) animals (or rather, by now, living things) capable of all of 
these except three: e.g. a plant has only the BpEnTLK1 v Kal TfV 
aüET1TLKrly C(ò1!V (NE 1098a2; cp. dA 413a26 -b10); 
(g) the inanimate (superiority of the study of the soul: dA 402a1 
ff.). 
1c. Hierarchy and Function 
How does this doctrine of the 'hierarchy of nature' help us 
clarify the doctrine of the t'pyov? The answer is that it suggests 
that we should redefine the 'gpyov of x'. Any x's function is not 
simply 'what x characteristically and uniquely does or is'. It 
is, more exactly, 'what x characteristically and uniquely does or 
is that differentiates it from what is below it in the hierarchy 
of nature'. 
This redefinition enables us to overcome the logical 
difficulty noticed above. On this definition, it will not be true 
that nothing except humanity has a function. Each creature in the 
hierarchy of nature will have a function which defines its place 
in that hierarchy. X, which does A and B but not C, will fit into 
the hierarchy between Y, which does A but not B or C, and Z, 
which does A, B and C. Here we cannot say that Z does not have A 
(69) 
as a function, simply because Z does A, but X does A too. Nor 
will it be true of X that it does not have B as a function, 
simply because X does A and B, but X does A and B too. The rò 
r5Lov we are looking for when we look for a creature's function, 
on this account, is not simply what differentiates that creature 
from any other creature; it is what differentiates that creature 
from all lower creatures. 
Of course, there are obvious problems here. (i) There may 
indeed be some activities x, y and z for which it is true that, 
say, humans perform x, y and z, but elephants only x and y 
(perhaps: running, eating, making hydrogen bombs). But so what? 
First, we could just as easily cite some activities p, q and r 
for which it is true that elephants perform p, q and r, but 
humans only p and q (perhaps: running, eating, uprooting trees 
with the trunk). And second, as my hydrogen bomb example 
suggests, the differentiating activity of the species which is 
capable of more activities might be an abhorrent activity, one 
which (it might be said) ought to demote that species in the 
hierarchy of nature, not promote it. This is a telling objection 
to the hierarchy doctrine, at least in any form in which the 
order of the hierarchy is supposed to follow from a definition of 
Yevn in terms of 6pYa; but it does not detain Aristotle, and need 
not detain us. 
More specifically (ii and iii), this redefinition still 
contradicts the 'Delphic knife' principle (Pol 1252b1 -5). There 
are still two classes of things without any tpyov: namely, at the 
(70) 
bottom of the hierarchy, whatever is left behind when all the 
things with ?pya have been distinguished from it and put above it 
in the hierarchy; and, at the top of the hierarchy, the gods. 
Lastly (iv), does this procedure really tell us that the Epyov of 
humanity is what Aristotle says it is? 
On (ii), there is little problem about there being no a "pyov 
for whatever is left at the bottom of the hierarchy. This need 
not be a yevoç, and therefore need not have an Epyov. What is 
left behind by the definition and specification of all yvt1 and 
their corresponding Epya is simply the undefined or the 
'unlimited'; which of course has no Epyov, no more than Tò 
únoKECpEVOV as such has any c75oç. 
(iii) and (iv): the answers to these questions come 
together. Let us try (iv) first, and ask again what the human 
rpyov is. Aristotle's problem, in answering this question, is not 
only that it is not at all clear that what he wants to call the 
human Epyov has been arrived at strictly by the method for 
differentiating between species which he claims to be using. More 
troubling still, he does not even have a single answer to the 
question: 
(a) XEI.nETaL 51) npaKTLKIi TLC TOD Xóyov EXOVTOC... (NE 1098a3-4). 
(b) (Oast noXLTLKÒV ö av6pwnoC. (NE 1097b11, Pol 1253a3) 
(c) li TEXECa 51) ELï5aL(_lovía aúT1I [BEwpí.a] av Ern äv8p6nou. (NE 
1177b24-25) 
(d) Epyov [exv6p6nou]... 4iuXñS gvépyELav Kat npáEELS NETà Xóyou... 
(NE 1098a14). 
(71) 
It is commonly said that Aristotle has two accounts of the 
good for humans, one intellectual and the other practical. But, 
on the face of it, the above four quotes present not just two but 
four different verdicts on the nature of the good life. (a) is 
clearly the practical good, (c) the intellectual, good; however, 
in addition to these, (b) suggests a political good- not 
necessarily the same as a practical good, as Aristotle himself 
admits even while trying to run them together (NE 1141b23)- and 
(d) suggests a composite, intellectual cum practical good, which 
of course cannot properly be identified with either of its 
components as represented in (a) and (c). 
Is there a way of making sense of this jumble? Many 
commentators think not (e.g. Clark (1978) arranges the evidence 
in the same sort of way as I do, but jibs at the conclusions I 
will now draw from that arrangement). My suggestion is, first, 
that we suppose that some kind of valid connection can, as 
Aristotle believes, be made between (b) and (a)- what kind, I 
will not discuss here. And second, that we make sense of the 
relations between (a), (c) and (d) by introducing a concept which 
stands alongside that of the rpyov: 
meta- rpyov. 
the concept of the 
What I mean to suggest by my meta- Epyov/ Epyov contrast is 
that any creature in the Aristotelian hierarchy of nature has, 
not one, but two final goods (Tgan). Recall that Aristotle does 
not just talk of excellence within a Teyvn, rpyov or ygvoç. He 
also talks of the excellence of a Teyvn, rpyov or yevoç. That, of 
(72) 
course, is the whole point of the hierarchy of nature. It allows 
us to say both that some creatures, and their activities, rank 
higher than others, and that some creatures (at least at the 
human level) achieve the T Xoç of their own rank more nearly than 
others. 
Correspondingly, I am suggesting, the gpyov of any creature 
or craft practitioner is to achieve excellence within its own 
rank in the hierarchy of nature. The meta -Epyov of that creature 
or craft practitioner is to rise to a higher rank in the 
hierarchy of nature. 
And there is good evidence for something like this view in 
Aristotle. (i) There is the point noted above, that tE dvopónc1v 
y(vovTat 6E0t 51' äpETfç ún£pßoÀnv (NE 1145a23). 
(ii) This interpretation makes sense of the puzzling words of NE 
1098a16 -18: Tò dvOpc5nivov dya06v Wuyfç tve pyELa y(vETaL KaT' 
álpETO, Et óÉ nñE(ouC, at ólpETa(, Kard TO ólp(OTnv Kat 
TEñELOTÓITnV. 
(iii) There is NE 1141a21-22: aTOnov ydp Er TLS TO noñLTLKIjV 
TO cppdVnOLV onoubaLOTÓITI)v orETaL avaL, Et µI} TÓ dpLOTOV TcJV tv 
Tep" Kóoµ(t) divAponóS taT L V. 
(iv) Most conclusively of all, there are the famous words of NE 
1177b27 ff.: 
ó 5É TOLOGTOS &V Ern ß(OS KpE(TTWV fl KaT' ÓlVep(Jnov OÚ yap t 
6v8pwnóS tOTLV O0T4) ßLGJOETaL, Ólññ' b eELóV TL tV aÚT() ÚnÓlp)(EL 
ÖOOV bt bLOüpÉpEL TOGTO TOG OUVAÉTOu, TOOOGTOV Kat n tvpyELa TnS 
(73) 
KaTà TO WOolv dpETIW... Ó6oV SÉXETaL Xprj 60avaTLCELV... 
(NE 1177b27 -35) 
I suggest that the upshot of the argument, given the evidence 
of these passages, is this. Granted the coherence of the very 
idea of a hierarchy of nature, we may say that each vrvoç in it, 
at least in the higher reaches of the hierarchy, has both an 
gpyov and a meta- Épvov. Each yvoç' gpyov is given, as NE 
1098a8 -9 suggests, by the definition of that Yvoç, and there is 
a TexoÇ for each y Voç of excellence within the 1pyov of that 
yÉvoç. But there is also a meta -gpyov (and a meta- TéXoÇ) for each 
yevoç, which is to ascend the hierarchy of nature: to rise beyond 
the performing of its own gpyov to the performing of the 1pyov of 
the next yevoç up. 
The application of this line of thought to the case of human, 
divine and animal pya should be clear. The human Epyov, on this 
view, is straightforwardly not the contemplative life, but the 
practical life of the best possible kind, Tò náVT ()v âKpÓTaTOV TwV 
npaKTSv ayaeCov (NE 1095a16). The divine gpyov (it is now evident) 
is simply the contemplative life, in accordance with NE 1154b26 
(5Lò Ó OEÒS áEL J(av KaL ánX ?v ya(pEL fi5ovfiv) and Mph 1072b14 
ff.. The gods are (it appears) the next and possibly only ygvoç 
above humanity in the hierarchy of nature. So the contemplative 
life, while it is not the human gpyov, is the human meta- gpvov: 
as we might say, TÓ náVTwV 6KpÓTaTOV TWV äyaeWV ánAWS. 
Likewise, we might suggest, the point of Aristotle's remark 
(74) 
that tame animals are superior to wild ones (Pol 1254b10 -13) is 
exactly that tame animals, by their participation in human life, 
come closer than wild ones to transcending their own y voç. 
Aristotle's view is, of course, that animals never actually 
achieve this transcendence. But there is a case where something 
very like this kind of transcendence does, in Aristotle's view, 
occur: namely, in a child's development into adulthood (NE 
1103b14 -25). 
My contrast between TÉñoÇ and meta -T Xoç has one further 
upshot, which brings us back to a more direct attention to the 
subject of voluntary action. On this view, Aristotle's theory 
entails that the yevoç of humanity (at least) is capable of 
making choices about whether to fulfil its pyov, its meta- tpvov, 
or neither. In this case, Aristotle is already assuming that 
humanity is a kind of creature which exhibits voluntary choice. 
We can now add to this the point that, for Aristotle, the human 
rpvov itself is voluntary action. For one of Aristotle's several 
ways of characterising the human 4pyov is in terms of the 
characteristic human process or movement (KCvfßlç). Aristotle 
says this is uncompelled, contingent, voluntary movement which is 
up to the agent. Examining this claim, then, will at last enable 
us to apply what has been established about the human tpyov to 
answering the question with which I began this chapter, the 
question of how to characterise the kind of 
humans are typically the àpvi. 
(75) 
KCv11oiç of which 
1d. KCvr1oLS, àpxrl, Contingency, and Ability to Do Otherwise 
At NE 1110a15 -18, where he is citing evidence for the view 
that what is done under duress is done voluntarily, Aristotle 
makes these rather cryptic remarks: 
npáTTE L 5e É K(ilV ' Kat yàp ti àpx,) TOO K L VE L V Td öpyav L Kà µtpfl 
tv TaÏ.C, TOLdÚTaLS npaEaLV tv a6T45 taTLV, 6v 5' Év aúT( A àpx,), 
Én' aÚT45 Kat TÓ npàTTELV Kat pli. (NE 1110a15-18) 
Does Aristotle tell us anything new in these words? 
Certainly the old 'àpxrl inside/ àpx?l outside' contrast is being 
applied here as a criterion of the voluntary in a way which is 
familiar from the last chapter. What is new is (i) the gloss on 
this procedure which follows: óv 5' tv aúT(J 11 dray?), en' aÔT45 Kat 
TÓ nPÓITTELV Kat Nnj; and (ii) the more extended formula ist àpxrl TOO 
KO/ETV Tà ÓpyavLKà 4JÉplj tv TaLS ToLaúTaLC npaEaLV tv 010T4) ÉOTLv, 
in place of the NE's usual f àpxr) tv aüTï) èaT(V. 
Both these amplifications help clarify Aristotle's meaning. 
(i) links the enigmatic phrases àpxr) Èv a0TCS and en' a0-CO, 'by 
me' and 'up to me'. It tells us that Aristotle believes that it 
is a condition of voluntary action that I should be able to do 
otherwise: that when I do x, I must have been able to do not -x if 
my doing x is to count as voluntary action. And (ii) focuses our 
attention on Aristotle's use of two terms which are to be vital 
in his further elaboration of this claim: namely, the terms àpxrl 
and KCVr1GLS. 
(76) 
To take these in turn. (i) Ability to do otherwise as a 
condition of voluntary action appears very clearly in both the NE 
and the EE. Aristotle would not agree with those moderns who 
contrast cases of actual compulsion with cases where my action is 
(they say) causally determined, yet not, in any normal sense, 
compelled. In such a case, it is often said, I am not forced to 
act as I do- 'it is me acting'- and yet I could not do otherwise. 
Aristotle's contrast between the allurements of pleasure and the 
coercion of force (NE 1110b9 ff.) is not meant to be aligned with 
this modern contrast. Aristotle's contrast makes the exactly 
opposite point: that pleasures are not, normally, causally 
determining factors, as successful applications of force are; and 
that only a scoundrel would attempt to equate the two on each and 
every occasion. The passages of the EE (discussed in Ch.1) in 
which Aristotle argues that pleasures can sometimes compel, give 
further evidence that he believed that pleasures do not normally 
compel. 
Aristotle's express view is that, if for any reason I could 
not have done otherwise than I do, I do not act voluntarily. In 
Aristotle's view, if determinism is true, then all action is 
compelled. So, at NE 1113b7 -10, Aristotle makes ability to do 
otherwise a condition of moral responsibility because it is a 
condition of voluntary action: 
r:cp' hNlv brj Kat h ÓIpETh. óuoCoS bt Kat fij KaKCa Iv otS yàp 
Écp' Ii4.16V TÓ npÓ1TTELV, Kat TÓ ph npáTTELV, Kat ÈV ofS TÓ uh, Kat 
TÓ VU( ' (Sur' E t TÓ npÓITTE L V KaXÓV 8v 6zcp' ti4J'L v Éd'T C, Kat TÓ ph 
(77) 
npárTeLV tcp' fluty toraL ataXpdv gv... (NE 1113b7-10) 
Compare EE 1225b8: daa uÈv o3v tcp' tauT 8v pi) npàTTeLv 
npàTTeL IA àYVO6V KaL bL' aÚTÓV, tKOÚOLa TOOT' àVÓYKn aVaL... 
(ii) This view, that voluntary action is necessarily 
contingent, is spelled out by what Aristotle has to tell us about 
the meanings of the terms àpxf and KCvnOLS. Here the exiguous 
argument of NE 1110a15 -18 can be filled out by reference to EE 
1222b15- 1223a20 (cp. MM 1187a30 -b30). 
EE 1222b16 tells us that eiat St náoai ptv at oúaCai KOTO 
(púcLv TLVèÇ äpyal: 'all substances are, by nature, principles of 
some sort'. To be an àpyi of some type x, apparently, involves 
the ability to produce other àpyat of that type x (b17 -18). But 
there is another sense of (Apyh which is more important (b21 -22: 
Tiav 8' àpX6V doaL ToLaüraL, deEV np6Tov at KLVI1aELS, KúpLaL 
)éyovTaL). In this sense of àpy>j, what is humanity the àpyi of? 
ó 8' dvepWnoS àpXr) K(VnOek TLVOS fi Yàp npáELS KCvnaLS. (EE 
1222b28 -30) 
d y' áveponoS KaC npaE6v TLVdiv ëaTLv àpXfi, pdvov TaV OWv 
T6v Yàp dXXov oúetv ernoLpEv áv npáTTELV. (EE 1222b19-21) 
(In spite of this latter remark, Aristotle himself sanctions 
the use of npÓTTeLV for animal behaviour at NE 1111a26 -27: what 
is done through Oupòç or tnieuiCa should not be called 
(78) 
'involuntary', beccause the undesirable consequence would be 
that oObty eT1 T(V àXÀCV C wv ÉKOÚOLG)Ç npÓEEL, We have three 
names for two kinds of action, apparently: Tò tKOÚOLOV, npöELç, 
action on npoa(pEOLç. Aristotle is quite clear that Tò ÉKOÚGLOV 
does not equal action on npoa(peGLç (NE 1111b7 -8), but less clear 
about whether npäELç equals Tò ÉKOÚOLOV or action on npoa(pcoLç,) 
What, then, does it mean for humanity to be the àpxi of 
npáEEty TLvcSv, which are constituted by KLVrjcELç? And, even if we 
can't properly speak of animal npaELç, is there anything in their 
case corresponding to this kind of being an apyf? 
An obvious answer to the first question, given the last two 
quotations, is also suggested by NE 1110a15, as above: fi àpyr TOO 
KLVELV Td dpyaVLKà u pn ËV Tc ç TOLaúTaLS npáEcoty èv aúT4 tOT(V, 
For a human to be the àpxfl of npáEEc5v TLVGv is, at least, for her 
to be the àpxf TOO KLVELV Tà ópyavLKà uepri. The human is àpyf of 
some particular npäELS if and only if the KLVTjGELÇ, the 
movement(s) of, or change(s) in, her body which that npäELc 
involves, are causally originated by herself. This answer is 
supported when Aristotle continues the EE passage with (1222b21): 
TCDV b' àpxCoV óQaL ToLaüraL, 60EV np6TOV at KLVfjQELS,,, 
This answer in turn suggests an answer to the second 
question, about animals. There is a correspondent to human npäELç 
in animals, even if their behaviour cannot be called npáELç. To 
put it noncommittally, an animal is, in the proper sense, an apyi' 
of some particular K(VIOLÇ if and only if that K(vga1ç is 
(79) 
causally originated by itself. This form of the statement, 
indeed, could apply to human beings too. For- and this is the 
point- npáELc is here being treated by Aristotle as necessarily 
involving KCvnoLS (in stark opposition, of course, to those 
places where Aristotle insists that npâELS, as opposed to 
nofnaLS, is an êvépycia, and not a KCvnOLS: on which v. Ackrill 
(1965). 
Having set the animals and their typical KLVTGELS below 
humanity, Aristotle next sets the divine and its typical KLVfioELS 
above humanity: 
Te5V ó' dipeaV ÖoaL TOLOOTOL, 60EV np6TOV at KLViloELS, KÚpLaL 
ñÉyOVTaL, WñL6Ta bÉ bLKaCcaS örcp' 15V µTl tVbÉXETaL (5XXw5, fly rowS ó 
0EdS 6pXEL. (EE 1222b21-23) 
The divine characteristically originates necessary, 
non -contingent KLVllocLS; Aristotle has in mind both OcwpCa and 
the perfect circular motion of the 'fixed stars' (Mph 
1072a7 -b31). Animals characteristically originate KLVficELS which 
are unworthy of the name of npaELS, or at any rate of the name of 
npoa(pccnç; elsewhere Aristotle tells us that animals KLVEïTaL 
äopfoTçç (dA 434a4), move without defined (self conscious) 
purpose. What kind of KCVnOLS will humans characteristically 
originate when they originate npaELS, given that (as we have 
seen) Aristotle takes seriously the thought that humanity is set 
between animals and gods in the hierarchy of nature? 
(80) 
Aristotle argues that npaELS is a kind of KCvnOLS which, 
unlike the animals' K(vnGLS, is not (in some sense or other) 
sub -purposive; and which, unlike the divine K(vnoLS, ÉVbÉXETaL 
yevtaOaL ems. TàvavT(a (1223a2). Aristotle's argument for this 
conclusion is entertainingly opaque. It seems to turn on a 
geometrical analogy. We have what we call àpxaì in geometry, 
although this name is only given analogously, and is not strictly 
appropriate to such principles (b23 -25). If these 'àpyaì' are 
changed, so, necessarily, is every consequence that follows from 
them (b25 -27, b33 -37). This is the point of analogy with genuine 
äpyaì which justifies the geometrical principles' being called 
àpyaì too. The points of disanalogy with genuine àpyaì are (i) 
that mathematical äpyaì do not move anything (b23 -25), and (ii) 
that mathematical àpyaì do not 'admit of coming to be otherwise' 
(1223a1). 
What we may learn from the geometrical analogy is this: that 
àpyaì of any given kind (as it might be, contingent or 
non -contingent) necessarily give rise to KLV4GELS of the same 
kind (1222b41- 1223a3, following Kenny (1979)'s interpretation of 
tVTEÜBEV at 1223a2). By contrast with the mathematical àpyaì, it 
follows that the genuine àpyaì (i) do produce actual KLVIIOELS, 
and (ii) produce KLVtoELS which do 'admit of coming to be 
otherwise'. Aristotle expects us to find it obvious that humans 
are contingent aplat, from which it follows (i) that humans are 
genuine àpyoa, and (ii) that humans characteristically produce 
KLV1cELS which do 'admit of coming to be otherwise'. Since 
Aristotle has also said (EE 1222b29 -30) that np&ELS is the 
(81) 
KCvnOLS characteristic of humans, it follows, further, that 
npâEELÇ are KLV1'QELz which 'admit of coming to be otherwise'. 
Human np5ZLS, then, is a KCvfaLS which can be placed in the 
middle of a range of KLVT1QELS of different degrees of 
contingency, between the products of chance and the animals' 
KCvncLS on the one hand, and the divine KCVfGLS on the other. The 
idea of a hierarchy of nature is obviously at work here. Compare 
Aristotle's remarks about the domain of deliberation, NE 
1112a18 -b11. As Joachim puts it (Joachim 1955, p.101): 
'Aristotle excludes not only Tà à"CÖLa (the timeless and 
unchangeable) and Tà AEt KaTà Tal'JTà yLVÓµEVa (absolutely regular 
changes), but also the haphazard (Tà ánò TLíynç)- changes which 
follow no rule at all, whether outside (Tà 15XAQTE 6)06)0 or 
within the region of human purposive action. He thus restricts 
deliberation to Tà k era Tò noXLí (things that happen in a 
certain way for the most part)'. And it is in our dealings with 
Tà tp era rò noXii that we are most characteristically human, and 
fulfil our .pyov. 
To repeat a point I made at the outset: Aristotle argues 
conditionally, not categorically, against determinism. Thus such 
passages as I have considered here will suggest this argument 
against the non -existence of human moral responsibility: 
1. A does X freely only if A does X voluntarily. 
(82) 
2. For any agent P and any voluntary action, Q, done by P, Q is 
not a voluntary action unless P could have done otherwise than Q. 
3. Therefore, if X was a free action, it cannot have been the 
case that A could not have done otherwise than X. 
Aristotle often fills out his claim that it is an unappealing 
position to say that there is no freedom of action, or no moral 
responsibility, by pointing out the dependence of the notion of 
free (or morally responsible) action on that of voluntary action. 
In his remarks about KCvnat,S he goes a step further, by pointing 
out the dependence of the notion of voluntary action on that of 
contingency, another notion which, it would seem to him, it would 
be very outlandish to deny. And his notion of contingency 
dovetails with something else again, namely his notion of the 
hierarchy of nature, into which human beings fit precisely by 
being such creatures as to produce contingent movements. 
Aristotle's tactics suggest that he thinks that anyone who denies 
any one of these notions, must deny them all. Perhaps we may say 
that Aristotle's arguments about KLvnclç are dialectical (in the 
strict sense: see §2) because he thinks that the relations of 
contingency, voluntariness, freedom and responsibility are a 
matter of definitions. For some action of mine to be voluntary is 
for it to be 'up to me to do or not to do'; for it to be 'up to 
me to do or not to do' is for it to be a KCvncLS which 'admits of 
coming to be otherwise'; for it to be a KCvnaL[ which 'admits of 
coming to be otherwise' is for there to be real contingency in 
the world. This dialectical argument that there really is such 
contingency is something which Aristotle pursues with conviction 
(83) 
and spirit- not just in the ethical writings (cp. dI 9). 
For an action to be uncompelled,then, is for it to be a 
KL'flGLÇ satisfying the details of the above description. It is 
also, to conclude this section, for that action to involve a 
K(vijoLç which fits under the third or fourth category in Table 
One (p.85), which sets out, as fully as may be, the array of the 
hierarchy of nature and the different KLVTiOELÇ which are, 
sometimes, called the pya of its different yÉvn. (N.B. that, in 
this table, as above, 'locus in nature' means, not sole or chief 
locus in nature of the K(VfoLc in question, but the point in the 
hierarchy of nature at which it is first characteristically 
present. Note also that 2c subsets 2b, and 2b subsets 2a.) 
2. Aristotle's Epistemology 
The negative requirement that a voluntary action should be 
uncompelled has for Aristotle the corollary that it should be of 
the kind described above. What description(s), in turn, must be 
satisfied as a corollary of the negative requirement that a 
voluntary action should not be done in ignorance? 
Aristotle may seem to have less to say about this question 
than about the corresponding question which I have just dealt 
with, regarding compulsion. In fact, one prominent contemporary 
Aristotelian has actually suggested that, from an Aristotelian 
(84) 
KINHEIE 
Table One: The Hierarchy of Nature 
MENTAL STATE NEEDED LOCUS 
(a: for performance (a: in Ar.; 
of this K(vrlGLS; 
b: for understanding it) b: in nature) 
1. KLvnoLS [IA tvSEXó- a: 9ECapLa? a: dA 404b6-8, 
pEVn TOO &aaS XELV] dC 1.2-4 
b: voúS/tnLOTfjpri b: the stars 
2a. Kí,vrioLS tvSEXÓpEVr) a: ? a: dA 404b6-8, 
TOO 6XXa1S tXELV EE 1224b41 ff. 
b: voúS/tnLOTkirl b: sublunary 
world 
2b. Td tKOúoLOV/npáELS a: äpEELS + cpavTaaLa 
b: ? 
2c. npáELS/npoaCpEOLS a: ßoUXEúoLS/cppoVi`joLC, 
b: ? 
[3. BECilpLa a: oocpfa 
b: ? 
(85) 
a: dA 433b32ff. 
and EE 1223a21 
b: animals, 
children 
a: NE 3.3, 6.9, 
EE 2.7 -10 
b: adult men 
a: NE 6.7, 10.8, 
1154b26; Mph 1072b14 ff. 
b: excellent men 
and gods] 
point of view, 'the whole epistemological turn of philosophy is 
the outcome of a mistake' (MacIntyre 1990, p.69). It is, indeed, 
widely supposed that the commonsensical Aristotle would have had 
no more patience than MacIntyre evidently has with 
epistemological questions, at least those in the form made 
classical by Descartes (and Pyrrho). Undoubtedly, Aristotle has 
little to say about such questions explicitly. However, this does 
not mean either that these questions do not interest him, or that 
he has no way of dealing with them. 
On what basis could it be supposed that Aristotle had no 
patience with, or aptitude for, epistemological questions? 
Perhaps this claim would come as part of the wider thesis that 
Aristotle is a foundationalist, and so a commonsense realist in 
epistemology. But that wider thesis is simply false: as I will 
argue, Aristotle is not a foundationalist. Or perhaps it could be 
argued that Aristotle's procedure is not to overthrow common 
sense realism, but to buttress it. However, Aristotle's attitude 
to what he takes to be the 'appearances' or 'common opinions' is 
not automatically uncritical; anything but. Or, thirdly, this 
anti -epistemological reading of Aristotle might be argued for on 
the basis of a passage like Mph 1008b13 -18. But, in the first 
place, this passage concerns a logical principle, not an 
epistemological one; and in the second place, the dismissive 
remarks of Mph 1008b13 -18 come after three pages of very careful 
statement of and argument for the principle in question (1005b18 
ff.), in the course of which, moreover, Aristotle actually 
suggests ways of arriving at that principle. There are, then, no 
(86) 
good general reasons (and no specific ones, either) for supposing 
Aristotle to be uninterested by epistemological questions. 
But, if Aristotle has an epistemology, what is it? That 
question is rather difficult to answer head on; because the point 
in Aristotle's philosophy at which his epistemological method 
becomes clearest is not in his response to epistemological 
scepticism, but in his response to moral scepticism. Accordingly, 
I shall deal with Aristotle's general epistemology only via his 
moral epistemology. Both kinds of epistemology are, of course, 
relevant to the topic of voluntary action and responsibility in 
Aristotle. Broadly, moral epistemology gives us an account of the 
possibility of knowledge of principles, lack of which does not 
hinder voluntary action and is blameworthy; general epistemology 
gives us an account of the possibility of knowledge of 
particulars, lack of which hinders voluntary action and, 
normally, exculpates. 
At first sight, Aristotle's tentative statements in 
definition of virtue, justice and related terms seem- as he 
himself admits- to succumb to a certain endemic redundancy:- 
'AXX' rOwq TO uev EúóaLµoV(av Tò ápLßTOV XeyELV 
ópoaoyoúuEVóv TL cpaCvETaL... (NE 1097b22) 
LSnóKELTaL ápa fiapsTij avaL fi ToLaúTn nsp fi bovaS Kole XúnaS 
Te5V ßEñTLOTwV npaKTLKfi, t') óÉ Kaida TOÚVaVTLOV. (NE 1104b27-28) 
(87) 
ó pÈv o0v ó 5E17 Kat oú gvEKa únopvc,)v Kat cpoßoúpEVOç, Kat c3ç 
SE Kat ¿STE, óµoLoç St Kat eappWv, avSpEi.oç. (NE 1115b18-19) 
The good is hard to define (cp. NE 1094b14 ff.). But this is 
no surprise, since, as Aristotle is careful to say several times, 
virtue itself is difficult: 
nept be TO XañEnWTEpov act Kat TÉ}(Vn yl.vETal. Kat apETI1' Kat 
yap Tò ETU ßXTLOV tV TOÚT(F). (NE 1105a8-10) 
SLò Kat gpyov ÈOTt Onoubatov EZ'vaL tv ÉKdIOT(¿) yap Tò pdOov 
XaßEtv gpyov. (NE 1109a25) 
Ol S' ÓlvepcanOL t(p' ÉauTO6ç oroVTaL avaL Ta aISLKELV, SLò Kot 
Tò SCKaLOV EZvaL 061,ov. Tò S' oúK OTLV... (NE 1137a5-6) 
Aristotle famously remarks that 'the same kind of accuracy is 
not to be sought in all arguments alike; in any particular kind 
of matter, an educated person looks for only that degree of 
precision which its nature permits' (NE 1094b13). But 'practical 
matters and questions of interests contain no fixed matter' (NE 
1104a4). So is it his policy to refuse to offer us any definite 
moral epistemology at all? Apparently not. There are several 
notions, prominent (or supposedly prominent) in his thought, 
which might seem obvious candidates for a key role in his moral 
epistemology. As a closer look at them will now show, none of 
these 'obvious' candidates is in fact adequate to the job. Yet it 
is their very inadequacies which will lead us to a possibly less 
(88) 
obvious, but certainly more suitable, candidate for the role of 
criterion of the good. 
Six candidates for the role of criterion of the good are 
given by these suggestions about how Aristotle thinks we should 
do moral epistemology. 
a. Functional naturalism: the basis of ethics is given by 
reference to the concept of 'function' already discussed. (NE 
1097b21- 1098a18) 
b. 'Aurea Mediocritas': the basis of ethics is given by defining 
a mean between two extremes. (NE 2.6 -9, 3.6 -5.4) 
c. Dogmatism: the basis of ethics is given in a set of specific, 
fixed moral principles or rules. 
d. Principle foundationalism: the basis of ethics is given in 
those universal moral principles (àpooç Xáyoç, NE 1103b34, 
1144b27) the 'immediate perception' or 'intuition' of which 
(6EwpEtv, NE 1140b10) furnishes an end to moral reasoning. 
e. Hedonism: the basis of ethics is given by asking 'What is 
pleasant ?'; or at least the presence of the pleasant is a 
necessary condition of the presence of the good. (NE II.3) 
f. Particular foundationalism: the basis of ethics is given in 
those particular moral truths the 'immediate perception' or 
'intuition' of which (6e0psív, NE 1140b10) furnishes an end to 
moral reasoning. (So, supposedly, APo I.1 and NE 1139b25 -36, 
1140b13 -20, 1143a25 -b6.) 
My arguments for rejecting each of these alternatives will 
(89) 
lead me to make my own suggestion about how Aristotle thinks we 
should do moral epistemology; a suggestion which I will then 
apply to Aristotle's treatment of general epistemology. 
2a. Functional Naturalism 
The concept of function has indeed- as I have argued in §1- 
an important role in Aristotle's moral philosophy. But it does 
not, properly speaking, play the role of definiens of what is 
good. For it leads us to this dilemma: should we interpret the 
concept loosely, using it as no more than a rule of thumb? Or in 
a rigorous, specific way, so that we take it that by using this 
concept we can arrive at moral verdicts on particular cases which 
can be deduced from the nature of those cases? Any loose 
interpretation is liable to be unhelpful in specific cases, and 
so not much use. But any rigorous interpretation has to justify 
itself in face of the fact that there are plenty of other 
conceivable ways of tightening the doctrine up enough for it to 
give verdicts on specifics. What gives one formalisation any kind 
of priority over any other? 
Moreover, Aristotle makes just as much of several other 
approximating methods of delineating what is good as he does of 
the concept of function. The concept of function is not clearly 
prior to any of these. In particular, it is not obviously prior 
to the notion of the mean. So what grounds are there for saying 
that the doctrine of the mean is to be understood in the terms of 
(90) 
the concept of function, rather than vice versa? 
2b. 'Aurea Mediocritas' 
The same points, mutatis mutandis, apply to the doctrine of 
the mean. This doctrine, important to Aristotle though it is, 
cannot provide the definiens of what is good, because of the 
loose, general and inconclusive nature of any pretheoretical 
conception of the mean, and the controversial nature of any 
posttheoretical conception of the mean. Also, the doctrine of the 
mean is no more clearly prior to the concept of function than 
vice versa. 
The main deficiency which (2a) and (2b) share, as candidates 
for the role of criterion of the good, is suggestive. It is that 
both notions are of such loose content, so hard to put to precise 
use, that to make real sense of them we need the further notion 
of an expert in using them. More of which below. 
2c. Dogmatism 
It cannot be true for Aristotle that the basis of ethics is 
given in a set of specific, fixed moral principles or rules. This 
is for the simple reason that, as he explicitly says, Aristotle 
does not believe there are any such fixed moral principles or 
rules. 
(91) 
If he is a dogmatist in ethics, it should not be hard to find 
a case of a moral rule which he says is indefeasible. But there 
is only one passage which might be taken this way in the whole of 
his ethical writings, NE 1110a26 -29: 
tvLa b' CowS oúK toTLV ävayKaaefivaL, àxxà päWov áno8avarov 
naeóvrt Tà ÓeLVÓTaTa. 
Here the indefeasible moral rule would, presumably, be 'No 
matricide' (a28 -29). But note, first, that 1110a26 ff. is not an 
unqualified claim: rocç is Aristotle's usual word for expressing 
the tentative, provisional nature of a remark. Second, note the 
context of this remark, in a discussion, not of what is always 
right and what is always wrong, but of notov àvrì noCou a%peTtov, 
Kai. TC ÒVTi. TCvoq únopevcTeov (1110a30), that is, of which 
actions are to be preferred to which (and/ or, following Joachim 
(1951, p.98), what are the pros and cons involved in any 
particular action). 
Aristotle is not making the dogmatist type of claim which, 
say, Geach (Geach 1977) would want to make- in this case, the 
claim that matricide is a categorically wrong action. His point 
is that matricide is not, for a good person, a practically 
conceivable alternative even to such extreme actions as allowing 
oneself to be tortured to death. If one is to be a virtuous 
person, and not an unprincipled coward or hypocrite, there must 
(Aristotle believes) be some things for which one is prepared to 
die. This does not mean that anything is absolutely forbidden in 
(92) 
the sense which the dogmatist needs. Notice that, even when 
talking of an act for which there could, in his view, never be 
any easily imaginable justification, Aristotle still uses the 
language of alternatives and not that of rules. The idea that 
ethics could be reduced to rules is a foreign one to him. 
In any case, there is good evidence that no moral rules 
whatever are, for Aristotle, actually indefeasible. In NE V, 
Aristotle says that there is a difference between TO äCKaLov, 
justice proper (as expressed in the character and actions of just 
persons, NE 1129a7 -10), and Td 5CKomov KaTà vópov, equity (state 
justice, as expressed in the laws of a state: NE 1137b12). The 
difference is that equity, unlike justice proper, is hindered in 
its attempts to make settlements expressive of TO gnLCLKÈS ('what 
is fair') by the fact that equity is expressed in laws, which 
are, by their very nature, exceptionless rules: 
ó pev vópoS KaBóXou náS, nEpt eV1.WV b' oúx ofóv TE 4166S 
EtnECv KaBÓXou. (NE 1137b13-15) 
Exceptionless rules- Aristotle explicitly says here- are 
bound to be defective. The reason is (NE 1137b20) the variable 
nature of their subject matter: napaXECncL ó vopoOTnÇ Kaì. 
Nap-rev ànX6q E ('nc)v (b22). (Compare NE 1107a29 -32: ev yàp Tots 
nspì. TÔS npá ELS Xóvoiç o1 pev KaOó)ou KoLVdTEpoC c oiv, of b' 
enì pepouç áXn0Lv(5TEpoL; and NE 1094b19 -22, 1142a18 -19.) Hence we 
do not reach Td enLE1KeÇ by simply accepting the universal rules 
of TO 5(<cxiov KaTÒ vópov but, on the contrary, by looking for the 
(93) 
grounds, if any, on which an exception should be made to that 
rule: 
KaL ËQTLV 0iíTr1 cpúoiS fi TOO en6ELKOÚS, Ënavóp8cilpa vópou 
0XELnEL Sax Toú Ka66Xou. (NE 1137b27) 
From all this it seems clear that Aristotle's moral theory is 
not based upon indefeasible moral rules. On the contrary, any 
such rule could only be of use to us in moral discernment when we 
know already whether the case before us is one in which we should 
simply apply the rule, or else make an exception to it, and if so 
of what kind. If, in ethical theory, we wish to invoke even the 
notion of defeasible moral rules- putting aside the implausible 
idea of indefeasible ones- we will need the further notion of an 
expert in using or applying these rules. 
Notice that, when Aristotle's argument leads him to invoke 
the idea of defeasible rules in equity, this further notion of 
the expert comes in at once. For (he tells us at NE 1137b20 -24) 
the right response, when one becomes aware of an exception to the 
legal rule, is to rectify the anomaly by doing 'what the lawgiver 
himself would have done had he been present, and would have 
enacted if he had known'. The expert in equity, then, is the 
VopoOÉTTjç . 
(94) 
2d. Principle foundationalism 
Nor can it be true for Aristotle that the basis of ethics is 
given in universal moral principles, the 'immediate perception' 
or 'intuition' of which furnishes an end to moral reasoning. This 
in spite of what a naive reading of, for example, NE 1140b17 -20 
might suggest: 
aL pÉV Yäp äpXat Twv npaKTdiv Tò OÚ EVEKa Tä npaKTÓI- TC0 5É 
bLECpBaputv(p 5L' 1)bov0 fi XLínnv EúBùS oú cpaCvETaL äpXfj, oúbÈ 5EUv 
TOÚTOU É°VEKEV OÚbÉ 5Lä TOLJB' aLpEL68aL nÓIVTa KaL npáTTELV. (NE 
1140b17 -20) 
This, however, is not because Aristotle does not believe 
there are any moral first principles. It is because, although he 
admits the existence of something like such principles, those 
principles do not play the role of providing a metaphysical 
long -stop for his ethics; nor are they the object of 'immediate 
perception' or 'intuition'. 
Aristotle, I have argued, is not a dogmatist, for there are, 
in his view, no actually indefeasible moral rules. If this is 
right, then clearly we cannot accept the claim that Aristotle's 
'moral principles' are anything like such rules. His moral 
principles are not such that, once we have worked back to them, 
no further working -back is possible. What then are his 'moral 
principles'? And what role do they serve in his moral theory? 
This is a big question, and one to which Terence Irwin has 
(95) 
devoted what I think is his magnum opus (Irwin 1987). Here I can 
only venture brief remarks. 
Aristotelian moral principles are in important ways analogous 
to other kinds of argumentative principle. But Aristotle's 
general argumentative principles are not what a principle 
foundationalist would want them to be. Despite the apparent sense 
of APo 72a6 -7, b18 -24, Aristotle's principles are not utterly 
indisputable and prime starting points for a77 argument. Rather, 
they are points at which one kind of argumentative method is 
exchanged for another, namely 'induction' for 'deduction': 
u Xav9avgTw 5' rjpáS ÓTL bLacpepouoLV oL ònò Tcilv 6p16W XÓyoL 
Rat OÌ. enL. TàS äpXáç.... (NE 1094a31-32) 
1.1 pev yòp enaywyrj 6pXñS eoTL KaL TOO KaBóXou, ò âe 
ouaXoyLopòS eK T3v K086a0u. ELoLV ápa òpXaL a c5v 6 ouXXoyLopóS, 
Sv ol'JK ÉßTL ouxxoyLopóS - enaywy) ka. (NE 1139b28-31) 
Thus Aristotelian first principles, so far from being objects 
of 'immediate perception' or 'intuition' as they are in 
intuitionism or foundationalism, are themselves results of a 
prior logical process. There can, paradoxical as it may sound, be 
argument to first principles (enaywyr)), as well as argument from 
those first principles (ouXXoyc.opóç or Xóyoç). Note that both 
auXhoyLopóç and Àóyoç, besides meaning 'deduction' as opposed to 
'induction', can also mean 'argument' in general: so NE 1094a32 
above, and APr 68b30. This, no doubt, is one root of the mistaken 
(96) 
view that Aristotelian 'induction' is not a pukka form of 
argument. It also helps explain the notorious problem about 
npooípEO1S, that sometimes (e.g. 1112b13) it has to do only with 
means, and at other times seems to be of ends too (e.g. 1139a33). 
Practical reasoning too may consist both of inductive and 
deductive parts. Strictly, npoo(pEoLS is practical reasoning from 
first principles, but the word is sometimes more loosely used by 
Aristotle to suggest practical reasoning to first principles: v., 
e.g., NE 1144a20. 
In what, then, does argument to first principles consist? One 
of Aristotle's answers is that tncyoyi' is equivalent to 
definition, óptapóç: 'Definition is a "thesis" or a "laying 
something down "', according to APo 72a21. APo 72b23 -24 tells us 
that, besides scientific knowledge, there is its originative 
source, which enables us to recognise the definitions. There is 
also NE 1142a26: ó ptv yàp voÛÇ TWV ápwv, óv oOK FOIL Aóyoç. 
Indeed, Aristotle has a whole science of definition, laid out in 
beautiful detail in the Topics, Bks. VI and VII, which I suggest 
gives further detail on what kinds of argumentative processes can 
be prior to and result in the positing of any first principle. 
Argument to moral (or, better, practical) first principles 
will be of an analogous kind to any other argument to first 
principles. It will start from what is uncertain to the reasoner 
and proceed to what is more certain, just as deduction proceeds 
in the opposite direction. An example would be when a number of 
non -cogent considerations, taken together, yield a more cogent 
(97) 
overall view; this overall view then becomes the 'first 
principle' of deduction. Thus: 'I have a reason to do x, and a 
reason to do y; but my reason to do y outweighs my reason to do 
x; so I have more reason to do y' is inductive reasoning; and a 
deductive reasoning, about how to achieve y, may then follow on 
from 'I have more reason to do y', taking this as its first 
principle. For more on this, v. Ch.3. 
To say this much is already to make it plain that the 'first 
principles' of moral discourse are in no foundationalist sense 
the foundations or basis of that discourse. The role of the 
'first principles' of moral discourse is the same as that of the 
first principles of any other kind of discourse: to provide a 
basis for ouXaoyiouóç in that discourse (i.e., in this case, for 
practical reasoning). It is not to be the epistemological warrant 
of the whole discourse; that job is performed elsewhere. 
However, saying that the first principles of moral discourse 
are definitions prompts the question 'Definitions of what ?'. My 
answer turns on a point noticed in my exposition of the gpyov 
argument. To define a Tgyvn is itself, I said, to define the 
TXoç of that Teyvn: 'To define what performing a function 
(Epyov) is, just is to define what performing that function well 
is'. 
So the apxaa of ethics may be found within the correct 
understanding of those TEyvaì, and other human practices 
excellence in which, on Aristotle's view, is constitutive of 
(98) 
human excellence in general. To have a correct understanding of 
what is required of me, in the context of any particular pursuit 
in which I engage, is no different from having a correct 
definition of what that pursuit itself is. (This is one point 
made by Aristotle's remark a[ u_v yàp dpycla TCv npaKTWV Td of 
gVEKa Tà npaKrá (NE 1140b17).) Thus my definition of what pursuit 
it is that I am engaged in is itself the first principle of my 
action within that pursuit. 
Note the consequence: if, in ethical theory, we wish to 
invoke the notion of the 'moral first principle', given by the 
definition of the T Xvn in which one is involved, we will need 
the further notion of a prior expertise in definition. Once 
again, we come back to the notion of the expert. 
2e. pp6vnoiç and Particular Foundationalism 
Again, it is not true that the basis of ethics for Aristotle 
is given in those particular moral 'perceptions' which furnish 
another kind of end to moral reasoning. This, again, is not 
because he does not believe there are any such 'perceptions'. It 
is because, although he admits the existence of something like 
such 'perceptions', they do not play the role of providing an 
ultimate basis to his ethics. 
My phrase 'particular moral perceptions' is suggested by what 
Aristotle has to tell us about cppóvnotç ('practical 
(99) 
intelligence'). ppóvnotç, he says, is of 'the ultimate 
particular, for what is to be done is an ultimate particular' 
(TOO OP êOXÓTOU ÉGT(V [gpóvnotç] TO yàp npaKTÒV TOLOOTOV, NE 
1142a25 -26). He then draws an analogy between ppóvnoiç and voOS 
(normally translated 'scientific intelligence'). According to NE 
1141b3, voüç is one of the two components- the other is trLOrfiun 
('scientific knowledge')- of Aristotelian oopta, the subject 
matter of which seems to be a heady mix of theology and 
astronomy. The point of the analogy, then, is that ppóvnclç is 
more like voùç than it is like tnLari>µn (a24 -25). 
So what is the contrast bewteen voúk and ênLOTfiin? The answer 
is, apparently, that voûç is the ability to recognise success in 
working, inductively, towards the first principles of science; 
tnLOTfiun is the result of working, deductively, from those first 
principles. vokk is the ability to see that a piece of thavcaNdi or 
óptapóç has or has not been a success, whereas truaTAun consists 
in the making of ouXXoytopot (so NE VI.6). But this is not the 
only sense in which Aristotle uses voûc: 
Kai á voúS T65V ÉoXáToV Én' äucpÓTEpa Kat yàp TaV np6ToV ópov 
Kat TSv tcyáTov vois ÉoTt Kat oú Xóyoç. (NE 1143a33 -35) 
Kenny writes: 'In a theoretical discipline like geometry, 
according to Aristotle, [vouc] comes in at two points: first, in 
the appreciation of first indemonstrable principles or axioms; 
secondly, in the realisation that particular individuals are 
instances of generalisations' (Kenny 1979, p.151). The ultimate 
(100) 
particulars, TO toyáTa, of which there is also voüs, Kai oú 
Xóyos, are particular facts, concerning which voCis is just seeing 
that 'so and so is the case' (NE 1095b7). yak in this sense is a 
kind of araonoLç: TOOTWV [sc. T(V Ka6' EKaoTa] EyELV SEL 
aroBnOLs, aOTn S' ÉOTì voGS (NE 1143b5-6). 
(To make things more confusing, Aristotle has a double sense 
of am) as well as a double sense of voüs. Sometimes, as we have 
seen (62d), he calls the understanding of right ends the ápyiI: so 
1140b17 at uèv yàp c5(pxaì TWV npaKT6v Tò OÚ ÉVEKa TO npaKTá. But 
at other times he describes the aroünoLS of ultimate particulars 
as the àpyi) of practical reasoning: so àpyrj yàp TO c5TL (1095b7), 
and 1143b4 àpyaí yàp TOO oú EVEKa COTaL. The answer to this 
puzzle is, no doubt, that speaking more accurately neither the 
understanding of right ends nor the aroOnoLs of ultimate 
particulars is the àpyl) of practical reasoning; each, in a 
different way, is an àpyi) of practical reasoning. Both are 
necessary for practical reasoning; only together are they, 
possibly, necessary and sufficient. Aristotle makes reference to 
both when he is emphasising different aspects of how action on 
practical reasoning arises.) 
In any case, it is presumably to the voüs of ultimate 
particulars that (p)óvnoLç is analogous, not, as NE 1142a26 -27 
seems to suggest, the voûç of first principles: 
ó uèv yàp vOÜs TWV (`Spov, óv OÚK t`OTL ñÓYoS, fi[cpp6vn6Ls] Sè 
TOIJ EtOXáTOU, 00 00K EOTLV ttnLQTi`jjJn ÓIxx' arOenOLS. (NE 1142a26-27 
(101) 
NE 1143b2 -4 suggests that cppdvnoiç is the knowledge (voiç) of 
the 'contingent particular fact' (TOO goyárou Kae tvbcyop vou, 
b3) which gives the practical syllogism its particular premiss. 
That is: wP6vgatq is the ability to see that this particular case 
is covered by the general rule of the universal premiss; the 
ability to see which are the morally relevant features of a case 
and which are not. 
But any case in which a moral judgement is called for may 
have indefinitely many different features which might be thought 
morally relevant: noXXaa yòp btacpopa( EI'OLV tv TOUq Ka0' EKaa-Tc 
(1110b9). Can the right features, those to which one ought to 
attend, simply be 'read off' the case by any means- say by 
attributing a privileged status to certain sorts of moral 
sentiment or 'perceptions' of moral quality? Aristotle clearly 
thinks not. To provide such a means would be to provide a genera] 
rule for particular cases. To say that 'This sort of "gut 
feeling" is always reliable' would be to return, even if in a 
covert form, to moral dogmatism. (It would also land us back in 
'private language' difficulties about the reidentification of 
'internal' experiences.) No kind of moral intuition, however 
strong or distinctive, is necessarily right (why should it be ?). 
The real job of the ethicist, much harder but much more 
worthwhile, is to tell us how to develop, not 'gut feelings', but 
discernment about (inter alia) one's own 'gut feelings' and one's 
perceptions of what count as morally relevant features of a case 
and what aren't. This kind of discernment, this learning to see 
one's way through the inexhaustible complexities of moral 
(102) 
questions, is an expertise; and hence the notion of cpp6vriGLS too 
is useless without the prior notion of an expert in the 
application of cppóvfloiq. 
In any case, if Aristotle's claim about cppdvrioiç is that 
cppóvfcic is the ability to see that this general principle 
applies in any particular case, this means that there is no 
cppóvflGLS, unless one's general principles are in good order. 
There is only 5Et.VdTI1Ç (NE 1144b15 ff.), for cppóvlioLS is 
characteristic only of the good person (NE 1144a29 -31). Ij pev ydp 
dpETIj TOV GKOnÓV noLF% àpAóv, se cppóvriGLS Tà npòS T011TOV (NE 
1144a7): cppdvfOLc either works in harness with ??BLKTl apETI) or not 
at all (NE 1144b30 -32). cppóv>1otç is only 'the ability to see what 
is right' in a particular case, if the general principle which it 
applies to that case is already describable as good. Therefore, 
since the existence of cppdvr)GLS is logically dependent on the 
goodness of moral principles which (I have argued) themselves 
cannot be the basis of Aristotle's ethics, a fortiori cppÓVI]GLS 
cannot be the basis of Aristotle's ethics either. 
2f. Hedonism 
The grounds for calling Aristotle an ethical hedonist would 
be given by remarks like NE 1104b9 -10 (nEpt govàç ydp Kat Aúnaç 
ÉOTtV Ti l'1BLKIj àpETT1) and, almost identically, EE 1220a35 (ncpt 
Mea Kat. Aunripà Kat' 1'] àpETlj Kat' 1'1 KaKLa). Such remarks, it might 
(103) 
seem, are backed up by Aristotle by a general hedonism in 
philosophical psychology: 
KaL TÓ bL(JKELV b' tSinavTa KaC BrIpCa Kaì, áv6p6nouS TO Abovr}v 
OfluEtóv TL TOO ETva( nwq Tò draw-Toy aÚTO, (NE 1153b25-31; cp. 
1172b35 ff.) 
Moreover, Aristotle says quite clearly that pleasure is an 
essential part of the Good Life: 
návTES Tòv EÚba(uOVp tibùv orovraL ßCOV avaL, Kai 41nñ6KOUOL 
TO MovljV E(S TO EübaLpov(av, EüXóYwS. (NE 1153b14-16) 
Td TE átnX6S ävaedv KaL 450 áinWS toT(v, (NE 1156b23) 
Does it follow, then, that Aristotle holds the hedonist view 
that the distinguishing mark of what is good, is that it is 
pleasant? The obvious objection to this would be that not 
everything pleasant is good. Aristotle makes this objection 
himself, at NE 1148b15 ff.: there are such things as unnatural 
pleasures. However, he also meets this objection, at 1153b8 -9: 
TapLaTOV b' oÚbE.Ev K(JñÚEL libov0 TLVO aVaL, El', ËvLaL (paüñaL 
fbova(. The way now seems clear for the ethical hedonist view of 
Aristotle to go through. The good for humanity is happiness (NE 
1097b21), and happiness is attained (let us say, making rough and 
ready use of the tpyov argument) either in the unimpeded 
performance of a natural activity (NE VII) or in the perfection 
of such an activity (NE X). Therefore 'pleasure accompanies the 
(104) 
good' (Tr)v EüsaLpovCav iE0' ñbovfç, NE 1152b7), and indeed is its 
distinguishing mark. We can do our moral epistemology by assuming 
ethical hedonism. 
In spite of all this, I still think that it is fairly obvious 
that the usual verdict of modern scholarship is right: Aristotle 
is not an ethical hedonist, nor indeed any sort of hedonist. In 
Justin Gosling's words, Aristotle's concessions to hedonism 
'should be sweet to the hedonist's ears so long as he looks only 
at the score and does not face the music' (Gosling 1973/4). 
The ethical hedonist's reading of Aristotle's moral 
epistemology can withstand the admission that the presence of the 
good is not identified by the presence of just any type of 
pleasure. He can simply refine his thesis to say that the 
presence of the good is identified by the presence of the right 
type of pleasure. However, what is this? What is it that all 
right pleasures, and no wrong pleasures, have in common which 
enables us to identify their presence, and hence the presence of 
the morally good? 
Here the ethical hedonist's progress meets an insurmountable 
mauvais pas. Perhaps what he would like to find is, ideally, some 
particular, some more than merely formal, quality which all good 
pleasures and no bad pleasures share. That quality will be the 
key to everything: an Alchemists' Stone for moral 
epistemologists. But from this position, a more plausible reading 
of Aristotle's account checkmates the ethical hedonist's reading 
(105) 
in three moves. (1) There is no single, more than merely formal 
quality which all good pleasures and no bad pleasures share. (2) 
Not only that, there is only one merely formal quality which all 
good pleasures and no bad pleasures share. (3) The nature of that 
single merely formal quality which all good pleasures and no bad 
pleasures share is such as to make the ethical hedonist reading 
of Aristotle impossible because redundant. 
To explain these moves. (1) The only definitions of pleasure 
which the NE gives are the (notoriously different) formulations 
found in NE VII and X. The NE VII account tells us that pleasure 
is the unimpeded performance of a natural activity (NE 
1153a13 -15); the NE X account, that pleasure 'perfects the 
activity', TEXEEol bL Tpv E'V pyELav T fjbovrj (NE 1174b23). There 
is nothing in either definition which says that it applies only 
to good pleasures and not to bad pleasures. 
Moreover, both definitions cover a remarkably wide range of 
experiences: anything that counts as an 'unimpeded performance of 
a natural activity', or as the 'perfection of an activity', will 
count as a pleasure for Aristotle. Thus he tells us that 'each 
sense has its own pleasure' (NE 1174b21), and that it is not the 
same pleasure which all creatures pursue: 'for nature and the 
best state neither is nor seems the same for them all' (NE 
1153b29). Again, 'each person exercises his faculties concerning 
what he loves best: for example, the musician exercises his sense 
of hearing on melodies, the intellectual exercises his 
understanding on theoretical problems' (NE 1175a13 -15): the 
(106) 
inference is that these very different activities involve very 
different pleasures, an inference which, at 1175b1, Aristotle 
goes on to draw. In fact, teleological speculations apart 
(b30 -32), there seems to be nothing at all necessarily in common 
between the pleasures which different creatures pursue except the 
definitional requirement that all the things that they pursue 
should be unimpeded performances of natural activities: o05' 
fi50V0 5L6KOUQL TO COTO návTES, fiSoVñV pÉVTOL náVTES (NE 
1153b29). This is why I say that there is no single, more than 
merely formal quality which all good pleasures and no bad 
pleasures share: 6ßnsp o3v a, - vÉpyELaL ÉTEpaL, Ka1 Of fibovat (NE 
1175b37). 
(2) What, then, is the single merely formal quality which all 
good pleasures and no bad pleasures is 
that the only thing that all good pleasures have in common is 
that they are the (characteristic) pleasures of a good person (NE 
1176a17 ff.). But (3) if this is so, then the ethical hedonist 
reading of Aristotle's moral epistemology is no longer 
defensible. For the ethical hedonist began by saying that 'the 
presence of the good was identified by the presence of pleasure'. 
Under pressure, this was amended to: 'the presence of the good is 
identified by the presence of the right type of pleasure'. Under 
further pressure, it was conceded that the right type of 
pleasure, the presence of which is diagnostic of the presence of 
the morally good, was not qualitatively but only formally 
definable. It now appears that the correct formal definition of 
the type of pleasure involved is 'the characteristic pleasure(s) 
(107) 
of the good person'. (Hence Aristotle's question 'What is the 
best pleasure ?' (NE 1176a25) is just another way of asking 'What 
is the best activity?', as NE 1177a13 ff. shows.) But then the 
ethical hedonist thesis, as refined, now says that 'the presence 
of the good is identified by the presence of the pleasure(s) 
characteristic of the good person'. It seems that, once again, we 
can only make use of the ethical hedonist criterion of good 
pleasures if we have a prior understanding of a quite different 
notion, that of the good person. For 'good pleasures' can only be 
defined with respect to this good person in whom they occur. 
2g. Aristotelian Epistemology and the Man of Virtue 
We have seen that attempts to base Aristotelian moral 
epistemology on the notions of function, or the mean, or the 
intuition of indefeasible moral rules, or on the intuition of 
moral principle or moral particulars, or on pleasure, are all 
bound to be unsuccessful for the same simple reason: all these 
notions imply a prior notion, that of the expert in applying or 
defining them. It is an important part of the argument for basing 
our moral epistemology on this notion that we should see that 
other attempts to find such a basis fail; and that we should see 
that there is a quite general reason why they fail, namely that 
they all refer us back to this prior notion of the expert. I now 
examine that notion. 
We saw ( §2c) that the expert in applying moral rules, where 
(108) 
the formulation of these is appropriate, is 6 vopoO TriS (NE 
1137b20 ff.); and vop oOEaía is a subspecies of (ppdvnoLç 
(1141b34), which itself is part of intellectual virtue (1139b14 
ff.). (g2a) The expert in applying the notion of function is the 
person who is good at defining TEXvai, which, again, is an 
exercise of intellectual virtue; and the person who is good at 
defining TEXvaì also turns out to be the expert in applying 
Aristotelian moral principles ( §2d)- without which expertise 
there can be no cppóvrlcnç ( §2e). Again ( §2b), who is the expert in 
applying the concept of the mean? Aristotle's geometrical analogy 
is suggestive: v -KÓOW yàp Tò peGOV XaßELV Úpyov, otov KÚKXoU 
Td p OOV, oO návroÇ ¿iXXÒ TOG Eï5ÓTOS (NE 1109a25 -26). Who, 
finally, is the only possible measure of what counts as a good or 
bad pleasure? The answer ( §2f) is ó 6yo06q. As shown by the very 
passage which makes it clear that an ethical hedonist reading of 
Aristotle is a non -starter, the expertises of applying these 
various methods of finding what is good converge in the overall 
expertise in moral epistemology of Aristotle's 'man of virtue' 
(and I use the word 'man' advisedly): 
bOKEL 5' ev á(naal TorS TOLOÚTOLC, ETvaL. Tò cpaLVóuEVOV T(i5 
onousaícp, ,, KaL raTLV t.KÓIQTOU pÉTpOV KaL äyaOÓS 
TOLOGTOC Kat. 1iSOVaL acv av al. TOÚT(J (poLVópEVaI. KO T'jsa OfS 
OÚTOC, XatpE L . (NE 1176b17 -19) 
At 1109a25 -26 (above) Aristotle makes the general claim that 
the way to understand any particular TeXVn is to ask the expert 
in that TÉXVÍ: cp. 1094b29, rKaGTOS KOCVEL KaXSÇ a yLv6oKEL, 
(109) 
Kat TOÚThV êOTtV äyaOòç KpIT ?S. In pursuing these extensions of 
the tpyov argument, it becomes clear that the way to understand 
virtue, qua hierarchy of Tc(vat, is to ask the expert in virtue. 
One has, of course, to speak guardedly when arguing that 
virtue, in Aristotle's conception, is in important respects like 
a TgYVn. There are important differences too. (i) Virtue is 
concerned with npäELÇ, T xvn with noLTa1S, (ii) Voluntary errors 
in np5ELS are worse than involuntary ones, but in T yvn the 
opposite is true (NE 1140b23 -24). (iii) Excellence in npaEig is 
mainly to do with habituation, excellence in a Tgyvn with 
knowledge (NE 1105b2 -4). (iv) A craftsman is technically 
excellent if and only if his production is technically excellent; 
but a moral agent is not virtuous if and only if his action is 
virtuous (1105a27 -30). As it happens Aristotle does sometimes 
compare np5ELS to loose kinds of T Xvn, like medicine and 
helmsmanship (NE 1104a8 -11); but the only similarities on which 
my argument here depends are these two. (i) Excellence in npäELS 
can, like excellence in a Tgxvn, be explicated by means of the 
gPvov argument. And, therefore, (ii) excellence in npâELS can, 
like excellence in a -r yvn, be understood as an expertise. 
Granted these riders, my claim is that the expert in virtue 
is the man of virtue: 
newt návTa uèv TaúTa [TOÚ KaXoü, ouNTepovroS, fiSeoS] ó äyaBdS 
KpTOpBwTLKÓS taTLV ó sÉ KaKÓS dtpapTnTLKÓS. (NE 1104b32) 
(110) 
TOOTo 6' [ sc. TO TeXOC, KaL TO òIpLOTOV] E L' pr) T(i5 ótya8( OÚ 
(paCvsraL. (NE 1144a32) 
TOO yàp (ppovCuou uáXLOTa ToüT' Epyov avaC (paµEV, TO Ed 
pouXEÚEOBaL. (NE 1141b10; cp. 1142b31) 
What does this claim mean? What it means is that expertise in 
virtue is not distinct from excellence of character: the man of 
virtue's expertise, what makes him the standard of virtue, is his 
excellence of character. 
However (1105b1 ff.), this does not mean that it is 
sufficient for me to have moral knowledge that I should ask the 
man of virtue about what is good. To know, in the true sense of 
'know', what is good, I must myself become the man of virtue 
(which incidentally makes virtue, or full virtue, impossible for 
women on Aristotle's account). Merely to know, in an abstract 
sense, which ethical propositions are true and which false, is 
meaningless for Aristotle and does not count as genuine moral 
knowledge: Tò se X yELv TOÙÇ hdyouç Tok änò Tfjç Èn1onpfç oO6Év 
onIaov (NE 1147a18 -23). Nor, indeed, is it sufficient for me to 
have moral knowledge that I should act in a virtuous way, that is 
to say in the way the man of virtue acts or would act. Doing the 
kind of things the man of virtue does is necessary for becoming a 
man of virtue; but it is not sufficient unless I do the kind of 
things the man of virtue does in the way that the man of virtue 
does them: 
Tà µLáv oí3v npáyuara b(KaLa Kai oc<ícppova XyETaL, (5rav t 
ToLaúTa Ofo aV á bCKaLOç II á oc,ícpp(ilv npótELEV bCKaLOS bÉ Kaì. 
O¿xppWV toTiV oily Ó TaIJTa npóTr(ilV, Ò00,6 Kai ó OÜT(il npáTT(JV óç Oí 
SLKaLOL Kai o[ oócppoveç npórrouoLV. (NE 1105b5-9) 
This is why Aristotle reminds us that the objective, in a 
study of ethics, is a practical one: 
7) napoúoa npayuaTECa oü BEopCaç ÉEvEKá ËaTLV 45onEp of (Wm 
(Oü yàp fV' EL'5(J4JEV TC ËoTLV fi äpETrl oKEnTÓpEBa, axx' Lv' áya8oi 
yEvc5pE6a, tnEi oübtv &v v gcpEXoç abTñç). (NE 1103b26-29) 
aixx' oL noaXoi TaúTa uÈv oü npáTTOUßLV, era be ròv Xóyov 
KaraCpEÚyovTEç orovTaL cpLX000CpErv Kai oúTCaç goE69aL onoubatoL... 
(NE 1105b12-15) 
Aristotle believes that there is no neutral and objective 
definition or description of virtue available which is equally 
intelligible and acceptable to all comers, irrespective of their 
attitudes and characters. There is an objective understanding of 
virtue; but not a neutral one. The whole point about conceiving 
virtue as a rtyvn is that, if that conception is right, then, 
just as with the other TEXva, it is the opinions of the experts 
that are conclusive. If you want to have the right opinions about 
what human excellence consists in, you have no option but to 
engage in the Tgyvn of virtue. But this means being committed to 
becoming good: to becoming a man of virtue. 
(112) 
What are we to make of this doctrine? At first sight it might 
just seem a mistake to say that what is good, is good because it 
is what the good person thinks is good. Surely (it might be 
replied), the truth is rather that what the good person thinks is 
good, is good because the good person is good? Surely we should 
define the good person in terms of the good, and not the good in 
terms of the good person? But Aristotle clearly does mean to give 
the good person, and not the good, definitional priority. His 
reason for doing this is explained at NE 1113a32 -34: 
Ka6' ÉKbQTnV Yap ËELV róLÓI ÉoTL Kaña Kal liba, Ka6 bLa(pÉpEL 
nñEL6TOV I.oWS ó onOUbaLOS T45 TaXnegs ÉV ÉKÓioTOLS ópáV, (ilonEp 
KOV6V Kat F1ÉTpoV aÚTWV rilV. 
The reason why the good is to be defined in terms of the good 
person, and not vice versa, is because TayaOdv toaxk X YETaL T(ti 
ÖVTL (NE 1096a24). Aristotle writes against (inter alios) 
Platonists, and so rejects the idea that there is a single, 
abstract thing called The Good, in terms of which all human goods 
are to be commensurated. Yet this does not mean that he rejects 
all possibility of commensurating goods. There is for him no 
single sense of Good, as the Platonists believe, in terms of 
which all other uses of 'good' are to be understood. (Cf., for 
example, the notorious division between action and contemplation 
noted above: this seems to be a clear case where there is not 
meant to be an easy way of commensurating what I have called 
T Xoc and meta- Téaoç.) But, on the other hand, it is not true 
that there is no chance of relating the different uses of 'good' 
(113) 
to each other: they do not seem to have appeared by accident (oú 
Op MOLKE ToLÇ yE and TÚXT1S ópGvúpolç, NE 1096b26). Aristotle's 
suggestion is that the locus of commensuration between these 
different senses is the life of the good person. Different 
supposed goods, if they are truly good, will find their places in 
the life of the man of virtue. Hence the way to find what is good 
is not to search for a definition of 'good' in the abstract, but 
to look for a concrete example of a good life. Aristotle would 
not have said, with Protagoras, that 'Man is the measure of all 
things'; but he might have said that 'The man of virtue is the 
measure of all things'. 
The obvious response to this claim is: But who is the man of 
virtue? It may seem that very little has been established in what 
I take to be Aristotle's moral epistemology, apart from the 
principle that the good is to be defined in terms of the good 
person and not vice versa. But this principle is unenlightening, 
unless we already know who the man of virtue is. In fact it seems 
that the same circularity applies which I noted before. Just as 
(I claimed) we need the prior notion of expertise in defining 
notions like 'function' and 'the mean' before we can make use of 
them, so we need the prior notion of expertise in defining the 
notion of the man of virtue before we can make use of the notion 
of the man of virtue. 
In response to this objection, I think two points can be 
made. First, if the request for a definition of the man of virtue 
is an attempt to take us back from true ethics, done rv' áyaOoì. 
(114) 
yEvcpcOa, to the method of inquiry of an ordinary tncoTIluri, done 
BEwp(oq nvEKa (1103b26 -29), then Aristotle would certainly resist 
this. Just as for Aristotle there is no definition of the concept 
of virtue which is equally available to all, regardless of their 
own excellence of character or otherwise, so likewise it is 
indeed the case that no definition of what it means to be a man 
of'virtue could be neutral in this way. But if it is (as 
Aristotle clearly believes) true that there can be no definition 
of the man of virtue which is equally accessible to idle 
intellectual curiosity and to sincere moral aspiration, then it 
is not a failing of his theory that it does not attempt, like so 
many other theories, to provide what cannot be provided. 
Aristotle wants us to see, first, that rules of thumb for finding 
the good (such as his own concepts of function and the mean) are 
useless unless we have a prior notion of expertise in their 
application; and, second, that the very notion of moral expertise 
is not separable from the notion of being good. To recognise 
these points in response to his theory, then, is not to refute 
him. 
Second, following on from this, Aristotle does in any case 
have an explicit description, and an implicit definition, of the 
man of virtue. The explicit description is given by the portrait 
of goodness of character which we find in NE III.6- VI.13. On the 
basis of Aristotle's important dictum (1103b26) that ethics is 
done o- -copt.aq ÉVEKa, 6X X' c:v' aya8ot ysvc5pE00, we may add to 
the details of character given by this description that 
Aristotle's implicit definition of the man of virtue is this: he 
(115) 
is the person who, like Aristotle himself in his own ethical 
writings, is engaged in a morally serious attempt to define the 
man of virtue. 
So it is not quite true, in Martha Nussbaum's words, that 
'Aristotle pointedly fails to endorse an art of measuring for 
ethics' (Nussbaum 1986, p.290). There is a measure, the Man of 
Virtue himself: gaTLV ÉK61aTOU peTpov f òpsrtj Kaì äya06q i'j 
ToloOToç (1176b18). But the paradox is that, for me to be skilled 
in the use of this measure, it is necessary that I myself should 
become the man of virtue. 
Hence the definition of the man of virtue which Aristotle can 
offer us is both provisional and (in a sense) circular in 
character. But neither its provisionality nor its circularity 
renders the definition negligible. On the contrary, these 
features are its strengths. The definition of the man of virtue 
has to be provisional, because virtue is in an important sense a 
Ttxvrt (though it is not, of course, just like other TEyvaì.). A 
Texvn is, as §2c suggested, an activity one crucial part of which 
is precisely to continue refining its own definition. And it has 
to be circular, or at any rate to proceed in a spiral, because as 
we have seen there is no way of understanding the enterprise of 
human excellence without being committed to that enterprise 
oneself. 
Both these points come out in the technique of moral (and, 
indeed, other) epistemology which is implied by and visible in 
(116) 
Aristotle's writings. Aristotle inherits from his philosophical 
forebears, especially Plato, the crucial epistemological contrast 
between appearance and reality. Appearance, for Plato and 
Parmenides, was absolutely deceptive, and reality was absolutely 
dependable. Aristotle, however, transformed this antithesis into 
a quite different contrast, in which both terms of the antithesis 
have something important to contribute to the growth of 
knowledge. Aristotle's contrast is between the commonly held 
opinions of humanity, and the views of the wise. 
The 'commonly held opinions of humanity' are given in the 
fv5oEa (NE 1145b5 -7), the cpaivóicva (1145b3), the XEyopeva 
(1098b11, 1145b20), whatever 5OKEL (1094a2, 1142a1, 1145b8), and 
the proverbs which Aristotle quotes (e.g. 1155a33 ff.). The 
'views of the wise' OC ev5of oL ávöpcç (NE 
of ó onou6aEoç (1099a23), d 6ya0óç (1176b19), om cppóvipoi 
(1095b28), ö voiv fywv (1112a21); of the poets, philosophers and 
sages whom Aristotle quotes (1152a23 (Anaxandrides), a32 
(Euenus); 1155b2 (Euripides), b4 (Heracleitus), b7 (Empedocles)). 
The first point to note about the two sides of this contrast 
is that Aristotle does not, like Plato, treat one side as 
altogether bad, and the other as altogether good. We see them 
working together at NE 1098b27 -30: 
TOLITOV 5É TO av nOXXOL Rai', nañaLOL ñtyOUoLV, Tp 5t ÓñLyOL 
KpL tv50EOL 6v5pEq oÚSETÉpouç 5t TOLSTWV EÚñOyoV SLauapTávELV 
TOLS ÖñOLS, dixñ' ËV yÉ TL ñ Rod Tp nXELOTa KaTOp80ÚV, (NE 
1098b27 -30) 
(117) 
In many cases, indeed, the views of the many correct those of 
the wise. So Speusippus is upbraided for arguing, highly counter 
intuitively as Aristotle thinks (NE 1094a1 -2), that not all 
creatures seek the good: 
a yàp náaL UOKE r, TOOT' E?va( (pOpEV ó 5' ávaLpwv TOLíTriV TO 
n(aTLV oú návu nLaTÓTEpa tpEr. (NE 1173a2) 
It is made clear elsewhere that this very sweeping claim is 
not, in fact, made by Aristotle without qualification. For the 
views of the wise can also correct those of the many. of noXÀot 
can sometimes be a term of opprobrium for Aristotle, as it 
standardly is for Plato: 
àxx' o( noXAoì TaúTO Uev oú npáTTouaLv, en( Se Tàv Xóyov 
KOTO(pEÚyOVTEG OIOVTaL. (121LX000(pEIV KaL OÚT(JC, EYOEaeaL anou5aroL... 
(NE 1105b12-15; cp. 1099a12) 
The views of the wise are just those refined and chastened 
views which correct the views of the many. Still, these views are 
themselves to be subjected to further scrutiny concerning their 
relationship to the views of the many. Philosophy has a duty to 
improve on the common opinions of humanity, for those opinions 
are often in crude conflict. It also has a duty to stay loyal to 
those opinions, for they represent the place where philosophy is 
best advised to begin its investigations. This may give a context 
to the sweeping claim of 1173a2. Aristotle's point, in context, 
cannot be the claim that the 1`v5oEoa are always true. It is more 
(118) 
likely that, on balance, he would have said something like J.L. 
Austin: 
'Certainly ordinary language has no claim to be the last 
word... in principle, it can everywhere be supplemented and and 
improved upon and superseded. Only remember, it is the first 
word.' 
(Austin 1956/7) 
Aristotle thinks that glibly commonsensical philosophy, such 
as Heracleitus accused Homer and Hesiod of purveying (DK B56, 
B57), is bad philosophy; but he thinks that wildly counter 
intuitive philosophy, philosophy which begins for example with 
universal doubt, is bad philosophy too. (Note that this does not 
mean that Aristotle would simply shrug off radical sceptical 
questions; although it does mean that he would criticise the form 
as well as the content of the inquiry that raised them.) Hence, 
for Aristotle, a common opinion which is plainly illogical or 
fatuous is not, in spite of 1173a2, immune from criticism simply 
because it is widely held. And a philosophical conclusion which 
eltp OßuEt Toi.S CpaLvopeVOLS évapY &)S, like Socrates' about akrasia 
(1145b28), is not to be tolerated either, however venerable its 
provenance. The relationship between the two sides of the 
contrast is dialectical, in the sense that there is a continuous 
mutual correction and refinement of each other by the two sides 
of the dialectic. 
(119) 
Where do Aristotle's own arguments stand in relation to that 
dialectic? The answer to this comes when we consider an objection 
to seeing the relationship between the views of of noXXoì. Kaì, of 
yap(evTES (1095a18) as I have just suggested. It might be pointed 
out that Aristotle seems to see the views of of noXXoi Kai of 
yap(evTeç rather as one loose category than as two specific ones 
which are in opposition. So, above, I quote proverbs on the one 
side of my contrast, and Anaxandrides, Euenus, Euripides, etc. on 
the other, from the same list of bolaì, at 1155a33 ff.. But what 
this demonstrates is not that Aristotle does not see a 
dialectical relationship between the views of of noÀXo( and of 
yap (EVTES. Rather, it shows that that dialectical contrast has 
both a historical and a current application. 
In the historical sense, someone is a 0o11)5S relative to any 
set of common opinions when she attempts, and at least to some 
degree proves able, to put them in coherent order. The famous 
oo(1)o( Kaì yapÍ.EVTES of the past are exactly those persons who 
took generally received beliefs and systematised them where they 
did not fit together. But what count in this historical 
perspective as the views of of noAaoì and those of f XapCEVTES, 
are all, from the current perspective, 'commonly held opinions'. 
Relative to these it is our own current efforts at clarification, 
definition or refutation which will count, if successful, as the 
views of of 00(p0(. They will count as such, of course, for just 
as long as they resist further refinement or refutation; from 
then on, they will only be the views of of oocpo( in the 
historical perspective. Thus Aristotle's verdicts stand to all 
(120) 
the views which he considers, and refines, refutes or reaffirms, 
in the same relationship which some, but not all, of those views 
once stood to others of those views. And likewise, present day 
attempts to extend, expose or explicate Aristotle's project also 
stand in that same relationship to Aristotle's views, and to 
those to which his views once stood in that relationship. 
Thus Aristotle's method is to look for those views which 
either are 'most widely current' (the many), or 'seem to have 
some logic to them' (the wise) (1095a28 -30); and for a way of 
reconciling them where they clash. When his method leads him 
(1095a14 -30) to see that the popular account of happiness differs 
from the Platonists' account, and that both views need 
refinement, this clash is a good example of a typical starting 
point for his philosophy. It is in this context that we may 
recall his famous dictum at NE 1145b2 -8: that the philosopher 
should begin with the apparent views and their difficulties, and 
establish as many as possible of the vboEa. If not all of them 
can be established, then the preference is to be for Tà nAEtoTa 
(the views of the many) Kat KupL6Tara (those of the wise): 
ÉàV Yàp XúnTaL TE TÓI bUßXEprl Kal KaTaXELnnTaL Tà aXvboEa, 
s£S£I,YaVOV aV ECn l.KavWS,,, TOÚT(ilV bE' TÓI pÉV ÓIVEXEIV b£L TCÌ bÉ 
KaraXinEtv el Yàp XúmS TñS alnopCaS Eúp£oCs eoTLV. (1145b6-7 and 
1146b6-7) 
To describe this dialectic is to describe the functioning of 
a TeYVn, the very special Teyvn of virtue, within a philosophical 
(121) 
tradition. Aristotle believes that moral epistemology is itself 
part of the practice of a Tgyvn: a skill or craft the practice of 
which is under constant revision and refinement. This means that 
we see ourselves as part of a history: our work within the craft 
has its validity from the fact that it is part of that craft. It 
also means a commitment, clearly visible in Aristotle's 
attitudes, to epistemological conservatism: where possible, we 
take on board what has already been settled. For ó 6' 6vaLp6v 
Ta6TrÌv TO nCGTLv oú návu nLaTÓTEpa LpEt. Further, it means 
philosophical humility: our insights, however thrilling, are 
indeed to be taken as truth, but also as provisional truth. There 
is nothing to guarantee that our current conception of the man of 
virtue will not be radically and rightly changed in the near 
future, and we should be always be open to that possibility; but 
until that happens, our current conception is the best we have, 
and we have no reason whatever not to act on it. 
Moral epistemology turns out to be a Tgyvn which is part of 
the Tgyvn of virtue. What does general epistemology turn out to 
be? The answer is that general epistemology is a Tgyvn too, which 
is conducted in something like the sort of way just suggested for 
the Tgyvn of virtue. There will be an expertise in general 
epistemology, the ability to have araerotç (in a more 
physiologically 'basic' sense of arcBIGLs than that relevant to 
TpßvnaLç) of what is really the case. This expertise will be 
defined by reference to the notion of an expert in general 
epistemology. 
(122) 
What is the connection between this kind of expertise and 
overall expertise, that is to say the excellence of character 
proper to a man of virtue? The answer to this is that to be an 
expert in general epistemology is also part, though a less basic 
part, of that same excellence of character, just as any other 
expertise in a T xvn is part of excellence of character (1113a33: 
Kai baacpepEL nXEraTov racilç (5 anoubaEoç TC0' TàXn6Èç tv hEKálaTOK 
ópâv). To be an expert in moral epistemology is to be a man of 
virtue, sans phrase. To be an expert in general epistemology is 
to be a man of virtue with respect to general epistemology. 
Thus, again, I am blamed for all principle ignorance, because 
(as Aristotle thinks) all principle ignorance has its äpy,f in me; 
but only some particular ignorance has its ápyfi in me 
(1135b18 -19), and it is only for this that I am blamed. I am 
blamed for this latter because one of the kinds of habituation to 
which I ought to submit myself is habituation towards correct and 
accurate awareness of the physical world. Insofar as I can so 
habituate myself, it is my responsibility to do so. Insofar as I 
do so habituate myself, I become an äya8òç. In this respect, the 
TEXvi) of general epistemology is not importantly different from 
any other Aristotelian Tgyvn except the special case of moral 
epistemology and virtue: for that Tgxvn is the one of which all 
TEXvai, properly and improperly so called, are parts. 
This completes what I have to say about the positive accounts 
of knowledge and origination of an impulse to act which Aristotle 
offers us as corollaries of his negative conditions of voluntary 
(123) 
action that such action should (i) not be compelled, and (ii) 
not be done in ignorance. What, then, of the positive account of 
rationality which I say Aristotle offers us as a corollary of his 
third negative condition of voluntary action, that such action 
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nota 5' do./Tt noCov aCpETtov, oú 3x5Lov óno5o0vaL. noXXaC yàp 
5taqiopaC ECGLV tv Totc Kae' EKacTa. 
(Aristotle, NE 1110b7) 
In Ch.2 I discussed the positive accounts of unhindered 
appetition and of knowledge which Aristotle offers us as 
corollaries to his negative requirements of voluntary action, 
that it should be behaviour which is neither compelled nor done 
in ignorance. Since the third negative requirement of voluntary 
action was that it should not be behaviour which is irrational, 
(125) 
in a sense I have defined, it is clearly time to examine 
Aristotle's positive account of the rationality of action. 
It may be clear why I have left this third positive account 
till last. The rationality of an action consists in the combining 
in that action of an unhindered appetition with relevant 
knowledge. Therefore it is plain that we cannot discuss 
Aristotle's account of the rationality of action without first 
being clear about his accounts of appetition and hindrance, and 
of knowledge and relevance. Moreover, we cannot discuss this 
third part of Aristotle's positive account of voluntary action 
without constantly presupposing and referring to the first and 
second parts of his account. It is impossible to deal with his 
doctrine of rationality in isolation. 
Aristotle's positive account of rationality is a treatment of 
how relevant knowledge and unhindered appetition combine to be 
the cause of a voluntary action. Examining what he has to say 
about this leads me to consider, first npoaípeßlÇ (g1 -2), then 
DOÚÀeuoiç (g3), and third, Aristotle's doctrine of the 'practical 
syllogism' (§4). 
1. npoaÇpEgls_ 
What is npoa(pccLS? Aristotle discusses it in detail in two 
passages of the NE, III.2 and 1139a21 -b13. I will concentrate 
here on III.2, as this actually purports to give us a definition 
(126) 
of npoaCPEGLS. Aristotle works his way towards this definition by 
giving us a list of things which npoaCpEoLS is not. Aristotle 
aims to establish, on the one hand, that npoOCpEOLS is not simply 
an ópEEtÇ, an appetition; and, on the other, that it is not 
simply a SóEa (opinion or belief) either (NE 1111b11 -13). This, I 
take it, is because Aristotle wants to argue that npoaCpEGLS 
involves elements of both appetition and belief. That is 
certainly the upshot of the VI.2 discussion: sßò ñ öpcKTLKòç voüç 
fi npooCpEoLS f gpEEIS ÖLavorff1Kfj (NE 1139b5). 
For Aristotle as for the Plato of the Republic, there are 
three kinds of ópcEiç, corresponding to the three parts of the 
soul: tntOupCo (desire), 6uµòç (spirit), and ßouXríaLS (wish). No 
one of these ÖPEEELS is identifiable with npoaCpEolç, though the 
third might have seemed the most plausible candidate to 
Aristotle's contemporaries. tnLOupta is disqualified from being 
identifiable with npoatpEolç for these reasons: 
(a) 'npoa(pEocc is not shared with irrational creatures (TCSv 
6A6vov), but tniOupCa and 6upòç are.' (1111b13) 
(b) 'The óKpa -tnç acts on desire (tntBu -i v), but not on 
npoatpeot.c; whereas the self disciplined person acts on 
npoatpEalç, but not on desire.' (b14 -15) 
(c) 'npoa(pcaLS can oppose desire, but desire cannot oppose 
desire.' (b16) 
(d) 'Desire is concerned with the pleasant and the painful, 
npoa(PEGLS with neither.' (b17) 
(127) 
6uudç is disqualified too (b19), although Aristotle gives us 
little explicit argument for this claim apart from (a) above. 
Possibly (a) -(d) are all meant to apply to 8upòç too, mutatis 
mutandis. 
Aristotle gives two reasons why ßoúÀnoiç cannot be equated 
with npoaCpEOLc, KaCnEp oúvEyyuç cpatvópcvov (1111b20 -34): 
(e) There can be ßoúXnotç for things which are either impossible 
tout court, or impossible for me; there cannot be npoaípc6Lç of 
either (b21 -26; cp. 113967 -13). 
(f) ßoúAnoLç is of the end (Toü TeXouç), npoaípEOLÇ of the means 
(T3v npdç Td TeXoç) (b27-29). 
Given the success of these six arguments, and given 
Aristotle's classification of gpEEELÇ into three sorts, it 
follows that npoaCpcoiç is no kind of gpEELç. The mere presence 
of an appetition, of whatever kind, is no guarantee of the 
presence of a npoa(pcoLç. 
(Contra Charles 1984, p.58, the point of NE 1139a23 cannot be 
that npoaCpcoLc is an gpcELç; unless Aristotle there simply 
contradicts the arguments of NE 1111b11 -30 which I have just 
outlined. If there are only three sorts of ópEELc, and npoaCpEaLç 
is none of those three, then it seems clear that npoalpEOLÇ 
cannot be any öpEELç at all. The point of NE 1139a23 (cf. 
1113a11) is, rather, the point amplified by 1139b5: óLò ñ 
óPEKTLKÒS VOÚc 
fi npoaCpEGLS f 6pcELc boavonTLKJ. npoaCpcoiç is 
(128) 
not simply a process of thought, SLávoLa; but it is not simply a 
process of appetition, ÖPEELc, either. npoaCpcGLS is the case 
where they combine, in a product which is just as much ópEELS as 
it is StávoLa and which, properly speaking, is more complex than 
either alone.) 
Aristotle then argues that npoaCpcoLS is not simply 56E0 
either. He begins this discussion by saying that fi itêv yàp 56Fa 
ÖoKEL nepì návra c?vat (1111b31). It seems that SóEa here means 
'belief' in its widest sense: not that sense in which 'belief' is 
opposed to knowledge, as at 1139b17 and 1145b32 ff., but a sense 
which includes both knowledge and (mere) belief, as suggested by 
Toú 5oE0oTLKOÜ at 1140b27. That wide sense certainly seems to be 
the one employed at all, where Aristotle says that SóEa precedes 
and accompanies npoaCpcoLS- having just remarked (a7) that 
npocapEOLS involves certain knowledge, not hazy belief. (For more 
on 1112a7 -8, see below.) 
The suggestion, then, is that the mere presence of a belief, 
of whatever kind, is no guarantee of the presence of a npoaCpEOLS 
either. Why not? 
(9) (cf. (e)) Belief can concern any matter at all, not just Tà 
4' fpty (1111b33; cp. 1139a36 ff.). 
(h) Belief is qualified as either true or false; but npoaCpeai.S, 
rather (µöXXov), as right or wrong (b34 -35; cp. 1139a21 -22). 
(g) and (h) are offered to show that npoaCpEOLS is not 
(129) 
identical to any kind of belief. Aristotle then continues: 
ax' oÚbÉ TLVL' TetS yàp npoaLpELOeaL Táya6à ñ Tà KaKà noLO( 
TLVÉCC ÈouEV, TC SÉ boEálCELv oú. (NE 1112a1-3) 
This sentence introduces six more specific arguments (i -n) 
for the claim that npoa(pEOLS is not identical to TLVL óóEr, 'to 
some particular belief', by which Aristotle seems to mean moral 
belief. If (g) and (h) succeed, then (i -n) are strictly 
unnecessary; but Aristotle obviously thinks the point worth 
stressing. 
(i) npoa(pEaLS makes our characters good or bad- not moral belief 
(a1 -3; cp. 1139a33 -34). 
(j) (cf. (g)) npoa(pEGLS is practical, moral bóEa theoretical 
(a3 -5). 
(k) (cf. (h)) Moral belief is qualified as either true or false 
(T(1 (3))nO&ç), 
nPoaCpEalç as either right or wrong (T45 ópBk) (a6 -7). 
(1) What we believe (boEáCopEv) to be right, we do not know for 
sure (oú nav(5 tapEv) to be right. But action on npoa(pEaLS is 
action on knowledge of what is right, not on (mere) belief 
(a7 -8). 
(m) I can have good 'abstract' moral beliefs without being a good 
person (a9 -10; cp. 1147a22). 
(n) That moral belief is a necessary condition of npoa(pcoiç does 
not show that moral belief is npoaCpEaLS (a11 -13; cp. 1139a33). 
(130) 
(a -n) are, as I say, presented by Aristotle as negative 
arguments. But plainly they also give us a good idea of the cards 
in Aristotle's own hand. Given a clarification of (f) and the 
exclusion of (1), the combination of these arguments with 
Aristotle's positive remarks gives us a fair account of his 
doctrine of npoaCpeouS. 
(1) should be excluded from consideration if, as I have 
argued, the whole point of NE III.2 is to show that npoaCpeoLS 
involves the combination of unhindered appetition and relevant 
knowledge, and hence bóEa here means 'belief' in its widest 
sense, not that sense in which 'belief' is opposed to knowledge. 
Of course it is true that action on npoaCpcaLS is action on 
knowledge, not on (mere) belief. Action on belief which is not 
also knowledge is action in ignorance, and hence not voluntary 
action, and hence (a fortiori) not action on npoaCpeolç either. 
But this is a point against bóEa as opposed to knowledge, not 
against SóEa in the wide sense which includes knowledge. 
Aristotle's aim, I am suggesting, is to show that npoaCpeo q must 
mean the combination of unhindered appetition and relevant 
knowledge, because either alone is insufficient for npoaCpeoiç. 
Then attacking the idea that npoaCpcaiç could be equivalent to 
6ó0 in the narrow sense, as (1) does, is beside the point. 
The clarification of (f) is this. 1111b27 need not mean that 
the setting up of a Texoc is an altogether non -rational process. 
Aristotle's pronouncement that there is no Xóyoç of definitions 
(1142826) does not mean that the setting up of a ópoS is an 
(131) 
altogether non -rational process. It means rather that, if the 
setting up of a öpoç is a rational process (as, we are told 
elsewhere, it is), that rational process is not, strictly, Xóyoç 
(which here means ouXXOyLOuóç). Likewise, Aristotle's 
pronouncement here that there is no npoaípEOLÇ of Tern does not 
mean that the setting up of a TexoÇ is an altogether non -rational 
process. It means rather that, if the setting up of a Texoç is a 
rational process (as, we are told elsewhere, it is), that 
rational process is not, strictly, npoaCpEOLS. 
However, there are two senses of both Xóyoç/ oUXAoyLOpóç and 
npoaCpEOLÇ, broad and narrow. This leads to ambiguities 
concerning npoa(pEOLS and theoretical reasoning which I believe 
to be in exact parallel. Aristotle sometimes calls Énaywyrj a kind 
of OuXAoyLOp6q (APr 68b30) (the broad sense), and sometimes 
opposes Ènayoyfl to OuXAoytopóç (the narrow sense) (68b13). 
Notoriously, he also describes npoo(pEolç as being (i) of means 
only and not of ends (1111b27), (ii) of ends (1110b32, 
1144a20 -23), and (iii) of both means and ends (1145a4 -6). There 
is a solution to this. Analogously to Xóyoç/ OU)'JOyiapÓS, 
npoaCpeotç has a narrow sense, in which it cannot include the 
rational processes involved in the setting up of a TÉXoÇ; but 
also a broad sense, in which it can. 
Given these qualifications, we may proceed to outline what 
Aristotle tells us about npoaCpEOLS. (a) npoaCpEOLS is something 
distinctive to mature humans, unlike Tò ÉKOLIOLOV (1111b8 -9). (b) 
It is limited not simply to mature humans, but more specifically 
(132) 
to self disciplined mature humans, such as those who act not 
suddenly (1110b10) but 'from a settled disposition of character' 
(1104a35). (c and d) npoaCpEaiç is concerned with non -abstract 
(m), character forming (i) beliefs (inter alga, n) about what is 
morally right (TcS óp1MS, k) in practical affairs (h, j). It can 
overrule any desire in a way that no desire can (c). The scope of 
someone's npoa(pEaLÇ is boa OCETaL yEVEaeoL áv 51' OÓTOU 
(1111b26). Thus there is no npoo(pEOLS about (e) impossibilities, 
(g) matters which are not tcp' lipty, or (j) theoretical questions. 
These remarks establish that npoaCpEaLS is not simply either 
a belief nor an appetition. I say that this is argued to pave the 
way for the conclusion that npoa(pEOLS involves the combination 
of belief and appetition. So what comes next in the NE? This 
definition of npoa(pEOLS: 
T( oí3v noróv TC ÉaTLV [npoaCpEOLS], enELUI T3V ECpwVwv 
[sc. tnL©uuCa, 8upòq, pouXlaLS, bóEa: 1111b11-13] oÚBev; ÉKOÚaLOV 
utv Slj cpa(vETaL , TO 5' tKOÚOLOV oú nay npoaLpETóv. Ctlxñ' ápá yE Tò 
npopEpouaEUavov; li Op npoa(pEaLS pETà ñÓyou KaC bLavoCaS. 
Únoallpa(VELV S' nOLKE Kat' Toúvopa (íSS ÓV npò ÉTÉpwv al.pETóv. (NE 
1112a13 -17) 
Aristotle, we read here, defines npoaCpEOLS as TO 
npoaCpouXrupevov. Does npò here mean 'before in time', or 'before 
in preference' as it does at EE 1225b8 (cp. MM 
(133) 
1189a13)? Joachim 1955 (p.100 -101), Gauthier -Jolif 1970 (p.198), 
and, it appears, Kenny 1979 would argue that npò here is 
temporal. A Rylean or Wittgensteinian commentator might want to 
argue, as might Ross (1925) and Burnet (1900), that, on the 
non - 
contrary, npò is /temporal. Hardie (1968, p.164) thinks that npo - 
in npoßEßouXEupevov is temporal, but npò in npò tTÉpwv is not. 
However, Hardie's distinction between npo- and npò seems 
dubious when one looks closely at a16 -17. Is Aristotle really 
'playing with the ambiguity of the proposition [npò]' (so Joachim 
according to Hardie, though in fact Joachim never suggests this)? 
It seems clear that what Aristotle wants to say at 1112a16 -17 
about Tò npoßEßouXcui vov, he also wants to say about npoaCpEoLS. 
Hence what npo- means in npoßEßouXEupÉvov, npò in npò ÉTÉp()V 
a[peróv should also mean- despite EE 1225b8. 
There are better grounds here for saying that both npo- and 
npd are either temporal or not than for distinguishing between 
them as Hardie suggests. And there is further evidence for the 
temporal view at e.g. 1113a2 -12; a passage cited by Joachim (v. 
§3) who writes that 'npò is to be interpreted as having a 
temporal significance' (100). It is suggested that npoaCpsoLS 
should be understood as a choice made before action or any 
mediate part thereof (npò ÉTepov). npoaCpEaLq will be a choice or 
decision made before acting, and with, or accompanied by, 
reasoning (pETO Xóyou Kal biavoCaç: n.b. that pETO + genitive 
cannot mean 'after'). 
(134) 
This conclusion brings us to ask: Accompanied by what kind of 
Wyoç Kaì. 6Lavo(a does npoa(peoLS occur? The answer to that will 
begin to be made clear in 53, on ßoUXcuOLÇ. The same conclusion 
also puts us in a position to offer an answer to the question to 
which I now, at last, turn: what is the difference between action 
on npoa(pEOLc and TÓ tKOúOLOV? 
2. Td tKOÚOLOV, Action on npoa(peotq and the Difference between 
them 
I said in Ch.1 that voluntary action (Tò ÉKOÚOL.OV) must, for 
Aristotle, mean action which is (i) uncompelled, (ii) not done in 
ignorance, and (iii) rational. But this question then arises for 
my account: How do I say Tò É KoLlm ov is different from action on 
npoa(pcoLS? 
On the normal view of Aristotle, Tò ÉKOÚOLOV differs from 
action on npoa(pOLç in that re) tKoLlcuov is any action which is 
(i) uncompelled and (ii) not done in ignorance. Action on 
npoa(peoLS, by contrast, is any action which is (i) uncompelled, 
(ii) not done in ignorance, and (iii) rational. 
Then does my claim that any voluntary action is, for 
Aristotle, rational, confuse Tò g.KOÚOLOV and action on 
npoa(peOLS? 
No: consider this conflict of texts. The definition 
of 'action on npoa(pEOLS' is 'voluntary action upon deliberation' 
(135) 
(NE 1112a15 -17). Deliberation means practical reasoning (NE 
1112b13 -29). Children and animals are incapable of action on 
npoa(pEOLç, though they are capable of Td 5' EKOÚOLOV (NE 
1111b9). From these three premisses it follows that children and 
animals are incapable of practical reasoning. Yet animals at any 
rate are clearly depicted by Aristotle, in the dMA, as acting on 
practical reason: 
nOTÉov poi, fl ttnLOuuCo aeyEL ToEì Se noTÓV, rj oral-pig E'CnEv 
cpavraOCa VOIJç EúOÙç nCvEL. oúTwç NÈV o0v en( Tò 
KLv£4a8aL Kaa npa1TTELV Tà Na óP4i6Ol., TTjç 4iÉV ÉOXÓITIiS cIL'TCaç TOLJ 
KLVEL08aL öpÉEEwç oúßrç... (dMA 701a32-35) 
One is, of course, inclined to object to this that here 
Aristotle must still be talking about human deliberation, as he 
clearly was just before this passage, at 701a6 -25 (a13: navT 
ßa5LOTtov ävOpc5w). But in fact there is nothing in 701a32 ff. 
which indicates that humans alone are under discussion. On the 
contrary, the reference is explicitly to Tà Na. Moreover, 
earlier in the dMA account, Aristotle says explicitly that the 
behaviour of all animals displays just that explicability in 
terms of purposes which, in Ch.1, I explained was what I mean by 
the rationality of voluntary action: 
navra p] yàp Tà Na Kal KLVEI. KOL KLVELTat.>1vEKà TLVOç, WOTE 
TOOT' C.OTLV aIJTOLC, nal0'rÎS 71iç KI.VIlOE(Jç népaç, TO Ot5 ÉVEKa. ópWuEv 
bg TÓI KLVOt1VTO TO Nov bLáVOLaV Kal, cpO1VTOOl.OV KaC npoa(pEOt.v [!!] 
KW, ßoúXr)Ol.v Kaì. axnL8up(av. (dMA 700b15-18) 
(136) 
Likewise NE 1118a17 -23, even while belittling the idea that 
we could talk of other animals' having the pleasures of the 
senses in the same way that humans do: 
008' óXeov [Xa(pEL] Tfj cpc,rvI:i TOO poóS, àAaà Tl] MOW ÖTL 5' 
NWS E'CTTL, SLÓI TfiS (pWVfiS 1168ET0, Kal Xa(pELv 511 TaÚTñ cpa(VETaL. 
óuoCK 5' oú5' 1!56v ,q Eúp6v 0,acpov ñ ayp Lov alya' [Iliad 3 . 24] , 
aXX' 8TL popàv EEE L . 
This passage, too, clearly implies the presence of some kind 
of reasoning ability in beasts like lions. 
How are we to account for this clash in the evidence? Must we 
simply say that Aristotle's attitude to animals is inconsistent 
between the ethical and the biological works? There certainly 
seems to be a strong case for saying that: compare a dismissive 
passage like NE 1149b32 -36 with the deep interest in animals 
evident in the quotations above and throughout the dMA (and cp. 
dA 432b23 -25). But we might also suggest that the theory of 
volition given in the dMA is meant to apply to all higher 
creatures, humans included. 
The translators (cp. Rackham (1926), Ross (1925)) tend to 
assume that the scope of rd 5Xoya at NE 1111b13 is the same as 
that of rd C45a at, e.g., 1118a17 -23, making both terms mean all 
non -human creatures. But sometimes the scope of Tà C(L3a seems 
wider than this, so that it includes humans- as I am suggesting 
it may at dMA 770b15 ff.. By contrast the term Tà 8Xoya at 
(137) 
1111b13 (its only occurrence in the NE) may well be narrower in 
scope, and not include the higher non -human animals. Its sense 
may be more like that of T65V dITE)(ilv at dA 433b32 than that of Tà 
Na at dMA 770b15. 
In any case Aristotle seems much more liberal in his use of 
the term Tàa Na in the dMA. Hence, perhaps, it is not such a 
glaring inconsistency for Aristotle to talk of npoaCpEoLç at 
700b15 -18. For if the scope of Tà NO includes ó ávOpárioç, then 
there are 'animals' which have a share in npoaCpEalç. This way of 
reading things is partly suggested by Martha Nussbaum's work: 
'When we turn to the de Anima and de Motu, we discover 
something that is very strange if we are used to Plato's ways of 
approaching the subject. Instead of Plato's moving accounts of 
human ethical dilemmas, we find a narrative whose leading 
characters are fish, birds, and insects as well as humans. 
Instead of what looks self -evidently important for us, we find 
what seems- and, we know, seemed to Aristotle's students- trivial 
and even disgusting. The inquiry into human action is carried out 
as a part of a larger inquiry into the movements of animals. 
Human action is very little singled out; instead we find a 
discussion of sweeping generality that ranges over the whole 
animal kingdom. It is this generality that we must seek to 
understand.' 
(Nussbaum 1986, p.264) 
(138) 
Still the central question remains: what are the distinctive 
marks of human, as opposed to animal, voluntariness which justify 
Aristotle's NE doctrine that only mature humans display 
npoatpc0Lq as well as TO ÉKOÚOLOV? It now appears that Aristotle 
offers no satisfactory answer to this. But one is clearly needed, 
as part of the theory of human nature given in the ethical 
writings. So here is my own suggestion about how to fill the gap. 
My suggestion is based simply on what Aristotle himself says 
about action on npoaípsoLq (1112a16 -17): that it is to be defined 
as TO npoßcpouXuuu vov. This, as 53 will help clarify, means 
action which has been deliberated on beforehand. We can only 
speak of TO npopcpouacupe vov when there has been predeliberation; 
hence we can only speak of action on npoaípsoLq when there has 
been predeliberation. If, in the case of some behaviour, there 
has been no predeliberation, we can speak only of Tò EKOÚOLOV or 
of TÓ 6K0001OV, and not of action on npoaípsoLq. 
But now the problem is, not how to distinguish TO ÉKOÚOLOV 
from action on npoaípsoLq in respect of the rationality 
requirement, but how to distinguish TO r=KOÚOLOV, the merely 
voluntary which does not count as action on npoat:pcoiq, from TO 
6KOUaCov in that respect. Consider some behaviour B which is not 
action on npoaípEatq. Although B is in fact done without 
predeliberation, still B may be explicable, with reference to 
some piece of predeliberation, as if that predeliberation had 
actually occurred. Then if B is so explicable, is B a case of 
rational action? Not necessarily, since (as I said in Ch.1) the 
(139) 
difference between rational action and irrational behaviour is 
that, in the case of rational action, it is not merely that 
relevant belief and unhindered appetition are present when the 
behaviour occurs; it is rather that the agent performs the 
behaviour because of the combination of relevant belief and 
unhindered appetition. But B could perfectly well be explicable 
with reference to some piece of predeliberation as if that 
predeliberation had actually occurred, without it being true that 
B occurred because of the combination of relevant belief and 
unhindered appetition. 
In this case Tò KOÚQLOV, the merely voluntary which does not 
count as action on npoa(pECSLS, must be distinct from Tò àKOúaLOV, 
with respect to the rationality requirement, in this way: 
T6 ÉKoúßlov is behaviour performed because of the combination 
in the agent of relevant belief and unhindered appetition. Tò 
ÒKOUGtov is any other behaviour. 
And Tò ÉKOúo1ov must be distinct from action on npoaCpEOLS, 
with respect to the rationality requirement, in this way: 
Action on npoaCpcoiç is behaviour performed because of the 
combination in predeliberation, in the agent, of relevant belief 
and unhindered appetition. TO t <oúatov, like action on 
npoatpEGLÇ, is also behaviour performed because of the 
combination, in the agent, of relevant belief and unhindered 
aPpetition; except that, in TÓ tKoúolov, that combination does 
(140) 
Likewise regarding actual and potential predeliberation. I 
might not actually say to myself 'Children drowning in weirs 
should be rescued; that child is drowning in the weir; I must 
jump in and save her'. It may be true that no actual thought 
process of predeliberation occurs, but this does not simply mean 
that I act without any reason or predeliberation. Rather, I act 
on potential predeliberation if I would give an account of my 
action by reference to such a train of thought if I were asked; 
and my behaviour is irrational if I could refer an inquirer to no 
such train of thought if I were asked. 
I have, then, suggested how it may be that behaviour which is 
not action on npootpcoLq nonetheless can involve a kind of 
deliberation, and so be rational, as well as uncompelled and 
performed without ignorance, thus counting as voluntary action 
(as I define that); and how merely voluntary action, TO tKOÚOLov, 
differs from actually involuntary behaviour, Tò âxoúaiov, in 
respect of the rationality condition. One thing that this account 
makes plain is the logical dependence of the category of the 
merely voluntary on the category of action on npaaCpeaLÇ. 
Potential knowledge is defined counterfactually with reference to 
actual knowledge. It follows that the definition of potential 
knowledge presupposes that of actual knowledge. Likewise, the 
potential predeliberation characteristic of the merely voluntary 
is defined counterfactually with reference to the actual 
predeliberation characteristic of action on npoaCpcoiq. It 
follows that the definition of potential predeliberation, and so 
the definition of the merely voluntary, presupposes that of 
(142) 
actual predeliberation, and so the definition of action on 
npoa(pEOLq. It does not follow, from my rationality requirement, 
that the only genuinely voluntary action is action on npoaCpcaLS. 
But it does follow that the form of explanation for all genuinely 
voluntary action is that form dictated by the nature of action on 
npoa(pcoLS. 
3, ßoúXEUOK 
What we want to know about next, then, is the nature of 
actual predeliberation. The natural starting point for this 
inquiry is Aristotle's discussion of poOxEUGLS, deliberation, in 
NE III.3. What this discussion establishes is, first, the very 
close connection between ßoúXcuaLC, npoa(pcaiç and action on 
npoa(pEOLS; and, second, that the possibility of giving a full 
and non -provisional account of ßoúXEuotç (which Aristotle does 
not give) is dependent on the possibility of giving a full and 
non -provisional account of practical reasoning and 'the practical 
syllogism' (which Aristotle does not give either). Thus 
discussing poúÀEuaLq will lead me on to the detailed discussion 
of practical reasoning which takes up the rest of this chapter. 
First, note six close parallels between Aristotle's remarks 
about npoa(pcaiç and about poúXEuats. 
(i) npoaípeoK, we heard (a), is not shared with irrational 
creatures; it is characteristic of sensible adult humans. 
(143) 
Likewise, the discussion of poúXEuaic is dominated by the word 
pouAEUóucOa, the subject of which, if Aristotle's examples in 
3.111 are anything to go by, is again sensible adult humans: 
XEKTÉOV 5' rac,)S poUXEUTÒV oúl( Onto oú ßouXEúoaLT' c v Tic fX(Otoç 
fi uaLvóNEvoç, óaa' Onto óv ó voúv Xcav (NE 1112a20-21; cp. 
1141b10). 
(ii) There is no npoaípEOLS either of what is impossible tout 
court, or of what is impossible for me (e). Likewise we 
pouaeuóIEBa ót Wept T65v cp' fflity Kat npaKTCiv (1112a31) . 
(iii) poúXflaiç is of the end, npoa(pEOLS of the means (f). 
Likewise we pouXEu6pc8a 5' oú Wept T65v TEX(ilv, ó)XÒ nept Tciiv npòç 
TO TÉñrl (1112b13). 
(iv) npoa(pEaLp cannot concern any matter at all, as SOEa can, 
but only TO tcp' fpty (g). Likewise, (1112a21) the range of 
poúXeuoiç does not include TO dV5ta or (1112b1) at âKpLOcIc Kat 
aúrápKEIS TcaV tnLOTrlJc&v (the objects of tnLaTflurl, 1139b20); nor 
(1112a24) things that change with complete regularity (the 
objects of aocp(a, 1141b1 -3); nor (1112a26 -27) irregular or chance 
changes (the objects of some sorts of Teyvrl, 1140a19 -20). Since 
(1141b2) aocp(a - voûc + tnc.arfjurl, it would seem to follow that 
the range of ßoÚÀEUOLc must coincide with that of the only 
remaining form of intellectual virtue, cppóvrlGLS (113915 -16). That 
this is so is clear from 1112b8 -10 (TO pouXEúeaOai. Srj Èv Totc óS 
ênt TO noaú, ósfjXoiç be ncilc ànoßfjoETaL, Kart by otc óöLópLoTov), 
and confirmed by 1140a24 -b6 (a32: poueúera1 o' oü9etS Wept Tóv 
65uvdiT(JV 6Iññcilc, Éye Lv) . 
(144) 
(v) Belief is qualified as either true or false, but npoaCpEoLS 
as right or wrong (h and k); npoaCpEoLS makes our characters good 
or bad- not moral belief (i). Likewise ßoLíXEuoLS is that kind of 
deliberation employed in settling moral, practical problems: 
SOKEL Sr) cppovCuou ETvaL TÒ búvaoBaL KaAwS pouXEúoao6aL nEpt Td 
aúT45 àyaAà Kat oupcpepovTa (1140a25-26). 
(vi) ' npoaCpEoLS concerns pursuit or avoidance, but belief, what 
things are, and how advantageous, and for whom' (j: 1112a4 -5). 
Likewise oOSt br) [Errj pouXEUTÒV] Td Ka6' EKaara, otov EI áproÇ 
TOOTO fi nenEnraL ()S öEt 01001)0E6K yàp Ta0ra: 1113a1). 
It is evident from this comparison that npoaCpEoLS and 
poúXcuoLS are indeed intimately connected. So intimately 
connected, in fact, that Aristotle actually feels it necessary to 
tell us how to distinguish them: 
pouñEUTÒV Kal npoaLpETÒV TÒ aúTÓ, nñTjv àcpupLOµVOV liSn TO 
npoaLpETÓV TO yàp et( TrjS pouXrjS npoKpLBev npoaLpETóv ÉQTLV. (NE 
1113a2-5) 
Somewhat freely, I translate: 'What poúXEUOLS has settled on 
is the same as what npoaCpEoLS settles on, except that when 
npoaCpEoLS settles on something, it is already predeterminate. 
For what one's deliberating (ßouX ) has already (npo -) adjudged, 
is what npoaCpEoLS settles on.' (Note, again, Aristotle's 
insistence on the use of the npo- prefix in npoKp L O v .) The same 
point is made in a different way by 1139a32: 
(145) 
npamS uev oí3v dipXr) npoaCpEaLS (60Ev KCvflaLS oúX oú 
EvEKa), npoaLptaEwq bt gpEELCC Kat XóyoS ö EVEKá TLVOS. 
The point of these passages is twofold. First: that the 
efficient cause of the npâELS- the 'action on npoaCpEaLS', as I 
have been calling it- is the npoaCpEOLS. And second: that there 
is something which precedes npoalpEaiç as its efficient cause, 
just as npoaCpEOLS precedes action on npoaCpEaLS. 1113a2 -5 
implies that this is BoOxEUGLC,; 1139a32, that this is gpEELC Kat 
Xóyoç Ó É`VEK6 TLvoç, 'appetition plus reasoning directed to some 
end'. 
This suggests that poúXEUOLS is equivalent to 'appetition 
plus reasoning directed to some end'. Bear in mind the NE III.2 -3 
doctrine that npOaCpEOLÇ and OotíXEuoiç are of means, not ends, 
and compare 1112b13- 14,16: 
OÚTE yàp l.aTpÓS ßOUXEÚETaL E L ' ÚyLÓIaE L , OÚTE (511TWp E C 
nELQEL, ,, ÓIñAÓI 8É4.lEVoL TÉñOÇ Tt, nWS Kal, bLá TCVWV ÉOTaL 
6KOnolJa L . . , 
(How do we translate Oeucvot here, given that (as I have 
argued) the establishment of first principles for reasoning is 
not necessarily itself an irrational process? Not as 'taking for 
granted', with the Loeb, but as 'positing' or 'laid down'. The 
doctor qua doctor does not deliberate about what end to seek to 
bring about; the TeXoç of her actions is already settled for her 
by the very fact that she is a doctor. But a human being- qua 
(146) 
human being, as 
one might say- might well deliberate about 
whether to be a doctor; or indeed about whether to act, in some 
situation, qua doctor or (say) qua soldier. As we have seen, 
there are both analogies and disanalogies between a TÉxvn and the 
no(notç which is the gpYov it must involve, and äpETp 6Xwç, 
overall virtue, and the npáEtç which it may or may not involve.) 
Anyway, we may gloss 1139a32 as meaning that what happens in 
poúXEuoLS is that an end which the agent has already decided upon 
(by some other process which is not, strictly, poOxEuotç, or at 
any rate not this pOÚÀEUOLS) is converted into a npoa(pcotç, a 
decision to act. This happens by way of the process which is, 
strictly, pot5XEuotç. By a mental searching, means to the end in 
question are found: nïS t<o1 btà TLVWV 0T01 OtconoüOt. 
The best and most detailed description of this process is 
given at NE 1112b16 -27. pot1XEuotç, says Aristotle, is a process 
of working from a first term, namely the T aoÇ which has been 
posited, to a final term, namely the beginning of the npdELq: Tò 
goxaTOv tv Tíj àvañúOEl. np&TOV E7vat. tv Tij YEVeoEt (b24). 
(Note that, on this account, the pot5XEuoLS includes the 
npoafpcotç, and is the efficient cause, not of the npooCpEotç as 
at 1139a32 -33, but of the action on npoa(pEOtÇ, the npäELS 
itself. The cause of the trouble here may be the ambiguity of 
Aristotle's use of npoa(pEOtS, between 'decision to act' (so 
1139a32) and 'action on a decision to act' (so, apparently, 
1112a13 -16).) 
(147) 
The deliberator, in 'examining how and by what means [the 
end] will be brought about' (b16), works from a first term, the 
r aoç, to a last term, the npÖZLS or the beginning of the npâELS, 
by the quickest method possible- if any method is possible. If 
several methods are available, the deliberator asks herself 
'Which is the easiest and best of these methods ?': 
bLà nñ£Ldv(JV pÈv cpaLVOpvou yLVEOBaL bLà Tí.voS kloTa Kaì 
K6AXL0Ta ÈnLOKOnoÛOL,,, (b17) 
In the case where only one method is available- and, 
presumably, in the case where the deliberator has decided which 
is the best of several methods- the deliberator asks two further 
questions: 'How will this method bring about the end? How is this 
method itself to be brought into operation ?': 
...bL' ÉVdÇ b' tnLTEñoupÉvou, n(JS bLà TOL1TOU t6TaL, KáK£rVO 
bLà TLvoç... (b18) 
And so the deliberator works back to some performance or 
movement within his power which is immediately available for him 
to do without doing anything else first- and does it. But if at 
any stage in this process it becomes clear that in fact no method 
is available, the deliberator abandons the project: 
..go5 av rttx9(oaLv Tò np8TOV arTLOV, 8tv Tt ELiaoEL 
toyaTÓv eaTLV, , ÉàV se buvaTÒV (pat'v1jTaL, byXELp000L npÓITTELV. 
(b19, b27) 
(148) 
...Kay elibuváTto bVTÚXtaatV, àp(ffTavTat. (1112b25) 
This performance or movement is the last term in the 
deliberation, and the first step (TO npt;3TOV a(TEOV) in the 
performance of the action (b24). The use of the word a(TLOV here 
reminds us again that this account can be seen as explaining the 
1139a32 remark, that the deliberation is the efficient cause of 
the action. The process of deliberation terminates in something 
which can be done as the beginning of a process of action: what 
Aristotle calls Tà %Kilroy a(Tlov, and what David Charles (1984, 
Ch.2) calls a 'basic action'. The same point is suggested by 
Aristotle's formula (1139a5) about npoaípEaLç, that it is A' 
ópEKTIKOS vOUÇ !j ópEELÇ 5taVOnTIKA. He repeats it in another form 
at 1113a5-6: 
naLi£Tat yàp ÉKOK3TOS 01T15V nc."ç npáEEt aTOV El'ç WTÓV (iV6yoya 
Ti}v äpxW, Kaì atíTOU EL'S TÓ tiyaúEIEVOV' TO0TO ydp Tó 
npoalpoúuEvoV. 
This analysis of Aristotle's account of deliberation suggests 
three points. 
First: to give an account of deliberation, as i have just 
done, is itself to give an account of the combination of 
unhindered appetition (öpE£tç for a TeXoç) with relevant 
knowledge (awareness of the appropriate method for obtaining the 
T ÀOS, and of the best means to put that method into practice). 
It was, of course, this combination which i suggested was what 
(149) 
,..Käv ay äSuváTCp tvrúX(,oirLV, àcpLaTavraL. (1112b25) 
This performance or movement is the last term in the 
deliberation, and the first step (TO npyTov 
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He rer,=-- 
naúETaL yàp fKa6TOS (11T(ilv n(ilq npáEE l ÖTOV E L' S aúTÒV áváyayU 
TO ÓIpX>lV , Ka L aLSTOU E L' p TO l'jy0ú4.J£ VOV ' TOLJTO ydp TÓ 
npoaLpoúuEVov. 
This analysis of Aristotle's account of deliberation suggests 
three points. 
First: to give an account of deliberation, as I have just 
done, is itself to give an account of the combination of 
unhindered appetition WEEK for a T Xoç) with relevant 
knowledge (awareness of the appropriate method for obtaining the 
Texoç, and of the best means to put that method into practice). 
It was, of course, this combination which I suggested was what 
(149) 
constituted the rationality of a voluntary action- whether the 
deliberation in question is actual, as in action on npoaCpcoiç, 
or merely potential, as in Tò tKOÚGLov, the merely voluntary. 
Second: we now have an account of something which may have 
seemed obscure thus far, namely what it means to say that some 
behaviour is performed 'because of' a combination of unhindered 
appetition and relevant knowledge. 'The last step of the 
deliberation is the first step of the action' (1112b24): the 
nx5TOV OrTIOV is both the termination of the process of 
deliberation, and the commencement of the process of action- and 
hence is itself the causal link between thought and action. (Cp. 
g4d below, on the nature of the conclusion of a 'practical 
syllogism'.). Thus to say that some behaviour B is performed 
'because of' the combination of unhindered appetition and 
relevant knowledge in deliberation is to say no more and no less 
than that B satisfies the rationality condition of voluntary 
action. 
And third: if this is what deliberation is, then it would seem 
that a more precise account of the nature of deliberative 
reasoning might be obtained by closer examination of the notion 
of the 'practical syllogism'. To this I now turn. 
4. Practical Reasonin and the 'Practical S lloism' 
The suggestion is that an account of practical reasoning in 
(150) 
the form of the 'practical syllogism' is at the heart of 
Aristotle's account of deliberation, which itself is central to 
Aristotle's account of action on npoalpEGLS, the most fully 
explicit form of voluntary action. What, then, is the 
Aristotelian 'practical syllogism'? In particular, how far is it 
inference in the strict sense? Answering this question will 
involve me in a brief examination ( §4a) of standard Aristotelian 
syllogisms, so as to compare them ( §4b) with practical 
syllogisms. 
First, a note on the name 'practical syllogism'. 
'The expression ['practical syllogism'] is not a translation 
or transliteration of any expression Aristotle ever uses... The 
Greek words ouXXoyLopoi TÔv npaKTC3v [NE 1144a32] are taken as the 
Aristotelian authority for the use of the expression... But to 
take [these words] as a unit of expression is to misread the 
Greek.' 
(Kenny 1979, p.111) 
NE 1144a31-33 reads: oC ydp OuXXoyLOuoi T6v npaKT6v dpX0 
gyOVTES ECOLV, tfEL51) TOL6V5E TÓ TÉXOS Kai TÓ dpicrov... . As 
Kenny says, tyovTES EioLV cannot possibly be the Greek for 'are 
such as to have'. Hence rightly dividing the vital words here 
gives us this: 
I o( ydp OuXaoyLauoì. I TC5v npaKT6v dpXr>v EXovTES I EtOLV... 
(151) 
and not, as Ross and Rackham apparently held, this: 
ot Op I vuAaoyrauoì rav npaKTC-av I ápXr}v t'XovrcS stoLv 
and it follows that we may render this phrase as: 
'The syllogisms which contain starting points of actions are 
like this...'. 
We may not, however, render it (with Ross 1925) as: 
'Practical syllogisms involve starting points of this 
sort...' 
nor yet (with Rackham 1926) as 
'For deductive inferences about matters of conduct always 
have a major premiss of the form...'. 
Which noted, I shall nonetheless follow the usual practice in 
using (faute de mieux) the phrase 'practical syllogism' - 
henceforth without scare quotes- to describe the particular 
'sums' or pieces of inference which Aristotle, clearly enough, 
believes to be the basic components of the phenomenon of 
practical reasoning in general. 
(152) 
4a The Standard Aristotelian Syllogism 
To understand Aristotle's account of the practical syllogism, 
we need to compare it very briefly with his account of the 
standard, 'theoretical' or 'abstract', syllogism. Aristotle's 
account of the standard syllogism is part of his account of 
general abstract reasoning, which in turn is part of his account 
of argumentation: i.e., his account of how to give persuasive 
arguments (n(GTELS, dAR 1354a16) or demonstrations (ánóbELEELS, 
APr 24a11). At dAR 1354a1 ff., he distinguishes two types of 
argument: 
(i) Logical arguments (which can be either 'demonstrations' or 
'dialectical arguments'), which depend on appealing solely to 
reason. 
(ii) Rhetorical arguments. These depend on appealing to 'the 
moral character of the speaker, [by] some way of making the 
listener feel, and [by] the speech (ô Xóyoç) itself, through its 
proving or seeming to prove its thesis' (dAR 1356a1 -4). 
Aristotle divides logical argumentation into demonstration 
and dialectic (APr 24a23 ff.), or, perhaps equivalently, into 
syllogism and induction (APr 68b13 -14; NE 1139b26: 'All teaching 
is either through induction or through syllogism'). 
What is Aristotle's contrast between induction and 
(153) 
syllogism? Whether induction is characterised as narrowly and 
tightly as it seems to be at APr 68b15 -29 (and NE 1098b4), or 
more loosely so that it includes definition, habituation and the 
activities of aro0noiÇ, cpavraoCa, or voaq (dMA 701a32 -33), 
Aristotle makes it clear that it is induction's job to supply the 
first principles of syllogism: 
115v äp0v 5' aC pev enaywyñ BECppoOvTaL, aC 5' 0LOB4OEL, aC 5' 
C6Lap45 TLVC, Kar, äññaL 5' (5XÁWq, (NE 1098b4) 
Now Aristotle does not believe that induction (in the strict 
or in the loose sense) is rationally justifiable in the 
argumentative form of the syllogism, to which induction is prior 
and by which induction is presupposed. But this does not commit 
him to saying that induction is not, in any sense, rationally 
justifiable. Consider the sentence just before the last 
quotation, NE 1098b1 -3: 
OÚK áinaLTljTeov 5' oÚSÉ Tr}V aL'TCaV eV óínaoLV ópoCWS, äxx' 
tKaIVÓV ÉV TLßL TÓ ÖTL 5EL}(8qVaL KañcilC, OEOV Kal. nEpì. TäS apXóS' 
Tó 5' ÖTL npWTOV KaL ÓlpXr`j. 
For Aristotle different kinds of 6p)05 are justified in 
different ways. Does this passage go against that view? Not if we 
translate it, as we quite legitimately may, 'Nor again must we in 
all matters demand an explanation of the same sort (ópo(cilç)'. 
(Again, on this view, Tó 5' ÓT1 np&TOV K017. äpyi5 need not be, with 
Rackham (1926), 'The fact is the primary thing and the 
(154) 
principle'; it can equally well be 'The fact is a primary thing 
and a principle'. It is not as if there were only one kind of 
The syllogism is the paradigm of rational justification, and 
yet it is not self supporting. For the formation of its 
principles, and hence for its very existence, the syllogism 
depends crucially on other forms of rational justification - 
which, be it noted, are both other forms, and forms of rational 
justfication. 
The syllogism is the TEXECoq form of theoretical reasoning: 
i.e., what all reasoning 'aims at being' (or creating) is the 
syllogistic form (APr 24b23 -25). Only syllogisms are or can be 
completely and rigorously valid. So induction lacks the formal 
cogency of syllogism. Yet what induction lacks in formal cogency, 
it makes up (says Aristotle) in immediacy and subjective 
certainty: 'If [a reasoner] is not more certain of his first 
principles than of his conclusion, he will have his scientific 
knowledge accidentally' (NE 1139b34 -35). 'By nature, the 
syllogism by the middle term [sc. the standard syllogism] is 
prior and more knowable (YvwpL.P(STEpeq, which also means'nobler'). 
But to us, the [syllogism] by induction is more obvious 
(evapyeaTEpoç)' (APr 68b36 -37). 
Aristotle saw that induction too plays a crucial role in 
human reasoning, a role which syllogistic inference could not 
Possibly fill. That role is the establishment, whether by 
(155) 
perception, definition, or induction strictly so called, of the 
first principles of those syllogisms. This is a necessity prior 
to the establishment of any syllogisms at all: 11 bra enaywyft 
óipXnS ÉOTL /COIL TOO Kafj(SXOIJ, ò6É OUñXOyLOpÓC, ÉK T(ilV KaBCíXOU (NE 
1139b28 -30). Admittedly some syllogisms do indeed, as the 
'rationalists' were claiming, derive their first principles from 
other syllogisms (call them derivative syllogisms). But at least 
some syllogisms (prime syllogisms) must, Aristotle thinks, be 
dependent on first principles arrived at not by syllogism but by 
induction. Eventually, in any reasoning, 'there will be a stop' 
(NE 1142a30)- the syllogising will come to rest on a first 
principle known by induction. 
The doctrine of the Analytics is that we can classify all 
fully rigorous logical arguments as what Aristotle calls 'full' 
or 'perfect' syllogisms: ([0] TeXEL.oç ouXXoytopòç). Less rigorous 
arguments, but which are still clearly logical or pseudo -logical 
in character, will be 'imperfect' (diTExil) syllogisms- degenerate 
types of syllogism. (Syllogisms of proper form can be less than 
fully cogent too, of course. They may involve falsehoods and 
improper transitions.) Other less than TExECoÇ forms of 
argumentation are the two rhetorical forms, enthymeme (APr 
70a11 -23) and napá5ELypa (APr 68b38- 69a13): from a logical point 
of view, these turn out to be imperfectly formed syllogism and 
induction respectively. 
Full syllogisms are either simple syllogisms; or they are 
what are called sorites, involving a series of transitions from 
(156) 
one simple syllogism to another, in which one premiss of the 
second syllogism is the conclusion of the first, of the third, 
the conclusion of the second- and so on. Aristotle, I take it, 
believes that all sorites are resoluble into simple syllogisms 
(APr 42a32 -b26 seems to suggest this, without actually saying 
it). 
There is on Aristotle's view a definite number of 
argumentative forms, some of which will always be valid and some 
of which will always be invalid (provided, of course, that we are 
dealing with well- formed examples of these forms). Aristotle's 
project, in the Analytics, is to classify these argumentative 
forms. If he succeeds, anyone who wants to show that a given 
dialectical argument is rigorously valid will need only to 
establish (i) that it is not a piece of induction, (ii) that it 
is an example of one of the rigorously valid or invalid forms of 
syllogism, and (iii), if (ii) is not sufficient to show its 
validity, that it is a well- formed example of a rigorously valid 
form of syllogism. Aristotle wants to give us a 'look -up table' 
of all the kinds of good argument there are- and some account of 
why only these kinds of argument are good. 
4b, Comparison with the Practical Syllogism 
How far, then, does this general account of the syllogism 
apply to the practical syllogism? To quote Anthony Kenny again: 
(157) 
'Practical syllogisms are riot, and most of them do not even 
look like, syllogisms. A syllogism should consist of two 
premisses and a conclusion, all three grammatically of 
subject -predicate form; it should contain three terms, one of 
which ( "the minor ") occurs in subject place in the conclusion, 
one of which ( "the major ") occurs in predicate place in the 
conclusion, and the third of which ( "the middle ") occurs in both 
premisses but not in the conclusion... A traditional syllogism of 
this kind is something very unlike the patterns of 
non -theoretical reasoning in Aristotle... We find practical 
inferences involving two, three and four premisses; the 
conclusion is never a straightforward subject -predicate sentence; 
the premisses are often of conditional form so that the whole 
looks more like an exercise in propositional calculus than in 
syllogistic... one must realise that a "practical syllogism" is 
something even in appearance very different from a syllogism in 
Barbara or an inference of the form "All Xs are Ys; A is an X; 
therefore A is a Y."' 
(Kenny 1979, p.112) 
It is certainly true that Aristotle's remarks on and examples 
of practical syllogisms, when compared with his remarks on and 
examples of abstract syllogisms, seem puzzling and unhelpful. The 
sustained and intricate account of the abstract syllogism in the 
logical works stands in stark contrast to Aristotle's scattered 
and informal remarks on the practical syllogism, and his 
desultory and apparently carelessly- chosen examples. It does not 
(158) 
look easy to extract a single canonical form from these. 
Nonetheless, although the practical syllogism is undeniably 
unlike other Aristotelian syllogisms in some respects, it is not 
totally unlike. There is room for doubt that the practical 
'syllogism' is truly a syllogism, when we consider Aristotle's 
definition of 'syllogism' at APr 24b19 -20: uuXaoyLGPÓS S ËoT L 
Xóyoç EV (5 TEE1 VTWV TLV6V FTEpOV TL TWV KELP eVWV É óVÓyKryç 
Q(Jpßo(VE t T( TOJTO E L'vol . But on the other hand, there is no 
doubt at all that Aristotle thinks that the practical syllogism 
expresses some kind of logic. 
My line will be that Aristotle viewed the relation between 
standard syllogisms and practical syllogisms as no more, and no 
less, than an analogical relation. That the relation between them 
is not simply identity of kind, but not simply dissimilarity 
either, seems to be expressed by Aristotle's language about 
practical syllogisms. If the relation was identity of kind, we 
might expect Aristotle's commonest term for 'practical syllogism' 
to be the heavily theory -charged term au),XoyLOfJóÇ. But, in fact, 
he uses ouXXoyiapóç of practical reasoning on only two occasions 
in the NE (1142b23, 1144a31; but cp. also 1149a33 c5onEp 
auXXoyLoópcvoç). Again, if the relation was anything approaching 
simple dissimilarity, we might expect Aristotle to prefer the 
very neutral, non -committal term Xóyoç (which he uses of 
(159) 
practical reasoning in six places: 1112a16, 1149a26, 1149b1 -3, 
1150b28, 1151a29). But neither of these terms is Aristotle's 
commonest term for 'practical syllogism'; this is xoyiopóç (NE 
1111a34, 1117a21, 1119b10, 1141b14, 1142b19, 1145b11 -12, 1146a33, 
1149b35, 1150b24). Moreover, unlike xóYoS, xoytopóç never seems 
to have any other sense in the NE. (The only possible exception 
is 1141b14, but even this seems dubious.) 
This terminological survey has a moral: the reasoning of 
practical syllogisms is not so loose as to deserve no more than 
the prosaic name xóYoS; but not so rigorous as to deserve the 
special name ouxxoyiopóç. It is somewhere in between. Adding the 
scientific looking suffix -iopoç promotes xóyos; dropping the 
intensive prefix ouv- demotes ouxxoyLopáç. By either route, or 
both, one arrives at xoyiapóç. The word was not of course an 
Aristotelian coinage; but its shape was very convenient for 
expressing what he wanted. 
I will now substantiate my suggestion that the relation 
between the standard syllogism and the practical syllogism is an 
analogical one. The right place to start this account is with the 
examples of practical syllogisms which Aristotle actually gives. 
(160) 
So here, in my own very literal English, are all twelve (as I 
count them) of Aristotle's formal or specific examples of 
complete or readily completable practical syllogisms, stripped as 
far as possible of the commentaries in which they are embedded. 
(1) '[Belief and reasoning about the universal] says that such a 
person should do such a sort of thing; [belief and reasoning 
about the particular fact says] that this thing now is a thing of 
that sort, and that I myself am such a person.' (dA 434a17 -20) 
(2) '...As when he thinks that every man should walk, and that he 
is a man, he at once walks...' (dMA 701a14) 
(3) '...or if he thinks that no man should walk now, and he is a 
man, he at once is still.' (dMA 701a15) 
(4) "I should make something good "; "A house is something good "; 
he makes a house at once.' (dMA 701a16 -17) 
(5) "I need a covering "; "A cloak is a covering "; "I need a 
cloak ". "I should make what I need "; "I need a cloak "; "I should 
make a cloak ".' (dMA 701a17 -20) 
(6) "I should drink ", says desire. "This is a drink ", says 
perception or imagination or voûç. At once he drinks.' (dMA 
701a32 -33) 
(7) "Since this is health, it is necessary, if the patient is to 
be healthy, that so and so should be the case, such as 
'homogeneity'. If there is to be 'homogeneity', there must be 
(161) 
heat..." -and so he always continues thinking until he arrives at 
the last term, what he himself can do.' (Mph 1O32b7 -9) 
(g) ' -"If he is to be healthy, he must be made homogeneous." -"So 
what counts as homogeneity ?" -"This; and this will come about if 
he is heated." - "What counts as being heated ?" -"This; and this 
is present in potential [i.e., is possible] and is already up to 
him. "' (Mph 1O32b18 -22) 
(g) '[One can be wrong] either that all "heavy water" is 
unwholesome, or that this is "heavy water ".' (NE 1142a23) 
(10) '...He may know that dry foods are good for every man, and 
that he himself is a human, or that Food X is a dry food; but 
that this is Food X, he may either not know or not actualise.' 
(NE 1147a5 -7) 
(11) 'If every sweet thing should be tasted, and this thing is 
sweet- being some particular item- it is necessary for a person, 
who is able and is not prevented, at once also to taste it...' 
(NE 1147a29 -31) 
(12) '...So when the universal premiss is present which forbids 
tasting [whatever is sweet], but also the [universal premiss] 
that "every sweet thing is pleasant ", and [the particular 
premiss] that "this thing is sweet ", and this latter is operative 
when desire happens to be present; then the [first universal 
premiss] says that one should flee this, but the desire leads one 
on.' (NE 1147a31 -34) 
What are we to make of these examples of practical 
syllogisms, when we compare them with standard syllogisms? There 
are five main problem areas: 
(162) 
(a) Do practical syllogisms have only two premiases, one major 
and one minor? 
(b) What is the 'major premiss' of a practical syllogism? 
(c) What is the 'minor premiss' of a practical syllogism? 
(d) What is the conclusion of a practical syllogism? 
(e) Are practical syllogisms, in fact, valid? 
(a) This question divides into two sub -questions: (al) How 
many premisses does a practical syllogism have? (a2) Of what 
sorts? 
On (al), dMA 701a12 (eK TaV 56o nporáoewv...) is clear 
enough; but dMA 701a23 -25 (ai úe npoTÓoEIS at nolnrlKaì. blà ßúo 
EtWav y(voVTal) clouds the picture by not telling us for sure 
that only one premiss of each Er5k comes to be in a practical 
syllogism. My examples (1 -4), (6), (9), and (11) support the dMA 
701a12 view; but (5), (7), (8), (10) and (12) go against it. And 
NE 1147a4 -10 argues explicitly that there are two (or is it 
three ?) major premisses in each practical syllogism: 
óla(pf'pEl 6e Kal TÓ KaBÓñOU' TÓ ueV yap ecp' eauTOU TÓ 5' enì 
roG npcSyparóS ÉQT l. V, oLov tíT l navT ì. 6v0p6n(t) ouu(pÉ pE l Ta E>>pa, Kaì. 
6TL aún-òS 5vepcilnoS, ñ óTl ,rIpòv Tò TolóvSE... (1147a4-7) 
Consider, however, the difference between standard 
'syllogisms' which are simple syllogisms and those which are 
actually sorites. It is, I suggested, Aristotle's conviction 
about standard syllogisms that all sorites can be analysed as 
(163) 
compounded out of simple syllogisms. Why not apply this idea to 
practical syllogisms also? Suppose we had formalised example (5) 
as follows: 
(5') 1. (X thinks:) X needs a covering. 
2. (X thinks:) A cloak is a covering. 
3. (X thinks:) X needs a cloak. 
4. (X thinks:) What X needs, X must make. 
5. (X thinks:) X must make a cloak. 
Given the point about sorites, we might renumber (5'5) as 
(5'6) and add a new (5'5), of identical content to (5'3): 
(5') 5. (X thinks:) X needs a cloak. 
(5'1 -3) and (5'4 -6) can now be seen as the two simple 
syllogisms out of which (5') is compounded as a sorites. For 
clarity, we may write the sorites out, showing the transferred 
conclusion, and with its constituent simple syllogisms marked 
off, like this: 
(5') 1. (X thinks:) X needs a covering. 
2. (X thinks:) A cloak is a covering. 
3. (X thinks:) X needs a cloak. 
4. (X thinks:) What X needs, X must make. 
5. (X thinks:) X needs a cloak. 
6. (X thinks:) X must make a cloak. 
(164) 
A similar treatment can be applied to the other cases which 
show just the same problem, (7), (8) and (10); with, however, the 
added complication that these are three -stage, not two -stage, 
sorites. Given that (7) and (8) are essentially the same 
syllogism, we might formalise that syllogism thus: 
(7') 1. (X thinks:) The patient Y is to be healthy. 
2. (X thinks:) Health is 'homogeneity' (óuaX6TriS). 
3. (X thinks:) X must increase Y's 'homogeneity'. 
4. (X thinks:) X must increase Y's ' homogeneity'. 
5. (X thinks:) Y's 'homogeneity' will be increased if Y is 
heated. 
6. (X thinks:) X must heat Y. 
7. (X thinks:) X must heat Y. 
8. (X thinks:) If Y is massaged, Y will be heated. 
9. (X thinks:) X must massage Y. 
Example (10), likewise, will give us this sorites: 
(10') 1. (X thinks:) To be healthy, X must eat what is digestible 
and wholesome. 
2. (X thinks:) Light meat is digestible and wholesome. 
3. X thinks: X should eat liht meat. 
X thinks: X should eat lieht meat. 
5. (X thinks:) Chicken is light meat. 
(165) 
6. (X thinks:) X should eat chicken. 
7. (X thinks:1 X should eat chicken. 
8. (X thinks:) This is chicken. 
9. (X thinks:) X should eat this. 
(a2) What sorts of premisses does a practical syllogism have? 
It appears from the Analytics that standard syllogisms have one 
minor premiss or premiss 'of the particulars' (Tà Ka8' ËKa6Ta), 
and one major premiss or premiss 'of the universal' (TÒ Ka8óXou). 
In the NE, Aristotle does use the terms Tò KaOÓXou and TO Ka9' 
ÉKaoTa when referring to the premisses of practical syllogisms: 
so 1143b3 -4, 1147a1 -10, 27 ff., and cf. 1135a6 -8: T_V Sì SLKaCwv 
K& vop Cpcov fKa6TOV c Ç Ta KaOóXou npÓS Tà Ka8' E KaOTO É XE L ' Tà 
ay yap npaTTó$EVa noXXÓ, bKECVC,)V S' Ka6TOV Ev. The same terms 
are employed in the dA (434a17 -18). But in the dMA, Aristotle 
uses a different pair of terms: 
at S? npoTà6El.C, at noLTITL.KaI Sid alo ELSWV yLVOVTaL, 5L6 TE 
To() aya8oü Kaa. TOO SuvaTOG... (701a23-25) 
A division of premisses into 'premisses of the good' and 
'premisses of the possible' seems to suggest a rather different 
(166) 
picture. Which 
(b) brings me to an examination of the practical syllogism's 
major, or universal, premiss, or premiss of the good- whichever 
we should call it. The term 'major premiss' should, perhaps, be 
reserved for standard syllogisms, so that practical syllogisms 
have neither major nor minor premisses. But considering some of 
the universal premisses in the examples above, neither of the 
other two pairs of names seems to fit either: 'Every man should 
walk' (2), 'I need a covering' (5), ' "I should drink ", says 
desire' (6), 'Dry food is good for every man' (10). In what sense 
are any of these premisses of the good? In what sense are (5) and 
(6) universal premisses? (Until these questions are answered, I 
will call them first premisses.) Two important passages in 
particular seem hard to square with the idea that such 
propositions as these could be the first premisses of practical 
syllogisms, NE 1144a31 -33 and dA 434a17 -20. 
(i) As we have seen, NE 1144a31 -33 reads: of y ouXXoyLopoì 
TWV npc(KT(ilV Ólp)(ijV rXOVTES EL'oLV, t:nsLbrj TOL6V5E TÓ TÉXOC, KOIì. TÓ 
Ip1GTOV,,, 
. The Loeb here has: 'For deductive inferences about 
matters of conduct always have a major premiss of the form 'Since 
the End or Supreme Good is so and so...' (Loeb, p.368). This is a 
miracle of mistranslation, even if we ignore the ouXXoyLopoì. TWV 
npaKr(ív business: note the completely baseless introduction of 
(167) 
'always', and the assumption that iò 71`Xoç Kai rò ¿P GTOV can and 
should be rendered in the Kantian upper -case. Nonetheless, even 
if the Greek does not make anything like such a strong claim as 
the Loeb- as it plainly does not- this passage seems at odds with 
the idea that anything but a very basic moral first principle 
could be an kxl5 of a practical syllogism. 
(1i) dA 434a17-20: li pev KaBÓXou ÚnÓXqq1LS KOII ñÓyOC li 5e TOLJ 
Kq8' EKdQTOI (li pÉ V Yáp ñeyE L 6TL 5E7 TÓV TOLOGTOV Tò TOL6V5E 
npÓITTELV, li 5e ÓTL TóSE Tó Vl'JV TOL.ÓV5E, Kby(il 5e TOL665E)... 
How is one to reconcile this with NE 1144a31 -33 and the 
examples above? The first premisses of (2, 3) ('Every/ no man 
should walk'), (7, 8) 'The patient is to be healthy', (9) ('All 
"heavy water" is every 
man'), and (11) ('Every sweet thing should be tasted') may fit 
the pattern laid down by dA 434a17 -20, but are, it seems, too 
narrow to be examples of general statements that nci51f ToLÓVSE 
Tó TÉñoç KOL Tò 6piaTOV... as NE 1144a31 -33 apparently requires 
them to be. On the other hand, the first premiss of (4) ('I 
should make something good'), might fit the NE formula, but is 
surely too broad to be a statement &TL 5E1 Tòv TOLOOTOV Tò 
Toi6v6E npdTTELV, as the dA requires. As for the first premisses 
of (5) ('I need a covering') and (6) ("I should drink ", says 
desire'), these do not seem to fit with either the dA or the NE 
doctrine. 
A reconciliation of this conflicting evidence can, however, 
(168) 
be brought about. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it turns on a correct 
translation and interpretation of 1144a31 -33. The correct 
translation is something like this: 
'The syllogisms which contain the starting point of actions 
run: "Since such and such is the goal and the best... " 
The correct interpretation depends on these two conditions. 
First, that 'the goal and the best' should not be given too 
exalted an understanding (and certainly nothing which deserves 
capitalisation); for Aristotle carries on: ...óTL56noTE. óv- ÉCTO 
yap )óyou yCipr.v Tó Tuyáv (33 -34). Second, that it be understood 
that the kind of moral 4x01 with which Aristotle is concerned is, 
as correct translation shows, not some moral "cpxll jirixwS ", but 
the Tay npaKTav 6pyl. 
1144a31 -33 does not, as the Loeb suggests, mean that a 
practical syllogism must start with a moral ópyll tout court, a 
completely general statement about what is good. Rather, one need 
only start with a Tav npaKTav ápx>`j, a statement of the good which 
is to be sought in some particular case of action. Hence, rightly 
interpreted, 1144a31 -33 is not out of line with dA 434a17 -20, but 
in complete accord with it: for it too teaches that '[Belief and 
reasoning about the universal] says that such a person should do 
such a sort of thing'. 
This account leaves out the first premisses of (4) ('I should 
make something good'), (5) ('I need a covering') and (6) (' "I 
(169) 
should drink ", says desire'). 'I should make something good' is, 
i think, simply an aberration; this is nearer a moral ópXl tout 
court, a completely general statement about what is good, than a 
Twv npOKTwv 41)1. It is too vague to do the practical work which 
Aristotle requires of a Tcw npaKT(ilv äpyl. (In fact it is very 
difficult to see how this thought could be the starting point of 
the chain of reasoning which follows it in (4). At the very 
least, .we need to amend it to: 'In this situation I should make 
some appropriate good'.) 
'I need a covering' and 'I should drink' look more like 
particular premisses than first premisses. Perhaps Aristotle 
wants us to assume sorites in which these are intermediate 
conclusions, as for example: 
(i) When it rains, all men should avoid getting wet 
(ii) It is raining here and now 
(iii) All men here and now should avoid getting wet 
(iv) All men here and now should avoid getting wet 
(v) I am a man here and now 
(vi) I should avoid getting wet here and now 
(vi) I should avoid getting wet here and now 
(viii) If I have a covering, I will avoid getting wet here 
and now 
(ix) I need a covering 
(170) 
-(ix) emerges from this sorites, and one can see that 'I 
should drink' might emerge from something similar. But it would 
be a mistake to call (ix) a first premiss without careful 
qualification. It would be a mistake to claim that (ix) and its 
ilk are, strictly, Tcilv npaKTwv 6pxaa (as I use the phrase), 
statements of the good which is to be sought in some particular 
case of action. These are not statements of the good as such at 
all. But it is clear how such statements might be brought back to 
depend on statements of the good at some earlier stage in what 
will be a rather complex sorites. 
The upshot of this analysis, then, is that the first premiss 
of a practical syllogism is an äpxrl TSv npaKT6v, that is, a 
statement of the good which is to be sought in some particular 
case of action. It is not, in spite of the appearance of 
1144a31 -33, a moral ópyî tout court, a completely general 
statement of what is good. 
This conclusion apparently suggests that moral äpxai' tout 
court lurk behind ápyaì Tciv npaKT6v, as their ultimate rational 
vindication; and (as at 1135a6 -9) Aristotle often seems to allow 
this kind of talk. Indeed, if the practical syllogism, just like 
the standard syllogism, rests on first principles attained by 
'induction', it apparently ought to follow that we can specify 
the content of those moral first principles, those aloyot tout 
court, just as we can specify the content of (e.g.) mathematical 
first principles (1142a27 ff.). However, it is an important point 
about Aristotle's moral outlook that, if there are any such moral 
(171) 
first principles at all, he seems very coy about giving us 
examples- as noted 
in Ch.2. Without the presence in a person of 
good character (1139a33 -34), it seems that no moral first 
principles in the strict sense will be available to that person; 
except possibly those unhelpful truisms of which the first 
premiss of (4) would be such a nice example if it read, as it so 
nearly does, 'All people should make whatever is good'. (For the 
suggestion that the (ultimate) moral principles are KaTC( Tùq 
fl9LK6g doer6g, in accordance with (or even indentical with ?) the 
virtues, cp. NE 1178a18.) 
(c) Given that this is the nature of the first premiss of an 
Aristotelian practical syllogism, and given what was established 
in (a) about the number and kind of the practical syllogism's 
premisses, it should now be plain what the second premiss, the 
'premiss of the possible', will typically be like. I have cleared 
the way for the view of dA 434a17 -20 concerning the first premiss 
of the practical syllogism. But there is far less conflict about 
the nature of the second premiss: it is not as hard to reconcile 
(for example) the claims that the second premiss is a [5óE01] ncpì. 
Tru RA' tKaoTa, Div oto©ncr1S ?brr Kupía (NE 1147a26) and that it 
is the premiss which says 6TL TME Td VOV ToLÓV5c, Kdyw 5F. 
ToLócrbc (dA 434a20) . 
The second premiss of the practical syllogism is concerned 
with the application of the moral belief or other pro- attitude 
expressed by the first premiss. It is the second premiss which 
does the vital work in making reason practical, in getting us 
(172) 
from a moral belief (the first premiss) to an actual deed (the 
conclusion). Aristotle's stress on the means, not the ends, side 
of practical reasoning in NE III.2 -3, and his remarks that it is 
A TEXEuTaCa npóraoLS which is Kup(a T(JV npáEECav (1147b10), and 
that blávoLa b' Ol'JTt) OÚeÉV K.I.VF 1. (.51Xñ' Ti ËVEK6 TOU KOt' npaKTlKA 
(1139a35), are all different ways of pointing to the crucial 
importance of the second premiss of the practical syllogism. 
On the basis of dA 434a17 -20, then, it seems that the 
paradigm of the practical syllogism will be a piece of reasoning 
of this form: 
(j) (li pr'V KaeÓÁOU únÓÁrll}JLS KOt' XóyoS:) bEL TÓV TOLOOTOV TÓ 
TOLóV5E npáTTF.1.V. 
(li be TOO KO8' >s`KaOTa [61-1Óñ01l4JLC, KOt' ñó\/oC,]:) TÓrOE: TÓ VUV 
TO L ÓVSE , KÓI\/lil bÉ TO L ÓobE . 
(iii) (TÒ oupn(paoua, 1139b34:) Eta (5E17 TÓbE. TQ VLJV npáTTE LV, ] 
Notice three things about this paradigm of practical 
reasoning. First, how readily the allegedly simple syllogism 
splits into a two -stage sorites: 
(1) (fi .IÉV Kp©ÓñOU Únanl41LS KOl ñÓYOS;) bEL TÓV TOLOOTOV TÓ 
TOLÓVSE npáTTEIV. 
(ii) (li bE'. TOO Ka©' tKOOTa [6n6)01IuLC KOt'. XÓ1/OS]:) TÓbE TÓ VÜV 
ToIóVSE. 
n ÓTTEI.V. 
n WTOV C3llInÉpaQ a: ) bE L TÓV ToI.oGTOV TóbE TÚ VIJV 
(173) 
(iy) (lfj fJtV KOI0CSñnll IlnfSXrpTLq Kor A<`iYor;: ) 6E17 T()V TOLOOTOV TÓÚE r() 
VÚV np6ITTF L V . 
(y) (fi 5? TOO Ka' I`KaoTO [únóXrpWIS KqL XÓYoq]:) KÓyW 5£ TOLÓOSE. 
(vl) (Ta sFIJTF(JOV p7ll{_In(poopo:) FiEL TÓSE TÓ VOY npÓITTELV. 
Second, notice that the desired distinction between first and 
second premisses- that the first should state a moral belief, or 
at least a pro- attitude, the second identify a case to which that 
attitude applies- is preserved in this sorites (compare (i) with 
(ii), and (iv) with (v)). The same distinction should be 
preserved in all practical syllogisms and sorites of canonical 
form- even at the stage of the sorites where the next first 
premiss turns out to be as specific and as infra -moral as 'I need 
a cloak'. 
And third, notice how closely this kind of syllogism fits in 
with the view of Aristotelian ethics as based on the 'man of 
excellence', and his expertise in definition and in the 
application of definitions, which I argued for in the last 
chapter. First premisses like (i) and (iv) are indeed, in a 
perfectly straightforward sense, definitions; and second 
premisses like (ii) and (v) are indeed applications of these 
definitions. These first premisses are, in a way, universal, but 
they do not have the legalistic form of statements like 'All 
murder is wrong' or 'Always practise charity'. What they say is 
not so sharply defined, yet no less practically realisable: 'Such 
a sort of person should do such a sort of thing'. And in this 
context, 
I suggest, saying that TOIÓOSE should act as prescribed 
(174) 
is virtually equivalent to saying that a 'man of excellence' 
should so act. 
(d) What about the form of the conclusion of the practical 
syllogism? It is a much -debated question whether the conclusion 
of a practical syllogism is an action or a proposition. Charles 
(1984), for example, argues that it cannot be an action; the 
conclusion of a practical syllogism is a proposition, and only 
the presence of desire in addition to the presence of that 
conclusion can render the conclusion operative (Charles 1984, 
Ch.4). Anscombe famously argued that the conclusion of the 
practical syllogism was an intention, not an action (Anscombe 
1957); and other writers have followed this sort of line. Other 
philosophers again (e.g. von Wright 1978) have argued that the 
conclusion of a practical syllogism is not a proposition, but an 
action. But the evidence which Aristotle gives us does not 
obviously favour either of these views over the other. Indeed, if 
one accepts that one must take either the one view or the other, 
Aristotle seems to contradict himself. 
In the dMA, he apparently argues for the view that the 
conclusion of a practical syllogism is not a proposition, but an 
action: 'From the two premisses, the conclusion that results is 
the action. Thus, if someone thinks that "Every man ought to 
march ", and that "He himself is a man ", he marches at once 
(eú0 oç)' (dMA 701a14 -15). In the NE, moreover, he adds that 
'When one [opinion] results from these, it is necessary for the 
soul to affirm the consequent there [sc. in the standard 
(175) 
syllogism], and [likewise necessary here], in practical 
[deliberations], immediately to perform the consequent' (NE 
1147a27 -29). 
On the other hand, there is the doctrine of NE 1139a32 -33, 
that 6p0:1(.7 c Kaì X6yoç ó `vEK6 TLVOS is the cause of the 
npoo(peolc, and npoOCpEOLS in turn of the np5ELS. I have argued 
that 6pEEtÇ Kaì X6yoS ö 1VEK6 TLVOS is equivalent to 
deliberation, and that the practical syllogism is the form of 
deliberation. Hence what the practical syllogism causes (or at 
any rate, causes directly)- where 'what it causes' means 'what it 
terminates i n' , 'what its conclusion is'- will not be the npá. L s 
but the npoc(proiç. In support of that view, there is also the 
evidence of dMA 701a15 -16 ('In both cases the agent does these 
things unless something prevents him or compels him') and the 
second 56E0( of NE VII: Kai' á aÚT6q ÈyKpoTfìç Kaì pG.rEVETLKÓS TQ 
XOyLOpI, Kal 61KpaTT'IS Kal. ?KQTaTLKÓS TOO ñoyLopOt (1145b11-12; cp. 
1151a29 -30). Aristotle endorses, cautiously at least, the view 
that akrasia involves or may involve a rejection of (the result 
of) a aoytop6S. This clearly cannot mean the rejection of a 
np5Eig, since no npáE_LÇ has yet been performed; so it must 
presumably mean the rejection of a npoa(pcoiç. 
The evidence, then, conflicts. I suspect there are good 
reasons for this. As we have already seen (g3), Aristotle 
equivocates between (a) saying that the 13o1XEuotÇ includes the 
npoa(pEOLS, and is the efficient cause of the action on 
np °a(pcoLS, the npaEtc itself (so 1112a13 -16), and (b) saying 
(176) 
that the 
pot'ar is q is separate from the npoo(psolç, and is the 
efficient cause of the npooípEcriç (so 1139a32 -33). Likewise, 
therefore, he also equivocates between saying that the practical 
syllogism (which is the po0Xcucnç) leads to the npooCpEGLS, which 
in turn leads to the action, and saying that the practical 
syllogism itself leads directly to the action. 
Aristotle evidently wants to sit on this particular fence. He 
does not want to be forced into saying either that the conclusion 
of a practical syllogism is a proposition and therefore cannot be 
an action, or that it is an action and therefore cannot be a 
proposition. What he wants to establish is that the conclusion of 
the practical syllogism is a hinge, a causal link, between 
thought and action. So NE 1112a24 -25 ('The last step in the 
analysis [made by reason] is the first step in the genesis [of 
action]') and Mph 1032b7 -10: 'And thus he will always continue 
thinking (voce) until he arrives at what he himself can do- the 
last term'. But attempts to classify the conclusion of a 
practical syllogism as either simply a proposition, or simply an 
action, beg the question if they assume in advance that there can 
be no such link, that the movement from thought to action cannot 
be smooth and continuous. 
For Aristotle, the conclusion of the practical syllogism is, 
or can be expressed in, both a proposition (such as an intention 
can give rise to) and an action. And why not? Generally speaking, 
it surely makes sense to suggest that an action can embody, 
incarnate, a proposition, just as much as a proposition can give 
(177) 
an interpretation of, a 'read -out' from, an action. (Think of 
mime artists, for instance, or the action that 'says' as clearly 
as any verbal remark 'I am disgusted by the taste of this 
water'.) 
The conclusion of the practical syllogism will appear most 
obviously as an action in cases of np5Eig where there is little 
need to run through one's reasons for acting in a specific way - 
that is, where the deliberation involved in the action remains 
implicit, and the rationality of the action is potential rather 
than actual (52). It will appear most obviously as a proposition 
rather than an action in cases where the expression of the action 
form of the conclusion is thwarted, e.g. by compulsion or by 
akrasia, so that only the propositional form remains: 
'It is normally only in the case where decisions are not 
acted on (in the case, for instance, of the incontinent) or where 
action is postponed that there is any point in distinguishing 
between the act and the decision.' 
(Kenny 1979, p.143) 
But there is, of course, nothing impossible about cases where 
the conclusion of the practical syllogism is expressed 
simultaneously as both action and proposition ('You need help,' I 
say to the tramp, giving him a fifty pound note). Certainly 
Aristotle sits on the fence on this question, and betrays some 
confusion and incoherence about how to answer it. But, confusions 
(178) 
and incoherences aside (and they are not irremediable), perhaps 
he was right to want to sit on it, if he is to succeed in 
presenting an account of 'how it is that a thinking agent 
sometimes acts and sometimes does not' (dMA, 701a7). 
(e) Finally, then, to the validity of the practical 
syllogism. Much has been written about this. One notable 
contribution is Hare (1969). Hare distinguishes between the 
necessary and sufficient logical or causal conditions of 
satisfying an imperative, meaning a universal imperative (which 
is what he thinks any moral statement amounts to). He applies 
this distinction to such imperatives as (A1) 'All men must march' 
(dMA 701a13) and (B1) 'I must make what is good' (dMA 701a17). 
Then (A3) 'I must march' gives us a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for the satisfaction of the imperative 
(A1). It is a necessary condition that I should march, if (A1) 
all men are to march and (A2) I am a man. But if I am the only 
one who marches, then this is not a sufficient condition for the 
satisfaction of (A1) , "A77 men must march". 
On the other hand (83), 'I must make a house', gives us a 
sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for the satisfaction 
of the imperative (B1). If (B1) I must make what is good, and 
(B2) a house is a good thing, then my action expressing (B3) is 
sufficient to satisfy (B1). But there are indefinitely many other 
good things I could have made- daisy chains, romantic novels, box 
girder bridges - any one of which would have satisfied (81), as it 
stands, equally well. So (B3) expresses an action the performance 
(179) 
of which is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the 
satisfaction of (B1). 
Hare's point is that Aristotle can't have it both ways. The 
necessary conditions of some moral imperatives can be satisfied 
by action; the sufficient conditions, of others; the necessary 
and sufficient conditions, of none. What makes the difference is 
where the universality comes in the first premiss. 
This is a beautiful argument, which would surely succeed, if 
Aristotle's practical syllogisms, in canonical form, began with a 
universal imperative of either of the two types that Hare 
envisages. Unfortunately, however, as we have already seen, they 
do not. As David Wiggins puts it: 
'There are no general principles or rules anyway... From the 
nature of the case the subject matter of the practical is 
indefinite and unforeseeable, and any supposed principle would 
have an indefinite number of exceptions. To understand what such 
exceptions would be and what makes them exceptions would be to 
understand something not reducible to rules or principles. The 
only metric we can impose on the subject matter of practice is 
the metric of the Lesbian rule [1137b27- 32]... what Aristotle had 
in mind in NE VI was nothing remotely resembling what has been 
ascribed to him by his Kantian and other deontomaniac 
interpreters.' 
(Wiggins 1980, p.231) 
(180) 
The validity of a practical syllogism will not be subject to 
this kind of lacuna if (in line with dA 434a 17 -20, and as I have 
argued in (b -d)) its first premiss states simply that, for such a 
sort of person (namely, a good person), this sort of conduct is 
right and appropriate, and that this action here would be a case 
of that sort of conduct, and that I am that sort of person; so I 
should do it. This kind of inference seems difficult to fault on 
logical grounds, loosely phrased though it may (necessarily) be. 
Here, evidently, the analogy between practical and standard 
syllogism is in one way at its closest. 
In fact, the difficulty and the interesting problem- to sum 
up- is not to formulate valid practical syllogisms, but sound 
ones: practical syllogisms which are not just valid, but true 
also. From a first premiss which states that, for such a sort of 
person, this sort of conduct is right and appropriate, plus the 
further premisses that this action here would be a case of that 
sort of conduct and that he is that sort of person (etc.), any 
fool can deduce that he ought to do the action in question. But 
X£KTt`OV b' t'00S DouñLUTÒV oh 11n4) oú Douñ£úc7aLT' av TiS 
4fBtoS ij poEVóµcvoS, unp 6v á voGv 4cov ((VE 1112a20-21). 
We want to start our practical syllogisms from the kind of 
âPyot, the kind of first premisses and second premisses, which 
the man of excellence would start his practical syllogisms from. 
And this is what is difficult and interesting, for the 
acquisition of these ópyoì, is in itself the whole work of virtue. 
(181) 
5. Conc= 
In concluding this chapter, I bring to a close the main part 
of my exposition of Aristotle's theory of the voluntary. By now 
it should be plain what, on my account, Aristotle thinks 
voluntary action is, and how the nature of the voluntary is, for 
him, relevant to the problem of human freedom. 
On Aristotle's view, we may say of voluntary action that it 
is action which is not compelled or done under duress; not done 
in ignorance; and not irrational. More informatively, we may also 
say a good deal about what an action must be like for it to 
satisfy these three conditions. It must originate within the 
agent, the agent being able to do otherwise. It must be action on 
well founded information and moral belief(s), where 'well 
founded' means that the agent who has the information and holds 
the moral belief(s) has, and has employed, the appropriate 
epistemological expertises for gathering information and 
formulating moral belief(s). And the action must be rationally 
explicable by means of a process of practical reasoning which is 
at least potentially, and preferably actually, occurrent in the 
agent. 
If there are any actions which do satisfy these three 
conditions, then in Aristotle's view there is voluntary action. 
And if there is voluntary action, then there is free action; for 
to talk of free action could mean no more than to talk about 
voluntary action. 
(182) 
'Virtue is up to us, as likewise is vice. For in those cases 
where it is our choice (f.cn,' Wv) if we act, it will also be our 
choice if we do not act; in cases where consent is possible, so 
is refusal. Thus if it is up to us to act, where acting would be 
good, it is also up to us to refrain, where refraining would be 
bad; and vice versa. Now since it is up to us to do good or bad 
things, and likewise to refrain from doing them; and since how we 
act was the criterion of whether we are good or bad people; it 
follows that it is up to us whether we are worthwhile or 
worthless people. For the saying that 'No one's a willing 
scoundrel, nor yet unwillingly blest'- the latter part of this 
seems true, the former false. It is true that no one is 
unwillingly blessed; but wickedness is voluntary- unless we are 
to contradict what has just been said, and man is not to be 
called the origin and progenitor of his conduct, just as of his 
children. But if that seems right, and we cannot trace back our 
conduct to other sources than those within us, then what has its 
origins in us is up to us and voluntary.' (NE 1113b6 -22) 
Aristotle, then, holds that 'free action' is nothing else but 
voluntary action as he defines it: thus the NE III.1 account of 
the voluntary and involuntary is supposed to cover ali the states 
which count as either. His theory of voluntary action is meant to 
be exhaustive as an account of free action. There is no free 
action which is not voluntary action in the sense which Aristotle 
gives that term. 
But here there arises, for Aristotle's account, a question 
(183) 
which the phrase oti`r.ìc, f'Ka5v novr1Pòç (1113b15, above) might seem 
to presage. What about the case of akrasia? How does this fit 
into Aristotle's theory of the voluntary? To that question, 











The Varieties of Akrasia 
1. How to Solve the Problem of Akrasia 
2. How not to Solve the Problem of Akrasia: Aristotle's Account 
3. The Varieties of Akrasia 
'Those who restrain desire, do so because theirs is weak 
enough to be restrained; and the restrainer or reason usurps its 
place and governs the unwilling. & being restrained it by degrees 
becomes passive till it is only the shadow of desire.' 
(William Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell) 
In this chapter, I will first try to show that, if my account 
of Aristotle's theory of the voluntary in Chs.1 -3 is right, then 
there is a way of dealing with a problem which the phenomenon of 
akrasia presents for his theory (g1). I shall develop this line 
of argument by reference to the modern debate about akrasia, and 
then relate this debate to my exegesis of Aristotle. The line of 
argument which I develop was, in principle, open to Aristotle, 
but he did not use it. Then I will show how very different was 
Aristotle's actual treatment of akrasia in NE VII; and I will say 
what I think are the inadequacies of this account of akrasia. 
Finally, in §3, I will point to some instances of the great 
(188) 
variety of kinds of akrasia or akrasia -like conditions which I 
believe there are. This chapter aims to show that, vis à vis the 
Aristotelian account of voluntary and free action which I have 
presented in Chs.1 -3, the existence of something like akrasia not 
only is no threat, but provides an interesting supplement to that 
account. 
1. How to Solve the Problem of Akrasia 
At a time t someone, N, is confronted with two courses of 
action A and B. N believes N can do either A or B at t, but not 
both; and N judges at t that it would be better for N to do A and 
not B at t. Nonetheless N voluntarily does B and not A at t. 
This phenomenon has had various English names in recent 
discussion: 'backsliding' or 'hypocrisy' (Hare 1952, 1963), 
'weakness of will' (Davidson 1980, Charlton 1988), 'incontinence' 
(Davidson 1980). But these English names beg important questions, 
so I shall stick with 'akrasia', the Greek name that Aristotle 
himself uses, and its derivative 'akrates' to describe the agent 
who suffers from akrasia. 
Does akrasia occur? Some philosophers, more or less following 
Aristotle (NE 1145b28), have taken it to be a rather obvious 
truth of experience that they do. Other philosophers, more or 
less following Socrates (Protagoras 355c) , have taken it to be a 
rather obvious truth of logic that they don't. For the former 
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school, the problem of akrasia is the problem of explaining how 
akrasia is possible. For the latter school, it is the problem of 
explaining why akrasia isn't possible. 
As Justin Gosling has recently observed (Gosling 1990, 
p.196 -7), modern discussions of akrasia have mainly taken their 
cue either from Richard Hare or from Donald Davidson, whose 
celebrated treatments of akrasia display this contrast rather 
well (Hare (1952) and Hare (1963); Davidson, 'How is Weakness of 
the Will Possible ?', in Davidson, 1980, p.21 -42). Re- examination 
of the alternatives which Hare and Davidson offer us suggests a 
way of reconciling the attractive, but apparently incompatible, 
intuitions on which they work. It also suggests a way of doing 
justice to a third intuition. 
Hare's explanation why akrasia isn't possible, at least not 
in the full- blooded sense in which many think it is possible, 
follows directly from his account of what moral beliefs are. As 
every undergraduate knows, on Hare's account any belief, to count 
as a moral belief, must display two features, prescriptivity and 
universalisability. The idea of universalisability is this: If I 
make judgement J1 in situation S1, then J1 is a universalised 
judgement if and only if, when I make J1, I could commit myself 
to making the relevantly similar judgements J2 -Jn in all 
relevantly similar situations S2 -Sn. The idea of prescriptivity 
is that 'Moral judgements, in their central use, have it as their 
function to guide conduct' (Hare, 1963, p.70). 
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Hare thinks that these two requirements are together 
necessary and sufficient to characterise moral beliefs. To 
require of moral beliefs only that they should be 
universalisable, and not also prescriptive, would let in as a 
moral belief, e.g., 'This thing is red' (Hare 1963, p.11). To 
require only that they should be prescriptive, and not also 
universalisable, would let in as a moral belief, e.g., 'I will 
jump/ want to jump this queue'. 
So Hare can dismiss the possibility of full -blooded akrasia 
like this. If akrasia means that I act against a moral belief in 
Hare's sense, then Hare can simply deny that any belief against 
which I in fact acted could be a moral belief. It must be 'off 
colour' in 'one of the many ways that are possible' (Hare 1963, 
p.68). For if a belief of mine is both fully universalisable and 
fully prescriptive, then necessarily, I will act on it unless 
something prevents me. For Hare it is a point of logic, a point 
about the use of words, that any case where I appear to have a 
fully formed moral belief, but act against it, must be a 
delusion. Akrasia is not that case, but a kind or kinds of case 
which looks like it: 
'So difficult is it, in fact- so great is the strain between 
prescriptivity and universalisability in certain situations- that 
something has to give: and this is the explanation of the 
phenomenon of moral weakness.' 
(Hare 1963, p.73) 
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Davidson, on the other hand, means to explain how akrasia is 
possible. Though he does not put it quite like this, his method 
is, in effect, to distinguish three (not two) kinds of practical 
judgements: (i) sans phrase judgements, (ii) prima facie 
judgements, and (iii) 'all things considered' judgements. 
(i) Sans phrase judgements are practical judgements which are 
indefeasible, final, and unconditional; an example would be the 
unqualified 'N should do A at t and not B', where this decision 
does not fail to lead to action. For it is sans phrase judgements 
which stand in direct causal relation to actions. 
(ii) Prima facie judgements, on the other hand, are qualified 
or, as Davidson says, 'relational' practical judgements. Their 
persuasive force depends on their relation to evaluative 
generalisations about actions which can only provisionally be 
assumed to hold good (Davidson 1980, p.39). Thus, e.g., the 
judgement that 'Prima facie, N should do A at t and not B' would 
depend on the generalisation that actions of A's action-type are 
as a rule preferable to actions of B's action -type. Prima facie 
practical judgements, then, lack the practical cogency of sans 
phrase judgements. 
(iii) Davidson's third kind of practical judgement is the 
'all things considered' judgement, the judgement based on all (or 
is it: the majority of ?) the evidence available. 
Now it might seem that the judgement 'All things considered, 
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N should do A at t and not B' can simply be equated with the sans 
phrase judgement 'N should do A at t and not B'. But the nub of 
Davidson's argument for the possibility of akrasia is to deny 
this equation. Despite some equivocation on the point (Davidson 
1980, p.40, para.2), it seems fairly clear that his central claim 
is that (iii) 'all things considered' judgements are equivalent, 
not to (i) sans phrase judgements, but to (ii) prima facie 
judgements. Hence Davidson can say that the 'all things 
considered' judgement, against which the akrates acts, is not a 
sans phrase judgement, but a prima facie judgement. For Davidson, 
this counts as establishing the possibility of akrasia because 
there is no logical contradiction between the akrates' two 
judgements. For an 'all things considered' judgement, being 
logically equivalent only to a prima facie judgement, cannot 
conflict with a sans phrase judgement. 
Hare and Davidson seem to me to represent two extremes, 
between which I want to find a mean. For in important respects I 
find myself agreeing and disagreeing with both of them. 
Hare's central intuition that there is something logically 
wrong with the very idea of akrasia is one which many have found 
suspiciously aprioristic. So Lemmon (1962): 
'Hare should not have defined value judgements in such a way 
that sincere assent to them entails an imperative leading to 
action, since in quite normal senses of the word a man precisely 
does assent to a value judgement sincerely and still fails to act 
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accordingly, in the situation of akrasia.' 
(Lemmon 1962, p.144) 
Contra Lemmon, I think Hare was on to something here. There 
is a sense in which there is 
the very notion of akrasia. 
about where this incoherence 
something logically incoherent about 
My disagreement with Hare is only 
is to be located. For I agree with 
Davidson that what is in question in the problem of akrasia is 
not the nature of moral belief as such, but the nature of 
practical rationality: 'Incontinence is not essentially a problem 
in moral philosophy, but a problem in the philosophy of action' 
(Davidson 1980, p.30, n.14). (This is a point which might also be 
suggested by a reading of Philippa Foot; v., in particular, her 
essay 'Are Moral Considerations Overriding ?' in Foot (1977).) 
On the other hand, Davidson seems to argue against (Hare's ?) 
idea that akrasia is a logical impossibility via an argument that 
the practical reasoning which leads to akrasia involves no 
logical contradiction. Thus Davidson seems happy to admit that 
the akrates acts against 'rationality' (in Davidson's sense of 
that word): 
'Why would anyone ever perform an action when he thought 
that, all things considered, another action would be better? 
...What is special in [akrasia] is that the actor cannot 
understand himself: he recognises, in his own intentional 
behaviour, something essentially surd.' 
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(Davidson 1980, p.42) 
But what Davidson will not admit is the idea that the 
akrates' practical deliberation might involve a formal 
contradiction. No doubt akrasia is unreasonable behaviour, but 
(Davidson thinks) it cannot, quite, actually be illogical 
behaviour, in the sense of being based upon a logical mistake. 
Davidson considers his job done once he has shown that 
'the logical difficulty has vanished because a judgement that 
a is better than b, all things considered, is a relational or 
[prima facie] judgement, and so cannot conflict logically with 
any unconditional judgement'. 
(Davidson 1980, p.39, my emphasis) 
But is showing that akrasia is not based on a logical mistake 
really the same as showing that akrasia is not logically 
impossible? After all, anyone who says sincerely that three and 
three make eight is making a logical mistake, but this does not 
show that it is logically impossible to make that mistake. Contra 
Davidson, it seems an attractive and plausible suggestion to say 
that what we are trying to describe, when we deal with akrasia, 
is a logically confused process of practical reasoning. But of 
course it would not follow that any description of that process 
was bound to be confused. 
In fact, I will not argue here that (full blooded) akrasia is 
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based on a logically confused process of practical reasoning. But 
I will argue one quite similar point, viz. that one important 
species of akrasia involves a logical incoherence, not between 
different parts of the same practical reasoning process, but 
between the practical reasoning process which actually occurs and 
the practical reasoning process which we might want to infer on 
the basis of the akrates' actual behaviour. It is just because 
this is so that I am also inclined to agree with Hare that there 
is at least one important kind of akrasia (though not the same 
type) which cannot satisfy the description of akrasia with which 
this chapter begins without logical inconsistency. My case 
depends on four points, which between them should now mesh what I 
have just said about Hare and Davidson with the account of 
Aristotle's theory of action which I presented in Chs.1 -3. 
1. I will say that there are such things as practical 
imperatives. These, very generally, are motivations to act of any 
and every conscious type. 
2. Practical imperatives are of two sorts: some are 
conditional and others are unconditional. Conditional practical 
imperatives (CPIs) have the form 'In view of some reason(s) it 
would be good for me to do x'. Unconditional practical 
imperatives (UPIs) have the form 'Taking into account all 
conditional practical imperatives, it is best for me to do x'. 
The point of this distinction is that any CPI formulated at 
time t is logically overridden by any UPI formulated at t. For 
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any CPI formulated at a given time is 'contained in' any UPI 
formulated at that time: the UPI is formed precisely by the 
aggregative consideration of all CPIs. So the agent might reason, 
in a very simple case, like this: 
(a) I want to go to the pub tonight. 
(b) But I said I would visit my aunt tonight, so I ought to do 
so. 
(c) One should keep one's promises unless there is good reason 
not to; and there isn't. 
(d) So, all things (i.e., (a -c)) considered, it is best for me to 
visit my aunt tonight. 
Here (a) mentions a desire, (b) an obligation, (c) a moral 
principle and its application. But none of (a -c) is any more than 
a CPI. The only UPI here is (d). My point is that (d) is arrived 
at simply by taking into account all the factors conceived as 
relevant, which in this case means (a -c). 
(This piece of practical reasoning, which goes to form the 
UPI (d), is not, of course, a practical syllogism. It is a 
practical induction, a dialectical process which issues in the 
definition, or specification, of (d) as the first premiss of a 
subsequent practical syllogism. The unconditionality of (d) is 
then 'transmitted', by that practical syllogism, to its 
conclusion: if the practical syllogism says that getting on the 
bus is a necessary means to fulfilling the UPI (d), then 'I must 
get on the bus' will itself become a subsidiary UPI for the 
agent.) 
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3. Hence only some practical imperatives, viz. the UPIs, are 
practically cogent, have indefeasible persuasive or 
action- motivating force. While all practical imperatives provide 
the agent with some sort of reason to act, not all practical 
imperatives, but only UPIs, provide the agent with necessary and 
sufficient reason to act. This means that only UPIs are such as 
to be suitable to enter into an account of the causation of 
voluntary action. 
(Consider the contrast between 'natural' or 'physical' 
causation, and the causation of voluntary action. In natural 
causation, a cause C brings about its effect E because C actually 
does provide necessary and sufficient reason for E to occur. In 
the causation of voluntary action, by contrast, the agent A's 
reason R to do X brings it about that A does X because R seems to 
A to provide necessary and sufficient reason for A to do X. Note 
the subjective and intensional nature of this account.) 
Thus if some agent who acts formulates only a CPI, then 
something is missing from the explanation of his action as a 
voluntary action. For, while a CPI does provide some sort of 
motivation to action, it alone cannot have provided the agent 
with a necessary and sufficient motivation to act. For that we 
need to postulate that there was also a UPI, even if this UPI 
differs from the CPI in no respect except that of being 
unconditional. 
4. To summarise the points made about the conditions of 
(198) 
voluntary action in Chs.1 -3: to understand a piece of behaviour 
as a voluntary action involves three assumptions about that 
behaviour: (i) that the agent was not compelled to do what she 
did; (ii) that she acted without ignorance of any important 
relevant consideration; and (iii) that her behaviour was 
rationally explicable, by which I mean that we have to assume 
that it was done as a result of a piece of practical reasoning 
which led to the formulation of what I have called a UPI in the 
way already described in the last chapter. 
Now, given these four points, I can show in what sense 
akrasia involves a logical incoherence between thought and act; 
and in what sense the concept of akrasia is itself a logical 
incoherence. Let us ask: what are the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a case of akrasia? I suggest that they are six in 
number. Three of them together stipulate that the akratic 
behaviour be a voluntary action. Three of them concern the 
akrates' beliefs at the time of action, and together stipulate 
that the akrates must knowingly do what she simultaneously 
believes it would be better not to do. The former three 
conditions are, of course, based on the three conditions of 
voluntary action which I have argued for. The latter three 
conditions of akrasia bring into play the contrast between UPIs 
and CPI s which I have just established. These then will be the 
severally necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for full 
akrasia: 
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Beliefs: For X's doing A at the time ti to be a case of 
akrasia, X must do A at t1, and consciously hold at ti beliefs 
which could be expressed in these words: 
C1. 'Unconditionally, A is not to be done by X at ti.' 
C2. 'Conditionally, A is to be done by X at t1.' 
C3. "Unconditionally, A is not to be done by X at t1" overrides 
"Conditionally, A is to be done by X at t1'." 
Voluntariness: For X's doing A at t1 to be a case of akrasia, 
X must also do A at t1 in these three ways: 
C4. without compulsion of any external or internal kind, 
C5. without important relevant ignorance, and 
C6. in a way that is not rationally inexplicable. 
Taking these to be the necessary and sufficient conditions of 
full blooded akrasia allows me to draw the following three 
conclusions. 
(i) There is a kind of akrasia, namely full blooded akrasia 
itself, the very idea of which does indeed, as Hare says, involve 
a logical confusion- though not the confusion Hare had in mind. 
The point is that C1 -3 are logically incompatible with C6. If 
C1 -3 are satisfied, then it follows that C6 is not satisfied, and 
vice versa. 
How so? Consider again the notion of the rational 
(200) 
explicability 
of a voluntary action. Explaining a voluntary 
action (I 
have suggested) means giving an account of the 
causation of the behaviour which it involves, in terms of the 
agent's seeing himself as having necessary and sufficient reason 
to do what he does. The presence in the agent's thinking of such 
(to the agent) necessary and sufficient reasons for action is the 
essence of any action's rational explicability. Now a necessary 
and sufficient reason for action can only be provided by an 
unconditional practical imperative. Hence properly to explain any 
piece.of behaviour as a voluntary action is to cite the UPI which 
provided the necessary and sufficient reason for that action's 
performance. 
But consider the fully akratic action, A, as just 
characterised by my C1 -6. Upon what unconditional practical 
imperative is A performed by X at ti? There is (of course) only 
one UPI which X, as described above, entertains at t1. But not 
only is this not a UPI to do A at tl; it is actually a UPI to do 
not -A at t1! 
By the canons of rational explicability which I have 
suggested here, the only voluntary action at ti of which the 
beliefs given in C1 -3 could be explanatory is any voluntary 
action or abstention from action which counts as not doing A at 
O. But, in the case of full akrasia, such an action is precisely 
what we don't have. X does the practical reasoning which, for the 
purposes of rational explicability, ought to go with voluntarily 
not doing A at t1; and yet the action which X does at t1- is A. 
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It follows that A, so performed, cannot satisfy C6. Hence A, so 
performed, is not a voluntary action. And- since full blooded 
akrasia is supposed to be voluntary action- A is not a case of 
full blooded akrasia either. 
Thus the sense in which the very notion of akrasia is 
incoherent is nothing to do with the nature of moral judgement. 
It is rather the confusion of thinking that a piece of behaviour 
could be rationally inexplicable in the sense I have defined, and 
yet still also be a fully voluntary action. A case of full 
blooded akrasia, satisifying all of C1 -6, would have to be like 
that. But it is impossible for any case to be like that because 
unless it is rationally explicable, a piece of behaviour does not 
qualify as a voluntary action at all, but remains merely 
unexplained behaviour. About the causation of such behaviour we 
do not know what we must know to be able to count it as a 
voluntary action. 
(ii) There is also a kind of akrasia- though it is not 'full 
blooded' akrasia, like the kind just discussed which is of a 
logically incoherent form- which does indeed involve what 
Davidson calls 'something surd', and even an actual logical 
inconsistency. The inconsistency in question is not so much in 
the agent's practical reasoning, as between the agent's actual 
practical reasoning and the practical reasoning that ought to go, 
but does not, with the agent's action. Take the case w re C11 -5 
are satisfied, though C6 is not (for brevity, call thïrs case 
(12345)). The agent's thinking leads, or ought to lead, the agent 
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lot to do 
the akratic action; yet the agent does the akratic 
lotion. 
There is nothing logically impossible about the 
)ccurrence of this sort 
of akrasia, even though it seems to 
involve something 
very like a logical inconsistency Such a case 
is simply puzzling; one is inclined to say of it, with Davidson, 
that 'In the case of incontinence the attempt to read reason into 
behaviour is necessarily subject to a degree of frustration' 
(Davidson 1980, p.42). 
(iii) My third conclusion underlies the analysis which has 
led to the first two conclusions; and it answers to a third 
intuition which Hare and Davidson share (as also does Gosling). 
This is that there are many more than one type of cases which 
look like akrasia: 
'There are many different methods of backsliding without 
appearing to.' 
(Hare 1963, p.76) 
'We are dying to say: remember the enormous variety of ways a 
man can believe or hold something, know it, or want something, or 
be afraid of it, or do something... These half -states and 
contradictory states are common, and full of interest to the 
philosopher.' 
(Davidson 1980, p.28) 
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'In practice many different kinds of behaviour are commonly 
iescribed as showing weakness [of the will] which do not feature, 
Dr not largely, in traditional accounts. Consideration of some of 
them suggests a criss -cross of overlapping problems...' 
(Gosling 1990, p.167) 
How many kinds of behaviour? And how are we to classify them? 
If there are six severally necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions of full blooded akrasia, then perhaps the way to 
classify the varieties of akrasia is by means of a statistical 
array like the one to be found at the end of this chapter. Since 
there are 26 ( =64) ways in which any six conditions can be either 
satisfied or not, there will be sixty -four different types of 
case answering to all the varieties of partial, full blooded and 
non -akrasia which exist, might exist, or demonstrably cannot 
exist. Drawing up this array may make it clear which types of 
akrasia logically can not occur; what the range of possible 
partial akrasias is; and what kinds of cases are not akrasias at 
all. 
However, consideration of these will be deferred until §3; 
what I want to do next, in §2, is consider Aristotle's account of 
akrasia. 
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2. How not to Solve the Problem of Akrasia: Aristotle's Account 
If full blooded akrasia existed, it would pose a threat to 
Aristotle's doctrine of npoaCpco1ç. As we have seen, Aristotle's 
account of the origination of action is (leaving aside variations 
which do not matter here) that practical reasoning generates a 
npoaCpeaLç, which we might perhaps think of (in this context) as 
a decision to act; and the npoaCpEOLÇ in turn generates a 
voluntary action. Now akrasia, apparently, is voluntary action 
(EE 1223a37 -b3); yet akrasia is 'against the npoaCpEoLç' (NE 
1148a18). Aristotle argues that voluntary action is definable as 
action which is caused by npoo pEo.ç, from which it ought to 
follow that there is no voluntary action which is not caused by 
npoaCpEolç. The threat is that full blooded akrasia may provide a 
counter example to this claim. 
Aristotle can deal with this threat by employing something 
like my distinction between a CPI and a UPI to deny that anything 
which could be called full blooded akrasia ever occurs. He can 
equate npoaCpcoi.ç with the UPI, and the three kinds of ópEEELç 
(and other kinds of conditional motivations, such as those 
provided by voúç, NE 1139a36) with the CPI. Then suppose that a 
piece of behaviour B occurs in which the agent acts contrary to 
npoaCpccRç. Expressed in my terms, what Aristotle can say is 
that, because B is not action on any UPI, and hence is not 
rationally explicable, B is not a voluntary action at all; hence 
B is not a case of akrasia either. 
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Aristotle does come quite close to equating npoa(pEOLS with 
what I call the UPI, and the three kinds of ópEEELS and other 
kinds of conditional motivations with the CPI. Consider 
Aristotle's account of the nature of npoa(peGLS (and ßoúXEuoiç) 
in NE III.2 -3. The central point of this is (Ch.3, 61) that 
npoa(pEOLÇ is neither belief nor appetition. We can now see that 
the reason why npoatpEoLS is not just belief is because belief 
is, in itself, at most only a conditionally motivating factor- a 
CPI, in other words; but npoa(pEOLS is unconditionally 
motivating, because a npoa(pcoLS expresses a UPI. Again, 
npoatpcoLS is not just appetition, because the three forms of 
appetition, although they are motivating factors, are not 
unconditional motivations- but npoa(pEotq is, because it 
expresses a UPI. 
So Aristotle repeatedly stresses that (unlike either bóEa or 
any sort of ápEELS) npoatpEOLS, or sometimes ßoúAsuoiç, issues 
directly in the action which it causes: 
of. SÈ AÉYoVTES [Trjv npoa(pEOLV] tnL9uptav ñ 9uuòv ßoúknoLv 
fI TLva bóEav oúK totKaaLv 6p96S XéYELv... (NE 1111b11-12) 
cpatvETaL b' fi Uev EtjTnOLS oú náoa EtvaL ßoúxEuoLS, otov at 
uaArjpaTLKa(, 
fi se ßOúXEUQLC n01Oa CriTn6LS- Kat Tò n6yaTOV tv Tj] 
ólvañúQEL npwrov EtvaL YEVÉOEL. (NE 1112b23-25) 
npoatpEaLq, then, is both necessary and sufficient to 
motivate the action to which it leads. In the terms which I am 
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arguing for, we might say that a complete deliberation gives an 
unconditional motivation to act- a UPI. It gives such a 
motivation because (going forwards) a deliberation is incomplete 
until it actually causes an action (1112b25); and also because 
(going backwards) a complete deliberation involves not only CPIs 
but also a UPI. 
So, if the real problem about akrasia which Aristotle's 
account must deal with is the question: 'Can there be voluntary 
action on what Aristotle classes as a conditional motivation and 
against what he classes as an unconditional motivation ?', 
Aristotle could have had a neat response to this question. He 
could have allowed for the possibility of behaviour which goes 
against an unconditional motivation, and is apparently action on 
a conditional motivation. But he could also have argued that such 
behaviour is not explicable by reference to the agent's actual or 
potential deliberations. For the combination of an unconditional 
motivation to do X and a conditional motivation to do not -X 
yields an unconditional motivation to do X; but the akrates is 
the person who, in this situation, does not -X. Hence there is 
nothing in the agent's actual or potential deliberations which 
explains his actions. Hence his behaviour is not rational; and 
hence in turn his behaviour is not voluntary action. 
But this is not, in fact, anything like the account of 
akrasia which Aristotle does give us in NE VII. Aristotle's 
account of akrasia in NE VII is dominated by the drawing of 
distinctions about different senses in which an agent can be said 
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to 'have the knowledge' of something when acting. These 
distinctions are brought out in response to the Socratic 
challenge recognised at 1145b23 -26: 'It would be strange if, when 
knowledge was present in the agent, something else could conquer 
that knowledge and drag it about like a slave.' Aristotle thinks 
he has met this challenge by 1147b15: 'It seems that what 
Socrates sought has come about...'. 
To treat 'the problem of akrasia' in these Socratic terms is 
foreign to Aristotle's method elsewhere, and largely irrelevant 
to the real problem raised for his account by akrasia. Aristotle, 
I suspect, has taken his eye off the ball here. He is not 
following through on his own agenda; his attention has turned to 
a rather different debate. He produces a free -standing, set -piece 
response to a Socratic question, rather than an integrated series 
of answers to Aristotelian questions. This does not prevent 
Aristotle's account from giving us much interesting material, 
which I shall now examine. 
Given the way Aristotle's account of akrasia stands (most of 
it) between the raising of a Socratic question and that same 
question's laying to rest, we ought to find a certain unity in 
the account. And so we do. Nonetheless, we may discern six 
separate phases in Aristotle's treatment of akrasia, marked out 
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These are the six phases so marked: 
1. 1146b31 -36: the potential/ actual knowledge distinction. (52a) 
2. 1146b36- 1147a4: application of this. (52b) 
3. 1147a4 -10: the 'syllogism breakdown'. 02c) 
4. 1147a11 -24: the conscious/ unconscious knowledge distinction. 
02d) 
5. 1147a25 -b18: the combined account. ( §2f) 
6. 1150b19 -28: the impetuosity/ weakness distinction. (52e) 
Five of these (given between 1145b24 and 1147b15) have an 
obvious unity. The relation of the sixth phase to the other five 
is less clear. And, if Aristotle meant even these first five 
phases to relate only to the Socratic question, he did not 
succeed in keeping the issue that clear -cut. 
The most complex of these, 1147a24 -b18, in which he seems to 
be trying to bring into play together all the ideas he has raised 
in phases 1 -4, is apparently Aristotle's most considered opinion 
on akrasia. The sixth account looks like it was interpolated 
(209) 
later by Aristotle- the afterthought of someone uncomfortably 
aware that he has not really settled the matter? As the fifth 
account is an attempt to combine elements of the first four (and 
other elements too), it is probably best left till last. The 
place to start is with the first account, for this seems to be 
involved in all the others except the sixth. 
2a. Potential/ Actual Knowledge 
At 1146b33 -35, Aristotle distinguishes two ways in which 
someone can be said to 'have knowledge' (tnCaraGOaL): 
'Someone who has knowledge, but is not using it, is said to 
know; so is someone who is using that knowledge. So the case 
where a [wrongdoer] has knowledge [that what he does is wrong] 
but is not considering it (6ccopoOvra) will be different from the 
case where a man is considering what he ought not to do. It would 
indeed (OP) seem strange [if he did wrong when he was 
considering that knowledge]; but not if he was not considering 
it.' 
I have already invoked EE 1225b11 -12 as evidence for a 
potential/ actual knowledge distinction in Aristotle (Ch.1, §3b; 
Ch.3, §3). That distinction is this: I actually know P at ti if I 
state, to myself or someone else, that P at t1; I potentially 
know P at t1 if I could state, to myself or someone else, that P 
at ti, but (for one reason or another) do not do so (and I do not 
(210) 
know that P at t1 if I neither do nor could state, to myself or 
someone else, that P at t1). Likewise (I said), I formulate, at 
ti, a practical syllogism S actually if I state S, to myself or 
someone else, at t1; potentially if I could have stated S, to 
myself or someone else, at t1; and not at all if I neither do nor 
could state, to myself or someone else, S at t1. Hence, my action 
A at t1, given that S is explicable by the practical syllogism S, 
is actually rational if I state S, to myself or someone else, at 
ti; potentially if I could have stated S, to myself or someone 
else, at t1; and not at all if I neither do nor could state, to 
myself or someone else, S at ti. 
This state of affairs makes it impossible to use the actual/ 
potential knowledge distinction to explain akrasia. The point 
which Aristotle wants to make about potential knowledge here is 
that the action which should be performed is not performed 
because the agent's knowledge is only potential. Evidently this 
could happen. When, for example, I forget to meet John at the 
station for an afternoon's train -spotting, I could make the 
statement 'I said I'd meet John at Waverley at 2 p.m.', if I was 
suitably prompted ('Where are you meant to be at 2 ?'). So I do 
know the fact, considered simply as a piece of knowledge, 
potentially but not actually. 
But, as far as the explanation of action goes, such knowledge 
does not count even as potential knowledge. Potential knowledge 
which explains action is knowledge which I act upon, although I 
make no actual statement of the knowledge (but could if 
(211) 
prompted). 
Thus, if I went to the newsagent's at 1.45 and went 
straight on, 
without thinking, from there to Waverley, this 
action would display potential knowledge which was motivating the 
action: although I have not formulated the thought 'I said I'd 
meet John at Waverley at 2 p.m.', this is what makes me go to 
Waverley. Potential knowledge which explains action is the kind 
of thing which one could mention- if one were to formulate it- in 
answer to the question 'Why are you doing that ?'. But if there is 
no action to which some potential knowledge K is relevant as 
explanation, then, as far as the explanation of action goes, I do 
not potentially know K; I am actually ignorant of K. Thus any 
case of akrasia which involves such 'forgetfulness' will not be a 
case of full akrasia (123456), but of akrasia mitigated by 
ignorance: that is, at best, (1234). 
2b. The Application of this Distinction 
Aristotle, nonetheless, applies this idea of akrasia as 
involving 'forgetfulness' at 1146b36- 1147a4: 
'Again, since there are two forms of the premisses [sc., both 
universal and particular], nothing prevents someone who has both 
from acting contrary to knowledge when his knowledge of the 
universal is actual but his knowledge of the particular is only 
Potential. For action has to do with particular things.' 
If someone's knowledge of a particular premiss fails to get 
(212) 
actualised, and remains only potential (in a form that has no 
bearing on the explanation of the action), then, as we have just 
seen, there is no good reason to say that the agent really knows 
the premiss. If it is forgotten information, then it is not (in 
the relevant sense) knowledge at all. 
(Why, incidentally, must it be the knowledge of the 
particular premiss which fails to get actualised? Couldn't the 
knowledge of the 'universal' fail to get actualised too? Because, 
as we saw in Ch.2, the more general, and the more explicitly 
moral, a principle seems, the less easy it is to envisage it 
being forgotten.) 
2c. 'Syllogism Breakdown' 
Aristotle keeps us guessing by giving us a second, more 
complicated, example of his actual/ potential knowledge 
distinction: 
'There is also a distinction as to the universal. For one 
universal relates to the agent and one to the thing [cp. NE 
1105b309 ff., distinguishing the mean of the thing from the mean 
relative to us] . Thus, the agent may know that dry food is good 
for every human, and that he himself is a human, or that 
foodstuff X is dry food. But that this is foodstuff X- either he 
MY not be exercising this knowledge, or he may not have it at 
all.' [My italics] 
(213) 
Whatever are we to make of this strange passage? In the first 
place, Aristotle is snubbing grievously a distinction which, only 
fifteen lines before, was getting VIP treatment- although, I have 
argued, it does not deserve it. I mean the distinction between 
having knowledge (but only potentially), and not having it at 
all. My italics are meant to point up the alarming way in which 
Aristotle glides from one to the other here. But this is no small 
difference, as Aristotle's own arguments about potential and 
actual knowledge are meant to suggest. If any piece of particular 
knowledge simply isn't there, as opposed to being in potentia 
only, then something vital is missing from the description of the 
agent as an akrates. For the agent is ignorant of something which 
is vital to the syllogism. And (as we have seen) to be ignorant 
is to be less than fully voluntary; and to be less than fully 
voluntary is to be less than fully akratic. 
Secondly, if there are two 'universals' here, Aristotle does 
not tell us what the second 'universal' is, which presumably is 
the one relating to the agent, not the thing. 'Dry food is good 
for every human' is evidently the 'universal of the thing'. 'He 
himself is a human', 'Foodstuff X is dry food', and 'This is 
foodstuff X' are all, surely, particular premisses. So what 
'universal' is missing? And what is its relevance to what 
Aristotle is saying here, anyway? 
The missing 'universal' can be supplied. It seems that 
Aristotle wants us to picture a practical sorites which, made 
completely explicit, goes like this: 
(214) 
A. Dry food is good for humans to eat. 
B. I am a human. 
C. Dry food is good for me to eat. 
D. Dry food is good for me to eat. 
E. Foodstuff X is dry food. 
F. Foodstuff X is good for me to eat. 
G. Foodstuff X is good for me to eat. 
H. This is foodstuff X. 
I. [He eats the bit of X.] 
Here 'the universal of the agent' is, apparently, (D). (There 
is also (G): Aristotle must be conflating the second and third 
syllogisms of this sorites if he thinks that (D) is the only 
'universal of the agent'.) But now what point is Aristotle making 
by drawing our attention to this 'second' universal? For the 
premiss that he suggests is the mischief maker in a practical 
sorites like this is, as we might expect, none of the universal 
premisses (A), (D), and (G). It is one of the particular 
premisses (presumably either (E) or (H)). What Aristotle really 
means to do, by drawing our attention to the distinction between 
the two (or rather three) universals, is to make a point about 
the two (or rather three) syllogisms which compose the sorites. 
Then what does Aristotle mean when he says this? - 
'Now indeed there will be a very great difference between 
(215) 
these types (Tpónouç), 
so that it will seem to be nothing absurd 
if [the akrates] knows 
in this way (oÜTW); but amazing if he 
should know otherwise (6X)w5).' (NE 1147a8 -10) 
What 'types' is Aristotle distinguishing here? (i) Types of 
premiss, as particular and universal (he uses TpónoL elsewhere in 
this passage only at 1147a1, apparently of that distinction)? 
(ii) Types of particular premiss, as 'particular of the thing' 
and 'particular of the agent'? (iii) Types of knowledge, as 
potential and actual? (iv) Or some combination of these types? 
If (i), then Aristotle is restating baldly his preference 
that the universal premiss should not be the one that gets 
obscured in any way. (ii) would fit most neatly into the context; 
but ignorant either of (E) or of (H)? 
(ii) and (iii) combined- so that the agent is (in Aristotle's 
sense) only potentially aware either of (E) or of (H)- seem to 
offer the best way of making sense of what Aristotle says here. 
But taking any of the four options will leave us with the puzzle 
of why it is supposed to be less surprising that the agent should 
be either actually or effectively ignorant in one way than 
another. Aristotle gives us little help with this. 
Probably, the passage means this: 
'In view of the different types [of particular knowledge] 
there are, it is not surprising that the akrates only has 
[potential knowledge of one of the particular premisses (E) or 
(216) 
(H)]- but it would be very surprising if he had [actual 
knowledge].' 
But why should reflection on the variety of the types of 
particular knowledge lead us to expect the akrates only to have 
potential knowledge? Are we to suppose that the akrates becomes 
confused between them (in which case, again, he is not an 
akrates, but is ignorant)? Aristotle remains uninformative on 
this. 
2d. The Conscious/ Unconscious Knowledge Distinction 
Aristotle has not finished making fine distinctions. Not only 
(he thinks) is there a type, potential knowledge, opposed to 
actual knowledge; there are two types of potential knowledge. 
'In the state of having knowledge but not exercising it [_ 
potential knowledge], we can see a distinction as to the 
disposition (Tr1v ËEiv), so that a person can as it were both have 
[potential] knowledge and not have it- like a sleeper or a madman 
or a drunkard. But persons under the influence of emotions 
(náOcaiv) are like this... It is clear then that we can say that 
the akrateis are like this. The fact that they speak the words 
which come from knowledge means nothing... akrateis speak like 
actors playing parts.' (NE 1147a11 -24) 
Aristotle is working on reducing the meaningfulness of saying 
that 'akrateis have knowledge' till it has come almost to the 
(217) 
vanishing point- but is not quite there; except when he forgets 
himself and throws in talk about akrateis as not having certain 
kinds of knowledge at all. I have already commented on the 
irrelevance and fruitlessness, for Aristotle of all people, of 
this procedure as a way of dealing with akrasia. For if some 
relevant knowledge does not enter into the explanation of an 
action, then the agent acts in ignorance- irrespective of whether 
she could supply the information in question if prompted. 
Still, what is the sense of this distinction which, for want 
of a better name, I call the 'conscious/ unconscious knowledge 
distinction'? Since Aristotle gives us no particular hints about 
what it means, apart from his examples, we have to shift for 
ourselves. One would like to say that the point is that sleepers, 
madmen and drunkards are under a double counterfactual where the 
possessors of ordinary (only) potential knowledge are under a 
single one. That is, a possessor of ordinary only -potential 
knowledge is in a state where this proposition is true of him: He 
would normally have been able to tell you the answer to your 
question if he were asked; but isn't so able for the duration of 
his akrasia. Whereas a possessor of unconscious only potential 
knowledge is in a state where this proposition is true of him: He 
would normally have been in the state of the possessor of 
ordinary only potential knowledge; but, for the duration of his 
akrasia, isn't in that state, even. 
This suggestion is at least partly supported by the examples. 
Drunkards and madmen are afflicted by kinds of abnormal mentality 
(218) 
that put them at a double disadvantage when it comes to avoiding 
akrasia. In the first place, they might be akratic anyway, when 
not also mad or drunk. In the second place, madness and 
drunkenness certainly do not help us to remain enkratic. Madmen 
and drunkards will also provide good examples of knowledge that 
appears to be being 'used', in Aristotle's sense, but in fact 
isn't being: for the causal connections between stimulus and 
response, and information and knowledge, are all wrong in their 
cases. The drunkard who repeats the verses of Empedocles 
(1147b13) is indeed producing 'the words that come from 
knowledge' (1147a29), at least if you take Empedocles' verses to 
contain knowledge, but producing them fortuitously. However, this 
suggestion of a double counterfactual remains only a conjecture, 
and nothing has been done about the central problem: the apparent 
confusion between potential but action- guiding and potential but 
action -irrelevant knowledge. 
2e. The Impetuosity/ Weakness Distinction 
'Some akrasia is impetuosity (nponrEta), other akrasia is 
weakness (àoOgvELa). Some [the weak] deliberate, but through 
emotion (bLdi rò nóüoç) do not remain in (oüK uuévouoiv) the 
[resolves] which they have deliberated. Others [the impetuous] 
are led by emotion (6yovTaL únò Toú nóOou) because they have not 
deliberated... The excitable [êKOTar1KOÌ., lit., 'the 
jumpers -out'] are better than [the weak], those who have reason 
(aóyov) but do not remain in it. For the [weak] succumb to 
(219) 
smaller temptations, and they have previously deliberated, unlike 
the other sort.' (1150b19 -22, 1151a1 -5) 
Aristotle here seems to suggest two ways of accounting for 
akrasia. Akrasia A, impetuosity, occurs when an agent seems to 
act voluntarily against an unconditional motivation which she 
never actually formulates. Akrasia B, weakness, occurs when an 
agent seems to act voluntarily against an unconditional 
motivation which she does actually formulate, but does not act 
upon. 
This fifth distinction, as I say, looks very like an 
afterthought. The focus of the rest of the discussion is on the 
status of the akrates with regard to knowledge and ignorance; but 
this distinction focuses on the akrates' status with regard to 
appetition and compulsion. Is it, then, any more successful as an 
account of akrasia? I think not. Neither of these 'akrasias', A 
or B, is in fact a genuine case of akrasia. 
If (A) an agent seems to act voluntarily against an 
unconditional motivation which she never actually formulates, 
then there are two possibilities. Either (i) she formulates it 
potentially, in which case her behaviour will be irrational and 
so, as it does not satisfy condition (6), will not in fact be 
voluntary action. Or else (ii) she does not formulate it at all, 
in which case there is no sense in which she holds the belief 
mentioned in condition (1). 
(220) 
But if (B) an agent seems to act voluntarily against an 
unconditional motivation which she does actually formulate, then, 
again, there are two possibilities. Either (i), if that 
motivation is unconditional, then her 'action' against it 
involves her holding the beliefs which satisfy my conditions 
(1 -3); hence her behaviour, while it is a form of partial akrasia 
(12345), is not voluntary action because it is not rational. Or 
else (ii) that motivation is not unconditional, in which case her 
behaviour is either irrational, and therefore not full akrasia, 
or else is voluntary action (on some other unconditional 
motivation), but not any sort of akrasia. 
2f. The Combined Account (1147a24 -b18) 
This is no greater than the sum of its parts, which I have 
already criticised where they are explicitly given us in advance 
( § §2a -d above). There are other items introduced also which are 
not explicitly given us in advance. 
The combined account, as its name implies, does not give us a 
single explanation of akrasia; not so much any explanation, in 
fact, as a can of worms. It contains intimations of at least 6 
quite distinct ways of accounting for akrasia, some of which are 
not compatible with the others: 
(221) 
(i) 'Biological' or 'compulsive' akrasia (a24, b4 -9, and cp. 
1151a20 -24); 
(ii) 'Syllogism conflict' akrasia (and 
(iii) moral dilemma) (a25 -36); 
(iv) 'Unconscious' akrasia (b11 -13, and 1146b31 -36); 
(v) 'Not real knowledge' akrasia (a36 -b4, b9 -11, b13 -18); 
(vi) 'Syllogism- breakdown' akrasia (one hint in b11, and cp. 
1146b36- 1147a10). 
(i) The passage begins with words that we might translate, 
though I have never seen them so translated, as follows: 'Or 
again, one could view the cause of akrasia as being biological - 
in this way...'. This tendency to account for akrasia in a 
biological, or physiological, manner is quite marked in 
Aristotle: 
'Fits of rage, and sexual desires, and certain other similar 
passions, quite evidently alter even the body, and in some cases 
actually cause kinds of madness. It is clear, therefore, that we 
should say that akrateis are in a similar state. The fact that 
they say the kind of things that come from knowledge proves 
nothing. Men in these states I have mentioned recite proofs and 
the words of Empedocles. New students chant together arguments 
that they do not yet understand. But knowledge [, to be truly 
understood,] has to grow into your very nature (oup(pufval)- and 
this takes time. We might say that akrateis' words are like those 
of actors (únoKpLvopévouç).' (NE 1147a14 -24; cp. 1151a20 -24, EOTL 
5 TLS,, 
, quoted on p.6) 
(222) 
Reason decides what to do, but is swept away by some 
compulsive passion. Its direction remains right; but its movement 
in that direction is about as effectual as it would be for me, 
once embarked on an Intercity 125 which is thundering down the 
railway line to London, to start walking down the train back 
towards Edinburgh. In a case like this, human rationality is no 
more than a veneer. To talk of it merely obscures what is really 
going on. The claim to want to do the right is just talk, even if 
sincere talk. The real and effectual power in the agent is some 
tniBup(a or Bupòç, which drags the agent about like a slave. The 
idea is one that would have appealed strongly to the Euripidean 
Romantic Irrationalists Aristotle seems so against (NE 1110a28). 
If öiávoLa b' a0T1) oúOgv KLVEC (1139a36), and it is desire (or 
passion) that K L VE L V yap EKaoTOV búvaTaL TcilV µop (ov (1147a36), 
then we can hardly say that on this account alone nOLKEV Ó ÉC1iTEL 
LwKpáTnS ouußa(vELv (1147b15). 
If the cause of this kind of akrasia is biological, is in 
one's cpúciç, then this kind is not full akrasia. It is a kind of 
partial akrasia which resembles BnpldTns, for objectionable 
behaviour which results from cpúaLS is, by definition, BnpLóTfç 
(NE 1148b15- 1149a20; cp. the description of animal 'motivation' 
at dMA 701a29 -36). The similarity to drunkenness and sleep of 
this kind of akrasia is noted by Aristotle (NE 1147b7 -9). But 
this very similarity suggests more a pathological state in which 
normal rational decision is impossible, than anything like the 
clear and conscious decision to do wrong which is a constitutive 
Part of full akrasia. 
(223) 
The victim of such a pathological state is not clearly a 
voluntary agent at all, at the time when he is such a victim. 
Aristotle would say that it was up to the agent not to become 
this sort of person (NE 1114a4 -7), or in the one -off case, not to 
get drunk on this occasion (1113b33 -35), or otherwise to avoid 
situations of temptation. But if such an argument is meant to 
persuade us that such a case is a case of (full) akrasia, rather 
than one resulting from akrasia, it misses the point. The cases 
where the agent made the decision to get drunk, or to become the 
kind of person he now is, are clearly closer to full akrasia than 
anything the agent does while in the fit of passion or booze. 
Action on such compulsions is plainly not full akrasia. In my 
schema, it will at most be either (1235) or (123). 
(ii) There seems no necessary connection between this 
biological argument presented at a24 and b4 -9, and the very 
different argument about the form of the practical syllogism 
involved presented at a25 -36. The 'two syllogisms' idea helps us 
see how close to being rational partial akrasia can be. But it is 
not obvious why this 'two syllogisms' shape, where one of the 
syllogisms is simply overridden by the other through the action 
of desire, should always or necessarily fit together with a 
biological compulsion. It is hard to imagine a case of akrasia 
where there were two conflicting syllogisms but no compulsion. 
Such a case would not really be a case of (even partial) akrasia. 
But it isn't hard to imagine a case where there was a compulsion, 
but no 'two syllogism' form. Such a form would obviously be less 
(224) 
like full akrasia, inasmuch as the akratic action is not 
rationally chosen. But my point is simply that the 'two 
syllogisms' explanation and the compulsion explanation are not 
necessarily parts of the same explanation. 
When there are two syllogisms present to me, either I will 
recognise that I agree with the universal premiss of one but not 
the other, yet still end up acting on the one I disapprove of. 
This will be a very rational form of akrasia like (12345)- but it 
won't be full akrasia. Or 
(iii) I will not be sure which universal premiss I approve 
of, and vacillate. While I vacillate, I am not in a state which 
is very like even partial akrasia. My position is, rather, one of 
moral dilemma (such as (3456) or (456)). I am confronted with two 
alternatives (or more? -Why not ?), both of which may seem good to 
me, or (for that matter) bad, by different and perhaps 
incommensurable looking standards. If I resolve this dilemma, and 
act accordingly, I am no kind of akrates. If I resolve it, yet 
act against my resolution of it, then what I will be undergoing 
is likely to be (12345). If I act while this dilemma is still 
unresolved, then again it is unclear that I am any kind of 
akrates, for condition 1 is not satisfied: I am not clear that I 
disapprove of what I do, even if I am not clear that I approve of 
it either. Such a case will be (3456), (456) or the like. 
(iv) 'Unconscious' akrasia (b11 -13; cp.1146b31 -36 and EE 
1225b11 -13). This, again, is not inconsistent with biological 
(225) 
akrasia; but it is not a necessary concomitant of it either. A 
physiological compulsion may cause me to lose sight of what I 
normally know to be right; but, as I said, it may also carry me 
protesting on. Getting myself in a state, like drunkenness, where 
I'forget myself' is often combined in practice with getting into 
a state where I cannot control myself; but need not be. 
As I have already argued, full akrasia could not involve 
anything like what Aristotle means by merely potential knowledge, 
or unconsciously held knowledge. While I am unconscious of an 
item of knowledge, I am, for all practical purposes, ignorant of 
it. 
(v) 'Not real knowledge' akrasia (a36 -b4, b9 -11, b13 -18). If 
the suggestion is indeed (as it appears to be) that there are two 
grades of knowledge possible, and that the type which gets 
'dragged about like a slave' is only the lower grade, then it 
seems inconsistent of Aristotle even to mention the idea. He 
himself has presented plausible arguments to show the 
implausibility of the (Platonist ?) suggestion that, in akrasia, 
it is only 36E0, and not nior1jpf, which gets dragged around 
(1146b24 -31). But at b16 -18 he seems to be arguing something very 
like this himself: 
'It does not seem to be the true sort of knowledge (ri1S 
KUp(0ç ?ruoTAprlq) that is present when the fit (nd9oç) [of 
akrasia] occurs; nor is it true knowledge that is dragged about 
by the fit, but perceptual (Tiç a ï.oOilrt.K>1S).' 
(226) 
This is hardly an argument at all; more like a furtive 
reversion to an opinion that Aristotle knows he is not really 
entitled to hold. For of course the Platonists' bóEa was 
precisely the class of forms of awareness like perceptual 
awareness; so if Aristotle is really espousing this opinion, he 
is siding with his own enemies. 
Even if it were true that perceptual awareness were somehow 
second -rate as knowledge, it is hard to see how this could help 
explain akrasia. After all, as Aristotle himself remarks, 'Many 
who only have beliefs yet have no doubts, but think themselves to 
have exact knowledge' (1146b26 -27). A belief held with perfect 
conviction, and never disproved, is practically speaking as good 
as knowledge; moreover it is the best we ever get in the area of 
perceptual knowledge; so it does not cut much ice to say that 
action against a syllogism based on such opinion is not really 
akrasia. Thus it is highly unconvincing to suggest (as Aristotle 
does at b16 -18) that an action against the reports of perceptual 
awareness makes for a less unlikely form of akrasia than an 
action against the reports of knowledge of principle. For full 
akrasia would not primarily be action against the reports of 
perceptual awareness, but against those of moral awareness. In 
fuller akrasias than Aristotle gives us here, the point is 
nothing to do with perceptual awareness; it is that I do what I 
know is wrong. To think that these cases can be accounted for by 
a story about acting against perceptual awareness is to duck the 
real question. 
(227) 
Typically, 'not real knowledge' akrasia will be action in 
(effective) ignorance, and will therefore come no closer to full 
akrasia than (1234). 
(vi) 'Syllogism- breakdown' akrasia (one hint in b11; cp. 
1146b36- 1147a10). The hint I mean is: 
'This opinion the akrates either does not possess or 
possesses it only so as to be able to repeat Empedocles like the 
drunkard does...'. 
Once again: to possess some knowledge, but only potentially 
(in the sense that Aristotle means), and not to possess it at all 
are not, where the explanation of action is concerned, distinct. 
Aristotle himself seems to blur the distinction here, in spite of 
the fact that the 'unconscious akrasia' argument depends on it. 
If the akrates does not have the right particular premiss at 
all, not even potentially, then the syllogism breaks down. Either 
the akrates will have no opinions on the object of perceptual 
awareness in question, in which case (a) he is ignorant and (b) 
no syllogism, right or wrong, is possible; therefore his case is 
not one of full akrasia. Or else he will have a wrong opinion, in 
which case a wrong syllogism is possible. But since the wrongness 
of this syllogism derives from a particular piece of ignorance, 
this is not full akrasia either. 
Thus 'syllogism- breakdown' akrasia is action in ignorance 
(228) 
too, and so no closer to full akrasia than (1234). 
To sum up: Aristotle's combined account of akrasia is very 
confusing. This is largely because it is very confused. A variety 
of different ways of explaining akrasia are being employed 
simultaneously and promiscuously: so much so that one is often 
unsure which is being used. If the attempt is, as I assume, to 
show (irrelevantly to Aristotle's main concerns) that knowledge 
need not be supposed to be dragged around like a slave in the 
kind(s) of akrasia that really ocur, then it must be judged a 
failure. If the attempt is (but it plainly isn't, unfortunately) 
to show how very profuse the sub -species of partial akrasia are, 
and how many ways we might explain some psychological phenomenon 
and still call it (partial) akrasia- then it succeeds. But, 
unfortunately for Aristotle, this is my thesis, not his. 
3. The Varieties of Akrasia 
So much for Aristotle's catalogue. Now for mine. As a coda to 
this essay, I will list some interesting forms of partial 
akrasia, and conditions like partial akrasia, drawn from my array 
of the sixty four permutations of C1 -6. It will be obvious that 
none of these conditions (some of which, though not all, 
Aristotle mentions) counts as full akrasia in my sense, since 
none of them satisfies all of C1 -6. 
viz. 
(Remember first that we know that some forms of akrasia, 
(229) 
those involving the satisfaction of both C1 -3 and C6, are 
logically impossible: which rules out not just (123456) but also 
(12346), (12356), and (1236).) 
I. Failure of Condition 1 
((23456), (2345), etc.) 
1. Plain and simple ignorance that one is doing wrong, (a) 
when one isn't, (b) when one is. 
Whether the others who think that I am doing wrong are right 
to think so or not, still I am plainly not acting against my own 
moral beliefs in this case. Ignorance is worth mentioning mainly 
because there are often cases where apparent akrasia can be 
explained by ignorance. 
2. Incommensurability dilemmas. 
If I genuinely accept the claims both of filial duty and of 
patriotism, I may face a dilemma when my choice is to fight with 
the Free French or care for my aged mother. I may truly not know 
what I should do, and hence form no unconditional practical 
imperative. But if (a) I resolve my dilemma, and act accordingly, 
then this is straightforwardly not akrasia. If (b) I resolve my 
dilemma by forming a UPI, but act contrary to my UPI, then this 
is a form of akrasia which does not satisfy C6. And if (c) I fail 
to resolve my dilemma and form no UPI, but still act on one or 
the other of my CPIs, then again my action cannot satisfy C6, 
(230) 
since I act on no UPI. (I do not act against my better judgement; 
i haven't got a (firmly held) better judgement.) 
The subject of moral dilemmas and incommensurability is very 
interesting, but I doubt that that subject is central to the 
study of akrasia. Apart from the above considerations, the study 
of akrasia is a study of so many different phenomena that, in a 
way, nothing is central to it. 
3. Uncertainty about a moral principle, which plays the part 
of an unconditional practical imperative, leading one to act 
against it. (Mere belief being mastered.) 
Contra Aristotle (NE 1146b24 ff.), there seems no good reason 
why the difference between (mere) belief and (supposed) knowledge 
should not make a good deal of difference to how easily I slip 
into akrasia. Of course Aristotle is right that 'Some men hold no 
less firmly to what they only believe than others to what they 
actually know- as Heracleitus makes clear' (NE 1146b29). But this 
is just a statement of the difference between objective certainty 
(here OC) and subjective certainty (here SC); and there are some 
other interesting distinctions around. 
SC is feeling sure that p, the certainty found in some kinds 
of religious faith, and not necessarily supported by anything 
outside itself. OC is having good reasons to be sure that p, the 
kind that was supposed by Logical Positivists to be most 
characteristic of the certainties of mathematicians and 
(231) 
scientists. OC and SC are not mutually exclusive. OC often 
engenders a sense of SC; SC makes us look for reasons, which if 
we find them may lead to OC. 
Aristotle argues that we can't say that the difference 
between SC alone and SC + OC is significant for akrasia, because 
akrasia is a matter of what goes on in the agent's own 
deliberations. Therefore what matters for akrasia is SC. This, no 
doubt, is correct; but what about the possible degrees of SC? I 
am (let us say) strongly tempted to go to bed with my neighbour's 
wife. But I also have a firm conviction, a matter of complete SC, 
that it would be wrong to do so. In these conditions, it is 
(prima facie) most unlikely that I will go to bed with my 
neighbour's wife. But suppose that my conviction that I should 
not bed my neighbour's wife is weaker than complete SC. Surely it 
is plausible to say that, the weaker my anti -adultery conviction, 
the more likely I am to end up an adulterer? So, in the sense of 
'believe' that we oppose to 'know' ('You don't know that, you 
just believe it'), it does seem that a distinction between moral 
knowledge and moral belief is relevant to some forms of partial 
akrasia. So, for example, with Pierre Bezuhov in War and Peace: 
"It would be nice to go to Kuragin's," he thought, but 
immediately recalled his promise to Prince Andrei not to go there 
again. Then, as happens to people who have no strength of 
character, such a passionate desire came over him for one last 
taste of the familiar dissipation that he decided to go. And the 
thought immediately occurred to him that his word to Prince 
(232) 
Andrei was not binding because before he had given it he had 
already promised Prince Anatole to come. "Besides," he reasoned, 
"all these 'words of honour' are mere convention and have no 
precise significance, especially if one considers that by 
tomorrow one may be dead, or some extraordinary accident may 
happen to sweep away all distinctions between honour and 
dishonour." Arguments of this kind often occurred to Pierre, 
nullifying all his intentions and resolutions. He went to 
Kuragin's.' 
(Tolstoy, War and Peace, Ch.1) 
We may note, incidentally, that there are many ways in which 
my subjective certainties about right and wrong can be eroded. 
One of them is if I am given conflicting injunctions by different 
moral authorities. Another is if I witness hypocrisy in those who 
seem most strongly to hold the moral principles which I also 
hold. 
4. Failing to see that this action is covered by a moral 
principle of which one is aware of. 
I may hold a UPI that actions of type P are to be avoided; 
but I fail to see that action p is of type P. Hence my UPI is not 
'transferred' to the conclusion of my practical syllogism. But 
this is just a kind of ignorance of a particular premiss 
necessary to a correct syllogism of the type favoured by 
Aristotle. 
(233) 
5. The suppression of one's awareness of the truth of the 
belief expressed in Condition 1. 
This is the first reference I have made directly to another 
interesting phenomenon which deserves, and receives (but not 
here), massive treatment of its own: the phenomenon of 
self -deception. The phenomenon was evidently known to St.Paul 
(oúK MoKLµaßav Tòv ecòv gXci.v tv tntYv6ocL... , Romans 2.28). 
Perhaps, even, it is the foolishness of what he takes to be the 
self- deception involved in the rejection of an instinctive 
awareness of God that made the Psalmist say that it is the fool 
who 'hath said in his heart, There is no God' (Psalm 53.1). 
In more recent centuries the idea of self- deception has been 
of importance to thinkers as important as Butler, Marx, Freud, 
and Sartre. As Patrick Gardiner is not the first to have pointed 
out, the idea is paradoxical: 
'It is surely odd to suggest that somebody could try to make, 
and succeed in making, himself believe something which he, ex 
hypothesi, at the same time believes not to be true.' 
(Gardiner 1969/70) 
The logical perplexities of self- deception seem remarkably 
similar to those involved in some kinds of partial akrasia. 
Perhaps we could call it doxastic akrasia, when someone 
deliberately sets about giving himself new and less inconvenient 
(234) 
beliefs: persuading himself that adultery isn't really wrong, or 
alternatively that this isn't really a case of adultery, etc. 
(see cases 36a -i). 
But if we say that I do this, fully consciously, to myself, 
and am successful and hence become an akrates in my action, an 
obvious rejoinder follows: 'No, the action was not a case of 
(full) akrasia, but simply done under a delusion. What was (full, 
or fuller) akrasia was the act of persuading yourself to hold 
false beliefs.' (Gardiner: 'One way out... consists in arguing 
that self- deception is really a form of other -deception... On 
such a hypothesis, I am prevented (I do not prevent myself) from 
recognising certain things about myself... [But the] difficulty 
merely re- emerges... If [the censor] is to perform the functions 
asssigned to it... it must presumably be aware of its own 
activity... But this implies that the censor in its turn is in 
"bad faith"'.) 
When I consciously make myself unconscious of certain facts 
of which I am conscious but wish to be unconscious, is this full 
akrasia? If I choose to suppress facts, then presumably I 
formulate a UPI to do so, and do so. But this does not 
necessarily involve me in acting against a UPI. If I do act 
against a UPI in self- deception, then clearly my act of 
self- deception cannot satisfy C6. If I do not, then it cannot 
satisfy Cl. Either way, self- deception cannot involve full 
akrasia. 
(235) 
Doxastic akrasia, I suggest, is an important form of partial 
akrasia; but (as with moral dilemmas) the temptation should be 
resisted to make this account the model for all forms of 
explanation of akrasia. For there are plenty of cases where my 
akrasia has nothing to do with my suppressing my own beliefs. 
'Partial akrasia' can mean being dragged unwillingly about by 
passion, or denying with complete sincerity the truth of some 
crucial premiss of the syllogism, just as well as it can mean 
self -deception. 
6. Problems of various sorts about the distinction between 
actual and potential knowledge (as discussed in §2). 
II. Failure of Condition 2 
(156) ( ?) 
7. Behaviour (OrhpLdrnç) with no actual or potential 
conditional motivation towards the action which expresses 
akrasia. 
This, surely, will only occur when one is behaving completely 
compulsively. Examples of completely compulsive behaviour are 
examples of full 8nplórnç; but they are also examples of partial 
akrasia. 
7 *. Not: 'Deliberate suppression of one's awareness of the 
truth of the belief expressed in Condition 2'. 
(236) 
To do X while actually suppressing one's belief that 
'Conditionally (in one way or another), X is to be done by A at 
ti', would be a very strange psychological phenomenon; but it 
would not count as akrasia. 
III. Failure of Condition 3 
(12456 and others) 
8. Making an exception. 
Cases like that of the person who can't resist the cream cake 
'just this once' are often cases where a belief about the 
relationship between unconditional and conditional motivation is 
suspended or claimed not to apply on every occasion. One may make 
an exception (a) of this occasion; or (b) of oneself or a partner 
in crime, of this agent; or (c) of the dirty deed, of this 
action. 
9. Amoralism. 
Wherein one simply denies in general, without trying to make 
excuses, that the UPI of Cl does override the CPI of C2; and, 
normally, rejects the UPI. Just as type 7, on the one hand, is 
very close to full OnpldTnç, so this kind, on the other, is very 
close to full KaKLa. 
10. Deliberate suppression of one's awareness of the truth of 
the belief expressed in C3. 
(237) 
V. my remarks on type 5. 
IV. Failure of Condition 4 
11. External duress. 
12. External compulsion. 
13. Internal duress. 
14. Internal compulsion. 
The difference between duress and compulsion was explained in 
Ch.1, §2d-f. 
15 -18: Pretending to be under one of these, or (19 -31) more 
than one of them. 
If the pretence (a) only fools others, the pretence itself is 
a kind of KOKCol. If (b) it even fools me, the remarks about 
self- deception for case 5 apply. 
V. Failure of Condition 5 
32a -i. Total ignorance of different parts of the practical 
syllogism. 
(238) 
This, of course, is never anything like full akrasia. 
33a -i. Effective ignorance of different parts of the 
practical syllogism due to the relevant piece(s) of knowledge 
being only 'potential' (in Aristotle's sense). 
34a -i. Effective ignorance of different parts of the 
practical syllogism due to the relevant piece(s) of knowledge 
being only 'unconscious' (in Aristotle's sense, whatever that 
is). 
35a -i. Effective ignorance of different parts of the 
practical syllogism due to deliberate suppression of the relevant 
piece(s) of knowledge. 
V. case 5. 
36. Failure to formulate a practical syllogism correctly 
because of a fault in the reasoning: i.e., by drawing a wrong 
inference from good premisses by committing any one of the kinds 
of fallacy that apply to practical reason (for these, see Ch.3, 
54), 
37. Formulating a practical enthymeme instead of a practical 
syllogism. 
This I find an interesting possibility. If rhetorical 
arguments aim (subjectively) at persuading us rather than 
(239) 
(objectively) at establishing the truth (dAR 1356a1-4), 'isn't it 
possible that what happens, quite often, in akrasia is that I 
listen to and act on an emotionally appealing argument because it 
is easier to do so than to listen to a logical argument? Of 
course, if I do so, I am not acting fully rationally, and so not 
fully akratically. 
VI. Failure of Condition 6 
38. Irrationality is due to only one cause: the lack of an 
explanation which applies to one's behaviour. See above, 61. 
And that's the end of my catalogue. Of course, some of these 
categories overlap; but on the other hand, several of them are 
subdivided into different alternatives. I started by showing 
that, in a defined sense, there is no full akrasia, and hence no 
great threat to Aristotle's theory of proairesis. This last 
catalogue, my catalogue, is my final demonstration that partial 
akrasia is a far more complicated affair than most philosophers 
give it credit for- including, but not especially, Aristotle. My 
original suggestion was that the subspecies of akrasia were to be 
found among a class of up to 26 types. That is an idea I have not 
deserted. But this last catalogue suggests strongly that, for 
each condition except C6, there is not just one way in which it 
might fail to be satisfied. 
If we bear in mind that not many of the 38 states of partial 
(240) 
akrasia described in my catalogue are mutually incompatible, and 
that many of these states are subdivided into different 
sub -possibilities, we will see that most of these states could 
occur together. Which will give sense to my final suggestion. The 
subspecies of akrasia were to be found among a class of up to 26 
types; but evidently the sub -subspecies of akrasia are to be 
found among a class with something of the order of 238 members. If 
we accept Aristotle's opinion that the akrates is, at least 
sometimes, at least fipLnóvlipoç (1152a18), we will then be in an 
even better position than Aristotle himself was to appreciate how 
very applicable to akrasia is the untraced line of verse which he 
quotes so approvingly at NE 1106b35: 
tßeñOt ptv yap ánX6S, navTObank bt KaKOC, 
(241) 
Table Two: The 64 permutations of the Conditions of 
Akrasia 
p 1 2 3 4 5 6 
12 23 34 45 56 
13 24 35 46 
14 25 36 
15 26 
16 































Freedom and the Voluntary in Augustine's 'de Libero Arbitrio' 
1. Introduction 
2. Book One 
3. Book Two 
4. Book Three 
'The concept of 'free w i l l ' ... is the most infamous of a l l 
the arts of the theologian for making mankind 'accountable' in 
his sense of the word, that is to say for making mankind 
dependent on him... The doctrine of will has been invented 
essentially for the purpose of punishment.' 
(Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, tr. Hollingdale, p.53) 
'If it is not by the exercise of will that we do wrong, no 
one at all is to be censured or warned. If you take away censure 
and warning the Christian law and the whole discipline of 
religion is necessarily abolished. Therefore it is by the will 
that sin is committed.' 
(Augustine, de Vera Religione 27, tr. in Burleigh, 1953) 
(243) 
1. Introduction 
The idea developed in my study of Aristotle has been that 
freedom to act means no more and no less than voluntary action, 
which in turn is defined as action which satisfies conditions 
about compulsion, ignorance and what I have called 
'irrationality' or 'rational inexplicability'. I have also 
offered, if not a resolution, then at least a classification, of 
the various kinds of problems there are about akrasia. I have 
suggested that some of these problems are real, but others are 
not. In particular, there is no problem about answering the 
question 'How is it possible for someone to do fully voluntarily 
what she honestly and seriously believes it better not to do ?'; 
because, in Aristotle's terms, this isn't possible. 
It will be interesting to attempt to apply this approach to 
Augustine's theory of freedom and the voluntary. Will this 
approach work for Augustine? Will the project yield consequences 
for Augustine's notion of deliberate wrongdoing which are 
anything like analogous to the consequences I drew about 
Aristotle's notion of akrasia? 
Augustine, like Aristotle, offers us some remarks about 
freedom and the voluntary which are not readily separable from 
the mosaic of other issues with which he is usually concerned. 
Unlike Aristotle, Augustine also offers us a set -piece 
exposition, the de Libero Arbitrio, which purports to be 
exclusively concerned with the theme of freedom of action. It 
(244) 
would be an ungrateful exegete who rejected this invitation to 
begin his exploration of the theme of human freedom in Augustine 
where I shall begin it: with a paratactic survey of the de Libero 
Arbitrio. 
The question 'Onde malum ?' (Conf 3.7) is a standard problem 
for Jewish and Christian apologetics; and there is a standard 
answer to it. To quote the Epistle of James, 1.13 -15: 
1-1115Eì.S nELpaCdNEVOS XEyÉTW ÖTL 'Anò BEOÚ nELpaopaL ò Yap 
6EòS ÓInapaoTÓS ÉOTLV KaK(JV, nELpaEL se aIJTòS ol'J5ÉVa, ÉKOIOTOS SÉ 
IIELpaETaL LJnò TfiS L'óÍ.aS enL6uµCaS ÊEEñKd4.lEVOS KaÌ. 6EñEaC6F1EVOS- 
EZTq fi enLBWCa OUXñaßOlJOa TCKTEL áµapTCav, >i bÉ aµapTCa 
ÓUIOTEÀEOeE'LOa ólnOKIJEL eÓIVOITOV, 
'The free will defence' is a gambit in Judaeo- Christian 
theodicy as old (at least) as the third chapter of Genesis. The 
philosophical interest of Augustine's presentation of it in the 
de Libero Arbitrio lies not so much in the recapitulation of this 
old, old theme, as in the theoretical underpinnings which 
Augustine gives it; especially, the philosophy of action and 
intention in the context of which he interprets it. At least in 
the degree to which Augustine organised and systematised this 
philosophical context, Augustine was a radical innovator in the 
Judaeo- Christian tradition of 'free will' theodicy. 
The dLA (387 -388 A.D.) is written in the form of a 
philosophical dialogue, or, better, set of three dialogues (v. 
(245) 
1.35 'aliud tempus sumendum est', 2.1 'in superiori libro...', 
2.54 'in aliam disputationem differendum est', 3.1 'si opportunum 
existimas...', 3.2 'superioribus duabus disputationibus'). These 
dialogues between Augustine and his friend Evodius present, 
against Manichaean teaching, expositions on three important 
issues for 'free will' theodicy: 
Book One: Why is there any evil in the world at all? 
Book Two: If the world's evils result from the gift of free will, 
should God have given humanity this gift? 
Book Three: If God should have given this gift, how did it come 
about that humanity misused it? 
It is in the context of these inquiries that I will pursue 
the question which concerns me: What is free will; for Augustine? 
The division given above is only a rough guide to the 
complexities of the dLA. Only at Ch.24 (out of 35) does the first 
book begin to address directly the proof of James's thesis that 
'Quisque malus sui malefacti auctor est' (dLA 1.1). Over half of 
the second book (2.7 -39) is devoted to proving God's existence, 
not (directly) to justifying the gift of free will. The third 
book discusses foreknowledge and predestination (3.4 -10) and the 
nature of the universe (3.12 -26) as well as the fall of humanity 
(3.47 -77). But I begin with Book One. 
(246) 
2. Boo One 
Summary of Contents: 
1.1 -3: Moral and natural evil; natural evil disposed of. On moral 
evil: first suggestion: is it taught? -No. 
1.4 -5: Methodological remarks: 'Credo ut intelligam'. 
1.6 -15: Definition of sin: based on law. To be in accordance with 
eternal law is to be in perfect order. 
1.16 -18: Definition of 'order': the threefold distinction (esse, 
vivere, intelligere); the hierarchy of nature. 
1.19 -21: Wisdom, reason and passion. 
1.22 -24: Sin its own penalty; but is this just? 
1.25 -30: The doctrine of the supremacy of the good will; its 
relation to the cardinal virtues. 
1.31 -34: Will and law; 1.34 the two genera of men. 
1.35: Restatement of the definition of sin; avant -propos of Book 
Two. 
1.1-3: Moral and natural evil. At the beginning of the dLA 
Evodius puts to Augustine the question which the Confessions 
tells us he wrestled with: 'Dic mihi, quaeso te, utrum Deus non 
sit auctor mali ?' Augustine's first response is to make a 
distinction: 
'Duobus enim modis appellare solemus malum: uno, cum male 
quemque fecisse dicimus; alio, cum mali aliquid esse perpessum.' 
(1.1) 
(247) 
The evils we suffer get exceedingly short shrift in the dLA. 
God, apparently, is the author of this kind. From the premiss 
that 'Divina providentia hoc universum regi', Augustine thinks it 
follows that 'Nemo iniuste poenas luit', and hence, since 
obviously there is suffering in the world, that such suffering 
must always be punishment for something. How long Augustine would 
have stuck by this outrageous argument is not made clear. The 
underlying idea, that the universe is in some sense perfect 
exactly as it is, which Augustine returns to at dLA 3.24, seems 
more akin to Stoic thought than to Christian. Compare Long 
(1974), p.165: 
'The Stoics held that this is the best of all possible 
worlds; notwithstanding apparent imperfections here and there, 
Nature so organises each part that harmony is present in the 
whole. The psychological and moral implications of this notion 
are constantly invoked by Marcus Aurelius, and it seems to be a 
fact that many men have found comfort in the belief that, come 
what may, their lives contribute to some grand universal scheme: 
"Everything that is in tune with you, 0 Universe, is in tune with 
me. Nothing that is timely for you is too early or too late for 
me" (Aurelius, Meditations 4.23).' 
But what of the other kind of evil? 
'Evodius. Est ergo auctor illius mali, cuius Deum non esse 
compertum est? 
Augustinus. Est certe: non enim nullo auctore fieri posset... non 
(248) 
[auteur] unus aliquis est, sed quisque malus sui malefacti auctor 
est.' (dLA 1.1) 
As I have said, this is an uncontroversial claim, at least to 
orthodox Christians. The interesting question is how to establish 
it. 
Augustine begins this task by suggesting that evil cannot be 
learnt (1.3). If it were, of course, the responsibility for my 
evil would simply revert to my teacher in evil, and we would have 
to ask whether he learnt evil, and if so from whom (a regress 
which might be suggested by the role of the serpent in the garden 
of Eden). Augustine has other arguments to make his point, 
however: principally the intellectualist claim that, since 
learning is necessarily of the good, evil is exactly that of 
which there cannot be learning. 
(As Burnyeat (1987) has pointed out, Augustine argues in the 
de Magistro that, in one sense, no one else can ever teach me 
anything, good or bad; I have to 'cotton on' for myself, which is 
essentially an internal business, like anamnesis in the Merv. 
This need not contradict Augustine's argument here: he can still 
say that this kind of 'cottoning on' only happens with learning 
of the good.) 
1.6 -15: Sin, Law and Order. If not by teaching, then how do 
we come to do evil? Augustine's eventual answer to this will be 
that '[male] facimus ex libero voluntatis arbitrio' (dLA 1.35). 
(249) 
He does not set his course towards this claim very directly, 
though, of course, one argument for it has been given already 
(1.1): 
'Malefacta iustitia Dei vindicara. Non enim fuste 
vindicarentur, nisi fierent voluntate.' 
But this begs the question of which deeds, exactly, are the 
evil ones punished by God's justice. Perhaps this is why 
Augustine moves on, at 1.6, to the definition of 'malefacta'. 
Evodius makes two suggestions about what the essence of 
evil -doing could be: (i) an appeal to the 'do as you would be 
done by' principle (1.6); (ii) an appeal to what society 
generally condemns (1.7). Augustine rejects both, and also his 
own suggestion that 'Fortassis ergo libido in adulterio malum 
est' (1.8). Some desires ('libidines' or 'cupiditates') are 
shared by all humans. But there is a vital difference between the 
desires of good and bad humans: 
'Cupere namque sine metu vivere, non tantum bonorum, sed 
etiam malorum omnium est: verum hoc interest, quod id boni 
appetunt avertendo amorem ab fis rebus, quae sine amittendi 
periculo nequeunt haberi; mali autem ut his fruendis cum 
securitate incubent, removere impedimenta conantur, et propterea 
facinorosam sceleratamque vitam, quae mors melius vocatur, 
gerunt.' (1.10) 
(250) 
Augustine's principle- and it is an odd one: his is, as 
Nussbaum (v. 
Nussbaum 1986) might say, not a very fragile good - 
is that all desire for anything that I could conceivably lose 
against my will, is wicked. 
'Culpabilis cupiditas... esse iam apparet earum rerum amor, 
quas potest quisque invitus amittere.' (1.10) 
As Evodius points out (1.13), this definition of 'malefacta' 
conflicts with the earlier requirement that the authority of law 
should be upheld by Augustine's definition of 'malefacta' (1.6). 
For the laws enforce us in possession of impermanent goods. 
Augustine's response (1.13 -14) is to introduce a distinction 
between the human law and the divine- an early hint of his later 
'two cities' theory. The good person is the one who lives in 
accordance with the divine, not the human law. But what does this 
mean? 
1.16 -23: The threefold distinction. Accord with the divine 
law turns out to consist- shades of the Stoics again- in Order: 
'iustum esse omnia ordinatissima' (1.15). And what is Order? 
Augustine proposes (1.16 -19) a philosophy of mind based on the 
threefold division vivere/ sentire/ intelligere. Humans are 
rightly ordered when reason (' i ntel l i gent i a') is in control, not 
'sensus' or mere vegetable life. 
Now we begin to move back towards the discussion of freedom. 
For when a human is rightly ordered, his mind controls his 
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physical nature. Then nothing external to him, either physical or 
spiritual, can compel him to do evil. Nothing except God is more 
powerful than a rightly ordered mind (1.20), and God is good. 
Vicious minds are weaker, and therefore cannot compel the rightly 
ordered mind. Other rightly ordered minds, by definition, will 
not want to lead a rightly ordered mind into disorder: 
'Quidquid par aut praelatum est [regnanti menti compotique 
virtutis] non eam facit servam libidinis propter iustitiam... 
nulla res alía mentem cupiditatis comitem faciat quam propria 
voluntas et liberum arbitrium.' (1.21) 
And yet, points out Augustine, 'iuste illam [mentem] pro 
peccato tanto poenas pendere' (1.21). Human minds (or beings) are 
punished for doing wrong; therefore, by the argument of 1.1 
again, it follows that this punishment must be just; and, by the 
argument of 1.16 -21, it also follows that the fault of an 
unfallen being like Eve cannot have originated outside her. So it 
must have originated inside her... 
1.22 -30: The supremacy of the good will. At this crucial 
point Evodius interrupts with two importunate questions: (i) How 
could someone choose to descend from the 'sublimitate 
sapientiae'? (ii) Have we ever been wise enough to avoid falling 
into evil? (ii) raises the issue of the origin of the soul 
(1.24), and suggests a paradox which Augustine eventually tackles 
in 3.73. It is Augustine's concentration here on (i) which 
introduces the first explicit discussion of the will (1.25 -30). 
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'Sitne aliqua nobis voluntas ?', asks Augustine; Evodius' 
answer is 'Yes' (1.25). All humans, it is suggested, have 
'voluntas'. Moreover, all humans have 'bona voluntas', and indeed 
the possession of 'voluntas' apparently implies the possession of 
at least some sort of 'bona voluntas'. For all humans desire - 
'modo to vide!'- 'recte honesteque vivere, et ad summam 
sapientiam pervenire' (1.25)- however confusedly they may desire 
it. This good will is the only thing which (in Kant's words, the 
similarity of which is noted by Thonnard (1941), p.496, and 
Burnaby (1938), p.183) 'can be called "good" without condition': 
'Vides igitur iam, ut existimo, in voluntate nostra esse 
constitutum, ut hoc vel fruamur vel caremus tanto et tam vero 
bono.' 
And hence Augustine urges us to treat the good will itself as 
the object supremely worthy of pursuit: 
'Quid enim tam in voluntate, quam ipsa voluntas sita est? 
Quam quisque cum habet bonum, id certe habet quod terrenis 
omnibus regnis, voluptatibus omnibus corporis longe anteponendum 
sit. Quisquis autem non habet, caret profecto illa re, quam 
praestantiorem omnibus bonis in potestate nostra non constitutis, 
sola illi voluntas per seipsam daret. Itaque cum se ipse 
miserrimum iudicet, si amiserit [bona mundi], tu eum non 
iudicabis, cum its inhaeret quae amittere facillime potest, neque 
dum vult habet, caret autem bona voluntate, quae nec comparanda 
est cum istis, et cum sit tam magnum bonum, velle solum opus est, 
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ut habeatur?' (1.26; my italics) 
It might be said that there are two reasons for the supreme 
value of the good will as an object of desire. First, since 'bona 
voluntas' is defined as that voluntas 'qua appetimus recte 
honesteque vivere, et ad summam sapientiam pervenire' (1.25), it 
follows that the rest of the Good Life will be impossible without 
it. And second, we might add, since to want to have a good will 
is eo ipso to have a good will, it is something that can be had 
simply by desiring it, and hence it cannot be lost against one's 
will. This makes it, consistently with the argument of 1.10, 
preeminently the right object of desire. 
These two points are both suggested by Augustine's remarks in 
dLA 1 and sometimes elsewhere. But to some extent they are in 
competition. The first point is that the good will's activity is 
only necessary for the good life; the second is that it is both 
necessary and sufficient. The second point may be coordinated 
with a general view of 'voluntas' as being undetermined by 
anything outside itself; the first with a general view which sees 
the activity of any 'voluntas' as inescapably cohering with a 
much larger scheme of things. I shall, in the end, reject the 
second point and its concomitant view, and argue for the first. 
But let me first explore what I mean by the second. 
'Voluntas', for Augustine, is (it might be said) something 
that can not only act on other extensional objects (as means) and 
towards other intentional objects (as ends); 'voluntas' can also 
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act on and towards itself. The will at time t1 can take, possibly 
its own present state, but more likely its own future state at 
some t2, as an intentional object of desire. For example, at 
1.26, the will is seen as having the capacity to will that it 
should become a good will, which is unmistakably an aspiration to 
a future intentional object. 
'...Quam [rem] [sc. bonam voluntatem] sola voluntas per 
seipsam daret.' (1.26) 
'Nonne bonam voluntatem suam diligere, et tam magni aestimare 
quam dictum est, etiam ipsa bona voluntas est ?' (1.28) 
This intentional object of the will is some state of affairs 
which includes the goodness of the same will. This willing is 
reflexive or self -referential in the sense that it is (we are to 
presume) one and the same self which does the willing at t1, and 
thereby attains the desired state at t2. In this act of willing 
the will in question is both subject and object. 
'Hanc igitur voluntatem, si bona itidem voluntate diligamus 
atque amplectamur, rebusque omnibus quas retinere non quia 
volumus possumus, anteponamus; consequenter illae virtutes, ut 
ratio docuit [v. 1.27], animum nostrum incolent, quas habere 
idipsum est recte honesteque vivere.' (1.29) 
From such words as these it is natural, on the second view, 
to draw out the claim noted above, that in the very act of 
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willing to have a good will and by virtue of my so willing, I 
immediately and by definition have what I will. For we remember 
again that the good will is defined as that 'qua appet i mus recte 
honesteque vivere, et ad summam sapientiam pervenire' (1.25). Now 
this definition will clearly include (i) any act of the will 
which has a good (first order) object. Hence, since the (second 
order) act of the will which is willing to have a good will is 
itself an act of the will which has a good object, (ii) as soon 
as I make this second order act of the will, I have a good will. 
It may be observed that this kind of analysis can be applied 
equally to the bad will (indeed, Augustine suggests such an 
application at 3.48 ff.). At dVR 26 we read that 'the bad angel 
loved himself more than God, refused to be subject to God, 
swelled with pride, came short of supreme being, and fell'. In 
that order? Is this a series of causes and consequences: or is 
its end in its beginning? If it is a chronological sequence, at 
which point in this sequence did the bad angel fall? Surely at 
the very beginning of it. On any orthodox view, one can hardly 
love oneself more than God without already having committed the 
worst sin there is. It seems inappropriate to put '...and fell' 
at the very end of this story of already pernicious acts. In 
fact, it looks wrong to call this a chronological sequence at 
all. It makes more sense to see Augustine's 'and's here as 
implying a number of different effects which came about 
simultaneously, being not causally but logically involved with 
each other. 
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This would fit well with the notion of the reflexivity of the 
will which is currently being canvassed. For what we may say 
about the bad angel on that view is that, as soon as he willed to 
have a bad will, he had one, instantaneously and exactly in 
virtue of so willing. This bad will need have no antecedent in 
the way that each element in the above sequence, including the 
first, seems to require. Hence (dLA 3.48 -49) it might seem that 
there is no need to postulate anything that precedes the act of 
the will as a necessary and sufficient condition, and hence there 
is no problem about God's alleged responsibility, direct or 
indirect, for the iniquities of free agents. If Augustine can 
make this notion of the 'reflexivity of the will' work, he will 
have provided an elegant solution to his problem of theodicy, by 
making the will its own cause, a self subsistent entity. 
An interesting parallel to this idea of reflexivity in 
Augustine's philosophy of mind is that one of the grounding 
certainties, for the Augustinian person, is her self- conscious 
awareness of her own mind (1.16): hence Augustine's well known 
anticipation of Descartes, 'Si fallor, sum'. When we add to this 
the point that knowledge too 'knows itself' we have the trinity 
of introspection of de Trinitate, the Confessions, and the City 
of God: 
'Augustine insists that introspection yields an irreducible 
trinity. I am, I know, I will: I am a being that knows and wills; 
I know and will my being, my knowledge, and my will.' 
(Burnaby (1938), p.144-5) 
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Now we might wonder: Is there such a thing as an 'act of the 
will'? Do we do something when we will, as an exordium to doing 
anything else? Or should we take a non -causal view of the 
relation between will and action, and see talk about the 
voluntary as being rather talk about the way one thing is done 
(viz., a voluntary action) than about whether a certain 
relationship holds or fails to hold between two things that are 
done, viz., the willing (or lack of it) and the action in which 
it issues? If Augustine's view is that acts of the will are 
causes of actions, the classic, Rylean accusation is that such a 
view generates a vicious regress: 
'[Both] mental [and physical] processes can then, according 
to the theory, issue from volitions. So what of volitions 
themselves? Are they voluntary or involuntary acts of mind? 
Clearly either answer leads to absurdities. If I cannot help 
willing to pull the trigger, it would be absurd to describe my 
pulling it as "voluntary ". But if my volition to pull the trigger 
is voluntary, in the sense assumed by the theory, then it must 
issue from another volition and that from another ad infinitum... 
The doctrine of volitions is a causal hypothesis, adopted because 
it was wrongly supposed that the question, "What makes a bodily 
movement voluntary ?" was a causal question.' 
(Ryle 1949, Ch.3) 
However, the upholder of this understanding of Augustine need 
not be too disturbed by Ryle's attack. He might simply respond 
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that there is indeed a regress, but not a vicious one, in 
Augustine's analysis of the ' voluntas'; and perhaps he might 
connect the self -referential nature of the 'voluntas' with 
classical philosophy's notion of the 'self mover'. 
A more telling criticism of this interpretation of 
Augustine's idea of the reflexivity of the will might be to 
question the conclusion of the interpretation, that we must see 
Augustine as having thought that all motions of the will are 
altogether undetermined by anything outside the will. This 
consequence alone gives us strong reason for rejecting as an 
adequate overall understanding of Augustine any interpretation 
which leads to it. As we shall see in Chs.8 -9, Augustine is in 
fact crucially committed to rejecting this kind of indeterminacy 
of the will, at least as a general claim about 'voluntas'. For 
him the only indeterminate will is a bad will- as more careful 
exegesis will make plain. (V. my remarks on dLA 3.47 ff., below.) 
Thus, whatever else Augustine may have meant by aligning 
'velle' with 'esse' and 'intelligere' as one of a triad of mental 
functions which display some sort of reflexivity, it cannot have 
been the elegant doctrine just outlined, that the will is 
normally altogether undetermined by anything outside itself. Seen 
in its proper context, Augustine's notion of reflexivity is more 
likely to be put to a less ambitious use, as an attempt to 
articulate philosophically our ability to be related to ourselves 
as both objects and subjects of thought, being and choice. 
Nothing need follow, from this doctrine of reflexivity, about the 
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indeterminacy of choice, nor indeed of thought or being. In the 
terms of my analysis above, we can admit the claim that 'voluntas 
can act on and towards itself', without having to make the 
crucial transition to the further claim that 'in the very act of 
willing to have a good will and by virtue of my so willing, I 
immediately and by definition have what I will'. And reflection 
does suggest that the former claim is more plausible than the 
latter, which would seem to commit us to the idea that good will 
can be formed in a person instantaneously. Augustine's most 
thought -out beliefs about moral development, as we shall see, are 
much less crude than that. Such an idea suggests a 
'perfectibilism' which is vigorously rejected by Augustine, e.g. 
at dCE 4.20, where Augustine warns us that 'anyone who thinks 
that in this mortal life a man may so disperse the mists of 
bodily and carnal imaginings as to possess the unclouded light of 
changeless Truth, and cleave to it with the unswerving constancy 
of a spirit utterly set apart from the common ways of this life - 
he understands neither what he seeks, nor what he himself is who 
seeks it'. (Compare Justin Martyr's rueful comment, ÓÀ(you ?vTÒS 
Kpóvou ctSunv aocpòS YEYovevar, Kaì. únò ßX(DIKECaç ijXntCov aúTCKa 
KaróijOBat Tòv 0Eóv: Justin, Dialogus contra Tryphonium, 2.) 
1.27: The good will and the cardinal virtues. Augustine goes 
on to show the centrality of the good will to the good life in a 
different frame of reference, by cementing the doctrine of the 
will, the central icon in his (from a classical point of view) 
highly revisionary philosophy of mind, into place in a reputable 
classical alcove, the doctrine of the four cardinal virtues: 
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1. Virtue: Prudentia. 
Definition: 'Appetendarum et vitandarum scientia'. 
Relation to 'good will': 'Quisquis ergo bonam habens 
voluntatem... hanc unam dilectatione amplexetur, qua interim 
nihil melius habet, hac sese oblectet, hac denique perfruatur et 
gaudeat... quamque invito illi eripi vel surripi nequeat... 
nullane hunc putamus praeditum esse prudentia, qui hoc bonum 
appetendum, et vitanda ea quae huic inimica sunt videt ?' 
2. Virtue: Fortitudo. 
Definition: 'Illa animae affectio, qua omnia incommoda et 
damna rerum non in nostra potestate contemnimus'. 
Relation to 'good will': '[Ille qui bonam habet voluntatem,] 
illa quippe omnia quae non in potestate nostra non sunt, amare 
iste ac plurimi aestimare non potest. Mala enim voluntate 
amantur, cui tanquam inimicae carissimo suo bono resistat necesse 
est. Cum autem non amat haec, non dolet amissa, et omnino 
contemnit; quod opus est fortitudinis.' 
3. Virtue: Temperantia. 
Definition: 'Affectio coercens et cohibens ab its rebus quae 
turpiter appetuntur'. 
Relation to 'good will': 'Utrum ab eo temperantiam alienare 
possimus, cum ea sit virtus quae libidines cohibet? Quid autem 
tam inimicum bonae voluntati est quam libido? Ex quo profecto 
intelligis istum bonae voluntatis suae amatorem resistere omni 
modo atque adversari libidinibus, et ideo iure temperantem 
vocari 
. ' 
4. Virtue: Iustitia. 
Definitio: 'Virtu[s] qua sui cuique tribuuntur'. 
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Relation to 'good will': 'Qui enim habet et diligit voluntatem 
bonam et 
obstitit eis... quae huic iniuria sunt, male cuiquam 
velle non potest. Sequitur ergo ut nemini faciat iniuriam: quod 
nullo pacto potest, nisi qui sua cuique tribuerit'. 
The life of the man of good will is the happy life, the 'good 
life' in Aristotle's sense. For the life of the man of good will 
is 'laudabilis'; and if it is 'laudabilis', then it is 'non 
fugienda' but 'appetenda sedulo'. Hence, says Augustine, since 
the praiseworthy life is to be sought after (one is reminded of 
the famous utilitarian equivocation over the word 'desirable'), 
it must be the happy life. And hence the happy life i s the life 
of the man of good will. Conversely, this must mean that, 
'etiamsi nunquam antea sapientes fuimus, voluntate nos tarnen 
laudabilem et beatam vitam, voluntate turpem ac miseram mereri ac 
dege re' . 
Augustine has aimed to demonstrate that the life of the man 
of good will is the virtuous life (so it is up to us to be good), 
the praiseworthy life (so it is up to us to pursue it), and the 
good life (so it is up to us to be happy) . He now wants to show 
that this life is also perfectly easy: 
'...Conficitur ut quisquis recte honesteque vult vivere, si 
A se velle prae fugacibus bonis velit, assequatur tantam rem 
tanta facilitate, ut nihil aliud ei quam ipsum velle sit habere 
quod voluit.' (1.29) 
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('...si id se velle... velit': note the reflexivity again.) 
Of course, if this life is perfectly easy, that does prompt 
the question of why people seem to find it so difficult. What 
then is the difference between those who succeed in living the 
good life, and those who don't? Augustine's reply is that it is 
possible to seek either happiness or righteousness. But happiness 
is not what we should be looking for, but righteousness, of which 
happiness is as it were a 'by- product' (Mt.6.33). 
'Nam illi qui beati sunt, quos etiam bonos esse oportet, non 
propterea sunt beati, quia beate vivere voluerunt; nam hoc volunt 
etiam mali: sed quia recte, quod mali nolunt... Itaque cum 
dicimus voluntate homines esse miseros, non ideo dicimus, quod 
miseri esse velint, sed quod in ea voluntate sunt, quam etiam eis 
invitis miseria sequatur necesse est.' (1.30) 
1.31 -34: Will and law again. At this point Augustine 
reintroduces the legal conception of morality: 
'Hoc enim aeterna lex ilia... incommutabili stabilitate 
firmavit, ut in voluntate meritum sit; in beatitate auteur et 
miseria praemium atque supplicium.' (1.30) 
This being so, which of the two, the good man and the bad, 
will love the 'aeterna lex'? Augustine apparently argues in 1.31 
that the good man will love it and the wicked hate it precisely 
because it rewards the one and punishes the other. (This seems to 
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subvert the very idea of absolute morality that Augustine is 
arguing for; he has just said that the good man is happy because 
he seeks to be good, not good because he seeks to be happy 
(1.30).) 
In any case, Augustine thinks it now 'manifestum... alios 
esse homines amatores rerum aeternarum, alios temporalium', and 
that this is a matter of human choice (1.31). The eternal law is 
inclusive of the temporal; since the eternal law is more 
demanding than the temporal law, those who obey the eternal law 
obey the temporal law a fortiori (1.31). The practical relation 
of the two laws is made clearer at 1.33, by Augustine's first 
allusion to his doctrine of use: the things of the earth are 
neither good nor bad in the way that humans are, but they can be 
put to both good and bad uses by humans: '...cum praesertim 
videas et igne bene uti medicum, et pane scelerate veneficum'. 
(Does the agent use his will, as well as all these other 
things? Should we translate 'voluntate' as 'voluntarily' or as 
'by the will'? See below on 2.3, 2.48 -54, 3.2 -3, 3.47 -50.) 
From this a redefinition of evil appears. It is evident that 
there are two classes of men obedient to two different kinds of 
law because they pursue two different kinds of object; and 'quid 
autem quisque sectandum et amplectandum eligat, in voluntate esse 
positum'. Evil, then, is this deliberate choice of the earthly at 
the expense of the eternal: 
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'Licet... considerare, utrum sit aliud male facere, quam 
neglectis rebus aeternis, quibus per seipsam mens fruitur et per 
seipsam percipit, et quas amans amittere non potest, temporalia 
et quae per corpus hominis partem vilissimam sentiuntur et 
nunquam esse certa possunt, quasi magna et miranda sectari. Nam 
hoc uno genere omnia malefacta, id est peccata, mihi videntur 
includi.' (1.34) 
1.35: Conclusion. Evodius agrees, and concludes that both the 
question of the nature of evil -doing and that of its cause have 
been answered: the nature of evil -doing is epitomised in the 
rejection of the eternal for the temporal, and the cause of 
evil -doing is human free will. Book One has argued that evil 
doing is cupiditas of a kind not necessarily punished by human 
law; and that the lawful life is the life of order, which is the 
life of the rule of reason in the individual; and that the life 
of reason is the life of the good will; and that the life of the 
good will is the life of the cardinal virtues and of happiness. 
By this series of identifications we are to be convinced of the 
possibility of the good life for humans, and of the doctrine that 
their rejection of the good life can only be by their own free 
choice or 'liberum arbitrium'. 
(265) 
S. Book 
Summary of Contents: 
2.1 -4: If free will causes sin, why did God give us it? 
2.5 -6: Knowledge and belief. 
^7.: Three questions proposed: 
2.7 -41: (a) How do we know that God exists? 
2.42 -47: (b) Do all good things come from him? 
2.47 -52: (c) Is free will a good thing? 
2.7 -14: Sensus corporis, sensus interior, ratio, and God. 
2.15 -28: The public and the private worlds 'seen' by these three 
faculties. 
2.29 -38: Wisdom, number and objective truth. 
2.39 -45: Number as the Xóyoç and formal cause of the world, and 
of all created things. 
2.46 -47: Hence, all good things come from God, 
2.48 -49: including the will. 
2,50-54: The doctrine of use. 
2.1 -4. The question of the second book is 'Utrum ipsum 
liberum arbitrium, quo peccandi facultatem habere convincimur, 
oportuerit nobis dari ab eo qui nos fecit ?' (1.35). Augustine 
answers that the will is necessary for any kind of moral life at 
all, good or bad: 'Si enim homo... non posset, nisi vellet, recte 
facere, debuit habere liberam voluntatem, sine qua recte facere 
non posset' (2.3). There could be no justice in God's punishing 
the natural use of the will; so if some uses of the will are 
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punished, it follows that they must be unnatural: 
'...si quis ea [sc. voluntate] usus fuerit ad peccandum, 
divinitus in eum vindicatur. Quod iniuste fieret, si non solum ut 
recte viveretur, sed etiam ut peccaretur, libera esset voluntas. 
Quomodo enim fuste vindicaretur in eum, qui ad hanc rem usus 
esset voluntate, ad quam rem data est ?' (2.3) 
My italics mark the innovation that at this passage the will 
is first spoken of by Augustine as a thing used for good or for 
evil, as well as being the means of choice between good and bad 
use of other goods. I will first consider this. 
If the will is used, then what is it used by If Augustine's 
reply to this is 'By the agent', then the question comes: 'Why 
this apparent distinction between choices of good or bad things 
made by the will, and choices of good or bad uses of the will 
made by the agent? What sense can be given to the second idea 
which is not already given in the first ?'. Accordingly, some 
Augustinian scholars, notably John Rist, have argued that 
' Voluntas is not a decision -making faculty of the individual, 
as subsequent philosophy might lead us to suppose, but the 
individual himself. Hence it can be good or bad. Furthermore it 
is the basic core of the human person.' 
(Rist (1969)) 
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Rist claims that Augustine's view is that to have a good will 
just is to be a good person (Rist cites dGLA 2.4 and cIOP 1.101). 
Rist is evidently right, but his comment brings out the oddness 
of Augustine's talk here- and elsewhere- of the will as something 
which can be used (how do I use 'the basic core of my person' ?). 
Rist suggests a possible smoothing of the roughnesses and 
oddities when he says that 'The word voluntas.., denotes the 
human psyche in its role as a moral agent' (op.cit, p.421). There 
are many such roles which we find ourselves in, or aspects of 
human life which we experience, which are too particular to be 
identified with the whole of human experience, yet too pervasive 
to be plausibly seen as dependent on single organs /limbs, even 
ghostly organs /limbs: emotion, language, reason, aesthetic or 
moral responsiveness. 
In context, at any rate, it is plain enough why Augustine 
suddenly begins to talk about the use of the will. It is because 
he is considering the will as a gift from God in dLA Bk.2. It is 
clear that gifts are things which the recipient may use; and one 
of God's gifts to us humans, in creating us the way he did, was 
free will. 
But, it might be objected, the whole idea rests on a false 
analogy. For free will is not just another of God's gifts to 
humans, like legs, or perception, or imagination, to be used well 
or ill. Supposing that it is is like supposing that existence is 
a predicate just like other predicates. We should not say that 
God gave some created object yellowness, and curvedness, and 
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edibility, and also (as it happens) existence too. Nor (if 'free 
will' means 'power of choice to use things well or ill') should 
we say that God gave us, to use well or ill by our own power of 
choice, legs, perception, imagination, and free will. 
Augustine's doctrine of the reflexivity of the will, on any 
.reading, must involve the affirmation that, actually, you can 
properly say that. It is perfectly true (he may concede) that 
free will is not just another gift which is used like all the 
others. But (as he explicitly argues: 1.25, 2.3) this does not 
mean that it is not a gift -which -is -used at all. On the contrary: 
it is only because this gift is in use, that any of the others at 
all can be. The doctrine of the reflexivity of the will which 
Augustine adopts is just the claim that the will is used. By 
what? By itself: choices of how to use the will are themselves 
choices made by the will. 
Does this condemn Augustine to Ryle's vicious regress? Not 
necessarily. On one reading of some of his remarks which I have 
been considering, Augustine could be committed to the claim that, 
behind every choice made by the will, there stands another choice 
made by the will about how to use the will. And indeed, in his 
extremer statements of the reflexivity theme, Augustine may 
commit himself to this kind of idea. 
But there is also a more moderate understanding of 
reflexivity to hand. Augustine could make a distinction between 
first -order choice (of simple intensional objects) and 
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second -order 
choice (where the intensional object is a 
characterisation 
of what kind of first -order choices I would like 
to be disposed to make). Plainly, only some choices are 
second -order. Equally plainly, if I am capable of controlling 
what I choose at this level, I have the power to choose (second 
order) what to choose (first order). This does not necessarily 
mean that there must be a third, and fourth, and fifth,... order; 
only that 'voluntas' as Augustine conceives it is patient of 
these kinds of distinctions of order, which it may sometimes, in 
a non -regressive manner, be useful to employ in analysis. 
Augustine, then, points out that freedom of choice can be 
misused. Evodius' response is one borrowed by John Mackie: 'Si ad 
recte faciendum [voluntas] data est, non debuerit ad peccandum 
posse converti' [my italics]. Evodius compares justice, also 
given to humans so that they may live well: this cannot be used 
for ill purposes, so how is it that free will can be? 
Augustine responds by proposing the argument of 2.7 -54, 
centred on these three questions: 
(i) quomodo manifestum est Deum esse; 
(ii) utrum ab illo sint quaecumque in quantumque sint bona; 
(iii) utrum in bonis numeranda sit voluntas libera. 
(i -ii) Augustine's argument to establish the first two points 
is as follows. it is clear that God exists because of the 
^hjectivity of the order in the world which humans are capable of 
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grasping. This order and truth, as the object of human reason, is 
superior to that reason (2.37). Therefore, since there is nothing 
superior to reason which is not God (2.14), this order and truth 
which reason perceives is to be identified with the presence of 
God (2.39). Now this order and truth which has been taken to show 
God's presence is both good and all- pervasive in creation (2.31). 
Therefore, we may indeed say that whatever is good, insofar as it 
is good, is from God (2.46). Hence, if (and insofar as) free will 
is a good, it must be from God. 
(iii) Augustine then (2.47 -54) has to show that free will a 
good thing, yet not the kind of good that cannot be turned to 
evil. First, some comments on 2.7 -47. 
2.7 -14: Sensus corporis, sensus interior, ratio, and God. At 
2.7 -14 Augustine gives us, in small scope, a philosophy of mind, 
the importance of which for his philosophy of action (and hence 
for his theory of the will) will become obvious as soon as we go 
into it. The key to this theory is again the human mind's 
essentially reflexive nature, which Augustine establishes at the 
very first step. The point has already been made at 1.16 that 
awareness of one's own existence is a grounding certainty. It is 
repeated here more clearly: 
'Utrum tu ipse sis? An tu fortasse metuis, ne in hac 
interrogatione fallaris, cum utique si non esses, falli omnino 
non posses ?' (2.7) 
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That I am a self -conscious living existent can, it is 
claimed, 
be established by simple introspection. And from that, 
it follows 
a fortiori that I am both a living existent, and an 
existent. 
This is the theme of reflexiveness again, and the motif is 
repeated in Augustine's analysis of perception. The bodily senses 
are shared by humans and animals, and 'sentire' is accordingly 
seen by Augustine as on the same level in his 'scala naturae' as 
'vivere' (1.16, 2.8) . But a question arises about how the 
interrelation of the bodily senses is achieved. For none of the 
senses themselves can be the means whereby we distinguish the 
reports of the different senses from each other. This, Augustine 
argues, requires us to suppose that there is a 'sensus intus' 
which discriminates between them. (Is this 'sensus intus' a 
descendent of Aristotle's co( vr> aroorìaLS ?) 
Augustine's question is: How do we perceive the difference 
between a visual sense -datum, and (say) an olfactory one? His 
answer is: By means of the 'sensus intus'. For this is the sense 
which has, as its objects of perception, not just first order 
sense data but the first order senses too: 'Sensum ilium 
interiorem non ea tantum sentire, quae acceperit a quinque 
sensibus corporis, sed etiam ipsos [sensus] ab eo sentiri' 
(1.10). 
But the 'sensus interior' is itself subordinate to something 
else: namely reason. And here comes the reflexivity again: Reason 
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is distinguished from the 'sensus interior' in that reason not 
only perceives both the first order sense data, and the first 
order senses, as the 'sensus interior' does; and not only 
perceives also the second order sense, the 'sensus interior', as 
we might expect; reason also perceives itself, reflexively, as 
well as everything else, non -reflexively. 
'Manifesta enim sunt, sensu corporis sentiri corporalia; 
eumdem auteur sensum hoc eodem sensu non posse sentiri; sensu 
autem interiore et corporalia per sensum corporis sentiri, et 
ipsum corporis sensum; ratione vero et i l la omnia, et eamdem 
ipsam notam fieri, et scientia contineri.' (2.10) 
This suggests an emendation of a standard reading in a 
crabbed passage in 2.9. This is Augustine's account of how sense 
data are mediated to the human reason, as it stands in Thonnard's 
text (which is Migne's, vol. 33, 1221 -1303): 
'Quid? Ista ratio posset haec quattuor discernere ab invicem 
et definitionibus terminare, nisi ad earn referretur et color per 
oculorum sensum, et ipse [oculorum sensus] rursus per ilium 
interiorem [sensum] qui ei praesidet, et idem interior [sensus] 
per seipsum, si tarnen iam nihil aliud interpositum est ?' 
Here, I think, consistency with the rest of Augustine's 
exposition requires the reading seipsam [sc. rationem] for 
Migne's seipsum [sc. interiorem sensum] in the last line. For, 
from the rest of Augustine's argument, it is plain that the 
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reflexivity of which I am making so much does not occur at the 
level of the 'sensus interior', but at the next level up, that of 
the reason. The 'sensus interior' cannot perceive itself any more 
than any other sense can; therefore it does not function 'per 
seipsum', but is one of the intermediaries in the chain: sense 
data > 'sensus exteriores' > 'sensus interior' > reason. But 
reason can perceive, or rather have awareness of, itself ('eamdem 
ipsam notam fieri'), and it is no kind of intermediary; 
therefore, reason does function 'per seipsam'. Given this 
emendation, we may translate: 
'How could the reason distinguish these four [sense data, 
senses, the interior sense, and reason] from each other, and 
define their limits, unless what was conveyed to it was all of 
these ? - (i) the colour, by the sense of the eyes; (ii) that same 
sense [of sight], by the interior sense which is set over it; and 
(iii) that interior sense, by reason itself?' 
Of course, all of this is not without its problems. The very 
idea of a 'sensus interior' may seem highly suspect to modern 
minds: what does this wheel turn? Augustine might also be 
accused, with some justice, of using 'ratio' as a deus ex machina 
to solve, or rather shelve, problems which are caused simply by 
the inadequacies of his account of perception. If the upshot of 
his story is simply that reason can 'make known to itself' both 
itself and all the yieldings of every subordinate form of 
awareness, then what is the point of all the preliminaries to 
this not very explanatory remark? And isn't Augustine just 
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committing a category blunder when he talks about perceiving 
senses? 
I will not defend him from these charges here. My main aim, 
in this account, is simply to point out the very strong parallels 
between Augustine's use of reflexivity in his theory of action 
and in his theory of knowledge. 
2.14 -38: Wisdom, number and objective truth. This account of 
the mind is followed by the transition to the argument for God's 
existence (2.14 -39). If there is something superior to the human 
mind, something eternal and unchangeable, this will be God. Now 
Objective Truth, grasped by the reason, is superior to that 
reason (35). Therefore God is Objective Truth. 
Once again the scala naturae plays a part in this argument: 
Augustine proceeds from the objects of outer sense, in which we 
can only have a certain degree of community since they are 
expendable, to the objects of reason, which are not expendable 
and hence capable of being absolutely shared. Your part in seeing 
some physical object is never quite the same as mine. If you were 
ever to look at Botticelli's Primavera from exactly the same 
viewpoint as that from which I looked at it, it would follow from 
that that I was not, at that moment, looking at Primavera from 
that viewpoint. My looking at Primavera at a given time, from a 
given place, is not compatible with anybody else's looking at it 
at the same time and place- as anyone who visits the Uffizi in 
August will quickly discover. But your part in grasping the kind 
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of Objective Truth that Augustine has in mind is completely 
independent of mine, and has no tendency to diminish my ability 
to grasp it. Augustine concludes that Objective Truth is the most 
unchangeable and eternal object of contemplation because, in this 
sense, it is the most absolutely public object of contemplation 
(2.19). Further, the perfect form of Objectivity in this sense 
seems to be identical with mathematical truth (2.32: 'cum eadem 
sit'), which is the object of pure reason: 
'Qua phantasia vel phantasmate tam certa veritas numeri per 
innumerabilia tam fidenter [novimus], nisi in luce interiore 
conspicitur, quam corporalis sensus ignorat ?' (2.23) 
From this Augustine draws a conclusion of importance to his 
(thus far unexpressed) conception of practical reason. Since 
objective truth, as defined, is unitary, it follows (2.25 -27) 
that wisdom is unitary too: 'Singulas quasque suas arbitraris 
singulos quosque homines habere sapientias ?' (2.25). The Latin 
'sapientia' is usually more suggestive of the Greek ao (a than 
(PPßvna i S but that Augustine means principally to discuss 
practical wisdom is plain at once from Evodius' response to his 
question, which concerns the goals of action. 
In reply Evodius admits the unity of wisdom, but adds, 'Video 
quippe varie videri hominibus, quid fiat dicaturve sapienter' 
(2.25). He cites the military life, the contemplative life, and 
the political life, as providing apparently incommensurable Tgxn 
at which reason might aim, and in pursuit of which wisdom might 
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be thought 
to be best exercised. Augustine's reply to this lays 
bare the heart 
of his thinking about practical wisdom. And once 
again the crucial links between Augustine's cognitive and 
conative philosophies become apparent. 
Augustine starts by defining 'sapientia': 'Num aliam putas 
esse sapientiam nisi veritatem, in qua cernitur et tenetur summum 
bonum?' (2.26). Practical wisdom is the possession of the highest 
good in virtue of understanding a certain kind of truth, 
practical truth. It follows that without practical truth, there 
is no practical wisdom. What kind of truth is this? It is the 
truth about what is really the 'summum bonum', independently of 
and antecedently to the various views which may be held: 
'Nam illi omnes quos commemorasti diversa sectantes, bonum 
appetunt et malum fugiunt; sed propterea diversa sectantur, quod 
aliud alii videtur bonum. Quisquis ergo appetit quod appetendum 
non erat, tametsi id non appeteret nisi ei videretur bonum, errat 
tamen... Inquantum igitur omnes homines appetunt vitam beatam, 
non errant. Inquantum autem quisque non eam tenet vitae viam quae 
ducit ad beatudinem, cum se fateatur et profiteatur nolle nisi ad 
beatitudinem pervenire, intantum errat... Et quanto magis in via 
vitae quis errat, tanto minus sapit.' (2.26) 
Augustine's practical truth turns out to be exactly the same 
in content as his theoretical truth. It is natural to all men to 
seek the (apparent) good and flee the (apparent) evil (cp. 1.30, 
'nu hoc volunt etiam mali'). But what more is necessary to the 
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good life is 
exactly the same knowledge of transcendent and 
objective reality as 
forms the end of enquiry. I said that, for 
Augustine, wisdom is as unitary as the objective truth which it 
contemplates. It follows from this that, in fact, there is no 
neat division between practical and theoretical wisdom in his 
thought. Just as, for Augustine, talk of volition and reason 
relates to the same human person in the different roles of agent 
and percipient, so also, for him, practical reason is only 
theoretical reason put to work, and theoretical reason is only 
practical reason in contemplative mode. The first principles of 
practical and theoretical reason are, in his view, one and the 
same. 
Evodius is quite capable of drawing the right conclusion from 
this: 'Si summum bonum omnibus unum est, oportet etiam veritatem 
in qua cernitur et tenetur, id est sapientiam, omnibus unam esse 
communem' (2.27). Since practical wisdom is identical with 
theoretical wisdom, and theoretical wisdom is the unitary 
possession of objective truth, it follows that there is only one 
genuine practical wisdom. The form of statement on the grounds of 
Which an ascription of the predicate 'practically wise' would be 
justified is: 'X has a good reason to (p'. And such statements 
have, for Augustine, quite determinate and objective 
truth -values, irrespective of X's actual reasons for (ping. 
Evodius admits all this as plausible, but is still impressed 
by the great variety of objects actually treated as 'summa bona': 
' Dubito sane, quia diversos diversis rebus gaudere video tanquam 
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summis bonis suis' (2.27). Augustine argues that the fact that 
there is a great variety of objects considered as goods (or even 
as the good) within some limited area of choice does not entail 
any disturbing conclusions about the incompatibility or 
incommensurability of those goods. The one concept of goodness is 
as common to all these choices as is the sunlight to the beauties 
that we see: 
'Etiamsi multa sunt bona eaque diversa, e quibus eligat 
quisque quod volet, idque videndo et tenendo ad fruendum summum 
sibi bonum recte vereque constituat; fieri tamen potest ut lux 
ipsa sapientiae, in qua haec videri et teneri possunt, omnibus 
sapientibus sit una communis.' (2.27) 
Burleigh (1953)'s translation of part of this runs: 'there 
are many diverse good things from among which each may choose 
what he likes, and... may rightly and truly constitute it his own 
chief good' (Burleigh 1953, p.152). This translation, which 
suggests that what Augustine means by this is that all choices of 
a 'summum bonum' for a whole life imply the same criterion of 
choice, ought to puzzle us. For Augustine is in the middle of 
arguing that there is only one right and true choice of 'summum 
bonum'. What Augustine's references to different aesthetic tastes 
in scenery rather suggest is that he is arguing that different 
people can hold quite different 'bona' as the 'summa' for 
smaller -scale areas of judgement than the judgement of what is 
'summum' for the whole life. If so (the evidence, like the 
argument, is unclear), then Augustine is introducing something 
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like a distinction between practical and technical reasoning: 
within these smaller (technical) contexts of choice of the good, 
there can perfectly well be different views about what is the 
best, without this fact undermining the unitary nature of the 
ethical choice to be made regarding the whole of a human life. 
Augustine thinks there is one best life for humans, but bids us 
consider, for example, how there is not and need not be one 
greatest painting; rather, there is a fuzzy -edged set, The Great 
Paintings. Augustine is simply pointing out to Evodius that this 
kind of technical indeterminacy may be what is making him suspect 
the existence of real practical indeterminacy- which of course 
Augustine says does not exist. The criteria of technical 
rationality will be subjective in a way that those of practical 
rationality are not. 
From considering the practical side of his unitary 
'sapientia', Augustine moves to a more contemplative mode 
(2.30 -36). What is relevant for this discussion is the 
reaffirmation that it is exactly this contemplated truth which is 
the first principle of action, and the point at which a context 
of commensurability is found between all smaller technical 
contexts: 
'Haec enim veritas ostendit omnia bona, quae vera sunt, quae 
sibi pro suo captu intelligentes homines, vel singula, vel plura 
eligunt, quibus fruantur... Sic fortis acies mentis et vegeta cum 
multa vera et incommutabilia certa ratione conspexerit, dirigit 
se in ipsam veritatem, qua cuncta monstrantur.' (2.36) 
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Augustine brings together two earlier claims to support his 
argument about the identity of practical and theoretical truth. 
At 1.10 ff. he argued that the essence of wrongdoing was the 
pursuit of what one can lose against one's will; at 2.19 ff., 
that the contemplation of physical goods can be frustrated by 
their expendability, by the fact that one contemplator of such 
goods is, at least to some degree, necessarily in competition 
with other contemplators. Putting these two points together 
(2.37) he gets the claim that the pursuit of truth is the only 
virtuous pursuit, for only truth is absolutely common and equally 
present to all its pursuers- provided, of course, that we simply 
will to pursue it. 
'At illa veritatis et sapientiae puchritudo, tantum adsit 
perseverans voluntas fruendi, nec multitudine audientium 
constipata secludit venientes, nec peragitur tempore, nec migrat 
locis, nec nocte intercipitur, nec umbra intercluditur, nec 
sensibus corporis subiacet. De toto mundo ad se conversis qui 
diligunt eam, omnibus proxima est, omnibus sempiterna; nullo loco 
est, nusquam deest; foris admonet, intus docet; cennentes se 
commutat omnes in melius, a nullo in deterius commutatur; nullus 
de illa iudicat, nullus sine illa iudicat bene.' (2.38) 
And this objective and absolute truth, both as seen in the 
world (2.42) and as seen in the canons of practical choice which 
we employ (2.41), turns out, again, to be identifiable with the 
presence of God (2.43, 2.39). Also with Number (2.42), 
the 
presence of which throughout creation is also evidence 
of the 
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good giving of God (2.45). So at length, with answers of a kind 
proposed to the first two questions of 2.7 ('How do we see that 
God exists ?'; 'Do all good things come from God ?'), Evodius comes 
back to the third question: 'Is free will a good gift ?' (2.47). 
2.46 -47: All good things from God. Augustine's first response 
is to claim that he has already answered this. For it has already 
been agreed (2.3) that humans cannot act well without free will; 
which itself makes free will a good gift. The problem with this, 
of course, is that it also establishes that free will is a bad 
gift, pari passu. Augustine needs a further argument. 
For this, he distinguishes three kinds of goods: 'magna 
bona', 'media bona', and 'minima bona' (2.50). This 
classification is arrived at by asking two questions about any 
putative good G: 
(1) Is G's possession necessary to the good life? 
(2) Is it impossible to misuse G? 
Three kinds of good? -Or four? These questions, taken 
together, generate four answers (YY, YN, NY, NN), not three. 
Justice, like all the virtues, is an example of the highest 
kind 
of good (YY): it is essential to the good life, and it cannot 
be 
misused (2.50). The parts of the human body are examples 
of the 
lowest kind of good (NN): 
'AUG. Iam ergo tu negabis luscum hominem recte posse 
vivere? 
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EV. Absit tam immanis amentia! 
AUG. ...Quo amisso tarnen ad recte vivendum non impeditur.' (2.49) 
And free will is a 'medium bonum'. Without it none can live 
aright (2.49), yet it can be misused (2.48). So it is a 'medium 
bonum' of the (YN) type. 
(In passing: The (NY) type of 'medium bonum' is here ignored 
by Augustine. But if my interpretation of 2.26 -27 is right, an 
interesting place in Augustine's philosophy can be found for this 
type. 'Media bona' which cannot be misused, yet which are not 
essential to the good life, will (I suggest) characteristically 
be the kind of aesthetic and other experiences which Augustine 
draws our attention to at 2.27. As I have noted, these are the 
kind of things which provide the smaller -scale 'summa bona' which 
are the TéXf of particular technical excellences. Evidently I 
need not have, e.g., a profound vision of the dramatically 
sublime to be a good man, nor indeed engage in the dramatic Texvn 
at all (of which, officially, Augustine of course disapproved). 
But if I ab so engage, then the AewpCa of that technical 'summum 
bonum' is itself a good. I can misuse my own technical 
excellences; but I cannot misuse the standards of the technical 
excellences.) 
The difference between a 'magnum bonum', like justice, and a 
'medium bonum', like free will, is in a sense just a grammatical 
one. It is built into the meaning of 'justice'- of any virtue - 
that one cannot act so as to misuse it. To 'use justice' at all, 
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if we care for this locution, is to use it for a good end. 'To 
use (the virtue of) justice for a bad end' could only mean 'not 
to use justice, but to use injustice'. This point, of course, 
applies equally to 'good will' (as opposed to 'free will'). To 
use good will for a bad end is not to use good will at all, but 
bad will. Good will, in short, is a 'magnum bonum' like the 
virtues, not a 'medium bonum' like free will. (Thus Augustine's 
'bona voluntas' cannot possibly be identified in sense with his 
'libera voluntas'.) 
A little reflection on Augustine's threefold (or rather, I 
have argued, fourfold) division of the goods shows a striking 
point. There are indefinitely many goods of the (YY) type- as 
many as the virtues which one might want to enumerate. There are 
also indefinitely many (NN) goods: as many as there are physical 
objects, perhaps. And if I am right, Augustine himself can be 
seen as arguing in effect that there are indefinitely many (NY) 
goods too- as many as there are TEyvot. But does not Augustine's 
own argument tend to the conclusion that there is only one (YN) 
good, free will itself? In general, whatever is necessary for the 
good life, like the virtues and good will, is so internal to the 
definition of the good life that it is logically impossible for 
it to be misused. Thus, to have a good will is to be living the 
good life (1.10). And whatever can be misused is not generally 
such as to be internal to the good life as Augustine defines it. 
Thus, nothing which we can lose against our will is worthy to be 
considered a good (or better, the good) (1.10). The 
only 
exception to these two rules is free will itself. This alone 
is a 
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necessary part of the good life; yet can be misused. 
2.50 -54: The doctrine of use. This must be partly because to 
speak of the will at all is to speak of use. It is to speak of a 
capacity which stands alongside and outside all other capacities, 
and yet remains a capacity itself; indeed the capacity par 
excellence, for without it there are, in effect, no other 
capacities. This is what I have been urging by my insistence on 
the notion of reflexivity; and this is the point which Evodius is 
brought to understand at 2.51: 
'EV. Quomodo et ipsa [voluntas libera] inter illa quibus utimur 
numeranda sit? 
AUG. Quomodo omnia quae ad scientiam cognoscimus, ratione 
cognoscimus, et tarnen etiam ipsa ratio inter illa numerator quae 
ratione cognoscimus... ut quodammodo se ipsa utatur voluntas quae 
utitur ceteris, sicut seipsam cognoscit ratio, quae cognoscit et 
cetera.' 
This is a clear statement of the doctrine of the reflexive 
use of the will by the will. It also points up nicely my claim 
that there is a strong parallelism between Augustine's 
conceptions of the will and of the reason. 
The happy life, then, is to share in the 'commune bonum', not 
the 'proprium bonum'; and whoever does so is happy, but whoever 
does not, sins (2.52 -3). Not that even the objects of 
desire of 
the worst humans are bad in themselves; but they are private 
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goods, changeable goods (2.53). Augustine now states baldly 
(2.53) that this 'aversio ab incommutabili bono, et conversio ad 
mutabilia 
bona' is, 'quoniam non cogimur', voluntary. But this 
needs to be argued (2.54) : what is the cause of this 'aversio'? 
Augustine's standard reply to this is 'nescio'. By this he does 
not mean that he is ignorant, but there is nothing there to be 
known. This is a version of Augustine's rather Protean argument 
that evil is not a substance but a privation of good: 'Detracto 
penitus omni bono, omnino nihil remanebit' (2.54). Here the 
application is not so much to substance as to the movement of the 
will: 'Motus ergo ille aversionis... defectivus motus est, omnis 
autem defectus ex nihilo est' (2.54). This might mean that the 
'aversio' is not compelled by main force; but doesn't it show 
this at the price of making it out to be a completely 
undetermined (i.e., random) 'motus'? Augustine thinks that, even 
if it is random, at any rate we do not have to let the 'aversio' 
happen in us: 
'Qui tamen defectus quoniam est voluntarius, in nostra est 
positus potestate. Si enim times illum, oportet ut nolis; si 
autem nolis, non erit. Quid ergo securius quam esse in ea vita, 
ubi non possit tibi evenire quod non vis ?' (2.54) 
I can choose to adopt this kind of 'aversio', it does not 
necessarily come on me like a mad fit; I can also choose to avoid 
it (cp. dVR 27). But, of course, once fallen, it is not so easy 
for mankind to rise again: what is needed is grace, 
the 
outstretched right hand of God- an important remark which makes 
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it clear that, even at this early stage, there is another side to 
Augustine's apparently rather simple- minded confidence that the 
good life can be obtained simply by willing. 
How far is this analysis of the causes of sin consistent 
with, and understandable in the light of, what has been said 
already about the reflexivity of the will? Some hints at an 
answer to that have been given already; a fuller statement can 
best be made in the context of Book Three, where the issue of the 
origin of sin is discussed more adequately (3.37 -77). To which I 
now turn. 
4. Book Three 
Summary of contents: 
3.1: How does the agent fall into wrongdoing? 
3.2 -3: Natural necessity contrasted with human liberty; the 
doctrine of use again. 'Neque culpandus homo esset cum ad 
inferiora detorquet quasi quemdam cardinem voluntatis.' 
3.4 -11: Foreknowledge and predestination. 
3.12 -18: The perfection of the universe in its variety and its 
balance. 
3.19 -25: Compulsion, misery, suicide and the goodness of 
existence qua existence. 
3.26 -37: Cosmic balance and sin. 
3.38, 42: Praise and blame: 'Nullius autem vituperatur vitium, 
nisi cuius natura laudatur'. 
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3.39 -41: How corruption happens. 
3.43 -46: Vindication of God's justice. 
3.47 -50: The causes of the will. 
3.51 -55, 64 -65: Ignorance and voluntariness. 
3.56 -63: The origin of souls and original sin. 
3.66 -69: Infant and animal suffering. 
3.70 -75: Wisdom, folly and perception. 
3.76 -77: God and the created mind. 
3.1: How does the agent fall into wrongdoing? 'What we should 
call psychological compulsions are not compulsions for Augustine. 
They are simply the individual working out his own nature' (Rist 
1969, p.422). If this is right, then it seems odd that, at the 
beginning of dLA Bk.3, Augustine makes it quite plain that in his 
view 'Si enim natura vel necessitate iste motus [peccandi] 
exsistit, culpabilis esse nullo pacto potest' (3.1). That this is 
his view appears in a good number of different places in his 
early writings, and not just the dLA. 
As Evodius is made to say: 'Nec quod naturaliter movetur 
recte vituperari potest; quia etiamsi ad perniciem movetur, 
naturae tarnen suae necessitate compellitur' (3.2). In which case, 
as Augustine points out, the ascriptions of praise and blame 
which Evodius is so strongly inclined to make of the corrupt will 
(3.1, 3.2) would be senseless. If free will is such that it is 
bound to go wrong, of necessity, then its movement is not free; 
or at any rate not responsible. In fact the stone (as conceived 
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in the Aristotelian physics of Augustine's day) provides a 
remarkably close analogy to what such a will would be like. A 
stone in mid air has no external force impressed on it. Nothing 
outside it forces it to go any one way rather than any other. The 
cause of its fall is within it: simply (in Rist's phrase) 'the 
working out of its own nature', the stone's own earthward 
propensity. 
But in fact, Augustine qualifies, while it is true that the 
soul's 'motus aversionis' is, like the stone's, a 'proprius 
motus', there is this difference: the soul can choose not to 
start falling: 
'In potestate non habet lapis cohibere motum quo fertur 
inferius; animus vero dum vult, non ita movetur, ut superioribus 
desertis inferiora diligat. Et ideo lapidi naturalis est ille 
motus, animo vero iste voluntarius.' (3.2) 
It is important to notice what Augustine does not say here: 
namely, he does not say that the soul can arrest its fall once 
begun. Nor does he say that a soul which so fell, and was unable 
to rise again, would not be culpable for this inability and for 
anything which resulted from it. Such differences in doctrine 
from what Augustine was later to oppose in the Pelagians are to 
be borne in mind. On the other hand, almost in the same breath he 
makes it sound as if that fall had not already occurred, was 
something within each individual's present control: 
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'Omnisque de hac re disciplina utilis ad id valeat, ut eo 
motu improbato atque cohibito, voluntatem nostram ad fruendum 
sempiterno bono, a lapsu temporalium convertamus.' (3.2) 
Evodius (3.3) sums up the findings of the dialogue so far. 
The will is an immediately present item of self- awareness, and 
the possession most truly my own; it pursues what brings joy; it 
is necessary for the good life, and its use makes us culpable for 
bad living and answerable for all our actions; its existence and 
freedom is implied by divine admonition and command. Without it 
there would be no responsibility; which brings us to the 
extraordinary phrase of 3.3: 
'Neque culpandus homo esset cum ad inferiora detorquet quasi 
quendam cardinem voluntatis.' 
What is Augustine's meaning here? Burleigh (1953, p.172) has 
'...Nor blameworthy, when he turns to lower objects, using his 
will like a hinge'; Thonnard (1941, p.329) reads '...Ni coupable, 
lorsque pivotant, pour ainsi dire, sur elle -même, elle se 
détourne vers les biens inférieurs'. But does 'cardinem 
voluntatis' mean, as Burleigh implies, that the will itself is 
the hinge; or is it that there is a part of the will which is 
used as a hinge? In either case, the familiar question arises: 
What is it that does the pivoting of the will or uses the will as 
a hinge? To this the only possible answer seems to be: The 
will 
itself. So perhaps the correct answer is that Augustine 
means 
that the will is both active and passive simultaneously 
in this 
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transaction: plays the roles both of mover and of hinge, is both 
the pivoter and the pivoted. 
3.4 -11: Foreknowledge and predestination. Evodius asks: 
'Quoniam peccaturum esse praesciverat, necesse erat id fieri, 
quod futurum esse praesciebat Deus. Quomodo est igitur voluntas 
libera ubi tam inevitablis apparet necessitas ?' (3.4). In 
response Augustine makes two gambits: first, he remarks that what 
God foreknows is that I act free 7y (3.8) ; which seems to suggest 
that Augustine's view is like Luis de Molina's, that, 
necessarily, I act freely. Second, he remarks that human 
prescience in itself has no tendency to limit freedom of action 
at all; so why should it be different with Divine prescience 
(3.10)? By 3.11 the distinction between compulsion and 
foreknowledge is clear enough for Augustine to ask: 'Cur ergo non 
vindicet iustus, quae fieri non cogit praescius ?'. He considers 
the problem solved from this point on. (It was not solved, of 
course: consider Molina (1588) and the huge recent literature on 
the subject, from Pike (1964) and Plantinga (1976) onwards.) 
3.12 -18: The perfection of the universe. At 3.12 Augustine 
turns to the question of 'Quomodo non Creatori deputandum sit 
quidquid in eius creatura fieri necesse est ?'. This question (of 
theodicy rather than of freedom) occupies much of Augustine's 
attention up to 3.46. The central points Augustine makes are (i) 
that the existence of what he (3.31) calls 'naturae'- substances - 
is a good in itself, and hence ( ?) so is the existence of as many 
different 'naturae' as posible (3.16, 22 -24). And (ii) that it is 
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a matter of indifference for God's glory whether humans sin or 
not (3.31). For if they do not, God's justice is shown in 
rewarding them; but if they do, His justice is shown in punishing 
them. 
'Miseriam quam doles, ad id quoque valere cognoscas, ut 
universitatis perfectioni nec illae desint animae, quae miserae 
fieri debuerunt, quia peccatrices esse voluerunt.' (3.25) 
Augustine remarks (3.15) that 'Est excellentior creatura quae 
libera voluntate peccat, quam quae propterea non peccat, quia non 
habet liberam voluntatem'. Augustine's theodicy involves a double 
notion of goodness. Natures can be better or worse according to 
their place in the scala naturae. But they can also be better or 
worse according to how successfully they play that role in the 
scala, how truly they are what they truly are or ought to be. 
Failing in this is a 'privatio boni', by which Augustine seems to 
mean indifferently a privation of good, or of substance, or of 
existence. 
3.19 -25: Compulsion and voluntary misery. Augustine offers, 
en passant, some remarks on the involuntary (3.19), designed, in 
context, to show that no one is miserable unjustly. Either one is 
in another's power, or in one's own; either one is miserable or 
not. If one is in one's own power, and not miserable, then there 
is no problem; if miserable, then this is caused by one's own 
unjust self -government. Or if one is in another's power, this 
other must either be someone who is able to overcome the soul, or 
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someone who is not so able. But only God is able to overcome the 
soul (2.14), and whatever one experiences from Him is of course 
justly dealt. And if one is in the power of someone who is not 
able to overcome the soul, then this can only be because one 
chose so to be; for which choice one is answerable. For (3.29) 
there are 'duae origines peccatorum, una spontanea cognitione, 
alia persuasione alterius'; but 'utrumque voluntarium est'. This 
argument is reiterated at 3.38 -40. 
3.21 gives us a different version of the kind of reflexive 
principle of virtue expounded in the first book. Compare (1.26) 
'Quid enim tam in voluntate, quam ipsa voluntas sita est ?' with 
(3.21) 'Si vis itaque miseriam fugere, ama in te hoc ipsum, quia 
esse vis... quanto amplius esse amaveris, tanto amplius vitam 
aeternam desiderabis'. To love existing is to love life, 
according to Augustine. 
At 3.32 -33 Augustine seems at first sight to be teaching 
something like double predestination. He divides free created 
natures into the higher and the lower, the 'in virtute ac 
iustitia permansuras' and the 'peccaturas' (3.32). By this he 
does not seem to mean a division between, say, angels and humans, 
for evidently some angels fell. Rather he seems to be dividing 
the elect (human and angelic) from the reprobate (ditto). He 
tells us (3.33) that the universe's order would be impaired if 
the higher sort either did not exist, or if they sinned; but it 
would only be impaired by the lower sort if they did not exist. 
And most significantly of all, 
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'[Sublimiori naturae] data est potentia omnia continendi 
officio proprio, quod rerum ordini deesse non possit; nec ideo in 
bona voluntate permanet, quia hoc accepit officium; sed ideo 
accepit, quoniam ab illo qui dedit permansura praevisum est.' 
(3.33) 
Here there is no mention of any direct predestination, only 
of prescience. But this prescience is made the ground for God's 
giving of an 'officium omnia continendi', not given to other 
natures, which is given on the sole ground that God's prescience 
distinguishes the higher kind of nature from the lower. The idea 
seems to be that God's grace comes only to those whom He foresees 
will accept it. 
3.34: Body and Soul. Augustine explicitly says that the 
sinful soul is not ruled only by its own volitions acting on a 
strong body, like the sinless soul, but also by the laws of 
physical determinism acting on a weak body: 
'In corporibus autem inferioribus atque mortalibus post 
peccatum, anima ordinata regit corpus suum, non omnimodo pro 
arbitrio, sed sicut leges universitatis sinunt.' (3.34) 
However, he does not seem to build anything on this - 
surprisingly, perhaps, from a modern viewpoint. 
3.47 -50: The causes of the 077. Augustine here lays out his 
reasons for affirming a doctrine which will be of great 
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importance in the City of God, and which is central to my 
interpretation 
of his thought: that there is no cause of an evil 
will. 
Note that I say 'of an evil will'. For Augustine is not 
saying that every 'voluntas' is uncaused, as (e.g.) Thonnard 
evidently takes him to be (Thonnard's chapter heading for dLA 
3.48 is 'Il n'y a pas de cause au delà de la volonté libre': 
Thonnard (1941), p.416). But note carefully the transition from 
Evodius' question to Augustine's answer: 
[Evodius:] 'Ego enim causam quaero ipsius voluntatis. Non 
enim sine causa nunquam vult illa [creatura] peccare, nunquam 
ista non vult, quaedam vero aliquando vult, aliquando non vult, 
cum eiusdem generis omnes sint. Hoc solum enim mihi videre 
videor, non sine causa esse tripartitam voluntatem rationalis 
creaturae; sed quae causa sit, nescio.' (3.47) 
Augustine's reply begins thus: 
'Quoniam voluntas est causa peccati, tu autem causa ipsius 
voluntatis inqui ris...' (3.48) 
Evodius is asking about the causes of all three of his kinds 
of wills, the wholly good, the wholly bad, and the mixed. But 
Augustine's reply restricts itself to the willing of bad deeds. 
This, surely, implies that Augustine assents to at least part of 
what Evodius says: namely, that there must be a cause of the good 
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will's being as it is. In Ch.7 I will argue that the notion of 
practical wisdom- as, in fact, developed in the dLA itself- gives 
us a crucial part of Augustine's theory of what it is for a good 
will to have causes. Thus, if Augustine were to say at dLA 
3.47 -49 that the will in general has no cause, he would be 
contradicting not only his own opinions, but his own opinions in 
the same work. 
The evil will does not have any cause, in the sense that the 
good will has a cause: this, not the claim that the 'voluntas' in 
general is subject to indeterminacy, is Augustine's point in dLA 
3.48 -49. We should not be misled by Augustine's use of 'causa 
voluntatis' into taking him to be making out a general claim. For 
the only 'voluntas' he is interested in here is that 'voluntas' 
which is the 'causa peccati'. Thus: 
'Quae tandem esse poterit ante voluntatem causa voluntatis? 
Aut enim et ipsa voluntas est; et a radice ista voluntatis non 
receditur; aut non est voluntas; et peccatum nullum habet.' 
(3.49) 
What does it mean to say that (not 'voluntas' in general, 
but) 'improba voluntas' has no cause? More about that in Chs.8 -9. 
For the moment I will simply point out the connection of this 
idea with the idea of 'privatio boni'. (Cp. 3.38 and 3.41, where 
Augustine tells us that whatever is a fault is contrary to the 
nature in which it is the fault; and that the fault is to be 
blamed precisely because the nature is to be praised.) 
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3.51 -6: Augustine considers the relation of ignorance and 
incapacity to voluntariness. Fallen man acts wickedly either 
because 'non habet in potestate ut bonus sit', a state which is 
now second nature to him (the ice is thin here: if wrongdoing is 
almost natural to humans (3.52, 'violentia... quodammodo 
naturaliter inolevit') then they are barely responsible for it, 
3.38). Or else he acts wickedly, by 'non videndo qualis esse 
debeat' (3.51). His state is attended everywhere by the 
conditions 'ignorantia' and 'difficultas' (3.52). (Is this 
ignorance, in Aristotle's terms, ignorance of moral principle or 
of facts?) 
Not everything so done in ignorance or because one cannot 
help it is to be pardoned (3.51: 'Etiam per ignorantiam facta 
quaedam improbantur'). But on the other hand, Augustine describes 
these conditions as 'duo iste poenalia' (3.52), penal conditions 
imposed in punishment for the first sin of the first (and only, 
before Christ) free human: 
'Illud quod ignorans quisque non recte fecit, et quod recte 
volens facere non potest, ideo dicuntur peccata, quia de peccato 
illo liberae voluntatis originem ducunt.' (3.54) 
'Cum autem de libera voluntate recte faciendi loquimur, de 
illa scilicet in qua homo factus est loquimur.' (3.52) 
The natural question now is: Is it just to punish us for 
Adam's sin? Augustine refuses to pursue this. He merely 
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reiterates his earlier arguments that God is necessarily just 
(3.51): 'Let them be silent, and stop murmuring against God' 
(3.53). In any case, he adds as an afterthought (3.53), it is 
fallen humanity's unresponsiveness to God which is culpable, not 
its mere fallenness. 
Augustine holds, like Aristotle, that if an act is culpable, 
it is voluntary; and if it is voluntary, this means that the 
agent could have done otherwise: 
'Ex conversione ad Deum, ut vinceret quisque supplicium quod 
origo eius ex aversione meruerat, non solum volentem non 
prohiberi, sed etiam adiuvari oportebat.' (3.55) 
Even fallen humans, it is here quite clearly affirmed, are 
able to desire God. And when they do so, God's grace is on hand 
to aid their desire. Again, in 3.65 Augustine stresses that it is 
within human power to choose whether to become good or not. 
In 3.66 -70 he discusses, rather unsymathetically, the plight 
of those creatures which do not seem to have such powers of 
choice, infants and animals. Of infants Augustine suggests (3.68) 
that what is not yet sinful is not yet good either; so that its 
suffering is unimportant. Of animals he suggests (3.69) that 
their suffering may contribute to the harmony of creation. 
Finally, in 3.71 -77, Augustine discusses the objection raised 
by Evodius at 1.24: 'If man was created wise, then he could not 
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be so foolish as to succumb to vice; if he was created foolish, 
then this was God's fault, not his'. Augustine replies that man 
was created neither foolish nor wise: 
'Tunc enim homo incipit aut stultus esse aut sapiens, cum iam 
posset, nisi negligeret, habere sapientiam, ut vitiosae 
stultitiae sit voluntas rea.' (3.71) 
The character of a person who has not yet chosen either for 
good or for evil is as yet unformed; ascriptions of 'wise' and 
'foolish' depend for their truth upon the existence of 
dispositions which have not yet been formed. 'Incipit homo 
praecepti esse capax, ex illo incipit posse peccare' (3.72). 
But (3.74) since the agent necessarily acts on what 
information is available to her, and the information available to 
Eve included the Serpent's voice, how could she avoid seduction? 
But Augustine responds (3.75) that this is not all the 
information present to the agent. Besides that temptation, there 
is also the awareness (intentio) of God's presence, and the 
reflexive awareness of oneself: 'Subiacet ergo intentioni animi 
prius ipse animus, unde nos etiam vivere sentimus: deinde corpus 
quod administrat'. All of these parts of our natural awareness go 
against the temptation of the Devil, which- Augustine says in 
conclusion- was therefore not sufficient to bring about the fall 
of humanity. 
The purpose of this chapter has been to raise questions and 
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issues by close scrutiny of the text of the de Libero Arbitrio. 
In subsequent chapters these issues and questions will be 
addressed more thematically, and in relation to a wider selection 
of Augustine's writings. But as a sufficient idea has now been 
given of the kind of issues with which this thesis will have to 
concern itself in addressing Augustine's theory of the voluntary, 
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'We in remorse are a radical minority within the social work 
community. We believe that not every wrong in our society is the 
result of complex factors such as poor early learning environment 
and resultative dissocialised communication. Some wrong is the 
result of badness. We believe that some people act like jerks, 
and that when dealing with jerks one doesn't waste too much time 
on sympathy. They're jerks. They do bad things. They should feel 
sorry for what they did and stop doing it.' 
(Garrison Keillor, 1989) 
1. Introduction 
My analysis of Augustine's doctrine of human freedom to act 
begins in the same way as my analysis of Aristotle's: with an 
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account of the negative conditions which Augustine thinks 
necessary for voluntary action. The same beginning, for the same 
reason: because the philosophical 'problem of freedom' is no more 
and no less than a problem in the theory of action. To be able to 
give the full conditions of voluntary action is to be able to 
give those of free action also. 
First I argue ( 52) that Augustine's interest in voluntariness 
stems from his concern, as an apologist, with responsibility for 
evil. Then ( 53) I survey (some of) his conditions for voluntary 
action. It will appear that, like Aristotle's, Augustine's theory 
of the voluntary has an important negative aspect. For him too 
the voluntary is at least partly defined by exclusion. (Does his 
theory, again like Aristotle's, also have a positive aspect? I 
address this question in Ch.7.) 
As I note in 54, fallen humans' actions, being vitiated by 
what Augustine calls 'ignorantia' and 'difficultas', fail to 
satisfy his own negative conditions for voluntary and responsible 
action. Nonetheless such actions are, apparently, responsible. I 
explain this (55) by noting Augustine's crucial distinction 
between culpable and non -culpable ignorance and compulsion. 
2. The Linkin of Voluntariness and Resonsibilit 
First, why should a Christian pastor and apologist be 
interested 
in an arcane philosophical question like the nature of 
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the voluntary? 
Augustine himself tells us why. In his youth he 
was much troubled by the evergreen question 'Unde malum ?' 
(Conf.3.7, dLA. 1.4). This question led hirn into Manichaeism. It 
was only when he had a satisfactory answer to it, in Christian 
Platonist terms, that Augustine returned to the Catholic fold. 
The problem which Augustine referred to by his question 'Unde 
malum ?' is this one: 
'Credimus autem ex uno Deo omnia esse quae sunt; et tarnen non 
esse peccatorum auctorem Deum. Movet autem animum, si peccata ex 
lis animabus sunt quas Deus creavit, illae autem animae ex Deo, 
quomodo non parvo intervallo peccata referantur in Deum.' (dLA 
1.4) 
Nietzsche's barbs, in my first epigraph to chapter are 
aimed at Augustine. For it was Augustine's efforts to solve this 
problem, the problem of evil, that induced him to develop his 
'free will defence', his version of the Biblical argument (Gen.3, 
Mk.7.14 -23, Jas.1.13 -15) that evil results from the exercise of 
creatures' God -given autonomy, not from God's own action: 
'Quisque malus sui malefacti auctor est' (dLA 1.1). Hence 
Augustine, and his commentators, are usually quicker to spot the 
difficulties he makes in theodicy in the dLA than those he makes 
in the theory of action. This, of course, is for the good reason 
that theodicy, not theory of action, is what he thinks he is up 
to. 
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Consider the first argument in the dLA: 
'Si Deum iustum fatemur, nam et hoc negare sacrilegium est, 
ut bonis praemia, ita supplicia malis tribuit... Si nemo iniuste 
poenas luit, quod necesse est credamus, quandoquidem divina 
providentia hoc universum regi credimus, illius primi generis 
malorum nullo modo, huius autem secundi auctor est Deus... 
Malefacta iustitia Dei vindicari. Non enim iuste vindicarentur, 
nisi fierent voluntate.' (dLA 1.1; cp. dVR 27) 
The argument is this: 
1. God punishes some actions. 
2. God is just. 
3. God's punishment would not be just unless the actions punished 
were sins. 
4. Therefore some actions are sins. (1,2,3) 
5. But no action is a sin unless it is voluntary. 
6. Therefore some actions are voluntary. (4,5) 
The argument shows clearly enough why Augustine is interested 
in voluntary action: because he sees a necessary connection 
between voluntariness and responsibility. If there are no 
creaturely voluntary actions, then the only voluntary agent in 
existence will be God. But if God is the only voluntary agent, 
then (Augustine thinks) he is, necessarily, also the 
only 
responsible agent. Everything, good or bad, results directly 
from 
divine agency. Therefore God himself is directly responsible 
for 
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everything, including all the evil in the world. Augustine thinks 
this an impossible position for a Christian. Hence, as he argues 
repeatedly throughout his career, Christians are committed to 
believing that God is not the only voluntary agent. 
However, we must distinguish two claims about the relation of 
voluntariness and responsibility: 
1. Any piece of behaviour is a responsible action if and only if 
it is a voluntary action. 
2. Any piece of behaviour is a responsible action if and only if 
it is either (i) a voluntary action or (ii) a relevantly 
connected consequence, e.g. a foreseeable causal consequence, of 
a voluntary action. 
When Augustine writes, e.g., that 'usque adeo peccatum 
voluntarium est malum, ut nullo modo sit peccatum, si non sit 
voluntarium' (dVR 27), we might think that he was arguing for 
(1). But (1) is an unsophisticated and implausibly strong thesis. 
We have already seen that Aristotle rejected it (NE 1114a4 -13): 
the person who kills someone while blind drunk is responsible for 
that killing, not so much because he chose to kill them, as 
because he chose to get blind drunk. This distinction between (as 
we might say) direct and indirect responsibility is also defended 
by Augustine, both in his early and in his late works. However, 
the importance of that distinction, as supporting a more fully 
developed doctrine of original sin, is clearer in his later work: 
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'Dereliquit [homo] Deum et factus est malo dignus aeterno, 
qui hoc in se peremit bonum, quod esse posset aeternum. Hinc est 
universa generis humani massa damnata; quoniam, qui hoc primus 
admisit, cum ea quae in illo fuerat radicata sua stirpe punitus 
est, ut nullus ab hoc fusto debitoque supplicie nisi misericordi 
et indebita gratia liberetur.' (dCD 21.12) 
So Augustine's 'free will defence' is never simply (1), that 
the human agent is responsible directly for each and every 
wrongdoing she commits, because each such wrongdoing is itself a 
voluntary action. It is, more subtly, (2): that one original 
wrongdoing by a human agent was a voluntary and hence responsible 
action, and that all human wrongdoings since have been 
relevantly connected (how ?) consequences of that responsible 
action. 
3. Two of Augustine's Conditions of Voluntary Action 
It is an important claim to say that voluntariness and 
responsibility are necessarily connected. Augustine never 
abandons this claim, at least not in the qualified form (2). But 
the claim is not, in itself, very informative. The prior and more 
important question is: What is 'voluntariness'? That is: Under 
what conditions is action properly called voluntary? 
Augustine's responses to that question tend, as the 
dLA 
illustrates, to be unsystematic. Hence it is that, particularily 
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'Dereliquit [homo] Deum et factus est malo dignus aeterno, 
qui hoc in se peremit bonum, quod esse posset aeternum. Hinc est 
universa generis humani massa damnata; quoniam, qui hoc primus 
admisit, cum ea quae in illo fuerat radicata sua stirpe punitus 
est, ut nullus ab hoc fusto debitoque supplicie nisi misericordi 
et indebita gratia liberetur.' (dCD 21.12) 
So Augustine's 'free will defence' is never simply (1), that 
the human agent is responsible directly for each and every 
wrongdoing she commits, because each such wrongdoing is itself a 
voluntary action. It is, more subtly, (2): that one original 
wrongdoing by a human agent was a voluntary and hence responsible 
action, and that all human wrongdoings since have been 
relevantly connected (how ?) consequences of that responsible 
action. 
3. Two of Augustine's Conditions of Voluntary Action 
It is an important claim to say that voluntariness and 
responsibility are necessarily connected. Augustine never 
abandons this claim, at least not in the qualified form (2). But 
the claim is not, in itself, very informative. The prior and more 
important question is: What is 'voluntariness'? That is: Under 
what conditions is action properly called voluntary? 
Augustine's responses to that question tend, as the dLA 
illustrates, to be unsystematic. Hence it is that, particularily 
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in Augustine's later work, crucial ambiguities and contradictions 
on that question pass (conveniently ?) unnoticed. Augustine's 
attention, as we have seen, is on theodicy, not on action theory. 
Anyway, even the young Augustine usually sees no need to spell 
out the conditions of voluntary action because he thinks that 
they are intuitively obvious. Typically, his remarks about them 
are flanked by bold phrases like 'quis dubitet... ?' (dDA 1.15), 
'cum... natura ipsa proclamet' (dDA 1.14), 'Nonne ista cantant et 
in montibus pastores, et in theatris poetae, et indocti in 
circulis, et docti in bibliothecis ?' (dDA 15). At dVR 27 we have 
an appeal to the authority of common sense reminiscent of 
Aristotle's appeals to 'the many and the wise' (NE 1095a18: v. 
Ch.2, §2): 
'Hoc quidem ita manifestum est, ut nulla hinc doctorum 
paucitas, nulla indoctorum turba dissentiat.' (dVR 27) 
This tone of airy confidence might encourage an unwary 
commentator to take Augustine's conditions of voluntary action 
for granted too. But a clear account of these is of the greatest 
importance for an adequate understanding of the strengths and 
weaknesses of Augustine's position. And, in spite of Augustine's 
tendency to gloss over them or only mention them in passing, it 
is not impossible to give an account of what these conditions 
are, as represented in the early works. I will base this account 
on the dLA ( Augustine's fullest treatment of the issues) and the 
dDA (his ablest treatment). 
(307) 
The picture that emerges is remarkably Aristotelian (cp. 
m1). For a start, the early Augustine agrees with Aristotle in 
believing that any behaviour, to qualify as voluntary action, 
must (at the least) satisfy two negative conditions, with which I 
will deal in this chapter. It must be: 
(i) not compelled, 
(ii) not done in ignorance. 
(i) Compulsion.- dDA 14 gives us one of Augustine's most 
adequate formulations of the definition of voluntary action: 
'Voluntas est animi motus, cogente nullo, ad aliquid vel non 
amittendum, vel adipiscendum'. 
(I call this a definition of voluntary action. It may rightly 
be objected that, strictly, what Augustine is defining at dDA 14 
is not voluntary action but 'voluntas' (however we are to 
translate that). However, not much hangs on this here; see Ch.7, 
g2, for further discussion of the point.) 
This definition, defended phrase by phrase in the dDA, covers 
nearly everything that the young Augustine believes about 
voluntary action; except, surprisingly, the question of 
ignorance. The role of the phrases 'animi motus' and 'ad aliquid 
vel non amittendum, vel adipiscendum' in Augustine's positive 
theory of the voluntary will be discussed below in 06. The words 
'cogente nullo' cover the question of compulsion. Why does 
Augustine think these words should be included in the definition 
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of voluntary action? He writes elsewhere (dLA 3.51): 
'De Dei iustitia dubitare dementis est... non enim quisquam 
iniustus dominator aut surripere hominem potuit... aut extorquere 
invito, tanquam invalidiori, vel terrendo vel confligendo, ut 
hominem iniusta poena cruciaret.' 
And in the dDA: 
'Omnis qui volens facit, non cogitur; et omnis qui non 
cogitur, aut volens facit, aut non facit.' (dDA 14) 
Augustine thinks that his claim that voluntary action must be 
uncompelled action is evident, not just from Scripture, but even 
from nature: 
'Haec cum in omnibus hominibus, quos interrogare non absurde 
possumus, a puero usque ad senem, a ludo litterario usque ad 
solium sapientis, natura ipsa proclamet...' (dDA 14) 
In the dLA, Augustine relies repeatedly- though not always 
explicitly- on the premiss that wrongdoing, to count as sin, must 
be uncompelled. I give three examples. 
(a) One point of Augustine's long argument (dLA 1.16- 1.22), 
that nothing is superior in power to the virtuous soul, except 
Reason and God, is that it helps him to establish that the 
virtuous soul cannot be compelled to do evil. For if it was 
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compelled it would not be acting voluntarily, and so not sinning. 
'Ergo relinquitur ut quoniam regnanti menti compotique 
virtutis, quidquid par aut praelatum est, non eam facit servam 
libidinis propter iustitiam... nulla res alia mentem cupiditatis 
comitem faciat, quam propria voluntas et liberum arbitrium.' (dLA 
1.21) 
(b) In Ch.5 I noted that Rist must be wrong to think that, 
for Augustine, there are no internal compulsions, and adduced 
Augustine's contrast between the stone and the actions of the 
human agent in the dLA. (Cp. Aristotle, NE 1103a18 -20: bfXov ÖTL 
OOÖEILO T(V fi6LK6V ppETe6V CIÚQEL fip v yy(VETOL.) As I said there: 
If the agent were compelled as a stone is compelled, then of 
course the resulting behaviour would not be voluntary action or 
relevantly connected behaviour, and hence not directly or 
indirectly responsible action, and hence not sin. 'Quaecumque 
ista causa est voluntatis, si non ei potest resisti, sine peccato 
ei ceditur: si autem potest, non ei cedatur, et non peccabitur.' 
(dLA 3.50) 
(c) In dLA 3.4 -11, Augustine argues that his doctrine of 
God's foreknowledge of human actions does not endanger his theory 
of human freedom; what God foreknows is that the human agent will 
act freely (dLA 3.8). Foreknowledge presents the threat that 
God's foreknowledge be seen to compel our actions; and this would 
mean that they were not voluntary actions, nor relevantly 
connected behaviour. But 'Deus neminem ad peccandum cogens 
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praevidet tarnen eos qui propria voluntate peccabunt' (dLA 3.10). 
So 'Cur ergo non vindicet iustus, quae fieri non cogit 
praescius ?' (3.11). 
To return to the dDA 14 passage with which I began my 
consideration of compulsion. The claim made there by Augustine 
is, apparently, that 'X acts voluntarily' entails 'X is not 
compelled'. This claim will be true if the absence of compulsion 
is either necessary, or necessary and sufficient, for voluntary 
action. Obviously, since I say that the absence of compulsion is 
not the only condition of voluntary action, my account requires 
that this condition should only be necessary. But Augustine's 
'Everyone who is not forced, either acts voluntarily or does not 
act at all' is, apparently, a claim that the absence of 
compulsion is both necessary and sufficient for voluntary action. 
So where does this leave the negative condition of ignorance? 
(ii) Ignorance.- In spite of this passage, there is plentiful 
evidence that Augustine did not, in fact, normally neglect the 
idea that ignorance is a limiting factor on responsible action. 
Elsewhere in his early writings Augustine clearly does defend 
that idea, so that the remark of dDA 14 is probably best 
dismissed as a rhetorical excess, and not representative of 
Augustine's usual theory of responsibility. I give, again, three 
examples of this defence. 
(a) In the dDA itself, at Ch.12, Augustine considers the 
example of a person whose hand is made to write something obscene 
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while he is asleep. His being asleep exculpates him from the sin 
of writing rude words either (i) if he is compelled (as above), 
or else (ii) if he does not know that his hand is going to be 
used in this way while he sleeps. But if he does know, and does 
nothing about it when he could have, then 'Num ei quidquam somnus 
ad innocentiam suffragaretur ?' (dDA 12). Strictly speaking, he 
will then be indirectly responsible, like the drunken killer. His 
knowledge meant that he could have avoided getting in a state 
where his hand would write filth, but he didn't. 
(b) In the early RomsIE, Augustine discusses the 
'unforgivable' sin of speaking against the Holy Spirit 
(Mt.12.32). He argues against the rigorous (Novationist) view 
that those who so sin after baptism cannot be forgiven, whereas 
those who speak against the Holy Spirit before baptism can be. 
The Novationists said that someone who speaks against the Holy 
Spirit after baptism could no longer be excused on the ground of 
ignorance. Augustine counters that it is perfectly plain that 
people can and do remain ignorant of such important teachings 
after baptism: 
'Quid auteur de his qui cum baptismi sacramenta pueri vel 
etiam infantes perceperint, postea negligenter educati per 
ignorantiae tenebras vitam turpissimam ducentes nescientes 
omnino, quid christiana disciplina iubeat aut vetet? Num 
audebimus peccata eorum propterea non ignorantiae peccata 
deputare, quia baptizati peccaverunt ?' ( RomslE 16) 
(312) 
What is at issue between the Novationists and Augustine is: 
How wide is the scope of exculpating ignorance? What is not at 
issue, but is accepted on both sides, is that there is 
exculpating ignorance. (Note, however, that here Augustine seems 
prepared to agree with the Novationists that 'sins of ignorance' 
are nonetheless sins. What he is arguing is that such sins are 
less culpable, not that they are not culpable at all.) Augustine 
was arguing that the Novationists' understanding of that notion 
was insufficiently generous. 
(c) At dLA 3.50, Augustine considers the idea that the 
experience of deception can sometimes result in a form of 
ignorance which exculpates: 
'An forte fallit incautum? Ergo caveat ne fallatur. An tanta 
fallacia est, ut caveri omnino non possit? Si ita est, nulla 
peccata sunt. Quis enim peccat in eo quod nullo modo caveri 
potest? Peccatur autem: caveri igitur potest.' (dLA 3.50 
So, despite the evident claim of dDA 14, the early Augustine 
does in fact believe that there can be exculpating ignorance, 
parallel in kind to exculpating compulsion. 
gnorantia' and 'Difficultas' 
However, as early as the dLA there is evidence of the 
beginnings of a quite different attitude to ignorance and 
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compulsion, an attitude which came to dominate Augustine's later 
theory of responsibility. For the classical tradition, and with 
it the early Augustine, the conditions of ignorance and 
compulsion were restrictions on culpability. But in Augustine's 
later writings on the subject, it often seems as if what he calls 
the conditions of 'ignorantia' and 'difficultas' have become the 
very hallmarks of culpability. 
In his later works, as I will now show, Augustine often seems 
prepared to argue that sin, so far from being- necessarily - 
neither compelled nor done in ignorance, is typically one or the 
other, or both. Augustine never renounced any of the central 
points of his teaching on the subject of responsibility and 
voluntariness. Yet his emphasis changes so dramatically that it 
looks at first as if he has done a complete vo l to face: from the 
view that 'ignorantia' and 'difficultas' are conditions which 
diminish responsibility; via the position that, as 'penal 
conditions', they are characteristic of fallen humanity; to the 
view that these conditions are actually culpable in themselves. 
'Nam sunt revera omni peccanti animae duo ista poenalia, 
ignorantia et difficultas' (dLA 3.52). As Augustine developed his 
theory of human nature, he came to think that fallen humans were 
not just thwarted from the achievement of their wishes by 
ignorance and compulsion in general. They were, rather, typically 
subject to specific forms of ignorance and compulsion. What were 
these forms? 
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In dLA 3.51 -6 Augustine says that fallen man acts wickedly 
either because 'non habet in potestate ut bonus sit', or by 'non 
videndo qualis esse debeat' (3.51). It is already apparent that 
his 'difficultas' and 'ignorantia' are impediments to voluntary 
action of quite specific kinds. 'Difficultas' characterises the 
agent who wishes to do what is right, but cannot. 'Ignorantia' 
characterises the agent who does not even have the knowledge of 
the good that puts him in a position to wish to do what is right. 
(Does this mean that Augustine's 'ignorantia' is equivalent 
to Aristotle's 'ignorance of principle' rather than Aristotle's 
'ignorance of particulars'? It seems that Augustine does not 
really take this distinction on board. He is more concerned to 
make out his own distinction, between voluntary and involuntary 
ignorance, which (he thinks) is the most morally important 
distinction. The Aristotelian question, whether there is any 
difference in moral status between voluntary and involuntary 
ignorance of principle, apparently does not occur to him.) 
Augustine gives us an even more detailed account of the roles 
of ignorance and difficulty in thwarting voluntary action in four 
works of the early 390s (EPRoms, Simp, 83DQ, EEGa1). Here he sees 
human moral regeneration as proceeding through four stages, 
summarised by EPRoms 13: 
'Ante legem sequimur concupiscentiam carnis, sub lege 
trahimur ab ea, sub gratia nec sequimur eam nec trahimur ab ea, 
in pace nulla est concupiscentia carnis'. 
(315) 
Ante legem there is complete ' ignorantia', but absolutely no 
' difficultas'. There is no struggle (EPRoms 14, 'non pugnamus'), 
because the human is in a state of 'concupiscentia', in which she 
simply follows her natural inclinations, and even approves of so 
doing (EpRoms 14, 83DQ 66.3). There is nothing to prevent this, 
for the human has no conception that what she does is wrong 
(EEGaI 46, 'non est qui prohibeat'). 83DQ 66.4 gives four 
Biblical proof texts: Roms.5.12 -13, 7.8 -9, 7.13, and 1 Tim.1.8. 
Sub lege there is no important 'ignorantia', but plenty of 
'difficultas'. The human experiences unsuccessful struggle 
(EPRoms 13, 'trahimur'; DQ83, 'victi peccamus') against desires 
which are now perceived, by the recognition which the Law brings, 
as evil (EPRoms 15 'Fatemur mala esse quae facimus'; EEGaI 46 
'Conatur a peccato abstinere se, sed vincitur'). EEGaI adds that 
the struggle is unsuccessful because 'nondum iustitiam propter 
Deum et propter ipsam iustitiam diligit, sed eam sibi vult ad 
conquirendum terrena servire'. Paul's Manichaean sounding remark 
that his sins are due not to himself but to >i evoLKOÚQa êv êuoT 
áuapT(a (Roms.7.18, cp. de Duabus Animabus) is picked up by 
EPRoms 15: 'fatendo mala esse utique nolumus facere'; hence (says 
EEGaI 46) the sinner 'trahitur pondere temporalis cupiditatis, et 
relinquit iustitiam'. This remark has a very Platonic ring (cp., 
e.g., Republic 439a- 440d). As proof texts 83DQ 66.5 cites 
Roms.5.20, most of Roms.7.5 -25, and Ps.18.13. 
Sub gratia there is no 'ignorantia', and less and less 
' difficultas' 
, since the agent's experience is now 
of successful 
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struggle with sin (EEGaI 46): 
'In hac enim vita etiamsi existant desideria carnis de 
mortalitate corporis, tarnen mentem ad consensionem peccati non 
subiugant.' 
Cp. 83DQ 66.3: 
'Iam non vincimur delectatione consuetudinis malae... sed 
tarnen adhuc earn interpellantem patimur, quamvis ei non tradamur.' 
This victory is, of course, the result of grace (EPRoms 16): 
'Venit ergo gratia, quae donet peccata praeterita et conantem 
adiuvet et tribuat caritatem iustitiae'. 
Without this grace victory is impossible (EEGaI 46): 
'Nisi charitate spirituali quam Dominus exemplo suo docuit et 
gratia donavit, fieri non potest.' 
Augustine's proof texts are: Roms 7.25, 8.1 -10, 25 (83DQ 
66.6). 
In pace there is no 'difficultas' and no 'ignorantia'. There 
is now no struggle with sin, for sin is finally defeated and 
the 
agent is perfected: 
(317) 
'Postea vero ex omni parte exstinguitur.' (EEGa1 46) 
'Quarta est actio, cum omnino nihil est in homine quod 
resistat spiritui, sed omnia sibimet concorditer iuncta et 
connexa unum aliquid firma pace custodiunt.' (83DQ 66.3) 
This stage, of course, is only reached in the life of the 
Resurrection: 
'...Quod fiet mortali corpore vivificato.' (83DQ 66.3) 
'Ideo autem perfecta pax, quia nihil nobis resistet non 
resistentibus Deo.' (EPRoms 17) 
As his scriptural warrant for this Augustine cites Roms 8.11 
(83DQ 66.7) . 
All four of these stages are implicitly identified at Simp 
1,2: 
'Legem ad hoc datam esse... ut peccatum demonstraretur, quo 
animam humanam quasi de innocentia secura ipsa peccati 
demonstratione ream faceret: ut, quia peccatum sine gratia Dei 
vinci non posset, ipsa reatus sollicitudine ad percipiendam 
gratin convertitur.' 
First, the state of 'carefree innocence'; or rather carefree 
quasi- innocence, for of course Augustine does not mean that the 
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iman 'ante legem' is sinless, just that her sins are unrevealed 
;imp 1.6: 'Non quia [lex] non erat, sed quia non apparebat'). 
ien the stage of .a 'sollicitudo' caused by the awareness of the 
3w; then, less clearly here, the two stages of grace and peace. 
(With this four -stage progress from wickedness to holiness, 
ompare four Aristotelian states: dioaaoCo, àKpaoCa, ZKpars(a, 
nd ßgppooúvil. ) 
Situp 1.11 gives us an opinion on the interesting question of 
Nether 'difficultas' applies just to the performance of good 
ctions, or even to the willing of them. There Augustine notes, 
f the 'sub lege' stage: 
'Certe enim ipsum velle in potestate est, quoniam adiacet 
iobis; sed perficere bonum non est in potestate.' (Simp 1.11) 
'Sine difficu7tate vult, quamvis non tam facile faciet, quam 
'acile vult.' (Simp 1.12) 
Perhaps we may say that, at the first stage ('ante legem'), 
¡hat the agent lacks, being in a state of 'ignorantia', is both 
)ood intentions and good performances. Whereas at the second 
stage ('sub lege'), the agent has good intentions, but he is 
(through 'difficultas') incapable of any corresponding (good) 
performances. The role of grace, at the third and fourth stages, 
into connect willing with performance. It is to be noted that 
in 
this area Augustine's doctrine does appear to have changed 
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radically. The later Augustine quotes repeatedly the dictum of 
Paul that 'God is at work in you both to will and to work 
according to his good pleasure' (Phil.2.12 -13). 
It is now pretty clear what Augustine means when he talks of 
'ignorantia' and 'difficultas'. The next question is: How did 
these conditions, so far from being thought exculpatory, come to 
be seen by Augustine as typical or even dia nose of 
culpability? 
5. From the Earlier to the Later Theory 
What enabled Augustine to take this direction was his 
development, again from what was originally fairly 
uncontroversial classical material, of the distinction between 
non -culpable and culpable ignorance and compulsion. He came 
increasingly to stress the culpable and neglect the non -culpable, 
until by the late works we hear almost nothing of exculpatory 
ignorance and compulsion, and a very great deal indeed about 
culpable ignorance and compulsion. 
But it should be noted that what was involved was more a 
change of emphasis than of doctrine. This is evident from the 
dLA, in which most of the doctrines usually supposed to 
characterise only Augustine's late theology can already be found. 
The dLA, it is true, teaches such typically 'early' doctrines as 
sYnergism, the view that God and human work together in the 
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economy of salvation. (So, e.g., when Augustine says that grace 
is given to those whom God foresees will respond to it: dLA 
3.33.) But side by side with this kind of teaching, often in the 
sane breath, comes the 'later' stress on grace. By and large, 
Augustine, in the course of his career as a writer on freedom and 
the voluntary, did not so much change his position as his 
nuances- promoting now one side of what he saw as Biblical 
doctrine, and now the other. This can be nicely illustrated by 
showing how, for Augustine's 'late' and 'early' doctrines on the 
issue of culpable and non- culpable ignorance and compulsion, we 
need look no further than the dLA, where nearly all of them can 
be found jumbled together. 
If we may cut through the attritions, we may suggest that 
Augustine's most basic teaching on this issue is that 'natural' 
ignorance and compulsion are not culpable, but 'voluntary' 
ignorance and compulsion are. Natural ignorance and compulsion 
are just where the soul begins its journey, even in an unfallen 
creation. So, at dLA 3.71, Augustine has to deal with this 
dilemma: 
'Si sapiens factus est primus homo, cur seductus est? Si 
auteur stultus factus est, quomodo non est Deus auctor vitiorum ?' 
His response to this challenge is that: 
'Est enim stultitia, rerum appetendarum et vitandarum non 
quaelibet, 
sed vitiosa ignorantia.' (dLA 3.71) 
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Which ignorance, then, is vicious (and culpable), and which 
innocent (and blameless)? Augustine's answer is that the innocent 
form of ignorance is that which is not chosen by the agent, viz. 
natural ignorance. Pari passu, the innocent form of compulsion is 
natural compulsion. Actions done under these influences are not 
culpable for Augustine because you can't avoid them (cp. dLA 
3.50, quoted above). This was still Augustine's view when he 
wrote the dGLA: 'Aliud est enim nescisse, aliud scire noluisse' 
(dGLA 5). 
This is a perfectly mainline view, in which no important 
ancient philosopher would have seen any problem. But what are 
'voluntary' ignorance and compulsion, and why are they culpable 
in fallen humans? This is where Augustine's teaching in the dLA 
becomes confused. Sometimes (an 'early' doctrine, consistent with 
the view of 'natural' compulsion just outlined) he tells us that 
they are culpable in fallen humans because fallen humans can 
themselves avoid them: 
'Non tibi deputatur ad culpam quod invitus ignoras, sed quod 
neglegis quaerere quod ignoras; neque illud quod vulnerata membra 
non colligis, sed quod volentem sanare contemnis.' (dLA 3.53) 
'Non enim quod naturaliter nescit et naturaliter non potest, 
hoc animae deputatur in reatum; sed quod scire non studuit, et 
quod dignam facilitati comparandae ad recte faciendum operam non 
dedit.' (dLA 3.64) 
(322) 
At other times, however, we get the 'later' doctrine that 
they are culpable in fallen humans because Adam and Eve could 
have avoided them: 
'Illud quod ignorans quisque non recte facit, et quod recte 
volens facere non potest, ideo dicuntur peccata, quia de peccato 
illo liberae voluntatis originem ducunt: illud enim praecedens 
meruit ista sequentia.' (dLA 3.54) 
'Ut autem de illo primo coniugio, et cum ignorantia, et cum 
difficultate, et cum mortalitate nascamur, quoniam illi cum 
peccavissent, et in errorem, et in aerumnam, et in mortem 
praecipitati sunt, rerum moderatori summo Deo iustissime 
placuit.' (dLA 3.55) 
At other times again it is already beginning to appear in the 
dLA as if such conditions are culpable in themselves: 
'Si non est ista [sc. facta ex ignorantia et difficultate] 
poena hominis, sed natura, nulla ista peccata sunt.' (dLA 3.51) 
The question raised by this apparent diversity of opinions is 
one of culpability. Is human responsibility for sin a matter of 
what, above, I called direct culpability, or of indirect 
culpability, or of a mixture? Which of these is Augustine's 
claim? 
(323) 
(a) There are wrong actions which fallen humans perform for which 
they are directly to blame. 
(b) There are wrong actions which fallen humans perform for which 
they are directly to blame, and as a result of which they 
helplessly perform other wrong actions for which they are 
indirectly to blame. 
(c) There are wrong actions which fallen humans perform for which 
they are indirectly to blame. 
When Augustine talks of ignorance and compulsion as penal 
conditions, as he often does even in the dLA, it seems at first 
as if he is defending (a) above. So, for example, 3.52: 'Illa est 
enim peccati poena iustissima, ut amittat quisque quo bene uti 
noluit'. The person who fails to take the initiative for good in 
her own life is punished by the removal of the chance to take 
that initiative at all. 
But then we notice that actions performed in 'ignorantia' and 
'difficultas' are themselves, sometimes, punishable: 
'Etiam per ignorantiam facta quaedam improbantur... sunt 
etiam necessitate facta improbanda, ubi vult homo recte facere, 
et non potest; nam unde sunt illae voces, "Non enim quod volo 
facio bonum, sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago " ?' (dLA 3.51). 
The idea (b) that the kind of culpability in question for 
such actions is mainly indirect might seem to be supported by 
Augustine's contention, in at least two other places, that sins 
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of ignorance are culpable, but culpable in a reduced degree. So 
in RomslE 17 Augustine entertains the conclusion that the only 
venial sins are those committed in ignorance: all others, he 
seems to be arguing here, are mortal. In dGLA 5, Augustine quotes 
the same Lucan verses (Lk.12.47 -48) in support of a somewhat 
similar argument, that 'gravius peccare hominem scientem quam 
nescientem'. 
But this argument too seems to be denied by the assertion 
above, from dLA 3.54, that all fallen human sinfulness is 
indirect and dependent on the wrong choice of Adam and Eve. So 
Augustine's position becomes still harder to elucidate: it now 
seems closer to (c). 
In any case there is a logical problem with (c), inasmuch as 
indirect responsibility is 'parasitic', logically dependent, on 
direct responsibility. At least in the sense in which 
'responsible' is normally understood, I cannot be indirectly 
responsible for any doing of mine B unless (i) I was directly 
responsible for some other doing of mine A, and unless (ii) B was 
a relevantly connected consequence, e.g. a foreseeable causal 
consequence, of A. But Augustine's doctrine of responsibility 
seems to fall at both these hurdles. (i) If my culpability under 
the doctrine of original sin depends on what Adam and Eve did, 
then it does not depend on any doing of mine, responsible 
or 
otherwise. (ii) A fortiori, the consequences of what 
they did 
were 
not, and could not have been, 'relevantly 
connected' to 
their action(s) from my point of view, neither as 'foreseeable 
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causal consequences' nor as anything else. 
Augustine seems aware of this problem, and it leads his 
theory into one last contortion, not yet noted, but hinted at in 
one of the quotes above: 
'Si non est ista [sc. facta ex ignorantia et difficultate] 
poena hominis, sed natura, nulla ista peccata sunt.' (dLA 3.51) 
Augustine's last manoeuvre on this topic, only performed on 
the occasions when he thinks he can get away with it, is actually 
to claim that what we are punished for by God is what we do in 
ignorance and difficulty. The penal conditions themselves become 
their own punishment. To offer two examples of this rare, 
spectacular back -flip: 
(a) dCD 14.11: Eve was guilty because she was 'seduced', i.e. 
deceived (and therefore ignorant). And Adam, says Augustine, 'was 
not less (!!) guilty because he was not deceived'. 
(b) dGLA 5: 'When a man says, "I cannot do what I am commanded, 
because I am mastered by my own concupiscence ", he has no longer 
any reason to blame God in his heart, but he recognises and 
laments his own evil in himself.' 
If one is attempting, as Augustine is, to explain the 
performance of large numbers of evil deeds by humans, this 
last 
manoeuvre is, of course, a patently circular and self 
defeating 
one; not so much a back flip as a belly flop. One might 
as well 
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'explain' the presence of large numbers of prisoners in jails by 
arguing (legitimately) that they were there because they were 
being punished, and then (crazily) that what they were being 
punished for was the offence of being prisoners. 
g6. Conclusion 
I have argued in this chapter that Augustine quite often 
articulates a very standard classical view of ignorance and 
compulsion as exculpating or mitigating factors, and that nothing 
he ever says amounts to a serious denial of this standard view. 
But, as I have also pointed out, in certain moods Augustine can 
be seen as attempting, in effect, to stand the classical view on 
its head. For sometimes he argues that certain kinds of ignorance 
and compulsion not only are not exculpating factors: they are 
either standard features of the behaviour of agents who typically 
incur blame; or else standard features of blameworthy cases of 
action; or even good reasons for ascribing blame to actions in 
which they are evident. 
This attempted reversal is a bold and interesting move, but, 
as Augustine presents it, it does not work. I have pointed out in 
his work some of the various theses about responsibility and 
voluntariness which Augustine sometimes seems prepared to 
endorse. But it is not satisfactorily clear exactly which of 
these he means, overall, to be arguing; and he cannot coherently 
combine them. Augustine starts from the tried and tested 
(327) 
foundation of eclectic classicism, and launches zealously out on 
a highly revisionary programme in the philosophy of action. This 
heroic programme might have been more successful had Augustine 
paid closer and more sustained attention to those fine logical 
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'Si liberum non sit, non est voluntas.' 
(Augustine, de Duabus Animabus, 15) 
1. Introduction 
In the last chapter, I examined two negative conditions which 
Augustine gives for voluntary action, namely that such action 
should (i) not be compelled and (ii) not be done in ignorance. I 
also raised the question whether Augustine, like Aristotle, gives 
any positive conditions for voluntary action. 
In this chapter and the next, I argue that Augustine does 
indeed give us at least two such conditions of normal voluntary 
action, (1) and (ii): 
(329) 
(i) Voluntary action, for Augustine, is action on that 'animi 
motus' which he calls the 'voluntas', and as such is the very 
opposite of compelled behaviour. 
(ii) Augustinian voluntary action is also action with the 
form of an aspiration to the good life ('ad aliquid vel non 
amittendum vel adipiscendum'). As that good life is, in 
Augustine's view, of determinate form, such aspirations partake 
of the 'measure, weight and number' of practical wisdom; which 
makes them anything but ignorant. 
(i) is a converse of the negative condition about compulsion. 
(ii) is, as I will argue, a positive account of the rationality 
of Augustinian voluntary action. Its existence suggests the 
existence also of a negative condition of voluntary action, that 
it should not be irrational; but no separate attempt will be made 
to draw this out. Nor will I discuss Augustine's theory of 
knowledge, the positive converse of his negative condition about 
ignorance. No doubt such a converse can be found in Augustine's 
Platonist epistemology; but this subject is too large to discuss 
in a thesis on his theory of freedom, and (unlike Aristotle's 
theory of knowledge) is in any case not neatly separable from 
what Augustine has to say about practical rationality/ wisdom. 
In this chapter I will deal with (i), Augustine's theory of 
the 'voluntas'- his account of the efficient causation or 
origination of voluntary action. In Ch.8 I will deal with (ii), 
Augustine's theory of 'felicitas'- his account of such action's 
(330) 
final and formal causation. 
2 'Voluntas': 'Voluntary Action' or 'Volition'? 
What, in Ch.6, I called the negative conditions of voluntary 
action, Augustine discusses as constraints on 'voluntas'. Hence I 
was content there to treat Augustine's 'voluntas' as if it meant 
simply 'voluntary action'. But does 'voluntas' mean 'voluntary 
action' or the cause of such action, i.e. 'volition'? 
Quite often, Augustine uses 'voluntas' to distinguish, not 
volitions from actions, but voluntary actions from other 
behaviour. When, e.g., he writes (dLA 1.30) that humans come to 
merit the good life 'voluntate', he does not mean that they merit 
it simply by choosing well, but by both choosing and doing well. 
Likewise, those condemned for 'mala voluntas' are not being 
condemned for evil volitions, but for evil voluntary actions. 
Again, when (dDA 15) Augustine defines sin as 'voluntas retinendi 
vel consequendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est 
abstinere', it seems that this use of 'voluntas' admits of either 
translation. 
But Augustine also uses 'voluntas' to mean 'volition', and 
not 'voluntary action': 
'Quid est enim quod facit voluntatem malam, cum 
ipsa faciat 
°Pus malum? Ac per hoc mala voluntas efficiens 
est operis 
mali...' (dCD 12.6) 
(331) 
'Non enim quidquam tam firme atque intime sentio quam me 
habere voluntatem, eaque me moveri ad a7iquid fruendum.' (dLA 
3.3) 
By extension from Augustine's use of 'voluntas' as 
'volition', there has arisen the common view, most recently 
defended in Dihle (1982), that his whole moral theory is based 
exclusively on 'voluntas' as volition. For him (it is suggested) 
the moral nature of an action is determined solely by the 
'voluntas' from which it results. The whole of our moral theory, 
including the assessment of responsibility, can be concentrated 
on the volitions, and may treat the resulting actions as 
peripheral to the main issue. 'Interest quails sit voluntas 
hominis' (dCD 12.6). 
There is no doubt that Augustine, like his commentators, is 
influenced by this kind of thinking, traceable to Jesus' remarks 
on the origins of human uncleanness in the heart (Mí.15.22). 
However, it is simply untrue that Augustine places all moral 
significance in the volition (as opposed to voluntary action). 
First, as we have just seen, 'voluntas' does not only mean 
'volition'. Second, it would in any case have been implausible to 
place all moral significance in the volition. Clearly there are 
morally significant differences between wanting to kill someone 
and actually killing them, even if both are reprehensible. 
Augustine was as well aware of these differences as Christ was: 
compare Jesus' 'The spirit is willing but the flesh is weak' 
(Mt.26.41) with Augustine's remarks (Ch.6, §4) on 'difficultas' 
(332) 
as the difference between wanting to do good and actually doing 
it (e.g. 'In nobis autem ante gratiam non est liberum arbitrium 
ut non peccemus, sed tantum ut peccare nolimus' (EPRoms 18)). 
Augustine does not have a well elaborated theory of action, 
like Aristotle's- and in any case, as we have seen (Ch. 3) , even 
Aristotle's theory displays an important ambiguity at an 
analogous point, about whether deliberation causes npoaCpeoiç or 
action on npooCpcoiç. 'Voluntas' does not simply and exclusively 
mean either 'volition' or 'voluntary action'; it is a rather 
loose term which Augustine allows himself to use to mean both. 
Hence I will not translate it exclusively as either 'volition' or 
'voluntary action'; and often I will mark the ambiguity by 
leaving it in the Latin. 
(I should also point out that there are, in both cases, type/ 
token ambiguities: does 'voluntas' mean 'volition (in general)' 
or 'a (single) volition'; 'voluntary action (in general)' or 'a 
(single) voluntary action'? Latin's lack of an indefinite article 
does not help here.) 
3. The Nature of ' Voluntas': Two Requirements 
What, then, does Augustine mean by talking of 'voluntas' as 
the origin, or alternatively the form, of voluntary action? I 
think this requirement breaks down into two separate subparts. 
(333) 
Behaviour, to count as voluntary action, must be positively 
describable as being: 
(a) original to the agent in question; and 
(b) such that the agent could have chosen to do otherwise. 
These conditions might seem to be equivalent. It might be 
said that any action which is original to me (a), is one I am in 
control of; and any action I am in control of, is one I can 
either do or not do- a description which satisfies (b). But, in 
fact, (a) and (b) are quite separate conditions. To see why, 
consider these two triplets of claims: 
1. A chooses to do X; A does X; A could have done Y, if A could 
have chosen to do Y, and had chosen to do Y. 
2. A chooses to do X; A does X; A could have chosen to do Y. 
(In (1), 'A could have done Y, if A could have chosen to do 
Y, and had chosen to do Y' is a more formal representation of the 
claim we make by the loose locution 'He could have done it if he 
had chosen to'. It might seem that an adequate formalisation of 
this would be: 'A could have done Y, if A had chosen to do Y'. 
But this leaves as an implication the vital point about (1): 
namely, that choosing entails ability to choose.) 
If (a) were equivalent to (b), (1) would entail (2); which it 
does not, because of the third part of each triplet. 'A could 
have done Y, if A could have chosen to do Y, and had chosen to do 
(334) 
Y' does not entail 'A could have chosen to do Y' (and/ or: '...A 
did choose to do Y'). The former does not entail the latter: any 
more than 'If Brownies were little boys, they would be Cubs' 
(which seems to be true) entails 'Brownies are little boys' 
(which is certainly false). The move from the conditional to the 
actual is illegitimate. Therefore (a) and (b) are not equivalent. 
To specify some item A as the origin of a 'motus' M, is 
intended to mean that A was the cause of M: without A, M would 
not have occurred. Now in the case of a voluntary action, we say 
that the efficient cause of the 'motus' M (the behaviour, not the 
action) is the agent A, or (more precisely) A's decision to act 
and her execution of that decision. So M would not have occurred 
without A's decision to act and her execution of that decision. 
This in turn implies that, had A decided otherwise, a different 
'motus', or no 'motus' at all, would have been the outcome. 
This is to say that A's production of M was such that A could 
have done otherwise, had she been able to choose to do otherwise, 
and had so chosen. But- and this is the vital distinction- it is 
not to say that A could have chosen to do otherwise. 
Causal statements (I take it) depend for their truth on the 
truth of whole conditionals. But the truth of a whole conditional 
statement need not depend on the truth either of its protasis 
or 
of its apodosis. For it to be true that q caused p, it 
only needs 
to be the case that if not -q, then not -p. It does not 
(ever) need 
to be the case that not -q. Likewise, for it to be true 
that the 
(335) 
cause of M was the agent A's decision to act and her execution of 
that decision, it only needs to be the case that if A had not 
taken that decision and acted on it, M would not have occurred. 
It does not (ever) need to be the case that A could have taken, 
let alone did take, a contrary decision. 
Hence any behaviour M (it might be said) is coherently 
characterisable as a 'voluntary' action in two quite different 
senses. First, because M was caused by some agent A: i.e., M 
would not have occurred without A's decision to act and her 
execution of that decision. This weaker sense is coordinate with 
condition (a). And second, because- in addition to what the first 
sense specifies- M is also something that A could have chosen to 
do and could have chosen not to do: a sense in line with both 
conditions. 
Condition (a) might be made the sole positive condition of 
voluntariness, yielding a thin account of voluntary action which 
is compatible with strict determinism. Or conditions (a) and (b) 
could be combined, to give a rich account of voluntary action, 
one which makes room (as the thin account seems not to) for a 
plausible theory of responsibility. I am arguing that Augustine's 
wider purpose of theodicy (among other considerations) commits 
him to argue, rightly, for the rich account. And he acknowledges 
that he is so committed; most often in his earlier writings, but 
not just there. 
Nonetheless, the later Augustine seems, at times, to 
have 
(336) 
been attracted by the thin account. In that mood he will, as we 
have seen, come close to arguing that one's inability to choose 
to do otherwise than sin is no reason for remitting one's 
culpability- and indeed may actually be evidence of one's 
culpability. But he himself presented good reasons for thinking 
this position untenable; as we shall see, when we look at the 
evidence for Augustine's acceptance of (a) and (b). 
(a) As we have seen, the condition that I should be the 
origin of those actions which truly pertain to me, simply means 
that it should be my 'animi motus', my 'voluntates' (in the sense 
of 'volitions'), which those actions, non -accidentally, express. 
Now there are, for Augustine, certain limitations, in the nature 
of things, on what shape my 'voluntates' could have. 
Two in particular: first, my tendency to have 'bonae' or 
'malae' 'voluntates' is governed by my habituation, my 
'consuetudo' as Augustine calls it (v., e.g., 83DQ 40). Second, a 
direct desire for something which I hold to be evil, desired 
because it is evil, could never be a 'voluntas' of any agent 
created by a good God. In Augustine's view, all 'voluntates', 
good or bad, aim at a single and particular good (however 
indirectly or inaccurately they may be aimed). However, to 
explore this side of the doctrine of 'voluntas' is really 
the 
topic of Ch.8; for this aspect of the doctrine has more 
to do 
with Augustine's teachings about practical rationality 
and wisdom 
than with his teachings about 'facilitas' or 'libertas' 
(as the 
converse of 'difficultas' or 'violentia'). 
(337) 
Although, as I have stressed, (a) and (b) are logically 
separate conditions, still Augustine would insist on their 
contingent connection in human psychology. For him, a different 
way of defining what it means to require that voluntary action 
should be original to the agent, would be to say that to require 
this is to require that voluntary action should originate in that 
'part of the agent' in which it could have originated otherwise. 
This leads us on to (b). 
4. Ability to do Otherwise 
That Augustine does take (b), ability to do otherwise, to be 
a condition of voluntary action is clear in at least four 
separate ways. Namely: 
1. the connection between this condition and another already 
granted; 
2. the historical context of his choice of the phrase 'liberum 
arbitrium' 
3. his definition of 'peccatum'; and 
4. his use of the language of the neutral will, or at any rate 
the morally ambivalent will. 
1. As noted, positive condition (b) is connected 
to the 
negative condition that voluntary action should not be 
compelled 
(v. Ch.6). For, as Augustine points out, if it is 
not open to an 
agent to do otherwise than she actually does, then we 
usually 
(338) 
call her a compelled agent, not a voluntary one. 
But, of course, this might be disputed. Is it self 
contradictory to claim both that 'A does X voluntarily at t', and 
that 'A has no choice but to do X at t'? It might seem not. To 
begin with, it may be said that 'has no choice' is an ambiguous 
phrase. A politician convicted of corruption 'has no choice' but 
to resign, and a sheep which falls out of a tree 'has no choice' 
but to plummet to the ground; but still we say that the 
politician resigns voluntarily and the sheep plummets 
involuntarily. So, it might be argued (say, by the kind of 
determinism sketched above), there are different senses in which 
A may have no choice but to do X at t, and not all of these are 
relevant to the question of voluntariness. In particular (it 
might be said), there is an important contrast between these 
situations: 
(1) A has no choice but to do X at t because A is not acting 
voluntarily; that is, A's doing X at t is not 'original to A' in 
the required sense. 
(2) A has no choice but to do X at t because A, although acting 
voluntarily at t, never has any choice to do or not to do. 
To refer to the distinction made above: on this view, 'A does 
X voluntarily at t' entails only that A could have done 
other 
than X at t, had she been able to choose to do otherwise, 
and had 
so chosen. It does not entail that A could have 
chosen to do 
other than X at t. 
(339) 
For Augustine, the main problem with this position would be, 
as I have suggested, its incompatibility with any convincing 
account of responsibility. If we are to keep responsibility and 
voluntariness as tightly connected as (I argued in Ch.6) 
Augustine would like to, then what are we to say here? We cannot 
say that my responsibility, like my voluntariness, turns not on 
my ability to choose to do other than I actually do choose to do, 
but on its being a counterfactual truth that I could have done 
other than I did, had I been able to choose to do otherwise, and 
had I so chosen. For this formula (as shown) leaves the 
possibility open that I was not able to choose to do otherwise. 
But consider a case where I was not, in fact, able to choose to 
do otherwise than I did. It does not sound plausible to say that, 
in such a case, the right way to settle whether or not my action 
was responsible would not be to ask about whether I was unable to 
choose to do otherwise than I did, but about why I was unable to 
choose to do otherwise than I did. 
2. The very phrase 'liberum arbitrium' implies this 
condition, as is shown by the Oxford Latin Dictionary's entry on 
the phrase (s. v. 'arbitrium'). 
The phrase has legal origins: the OLD cites Livy's use 
of it 
at Historiae 32.37.5. There Livy is describing a meeting 
between 
the Roman general Quinctius and Philip of Macedon. 
He writes: 
'Sic infecta pace regii dimissi: Quinctio liberum arbitrium 
pacis 
et belli permissum' ('So the royal ambassadors were 
dismissed 
without obtaining peace: Quinctius was given full 
discretion 
(340) 
regarding peace and war'). Livy's point is that it was entirely 
up to Quinctius to declare or not declare war. No Roman law or 
regulation bound him to do either, and so the decision was deemed 
to rest with him. His action was such that he could have done 
otherwise had he chosen to. 
Likewise, when the jurist Gaius wants to say that the court 
is not bound by any established rule to follow a particular 
procedure against a defendant, he says that the court 'liberum 
arbitrium habet vel capitali crimine reum facere eum vel damnum 
persequi' (Gaius, Institutiones, 3.213). The point is exactly 
that the court is free to do either. 
This historical evidence gives us good reason to presume that 
Augustine's choice of the phrase 'liberum arbitrium' was partly 
motivated by its legal sense of 'freedom of judgement' or 
'discretion'. Augustine deliberately used a term which implied, 
to Roman ears, that the kind of decision in question was the kind 
which can go either way. 
3. At dDA 15, Augustine defines 'peccatum' thus: 
' Peccatum est voluntas retinendi vel consequendi quod 
iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere.' 
It will be objected that the italicised words give a 
constraint on what counts as a sin, not on what counts as a 
voluntary action. How can this remark help establish that (b) 
is 
(341) 
a condition of voluntary action? Doesn't it, rather, imply that 
there might be 'voluntates' from which one was not free to 
abstain? These objections are met when Augustine continues: 
'Quanquam si liberum non sit, non est voluntas... quod si 
nemo vituperatione vel damnatione dignus est, aut non contra 
vetitum iustitiae faciens, aut quod non potest non faciens, omne 
autem peccatum vel vituperandum est, vel damnandum; quis dubitet 
tunc esse peccatum, cum et velle iniustum est, et liberum nolle ?' 
(dDA 15) 
Here Augustine gives two necessary conditions for any deed to 
count as a sin: (i) it must be a wrongdoing, (ii) it must be 
avoidable. Thus an agent who does what it is impossible for him 
not to do, even if this is 'forbidden by justice', cannot be said 
to have sinned. 
(N.B. the distinction, which will come up again in Ch.9, 
between 'wrongdoing' and 'sin'. A 'wrongdoing' is an infraction 
of the commandments of a legal or quasi -legal code. A 'sin' is 
such an infraction which is deliberate. Augustine's view on the 
relation between sin and wrongdoing switches back and forth 
between these four alternatives: 
(i) all sin (which is directly culpable) is wrongdoing, 
but not 
all wrongdoing (which may be either indirectly 
culpable, or not 
culpable at all) is sin; 
(ii) all wrongdoing is either directly culpable (sc., 
when it is 
(342) 
also sin) or indirectly culpable (sc., when it is merely 
wrongdoing); 
(iii) the words 'sin' and 'wrongdoing' have exactly the same 
extensions: all wrongdoing is essentially sin, and there is no 
non -deliberate wrongdoing; and 
(iv) the words 'sin' and 'wrongdoing' have exactly the same 
extensions: all sin is essentially wrongdoing, and there is no 
deliberate (in the sense of avoidable) wrongdoing at all; but we 
are nonetheless somehow to blame for our wrongdoings. 
Augustine's best choice out of these four, and the position 
which he most coherently presents and should most consistently 
have presented, is (i). But it cannot be denied that, on this 
question, it is more than a shift of emphasis in his position 
that is evident when we compare the earlier and later works. V. 
Ch.6, g5.) 
The action of such an agent as Augustine envisages at dDA 15 
does not, according to (i), count as a sin because it does not 
count as a responsible action. It does not count as a responsible 
action because (v. Ch.6) it does not count as a voluntary action. 
And why does it not count as a voluntary action? Because- and 
this is the point which Augustine is making here- 'if the agent 
is not free [sc. to abstain], there is no voluntary action'. 
Hence the relevance of (b), the positive condition 
of 




4. Augustine commonly seems to talk of 'voluntas' as being 
neutral between good and bad. I shall be arguing in Chs.8 -9 that, 
on Augustine's conception, 'voluntas' is anything but neutral 
between good and bad (although it is, somehow, able to turn to 
either). But this argument might seem an uphill struggle when 
confronted with some passages from Augustine. Such as these 
three: 
(i) 'Motus autem quo huc aut illuc voluntas convertitur, nisi 
esset voluntarius, et in nostra positus potestate, neque 
laudandus cum ad superiora, neque culpandus homo esset cum ad 
inferiora detorquet quasi quendam cardinem voluntatis.' (dLA 3.3) 
(ii) 'Virtutibus nemo male utitur: ceteris autem bonis, id 
est, mediis et minimis, non solum bene, sed etiam male puisque 
uti potest... Voluntas ergo medium bonum est.' (dLA 2.50, 52) 
(iii) 'Liberum arbitrium, naturaliter attributum a creatori 
animae rationali, illa media vis est, quae vel intendi ad fidem, 
vel inclinare ad infidelitatem potest.' (dSL 58) 
The least these passages prove is that voluntary action, for 
Augustine, involves the ability to choose to do x or not to do 
x- 
that is, the ability to do otherwise. (That they do not, 
in fact, 
establish very much more than this, will be argued in Chs.8 
-9.) 
Augustine, then, requires the ability to do 
otherwise as a 
condition of uncompelled action. Given, further, 
that for him 
(344) 
voluntary action must be uncompelled, and that he thinks that no 
deed can be responsible, worthy of praise or blame, unless it is 
voluntary (points I made in Ch.6, §2 -4), this conclusion reflects 
interestingly on his much -discussed doctrine that the original 
human freedom was an ability not to sin, whereas the human 
freedom of the Resurrection will be an inability to sin: 'Primum 
liberum arbitrium posse non peccare, novissimum non posse 
peccare' (dCD 22.30). 
Does Augustine's 'non posse peccare' describe any state of 
real freedom? If it does, then one wants to ask, with J.L.Mackie, 
why God did not give Adam this kind of freedom rather than the 
dangerous 'posse non peccare' variety. But it would seem that 
this eschatological freedom, as Augustine describes it, is not in 
fact much of a freedom. It is not clear that someone who is 
unable to sin is capable of voluntarily refraining from sinning. 
Hence it is also unclear that such an agent is responsible, or 
praiseworthy, for so refraining. After all, even a fallen human 
normally displays inability to sin in some respect or other. In 
my present state I cannot commit the sin of drunkenness, because 
I cannot afford it; nor the sin of fornication (as opposed to 
adultery), because I am married. Am I to be praised for my 
economically enforced sobriety, or my logically enforced 
non -fornication? Hardly; but then why should any kind of 
enforced 
sinlessness be praiseworthy? (Similarly, a theological 
point: if 
God's necessary sinlessness means that God cannot do 
wrong, why 
praise God for never doing wrong ?) 
(345) 
5. The Cause(s) of 'Voluntas' Again 
I began with the question: What, for Augustine, counts as an 
efficient cause of 'voluntas'? I noted the ambiguity of 
'voluntas' between 'voluntary action' and 'volition', and a 
logical problem about seeing volitions as causes of actions. I 
considered two sub -conditions which Augustine gives upon the 
origination of voluntary action: that it should originate with 
the agent, and that it should originate in such a way as to make 
it possible that it should have originated otherwise. All this 
might seem insufficiently informative. How much does it tell us 
about how voluntary actions do in fact originate? We might wish 
to come back to the opening question: What does Augustine think 
the efficient cause of voluntary action is (if there is one)? 
The question, of course, is a blunt instrument, and to do 
justice to the complexity of Augustine's thought on this issue, 
we need a rather more nuanced account of the matter than has yet 
been given. We must keep several questions firmly separate (as 
Augustine does not). We must distinguish (1) the question of the 
efficient cause of volition, from (2) the question of the 
efficient cause of voluntary action. We must also distinguish (1) 
and (2) from (3, 4...) questions about other kinds of cause. 
On (1) and (2): as we have seen, many Augustinian 
texts 
strongly suggest that volition is the efficient 
cause of 
voluntary action. This idea has already been exposed 
to doubt. 
If, as I have suggested, a volition is not individuable 
as 
(346) 
anything more than an (unsuccessful) attempt to do a voluntary 
action, then the efficient cause of voluntary action will not be 
volition. On the contrary, volition and voluntary action will 
have the same kind of efficient cause (if they have any), which 
will be identical with neither of them. 
But: what is this kind of cause- if there is one? Augustine's 
remarks on this question are ambiguous. In some places, as we 
have seen, his view is apparently that the 'voluntas' is 
altogether uncaused. In others, he seems to take a second view: 
that the 'voluntas' can be caused, but only by itself. In others 
still, he seems to argue for a third view: that there can, in 
fact, be causes of the 'voluntas' other than the 'voluntas' 
itself, and that an interesting theory of the causation of 
voluntary action can be elaborated. This third view is, I will 
argue in Chs.8 -9, Augustine's most convincingly argued view about 
normal voluntary actions; although there is one special kind of 
voluntary actions to which the first and second views might seem 
to apply better. 
For the first view, we might cite this evidence: 
'Improba voluntas malorum omnium causa est... Quae tandem 
esse poterit ante voluntatem causa voluntatis? Aut enim et ipsa 
voluntas est; et a radice ista voluntatis non receditur: aut non 
est voluntas; et peccatum nullum habet. Aut igitur ipsa voluntas 
est prima causa peccandi, aut nullum peccatum est prima causa 
peccandi.' (dLA 3.48 -9) 
(347) 
Augustine seems here to be arguing thus: 
1. All possible causes of voluntary actions are themselves either 
voluntary actions or not voluntary actions. 
2. 'X causes Y' _ 'X gives necessary and sufficient grounds for 
Y's occurrence' _ 'X compels Y'. 
3. If a supposed voluntary action A had a cause C which was not 
itself a voluntary action, then A could not be a voluntary 
action, because A would have been compelled by C. Therefore no 
possible cause of a voluntary action could itself be other than a 
voluntary action. 
4. And if a supposed voluntary action A had a cause C which was 
itself a voluntary action, then A could not be a voluntary action 
either, because A would have been compelled by C. Therefore no 
possible cause of a voluntary action could itself be a voluntary 
action. 
5. But there are no other alternatives. Therefore voluntary 
actions have no causes. 
From elsewhere, however, it seems that Augustine cannot be 
arguing that 'voluntas' has no cause. Augustine's point at dLA 
3.48 -9 is (as I argued in Ch.5, ad dLA 3.47 ff.) not about 
all 
voluntary action. He is not saying here that 'voluntas' 
(in 
general) has no prior cause. He is saying that 'mala 
voluntas' 
(in particular) has no prior cause- indeed, that it is 
only 'mala 
voluntas' which has no cause: other kinds of voluntary 
action do 
indeed have causes. 
(348) 
For the same reason, Augustine cannot be committed either to 
the view that nothing but one 'voluntas' can cause any other 
' voluntas': even though he himself might be read as giving a lot 
of space, particularily in the dLA, to developing the view that 
'voluntates' typically are the causes of 'voluntates'. The first 
pointer for this theory would be seen in the last passage quoted, 
if that quote was read in a different way: 
'Quae tandem esse poterit ante voluntatem causa voluntatis? 
Aut enim et ipsa voluntas est; et a radice ista voluntatis non 
receditur...' (dLA 3.49) 
This form of the 'reflexive theory of the "voluntas "' 
deserves a little further consideration- before its final 
rejection. 
6. A Reflexive 'Voluntas'? 
We have seen that, for Augustine, the cognitive abilities of 
the human mind are reflexive: to know (or perceive) anything is 
also to know that I know it (or perceive it). A foundational 
epistemological certainty is had by simple consciousness of one's 
self- consciousness. That I am a self- conscious living 
existent 
can, it is claimed, be established by simple introspection 
(dLA 
1.16). An interesting parallel to this in Augustine's philosophy 
of action has appeared in the dLA. There, and sometimes 
elsewhere 
(a.9. dTrin 14.10), the nature of the human psyche 
in its 
(349) 
cognitive role is mirrored by its nature in its conative role. 
The structure of volition too is reflexive. This claim can be 
taken in different ways. I suggested in Ch.5 that it need imply 
no more than that 'bona voluntas' is necessary for the good life, 
because without it we cannot put anything else to good use. But 
it might also imply that 'bona voluntas' is sufficient for the 
good life: as I put it in Ch.5, ' "bona voluntas" is had by simply 
choosing to have it. To want to have "bona voluntas" is eo ipso 
to have "bona voluntas "'. Clearly it is the second, stronger form 
of the reflexivity idea that we are interested in if we are 
considering the idea that the 'voluntas' is its own cause. 
For (on the second reading) this theory makes the 'voluntas' 
its own cause, in the sense that the explanation of my having 
'bona voluntas' of the first -order variety is that I made a 
(second- order) choice to have it. Presumably, if we are to look 
for an explanation of this second -order choice, we will be 
deferred to the third order; and so on ad infinitum. 'Voluntas', 
on this picture, is something absolutely independent of 
everything outside itself; something free standing, self 
motivating, and even, in something a little like Aristotle's 
sense, self moving. 
The attractions of this theory to certain kinds of exegete 
of 
Augustine are obvious. If it is held that Augustine 
aims to argue 
away the threat of causal determinism, the reflexive 
theory of 
'voluntas' seems to be a way of achieving that 
end. For, 
according to this theory, nothing causes the will 
except the will 
itself. 
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Indeed, it seems to be quite commonly thought that 
Augustine's aim is to present us with a voluntarist (as opposed 
to rationalist) theory of the voluntary, i.e. a theory based on a 
'voluntas' which 'being anterior to reason, has at the most 
fundamental level no reason for its biddings' (Macintyre 1985, 
p.156). If the reflexive theory of the voluntary is Augustine's 
most developed thinking on the subject, then it seems possible to 
argue that, taking him all in all, Augustine is indeed a 
voluntarist in the sense required. 
Of course, it would then have to be conceded that the 
explanation of the activity of the 'voluntas' offered by this 
theory is essentially regressive and uninformative. First -order 
choices are referred to second -order choices; second- to 
third -order choices; third- to fourth -; and so on. If the 
'voluntas' is to be caused by nothing but the 'voluntas', then we 
cannot use the escape route from this regress suggested in Ch.5, 
and say that at some order there can be a 'voluntas' which is not 
caused by another 'voluntas'. Then the activity of the 'voluntas' 
will remain unexplained, and apparently inexplicable. As already 
suggested, the rejoinder might be that this inexplicability of 
the 'voluntas' is exactly what we ought to expect in a 
voluntarist world. If it is true (i) that the deliberations of 
the 'voluntas' are anterior to reason, and (ii) that the 
'freedom' of the 'voluntas' means its being radically 
unconditioned by causes, then clearly (it might be 
'libera voluntas' is bound to be inexplicable. 
(351) 
said) a 
To put this in a less favourable light: the reflexive theory 
seems to lead either to a regress or else to the admission that 
there is a first term of the regress which is a will which is not 
caused at all- thus establishing the same as the first view, the 
view that the 'voluntas' as such is uncaused. Some might think 
that this is how it ought to be. Others, in the light of much 
else that Augustine says, will view this prospect with suspicion. 
In particular, as we have already seen in Ch.5, in exegesis of 
dLA 3.47 ff., it is not at all clear that the exegetical basis 
for attributing the strong version of the reflexivity thesis to 
Augustine is sound: it cannot be if Augustine there means to talk 
only about 'mala voluntas' and not about 'voluntas' in general. 
As I have argued that Augustine does indeed mean to talk only 
about 'mala voluntas' at dLA 3.47 ff., my reasons for rejecting 
the strong version of the reflexivity idea should be plain. 
One last point in the strong version's favour, however, may 
be mentioned before leaving the topic. Such a recursive 
understanding of 'voluntas' might seem to connect with, perhaps 
even to support, the circular idea of responsibility pointed to 
in the last chapter. The suggestion there was that fallen humans 
are culpable for the sins which they cannot help committing, 
because they are in a state of helplessness, which itself is the 
penalty of committing those same sins. The suggestion here is 
that the only possible cause of any nth -order 'voluntas' 
is an 
(n +1)th -order 'voluntas'. So the moral quality of any one 
'voluntas' of any person is fixed, if by anything, 
only by 
another 'voluntas', which will (ipso facto) share that moral 
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quality. Ascriptions of praise and blame apply, therefore, 
equally to all the individual 'voluntates' of a given person. 
Thus our account of responsibility has to be circular; for our 
account of motivation is circular. The moral state in which we 
find ourselves is not something to be explained; it is simply a 
given, just as (as Ricoeur remarked, Ricoeur 1967) one point of 
the Adam and Eve story is that the prevenient existence of evil 
is a given even in the Garden of Eden. 
However, if there is a connection to be made here, Augustine 
never explicitly made it. Although it is never formally repealed, 
the idea of the reflexivity of 'voluntas' is only developed in 
the early works. The idea of 'reflexive responsibility', on the 
other hand, is most commonly developed in the later works. The 
only work in which both ideas may be found is, as we have seen, 
the dLA; but no tie up is attempted by Augustine, which of course 
suggests that this was not what he had in mind. 
Moreover, there are other, crucial developments in his 
doctrine which stand in the way of a general ascription to 
Augustine of this kind of reflexive theory of the voluntary. A 
broader look at Augustine's philosophy of action shows that it 
is, overall, very far from the truth to say that he believes that 
typical voluntary action is either uncaused or rationally 
undetermined. On the contrary: Augustine has a very 
definite and 
prominent theory of practical reasoning, according 
to which 
rational determination is in fact characteristic of 
voluntary 
action 
, and moreover is itself the cause of voluntary 
action. To 
(353) 
that theory, in the next chapter, I will now turn. 
(354) 
Chapter 8 
The Good Will and the Good Life 
1. Introduction 
2. Practical Reason and Practical Wisdom in Augustine 
3. Aristotle and Augustine on the Directedness of Action 
4. 'Felicitas' 
5. Good Will and the Order of the World 
'Nulla est homini causa philosophandi nisi ut beatus sit.' 
(Augustine, City of God 19.1) 
'Quia fecisti nos ad te, et inquietum est cor nostrum donec 
requiescat in te.' 
(Augustine, Confessions 1.1) 
1. Introduction 
Augustine has much to offer us in the way of demarcation of 
the conditions of voluntary action, as has become clear in Chs.6 
and 7. He develops a number of (not always consistent) lines of 
thought on the subject. But among his principal themes 
are the 
very Aristotelian ones that absence of compulsion and of 
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ignorance are negative conditions for voluntary action; and that 
among the positive conditions for voluntary action are (i) that 
the action should originate with me and (ii) that I should be 
able to do otherwise. 
For my analysis of these conditions I took as a starting 
point the first two phrases of Augustine's description of 
voluntary action, at dDA 14, as an 'animi motus, cogente nullo, 
ad aliquid vel non amittendum vel adipiscendum'. In this chapter 
I turn to the last phrase of this definition. The phrase 'ad 
aliquid vel non amittendum vel adipiscendum' points us to a 
question which is also suggested by the comparison with 
Aristotle: what does Augustine have to say about the rationality 
of voluntary action? 
Of Aristotle's theory I noted that his three conditions for 
voluntary action can most succinctly be expressed in their 
negative forms, as the requirements that voluntary action should 
not be (i) compelled, (ii) done in ignorance, or (iii) 
irrational. But I also noted that Aristotle says a great deal to 
fill out these negative conditions with a positive content. In 
Particular, it is a positive consequence of Aristotle's negative 
condition about irrationality that fully voluntary action must 
logically follow from the combination of a premiss of the good 
with a premiss of the possible. 
We have seen that there are correlates, in Augustine's theory 
of the voluntary, to Aristotle's conditions, positive and 
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negative, about compulsion and ignorance. The question I ask in 
this chapter is: Does Augustine have anything corresponding 
(negatively) to Aristotle's 'no irrationality' requirement, or 
(positively) to his account of the role of practical reason in 
voluntary action? 
2. Practical Reason and Practical Wisdom in Augustine 
My answer is a very guarded 'Yes', with two caveats in 
particular, (i) and (ii) as noted below. Contrary to what many of 
his interpreters think, Augustine is no irrationalist: he does 
not believe that it is normal that nothing should motivate human 
choices except the sheer fiat of an inscrutable 'black box' 
called, say, 'the will'. Genuine voluntary action, for him just 
as for Aristotle, is action on a good reason: 
'Pax animae inrationalis ordinata requies appetitionum, pax 
animae rationalis ordinata cognitionis actionisque consensio.' 
(dCD 19.13) 
'Sed quia homini rationalis anima inest, totum hoc, quod 
habet commune cum bestiis, subdit paci animae rationalis, ut 
mente aliquid contempletur et secundum hoc aliquid agat, ut sit 
ei ordinata cognitionis actionisque consensio.' (dCD 19.14) 
Note the contrast between 'anima rationalis' 
and 'anima 
inrationalis'. 
a contrast which might have been taken 
straight 
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from NE 1102a29 -30 (though more probably it came from a Platonist 
writer). If Augustine really believed, like David Hume, that the 
choices of a human soul were incapable of receiving the direction 
of reason- and that in fact the relation of control ran the other 
way- we might be surprised to find Augustine saying, as he so 
often does, that the human soul is, by nature, 'rational' 
(whatever precise meaning that word may have). 
For Augustine as much as for Aristotle, genuine voluntary 
action involves the congruence ('consensio') of one's action with 
one's knowledge and one's desire; or, to put it another way, it 
entails that one's action should, in some appropriate sense, 
follow from the combination of one's knowledge and one's desire. 
What is this if not an account, or at any rate the outline of an 
account, of practical reasoning? 
However, (i) there is (as we shall see) one large problem 
with describing Augustine's account of practical wisdom as a 
condition of voluntary action, since Augustine emphasises that 
wilful wrongdoing, action directly against practical wisdom, is 
not necessarily involuntary. The complexities raised by this 
problem will be considered in Ch.9. 
Also (ii), unlike Aristotle in NE III and VI, Augustine 
nowhere fills in the outline with a detailed, explicit account of 
practical reason. This is not to say that he does not fill in 
that outline: it is to say that he fills it in with 
something 
else. Aristotle offers us an account of the mechanics 
of 
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practical reasoning which, I have suggested, is virtually a 
formal logical account, and can certainly be presented as such 
with some tidying up. Augustine, on the other hand, concentrates 
on the other side of the picture. The mechanics and the logic of 
practical reason he leaves almost entirely implicit and 
unexplored, though this is no excuse for saying that he has no 
such concept as practical reason. But on the more nebulous matter 
of practical wisdom, Augustine has plenty to say. 
Practical wisdom, for Augustine, means understanding what the 
good for humanity is so as to live it out Discovering the good 
for humanity in one's own life is not just a result of 
deliberating well (which is why this kind of practical 
understanding is more appropriately called wisdom than reason). A 
kind of revelation, a kind of special knowledge, is needed. (V. 
dTrin 13.4, 'Non quod aliquis [beatitudinem] nolit, sed quod non 
omnes eam norint' ; cp. dFRV 1) . 
On the other hand, Augustine often speaks of this special 
knowledge as if it were completely deducible on the grounds of 
reason alone (as in the 'proof' of God's existence at dLA 
2.7 -39). This is an example of a standard tension in Christian 
apologetics, between natural and revealed theology; 
Platonic 
Yvc)ßiç displays the same ambiguity of status between 
the natural 
and the revealed. it is in accord with that 
ambiguity that 
Augustine's quest for the good life begins with 
the frankly 
Phenomenological just about as often as it 
begins with the 
transcendently metaphysical. I consider both 
approaches. 
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2a. The Good Life: Phenomenological Arguments 
On the phenomenological side, the maxim of Augustine's 
practical wisdom is the Delphic yvc3OL aEaurdv. The method of 
Augustine's work often suggests that practical wisdom is no more 
than self awareness: becoming aware of what I really want, the 
better to pursue it. It means knowing what is the natural 
objective of all action and desire. We can arrive at practical 
wisdom by discovering what this objective is. And one way to 
discover that objective, since it is natural, is by simply 
examining what humans (for example, me) actually do pursue, what 
they intend to gain by this pursuit, and what the difference is, 
if any, between practice and underlying intention. 
This examination is performed at the beginning of several of 
Augustine's works, e.g. the dBV, the cAcad, and the dLA. What 
such an examination finds is, unsurprisingly, a great variety of 
different objectives, and a great variety of degrees of success 
or failure in humans' attempts to achieve what they are seeking 
to achieve. 'Quomodo enim voluntate quisque miseram vitam 
patitur, cum omnino nemo velit misere vivere?' (dLA 1.30, cp. 
dTrin 14.4): how do we explain this gap between intention and 
performance? Augustine's answer is that it demonstrates that not 
just any route will lead one to the happy life: 
'Ad hoc pergendo, quod aut non est, aut, si est, 
non facit 
beatos, ad beatam vitam nullus pervenire potest.' 
(dLA 3.59) 
(360) 
This is where the need for practical wisdom appears. There is 
agap between wanting the good and pursuing the good: 
'Nam i l l i omnes quos 
appetunt et malum fugiunt; 
aliud alii videtur bonum. 
commemorasti diversa sectantes, bonum 
sed propterea diversa sectantur, quod 
Quisquis ergo appetit quod appetendum 
non erat, tametsi id non appeteret nisi ei videretur bonum, errat 
tarnen.' (dLA 2.26) 
It is right to pursue the good life, yet there are wrong, 
unwise, ways to pursue it: 
'Inquantum igitur omnes homines appetunt vitam beatam, non 
errant. Inquantum autem quisque non earn tenet vitae viam quae 
ducit ad beatudinem, cum se fateatur et profiteatur nolle nisi ad 
beatitudinem pervenire, intantum errat... Et quanto magis in via 
vitae quis errat, tanto minus sapit.' (dLA 2.26) 
Phenomenological examination of our natural desires shows 
that '[Nemo] beatus [est] qui quod vult non habet' (dBV 10). 
Unhappiness is caused by seeking without finding (cAcad 1.6 -8), 
or by finding and then losing again. One should therefore seek 
the objectives of greatest permanence for the maximal 
satisfaction of desire. Wrong objectives characteristically 
do 
not admit of that 'stable and permanent possession' 
which 
Boethius talks about as characteristic of eternal 
(Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, Bk.V, Prose 
happiness 
6). So in 
the dLA Augustine argues, rather implausibly, that 
all and only 
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bad objectives are transient: 
'Cupere namque sine metu vivere, non tantum bonorum, sed 
etiam malorum omnium est: verum hoc interest, quod id boni 
appetunt avertendo amorem ab iis rebus, quae sine amittendi 
periculo nequeunt haberi; mali autem ut his fruendis cum 
securitate incubent, removere impedimenta conantur, et propterea 
facinorosam sceleratamque vitam, quae mors melius vocatur, 
gerunt.' (dLA 1.10) 
If Augustine can make out this step of the argument (more on 
which below), that the right objectives of action are the most 
permanent ones, that will bring us to the metaphysical form of 
his argument about the objectives of practical wisdom. 
2b. The Good Life: Metaphysical Arguments 
On the metaphysical side, practical wisdom is the possession 
of the highest good in virtue of understanding a certain kind of 
truth, the truth about what is really the 'summum bonum', 
independently of and antecedently to the various views of it 
which may be held. So dLA 2.36: 
'Haec enim veritas ostendit omnia bona, quae vera sunt, 
quae 
Bibi pro suo captu intelligentes homines vel singula 
vel plura 
eligunt, quibus fruantur.' 
(362) 
Action- which is to say pursuit of some perceived good- needs 
to follow from genuine knowledge of what is worth pursuit. Right 
cognition, cognition of the truth, is a condition of successful 
voluntary action. True to his Platonist roots, Augustine stresses 
the role of knowledge in practical wisdom. For him as for 
Socrates 'virtue is knowledge'- at least in the sense that 
knowledge is necessary for all virtue, even if it is not also 
sufficient. 
Moreover, what we want for practical wisdom is not just the 
truth given by self examination; it is truth in a rather loftier 
sense, a truth identical with wisdom and common to all humans: 
'Num aliam putas esse sapientiam nisi veritatem, in qua 
cernitur et tenetur summum bonum ?' (dLA 2.26) 
'Si summum bonum omnibus unum est, oportet etiam veritatem in 
qua cernitur et tenetur, id est sapientiam, omnibus unam esse 
communem.' (dLA 2.27) 
(This last passage, incidentally, suggests a response to a 
likely objection to Augustine's doctrine of practical wisdom. It 
may be said that Augustine's argument is fatally flawed because 
he illegitimately infers from 'All humans seek some good thing in 
all their actions' to 'There is some (one) good thing which all 
humans seek in all their actions'. If Augustine argued like this, 
certainly he would be guilty of a logical fallacy. But in 
fact, 
he argues the other way round. He starts from the claim 
that 
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there is one good at which all action aims. So the above passage 
begins from this assumption: 'Si summum bonum omnibus unum 
est...'. He does not deduce this claim from the claim that all 
human action aims at some good or other. On the contrary, that 
latter claim is deduced from the first claim, by a logically 
unimpeachable transition.) 
So lofty is Augustine's metaphysical conception of practical 
truth that, for him, practical truth turns out to be exactly the 
same in content as his theoretical truth. It is natural to all 
mean to seek the (apparent) good and flee the (apparent) evil 
(cp. dLA 1.30, 'nam hoc volunt etiam mali'). But what more is 
necessary to the good life is exactly the same knowledge of 
transcendent and objective reality as forms the end of 
theoretical enquiry. In this sense Augustine's wisdom is as 
unitary as the objective truth which it contemplates: in fact, 
there is no neat division between practical and theoretical 
wisdom in his thought. Just as, for Augustine, talk of 'voluntas' 
and 'ratio' relates to the same human person in the different 
roles of agent and percipient, so also, for him, practical reason 
is only theoretical reason put to work, and theoretical reason is 
only practical reason in contemplative mode. The first principles 
of practical and theoretical reason are, in his view, one and the 
same. 
'Sic fortis acies mentis et vegeta cum multa 
vera et 
incommutabilia certa ratione conspexerit, dirigit 
se in ipsam 
veritatem, qua cuncta monstrantur.' (dLA 2.36) 
(364) 
This conjunction of metaphysics and phenomenology is also a 
conjunction of moral and factual claims. Augustine holds both 
that our desires naturally have a certain form, and that our 
desires ought to have that form. The vision of the good for 
humanity is, on the one hand, a kind of eswpIa of what is 
objectively the case. But, on the other hand, it is also action 
guiding, indeed it is preeminently so. Augustine's endorsement of 
the idea that voluntary action is necessarily, in some sense, 
reasonable or rational behaviour is an endorsement of the claim, 
also made by Aristotle, that voluntary action has an intrinsic 
directedness, namely towards objectives which necessarily are 
always either actual or at least perceived goods. 
3. Aristotle and Augustine on the Directedness of Action 
This notion of directedness is a crucial one, and needs 
further elucidation. Before turning to Augustine's statements of 
this notion, I will briefly review what Aristotle meant by it. 
It would not make sense to Aristotle for someone to say that 
the reason why they wanted, say, to drink a can of paint was 
'because it seemed like a bad thing to do'. Purported 
explanations of an action, which do not refer to some real (or 
supposed) good which is obtained (or thought to be obtained) by 
that action, are simply not explanations at all. 
to 
Thus, for Aristotle, it makes sense to explain 'John 
wants 
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drink a can of paint' by '...because he has made a bet about it'; 
or '...because he is being forced to at gunpoint by a maniac'; or 
'...because he wrongly imagines that the can of paint is a can of 
beer'; or even merely '...because he thinks it would be a neat 
thing to do'. Even this last could count as a rational 
explanation of an action, in the sense of 'rational' which I have 
in mind. But it does not make sense to explain 'John wants to 
drink a can of paint' by '...because he hates the taste of 
paint', or '...because he knows that paint is poisonous', or 
'...because he thinks it would not be a neat thing to do'. As 
they stand, these 'explanations' simply aren't explanations of 
John's behaviour at all. Consider, for one thing, how much more 
naturally they would read if, in each one, 'although' were 
substituted for 'because'. 
Of course, we can easily adorn all three non -explanations so 
that they do read like pukka explanations. E.g., we can add to 
them, respectively, '...and wants to inure himself to horrible 
tastes', '...and is trying to commit suicide', and '...and is 
aiming to disgust his girlfriend into leaving him'. But what is 
the point, the attractiveness, of adding these adornments, if not 
that they restore intelligibility to our characterisation of 
John's behaviour precisely by indicating a conceivable good which 
it aims at? Which is simply another way of making the same point: 
that Aristotle's teaching is emphatically that 'Quidquid 
appetitur, appetitur sub specie bonitatis' (as Aquinas puts 
it). 
Now, as we have seen, Augustinian voluntary 
action is not 
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primarily rational 
in the tight sense that Augustine too has an 
explicit, closely argued 
us. Rather, Augustinian 
account of practical reasoning to offer 
voluntary action is principally to be 
called 'rational' in the looser sense that he too holds that no 
behaviour is (fully) explicable as voluntary action unless we can 
give some account of the good at which it aims or is supposed by 
the agent to aim. For Augustine too, to explain a piece of 
behaviour in terms of reasons (as opposed to other types of 
causes) is to mention a good which the behaviour is supposed to 
be conceived as aiming at by the agent. That this is a belief of 
Augustine's, and such a fundamental one that much of the time it 
remains unexamined, is already evidenced by one casual aside I 
have quoted, from dLA 2.26: 'Quisquis ergo appetit quod 
appetendum non erat, tametsi id non appeteret nisi ei videretur 
bonum...'. Here Augustine takes it absolutely as read that no one 
would pursue anything unless they held it, for one reason or 
another, to he a good objective to pursue. 
If there is evidence of Augustine's endorsement of the thesis 
of the directedness of voluntary action, then a most important 
tie up can be made in Augustine's moral theory: between practical 
rationality and practical virtue, between what it is rational or 
reasonable to do, and what it is good to do. But the evidence is 
no accumulation of slips of the pen; it is Augustine's consistent 
doctrine. Further evidence of that doctrine can be found by 
examining Augustine's expression of the thesis of the 
directedness 





The central importance to Augustine's thought of the question 
'What is the good/ best life for humanity ?' is obvious from one 
end of his philosophical career to the other: 
'De beata vita [,Theodore,] quaesivimus inter nos, nihilque 
aliud video quod magis Dei donum vocandum sit.' (dBV 1.5) 
'Nam cum beati esse cupiamus, sive id fieri non potest nisi 
inventa, sive non nisi diligenter quaesita, veritate; postpositis 
ceteris omnibus rebus, nobis (si beati esse volumus) perquirenda 
est [veritas].' (cAcad 1.25) 
'Socrates animum [intendebat], quod esset beatae vitae 
necessarium, propter quam unam omnium philosophorum invigilasse 
ac laborasse videtur industria...' (dCD 8.3) 
'Quid quod et Felicitas dea est ?... Ipsa ergo sola coleretur. 
Ubi enim ipsa esset, quid boni non esset?' (dCD 4.18) 
How does Augustine answer this question of the nature of the 
good/ best life? Like Aristotle (NE 1097b22 ff.) and like Cicero 
in the Hortensius, he generally begins with what is often thought 
to be a truism: that the good for humanity is happiness. 
'Beati certe omnes esse volumus.' (dBV 10; cp. cAcad 
1.5, 
Sermon 150.4, dTrin 13.4 and Cicero, Hortensius, Fr.36 Müller) 
(368) 
'Cum ergo beati esse omnes homines velint...' (dTrin 13.4) 
'Quis enim optat aliquid propter aliud quam ut felix fiat?' 
(dCD 4.23) 
'Nemo est qui gaudere nolit.' (dCD 19.12) 
'Utique peccando nec pietatem nec felicitatem tenuimus, 
voluntatem vero felicitatis nec perdita felicitate perdidimus.' 
(dCD 22.30) 
But tIoBEL'TOIL ó' ÉVOI(JyÉ6T£pOV T( eOTLV ÉTL XEX8fiVOlL (NE 
1097b23): what does it actually mean to say that 'laetitia', 
'felicitas', 'beatitudo' is the good for humanity? Augustine has 
at least seven ways of approaching this question, which I will 
now run through. These seven approaches may or may not come down 
to the same thing, as they are intended to; and they may or may 
not depend circularly on each other, as they are not intended to. 
4á. Peace 
One standard image for the human good in the City of God is 
that of the final rest of the saints in 'pax' or 'quies': 




'Sicut enim nemo est qui gaudere nolit, ita nemo est qui 
pacem habere nolit.' (dCD 19.12) 
Is this peace the same to which Augustine had referred in the 
schema of moral progress noticed (Ch.6, §4) in his exegetical 
works on Romans and Galatians ('ante legem', 'sub lege', 'sub 
gratia', 'in pace')? There is good evidence in the dCD that it 
is. The point about the 'pax' referred to in the exegetical works 
is that such 'pax' only comes after the end of the struggle 
between good and evil impulses- which itself is characteristic of 
unhappiness. The 'pax' of the dCD is precisely this kind of 
absence of internal conflict. For a rather unfairly unsympathetic 
criticism of Augustine's doctrine of 'pax' as the final good, v. 
Kirwan (1989), p.222 ff.: 'It is striking that apart from the 
reference to worship this description at the end of the City of 
God is wholly negative'. But in fact the absence of strife in 
heaven is an absence which, as we have seen, Augustine identifies 
in the dCD with something very positive, viz. the possibility of 
successful practical reasoning: 
'Pax animae inrationalis ordinata requies appetitionum, pax 
animae rationalis ordinata cognitionis actionisque consensio.' 
(dCD 19.13) 
One notable point about defining the human good as 'pax' 
in 
this sense is that, given Augustine's orthodox Christian 
belief 
in human non- perfectibility in this life, it makes 
that good 
essentially other- worldly. The point is clear already 
in the 
(370) 
EPRoms and EEGa1: 
'Non finientur haec [desideria carnalia] nisi resurrectione 
corporis immutationem illam, quae nobis promittitur, meruerimus, 
ubi perfecta pax erit.' (EPRoms 18) 
'Postea vero ex omni parte exstinguitur [poenalis 
consuetudo]. Quoniam Spiritus Iesu... vivificabit mortalia 
corpora nostra.' (EEGa1 46) 
Our lot in the present life is wretchedness and punishment, 
as is increasingly strongly emphasised as Augustine's thought 
develops: 
'Omnes homines, quamdiu mortales sunt, etiam miseri sint 
necesse est.' (dCD 9.15) 
'Hanc vitam de peccato illo nimis nefario, quod in paradiso 
perpetratum est, factam nobis esse poenalem, totumque quod 
nobiscum agitur per testamentum novum, non pertinere nisi ad novi 
saeculi hereditatem novam.' (dCD 21.15) 
God is only to be known in the hereafter. The 'pax' 
or 
'quies' for which we long is only to be found in the perfected 
knowledge of God, which Augustine also calls 
(371) 
4b. The contemplation of God 
'Quia fecisti nos ad te, et inquietum est cor nostrum donec 
requiescat in te.' (Conf 1.1) 
'Ibi videbimus, et gaudebit cor nostrum [Isaiah 66.14]. Nec 
expressit [Esias] quid videbimus: sed quid nisi Deum? Ut 
impleatur in nobis promissum evangelicum: Beati mundicordes, 
quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt [Mt.5.8]... Hic creditis, ibi 
videbitis.' (dCD 20.21) 
Since this contemplation of God is happiness, the lack of it 
is unhappiness: 
'Illa namque visio Dei tantae pulchritudinis visio est et 
tanto amore dignissima, ut sine hac quibuslibet aliis bonis 
praeditum atque abundantem non dubitet Plotinus [Enneads 1.6.7] 
infelicissimum dicere.' (dCD 10.16) 
4c. Function 
Very different in tone, and implicitly much 
more 
this -worldly, are Augustine's arguments about function, 
in the 
performing of which one's happiness is often, especially 
in the 
early works, said by him to consist. Like Aristotle, 
he takes 
'human function' to mean 'activity/ state which 
sets humans 
"above" the animals': 
(372) 
'Quid censes, inquam, esse aliud beate vivere, nisi secundum 
id quod in 
homine optimum est vivere ?... Quis, inquam, 
dubitaverit nihil aliud esse hominis optimum, quam eam partem 
animi cui dominanti obtemperare convenit cetera quaeque in homine 
Bunt ?' (cAcad 1.5; cp. Aristotle, NE 1113a5 -9) 
'Hoc quidquid est quo pecoribus homo praeponitur, sive mens, 
sive spiritus, sive utrurnque rectius appellatur... Si dominetur 
atque imperet ceteris quibuscumque homo constat, tunc esse 
hominem ordinatissimum.' (dLA 1.18) 
It follows that not performing the human function is often 
taken to be definitive of unhappiness; as when one performs some 
other, lower animal's function: 
'Pulchre namque incedit quadrupedans equus: at si hoc homo 
pedibus manibusque imitetur, quis eum vel palearum cibo dignum 
putet? Recte igitur plerumque improbamus imitantem, cum eum quem 
imitatur probemus.' (dDA 20) 
-Or as when one's own body is disobedient to one's own 
'voluntas'- a phenomenon which seems to have fixated Augustine 
(dCD 14.23) . In heaven the body will, he says, no longer disobey 
the 'voluntas'. As evidence of this he adduces the fact that even 
now some people can control their bodies in remarkable ways, and 
goes on: 
'Cum itaque corpus etiam nunc quibusdam, licet in carne 
(373) 
corruptibili hanc aerumnosam ducentibus vitam, ita in pleribus 
motionibus et affectionibus extra usitatum naturae modum 
mirabiliter serviat; quid causae est, ut non credamus ante 
inoboedientiae peccatum corruptionisque supplicium ad propagandam 
prolem sine ulla libidine servire voluntati humanae humana membra 
potuisse? Donatus est itaque homo sibi, quia deseruit Deum 
placendo sibi, et non oboedens Deo non potuit oboedire nec sibi. 
Hinc evidentior miseria, qua homo non vivit ut vult.' (dCD 14.24) 
The obvious response to 'The happy life for humans is the 
life of living out the human function' is 'Yes, but what is the 
human function ?'. The above passages give some indications about 
what Augustine thinks the human function is. More evidence as to 
his beliefs on this may be gathered by examining another way in 
which he describes the good life, as 
4d. Desire of the right things 
The argument that the good life is a matter of having the 
right desires, and (if one has the right desires) of fulfilling 
them, is very clearly presented in the dBV. It is agreed 
there 
that happiness has to do with the satisfaction of desires: 
'Videturne vobis, inquam, beatus esse qui 
quod vult non 
habet? Negaverunt.' (dBV 10) 
But not just of any desires: 
(374) 
'Quid? omnis qui quod vult habet beatus est? Tum mater: Si 
bona, inquit, velit et habeat, beatus est; si auteur mala velit, 
quamvis habeat, miser est.' (dBV 10) 
Compare the teaching of the de Trinitate: 
'Velle enim quod non deceat, idipsum miserrimum est; nec tam 
miserum est non adipisci quod velis, quam adipisci velle quod non 
oporteat.' (Cicero, Hortensius, apud dTrin 13.5) 
What, then, are the right things to desire? Augustine gives 
us these examples of wrong objectives of desire, desires which 
could not be given a central part in the constitution of the good 
life for humans: 
'Sunt alia quaedam, quae iam cadere in feras non videntur, 
nec tarnen in homine ipso summa sunt, ut iocari et ridere; quod 
humanum quidem, sed infimum hominis iudicat, quisquis de natura 
human rectissime iudicat. Deinde amor laudis et gloriae, et 
affectatio dominandi...' (dLA 1.18) 
'Unde illa cuiusdam mimi facetissima praedicatur urbanitas, 
qui cum se promisisset in theatro quid in animo haberent et quid 
vellent omnes, aliis ludis esse dicturum, atque ad 
diem 
constitutum ingenti exspectatione maior multitudo conflueret, 
suspensis et silentibus omnibus dixisse perhibetur: 
Vili vultis 
envere, et caro vendere.' (dTrin 13.3) 
(375) 
'Corporea diligendo peccamus, quia spiritualia diligere et 
iustitia iubemur, et natura possumus.' (dDA 20) 
Augustine has three positive answers to the question of what 
right desire is. These answers seem different in content; 
different enough, at least, to supply two further ways of 
answering the earlier question, 'What is the good life ?'. First, 
in line with ( §4b), that the good for humanity is the 
contemplation of God, he argues that the right supreme object of 
desire is God himself. Second, it seems in many places that the 
right thing to desire is not the happy life, but 
4e. Righteousness 
'Nam illi qui beati sunt- quos bonos esse oportet- non 
propterea sunt beati, quia beate vivere voluerunt (nam hoc volunt 
etiam mali), sed quia recte, quod mali nolunt.' (dLA 1.30) 
'Nisi beatus non vivit ut vult, et nullus beatus nisi 
iustus.' (dCD 14.25) 
'Recta vita ducenda est, qua perveniendum sit ad beatam.' 
(dCD 14.9) 
It appears that this right kind of life is defined 
as that 
life which exhibits all the emotions in a right kind of 
way, and 
a misdirected life is one which exhibits them in the 
wrong way 
(376) 
(dCD 14.9): 'Quia rectus est amor eorum, istas omnes affectiones 
habent'. 
4f. Secure Goods 
The third answer found in the dLA is: we should desire those 
things which we cannot lose against our will. This is the 
difference between the right desires of good people and the wrong 
desires of bad people: 
'Cupere namque sine metu vivere non tantum bonorum, sed etiam 
malorum omnium est. Verum hoc interest, quod id boni appetunt, 
avertendo amorem ab iis rebus quae sine amittendi periculo 
nequeunt haberi; mali autem ut his fruendis cum securitate 
incubent, removere impedimenta conantur, et propterea facinorosam 
sceleratamque vitam, quae mors melius vocatur, gerunt.' (dLA 
1.11) 
And what, in turn, is it that we cannot lose against our 
will? In the dLA Augustine answers that what we cannot lose 
against our will is 
49. Bona Voluntas 
-The good will itself. This is the 'voluntas qua 
appetimus 
recte honesteque vivere, et ad summam sapientiam pervenire' 
(dLA 
(377) 
1.25). Its value is greater than 'anything in the way of riches, 
or honour, or the desires of the body' for the simple reason that 
one has good will by choosing to have it, and can only lose it by 
choosing not to have it. This makes the good will the most secure 
of all goods, a good completely independent of the ravages of 
fortune and time: 
'Vides igitur iam in voluntate nostra esse constitutum, ut 
hoc vel fruamur vel caremus tanto et tam vero bono. Quid enim tam 
in voluntate quam ipsa voluntas sita est ?' (dLA 1.26) 
'Placet igitur beatum esse hominem dilectorem bonae 
voluntatis suae, et prae illa contemnentem quodcumque aliud bonum 
dicitur, cuius amissio potest accidere etiam cum voluntas tenendi 
manet.' (dLA 1.28) 
The same kind of thought is found in the dCD: 'Beata quippe 
vita si non amatur, non habetur' (dCD 14.25). 
Now there are at least two important problems with defining 
the human good in this manner, as the 'bona voluntas'. Firstly, 
the security of possession of the 'bona voluntas' is no guarantee 
of its goodness as an object of possession. After all, by the 
same arguments that Augustine gives for the security of 
possession of the 'bona voluntas', one could argue that the 'mala 
voluntas', if there is such a thing, was a secure possession- and 
so a good thing? The argument from permanence of a possession 
to 
its goodness is implausible because, as Augustine himself 
points 
(378) 
out, as early as the dBV, that desire for or possession of 
something is not a good state of affairs unless that something is 
a good thing: 
'Si bona [quisquam] velit et habeat, beatus est; si autem 
mala velit, quamvis habeat, miser est.' (dBV 10) 
(Why, incidentally, shouldn't the pursuit and possession of 
wrong objectives make one happy? One standard answer of 
Augustine's is that the satisfaction to be had in the attainment 
of bad things is not a real satisfaction. In truth it makes one 
more miserable than happy to obtain such things: 'Quis namque ita 
sit mente caecus... ut eum qui nequiter vivit ac turpiter, et... 
implet omnes suas facinorosissimas et flagitiosissimas 
voluntates, ideo beatum dicat, quia vivit ut vult: cum profecto 
quamvis et sic miser esset, minus tarnen esset, si nihil eorum 
quae perperam voluisset, habere potuisset ?' (dTrin 14.8). Once 
again, the argument is of fundamentally phenomenological form: 
Augustine's point is that even the wicked know, in their heart of 
hearts, that what they pursue and obtain is not really of a kind 
to bring them happiness. Though of course if they failed to know 
this, that ignorance would be just another sign of their 
iniquity; they lose either way.) 
Correspondingly, as Augustine remarks in the Confessions 
(6.16), their lack of permanence is, on its own, 
no argument 
against the supremacy of the 'carnal' goods. For 
the implication 
seems to be that the 'carnal' goods might be 
the supreme goods, 
(379) 
if they did last for ever; but Augustine hardly wants to concede 
that. (The tendency to appeal, irrelevantly, to the longevity of 
a good as evidence of its 'true' goodness is a chronic vice of 
Platonism, which Aristotle's tart medicine should really have 
cured once and for all: 6)0,6 urjv oúF,È TC6 árbLov avaL uáANov 
6yaeÓv ËQTaI, F, r nEp XEUKÓTEpOV TÓ noauXpdviov TOG eplupou 
(NE 1096b3-5).) 
Secondly: for a Christian bishop, there might seem a danger 
of some kind of unorthodoxy or idolatry in saying that the 
greatest good for humanity is 'bona voluntas', and that we should 
love this 'voluntas' and scorn everything (!) else. After all, 
where does God enter this story? In the section of the 
Retractationes dealing with the dLA (Retr 1.8), Augustine does 
not explicitly repudiate this claim. But he does point out that 
even in the dLA the 'potentiae animi', including 'bona voluntas', 
are only 'media bona' (even if 'tam vera bona'), and that he 
there stressed the need for divine grace to assist human 'bona 
voluntas': 
'Voluntas ergo ipsa nisi Dei gratia liberetur a servitute, 
qua facta est "serva peccati ", et ut vitia superet adiuvetur, 
recte pieque vivi a mortalibus non potest.' (dLA 1.11) 
This suggests that possession of the 'bona voluntas' alone 
is 
not, in fact, sufficient for the possession of the good 
life. 
God's grace is also needed. But the supplying of 
that grace is 
clearly not 'in voluntate nostra', unless our possession 
of the 
(380) 
'bona voluntas' guarantees God's supplying of divine grace- a 
suggestion which Augustine and a host of followers have 
strenuously denied. 
More usual answers to the question of the nature of the human 
good, in the later works especially, are the ones reviewed 
already, that it is (4a) peace or (4b) contemplation of God. 
Augustine's doctrine of the 'bona voluntas' was never meant to be 
a denial of these answers, even if it looks rather like one at 
times. As more careful examination of the dLA shows, the 'bona 
voluntas' is not so much the greatest good for humans as the 
desire for (or choice of) the greatest good for humans. It is 
therefore the best desire to have and the best choice to make, 
but this is only because it is desire/ choice of the best 
possible objective- which in Augustine's view is of course God. 
Once again, we see the need to adopt a relatively modest view of 
the role of 'voluntas' in Augustine's thought. The best 
interpretation of Augustine is not that the possession of 'bona 
voluntas' is sufficient for the good life, but only that it is 
necessary. 
Formally speaking, Augustine's way of reaching the conclusion 
that the best kind of 'voluntas' is the desire for God is to 
revert to the 'function' style of argument. It is the human 
function to turn to what is good. What is good? What is eternal: 
'Iubet igitur aeterna lex avertere amorem a temporalibus, 
et 
eum mundatum convertere ad aeterna.' (dLA 1.32) 
(381) 
What is good is also, characteristically, not private, it is 
equally available to all. This is a principle of metaphysics in 
the dLA: 
'Satis enirn est quod istas tanquam regulas, et quaedam lumina 
virtutum, et vera et incommutabilia, et sive singula sive omnia 
communiter adesse ad contemplandum eis qui haec valent sua 
quisque ratione ac mente conspicere, pariter mecum vides 
certissimumque concedis.' (dLA 2.29) 
In the dCD it is a principle of political philosophy too: 
'[ Civitas libera erit civitas Dei], ubi sit non amor propriae 
ac privatae quodam modo voluntatis, sed communi eodemque 
immutabili bono gaudens atque ex multis unum cor faciens.' (dCD 
15.3) 
'Quanto magis homo fertur quodam modo naturae suae legibus ad 
ineundam societatem pacemque cum hominibus... omnibus 
obtinendam.' (dCD 19.12) 
Now what is common and eternal in this way, except for truth 
itself? 
'Promiseram autem... me tibi demonstraturum esse aliquid quod 
sit mente nostra atque ratione sublimius. Ecce tibi est ipsa 
veritas; amplectere illam si potes, et fruere illa... Quid 
enim 
Petis amplius quam ut beatus sis? Et quid beatius eo qui 
fruitur 
(382) 
inconcussa et incommutabili et excellentissima veritate? ...An 
nos in amplexo veritatis beatos esse dubitamus ?' (dLA 2.35) 
In the very Plotininan de Quantitate Animae, the 
'contemplatio veritatis' is made the seventh and last stage in an 
'ascensio animae' from minimal vitality, via sensation, technical 
knowledge, the work of purgation, moral purity, and the hunger 
for What Is: 'septimus atque ultimus gradus', with nothing better 
to follow it, for there is nothing better than the 'perfructio 
summi et veri boni' (dQA 76). Truth is the chief good because 
(Augustine suggests) nothing could be put above its 
contemplation. 
Truth is also the chief good because, by a quick bit of 
Scriptural manipulation, Augustine thinks he can show that 'truth 
itself' is identical with God: 
'Haec est libertas nostra, cum isti subdimur veritati: et 
ipse est Deus poster qui nos liberat a morte, id est a conditione 
peccati. Ipsa enim Veritas etiam homo cum hominibus loquens, ait 
credentibus sibi: Si manseretis in verbo meo, vere discipuli mei 
estis, et cognoscetis veritatem, et veritas liberabit vos.' (dLA 
2.37) 
Hence 'Inmutabile bonum non esse nisi unum verum beatum Deum' 
(dCD 12.1); and the 'bona voluntas' which we cannot lose without 
choosing to is only a supremely good thing because it 
is 
identical with desire for this God. 
(383) 
This completes my presentation of Augustine's seven 
definitions of the human good. Perhaps it is clear now that they 
do in fact tie up, in this way. The highest human good is 
contemplation (4a) in peace (4b) of God because the beatific 
vision is the highest good that there is, the highest good that 
we can desire; such a good is also preeminently the right object 
of desire (4d) and a righteous desire (4e) or 'bona voluntas' 
(4g), and (given that humans can attain to the very heights of 
the cosmic order) the natural thing for humans to desire (4c). 
Augustine also believes that God is that object of desire which 
(4f) it is supremely difficult to lose unless you choose to: that 
is the point of his argument (dLA 1.20 -21) that no wicked power 
in heaven or earth, apart from the defection of the 'voluntas' 
itself, could be strong enough to overpower the 'bona voluntas'. 
The underlying motivation of all these arguments is the same. 
Augustine's central moral axiom is that there should be a match 
between the ordering of our desires and choices and the ordering 
of the world: 
'Naturam corporis inferiore gradu esse quam animi naturam, ac 
per hoc animum maius bonum esse quam corpus.' (dLA 2.48) 
'Hic itaque in unoquoque iustitia est, ut oboedienti Deus 
homini, animus corpori, ratio autem vitiis etiam repugnantibus 
imperet.' (dCD 19.27) 
'Virtutes quas habere sibi videtur per quas imperat 
corpori 
(384) 
et vitiis, ad quodlibet adipiscendum vel tenendum rettulerit 
nisi Deum, etiam ipsae vitia sunt potius quam virtutes.' (dCD 
19.25) 
The perfect ordering of the volitions would reflect perfectly 
the perfect ordering of the goods which there are in the world; 
desire would match up perfectly with desirability (in the 
gerundive sense). Thus, for Augustine, ethics depends on the 
natural ordering of the world. 
5. Good Will and the Order of the World 
And, in turn, the natural ordering of the world depends on 
God: '[Tu] qui omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti' 
(Conf 5.4). As Gosselin remarks (Gosselin 1949, p.525), ' "Modus, 
species, ordo" reviennent comme un refrain': a refrain which 
crops up, with some variations such as the substition of 
'mensura' for 'modus' and of 'pondus' for 'ordo', throughout 
Augustine's works. 
The point of this refrain is a point about God as the formal 
cause of that order in the world which is a necessary condition 
of its continued existence. This is argued at length in dLA 
2.44 -45. 
The first step in the argument is the claim that 
all 
non -eternal things have form (as opposed to being form). 
They 
(385) 
have this form inasmuch as they admit of numbers, i.e., are 
measurable: 
'Intuere coelum et terram et mare, et quaecumque in eis vel 
desuper fulgent, vel deorsum repunt vel volant vel natant: formas 
habent, quia numeros habent: adime illis haec, nihil erunt.' (dLA 
2.42) 
'Si ergo quidquid mutabile aspexeris, vel sensu corporis vel 
animi consideratione, capere non potes nisi aliqua numerorum 
forma teneatur, qua detracta in nihil recidat.' (dLA 2.44) 
(Note here that, in both passages, Augustine says that what 
lacks this form is nothing. Likewise, at dNB 3 he writes that 
'Ubi nulla sunt [modus, species et ordo], nulla natura est'. Some 
writers, such as Gilson (Introduction . l'étude de Saint 
Augustin, p.258 -259), attempt to distinguish divine making and 
forming in Augustine's thought about creation, a 'faire' and a 
'parfaire', as if God created matter first and only then imposed 
form on it, like water poured into a jug or a seal pressed into 
wax. But, at least from passages like these, it seems rather as 
if the creative operations of making and forming are, to 
Augustine's mind, identical. For him, what was (per impossibile?) 
only made and not also formed would not be anything actual at 
all.) 
Hence Augustine does not go along with the Manichaeans 
in 
saying that matter is essentially evil. For him it is unclear 
(386) 
that matter has any essence, evil or not. On the other hand, he 
does not deny the existence (in some sense) of matter. Rather, 
what he says about it is that there is an inherent 
inaccessibility, both perceptual and conceptual, about matter 
considered in itself: 
'Nec ista ergo hyle malum dicenda est, quae non per aliquam 
speciem sentiri, sed per omnimodam speciei privationem cogitari 
vix potest.' (dNB 18) 
Matter is something mysteriously poised on the brink of being 
nothing; its only reality is so much in potentia, and so little 
in actu, that it is barely anything real at all. There is an 
important analogue to all this in Augustine's theory of action - 
as we shall see in the next chapter. 
The second step of the argument is the claim that the forms 
recognisable in mutable things must have been imposed on those 
things from outside: 
'Nulla autem res formare seipsam potest: quia nulla res 
potest dare sibi quod non habet.' (dLA 2.45) 
And where does this imposed form come from? From an eternal 
form: 
'Conficitur itaque, ut et corpus et animus 
forma quadam 
incommutabili et semper manente formentur. Cui formae 
dictum est: 
(387) 
" Mutabis ea et mutabuntur; tu autem idem ipse es, et anni tui non 
deficient" [Ps.101.27 -28].' (dLA 2.45) 
This eternal form is identical with 'providentia', a word 
which Augustine chooses with an eye on Plotinus' npóvoLa (v. 
Enneads 3.2 -3): 
'Hinc etiam comprehenditur omnia providentia gubernari. Si 
enim omnia quae sunt, forma penitus subtracta nulla erunt, forma 
ipsa incommutabilis, per quam mutabilia cuncta subsistunt, ut 
formarum suarum numeris impleantur et agantur, ipsa est eorum 
providentia: non enim ista essent, si illa non esset.' (dLA 2.45) 
'Providentia', in turn, is identical with wisdom: 
'Quicumque iter agit ad sapientiam, sentit sapientiam in via 
se sibi ostendere hilariter, et in omni providentia occurrere 
sibi...' (dLA 2.45) 
And lastly wisdom is of course identical with God, 
specifically with the second person of the Trinity: 
'Esse patrem sapientiae... aeterno patri sit aequalis quae 
ab 
ipso genita est sapientia.' (dLA 2.39) 
God, then, is the formal cause of the order 
of the world. 
That is part of what it means to talk of him as 
creator. There is 
no other possible source for the existence, life 
and intelligence 
(388) 
manifest in the world (dLA 2.46); and, without his formal 
causality, Augustine argues not only that there would be no order 
in the world, but even that there would be no world. (As we have 
seen, the two propositions are barely separable for Augustine.) 
The right ordering of volitions, I said, reflects the right 
ordering of the world; and we have just established that 
everything that is right in the ordering of the world is for 
Augustine a direct consequence of God's formal causality. It 
follows that all right volition is equally under the influence of 
God's formal causality. Whatever is a formal cause of the order 
of the world, is also a formal cause of the rightly ordered 
' voluntas'. To put the same point a different way: the Good Life 
is the formal cause of the Good Will. The natural aspiration of 
human volition, and the right direction for human volition, 
converge; on the Good Life in Augustine's most adequate 
characterisation of it, as the beatific vision of God. Gosselin 
notes (1oc. cit.) that sometimes Augustine substitutes 'pondus' 
for 'ordo'; others have noted another equation often made by 
Augustine, between 'pondus' and 'amor'. There is an upshot to 
this: that there is an 'ordo amorum'; that the natural and right 
tendency of the soul or the 'voluntas' is towards the good, which 
is to say, ultimately, towards God. In the famous words of The 
Confessions: 'Quia fecisti nos ad te, et inquietum est cor 
nostrum donec requiescat in te' (Conf 1.1). That, for Augustine, 
is the ultimate meaning of the directedness or rationality or 
form of voluntary action: the active soul's natural and (almost) 
inevitable gravitation is towards its source and final purpose, 
in God. 
(389) 
This is the conclusion about the directedness and the 
rationality of the 'voluntas' at which I have been aiming all 
along in this chapter. However, some doubts may remain. In 
particular, my conclusion equates the formal causality of the 
good 'voluntas' with that of the 'voluntas' as such. But to many 
modern minds there will seem to be an unbridgeable gap between a 
conclusion about what the 'voluntas' ought to be motivated by, 
and one about what it is motivated by. 
The best way of dealing with such doubts is to turn to a 
question which may already have seemed pressing anyway: the 
question 'What about "mala voluntas"?'. I attribute to Augustine 
the claim that it is normally a condition of some action's being 
voluntary that it should be rational, i.e. directed towards some 
good objective. Can this claim be convincingly maintained in face 
of the objection that there is in Augustine plenty of evidence 
for a doctrine of volition towards bad objectives? That is the 
question of the next, the final, chapter. 
(390) 
Chapter 9 
'Mala Voluntas' and the Mystery of Evil 
1. Introduction 
2. 'Mala Voluntas' 
3. An Incomplete Account? 
4. A Necessarily Incomplete Account? 
5. Manichaean Dualism and 'Privatio Boni' 
6. Incompleteness Again 
7. Augustine and Voluntarism 
8. From Augustine's Rationalism to Augustinian Voluntarism 
9. Conclusion 
'It is commonly held that Augustine's ontology, in which evil 
is treated as a privation, does no more than evade the problem 
which it is professed to solve; and that his deeply Christian 
sense of the reality of moral evil caused him to relapse into 
Manichaeanism with his doctrine of original sin, in which the 
Not -Being, the Nothing out of which man was created, is 
transformed into a Something with fatal power. In fact 
the 
originality of Augustine appears just in his steady refusal 
to 
hypostatise evil.' 
(Burnaby 1938, p.37) 
'The first man is summed up in one act: he 
took the fruit and 
(391) 
ate of it. About that act there is nothing to say; one can only 
tell it; it happens and henceforth evil has arrived.' 
(Ricoeur 1967, p.244) 
'The Apostle meets the problem by leaving it unsolved.' 
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1. Introduction 
In Chs.6 -7 I argued that Augustine, like Aristotle, teaches 
that the absence of compulsion and the absence of ignorance are 
conditions of voluntary action. The conclusion of Ch.8 was that 
Augustine, again like Aristotle, is also committed to the view 
that voluntary action is normally, in an important sense, 
rational. The relevant sense is that he believes that voluntary 
action, to be understood as such, must be directed towards some 
good. Augustine's doctrine of the rationality of action, then, is 
a weaker one than Aristotle's, but it is nonetheless a doctrine 
of the rationality of action. 
In Ch.4 I suggested that the three conditions of voluntary 
action which I had argued for from Aristotle's writings pointed 
us to a way of dealing with the puzzle about akrasia raised in 
Aristotle's system. To conclude my work on Augustine, I will now 
suggest that the three parallel conditions of voluntary action 
(392) 
which I have argued for in Augustine suggest an analogous 
treatment of an analogous problem. 
The analogous problem is that posed for Augustine by the 
admitted existence of what he calls 'mala voluntas'. 'Mala 
voluntas'- he believes- exists, and like akrasia can be 
characterised as wilful wrongdoing (deliberate choice of the 
worse over the better). Because of this belief Augustine, being 
both a Christian and a classical philosopher, is confronted by a 
dilemma. 
On the one hand: Scripture (e.g. Roms.1.20 -21) affirms that 
there is wilful wrongdoing. Admittedly, in the Bible, the origin 
of wilful wrongdoing is as mysterious as the origin of suffering. 
But that it is a reality is strongly affirmed. 
On the other hand: against Scripture, classical philosophy 
from Socrates to the Stoics denies the possibility of wilful 
wrongdoing, of a knowing, deliberate choice of evil. Even the 
Plato of the Republic presents an account of akrasia, not as a 
matter of the rational soul's choosing to follow desires it knows 
to be wrong, but as a matter of its being overpowered by those 
desires. And, as I have argued in Ch.8, Augustine's philosophical 
psychology was not (pace Dihle) radically different from the kind 
of accounts which the writers of the classical era had proposed. 
Like theirs, his took as its most basic principle the 
axiom that 
all desire is desire of something intrinsically good. 
Thus the 
idea of EK(V áuaprávstv was just as problematic for him 
as for 
(393) 
Socrates (or Aristotle). To offer an account of the psychology of 
wilful wrongdoing, in the terms of a classical theory of action 
like this, was simply impossible. Augustine was too good at 
philosophy to miss this- although (as we shall see) he was also 
too fond of rhetoric to keep himself from ever indulging in the 
inconsistency of exploring other, ultimately less fruitful, lines 
of thought. 
So the problem which haunts Augustine's theory of the 
voluntary is a conflict between the givens of revelation and 
philosophy. If voluntary action has the inherent directedness 
towards the good which Augustine, in line with his philosophical 
tradition, says it has, how can there be even one case of genuine 
deliberate choice of the worse over the better- as opposed to 
action which looks like such a choice, but is really ignorant or 
compelled or irrational action? 
It may now be clear why I say this problem is analogous to 
Aristotle's problem about akrasia. In what follows, I hope to 
make it clear why I also say that Augustine's treatment of this 
problem of 'mala voluntas' is analogous to Aristotle's treatment 
of the problem of akrasia. 
'Mala Voluntas' 
How can there be 'mala voluntas'? To see Augustine's 
response 
to this question, we need to look in detail 
at how he actually 
(394) 
uses the vital words 'mala voluntas' and associated phrases. The 
evidence will suggest two points: 
1. If the notion of 'mala voluntas' is to be used as an 
explanatory tool in Augustine's theory of action, then it cannot 
be used to mean 'a choice of something evil in itself'. What 
Augustine's use of it marks, is not a belief that his talk of 
'mala voluntas' explains any choice of something evil in itself, 
but a belief that at this point in the theory of the voluntary, 
explanations necessarily run out. For voluntary action is, in 
Augustine's view, necessarily directed towards the good. 
Therefore we cannot explain behaviour as voluntary action by 
supposing it to be directed towards something evil. 
2. Hence Augustine's account of the origination of 'mala 
voluntas' is not only incomplete, but necessarily incomplete. 
Both points- I shall argue- play vital parts in Augustine's 
own apologetic strategy. But this may be far from obvious at 
first sight. I now present evidence against both (1) and (2). 
2a. Evidence against (1) 
The 'directedness' thesis which I have been 
attributing to 
Augustine, the claim that all choice 
is of something 
intrinsically good, runs clean against 
the normal line of 
exegesis of Augustine, which, on the contrary, 
credits him with a 
(395) 
'neutrality' thesis about the 'voluntas'. That thesis is that the 
'voluntas' is not necessarily directed towards anything. Now 
Augustine does often talk as if his doctrine of 'voluntas' does 
mean that one can have choices between a good and a bad where it 
is a matter of 'indifference' (in Hume's sense) which one 
chooses. Consider these five passages: 
(i) 'Motus autem quo huc aut illuc voluntas convertitur, nisi 
esset voluntarius, neque laudandus cum ad superiora, neque 
culpandus homo esset cum ad inferiora detorquet quasi quendam 
cardinem voluntatis.' (dLA 3.3) 
If the 'voluntas' is a hinge between the good ('superiora') 
and the bad ('inferiora'), then it may be said that, as a hinge 
between a door and a door frame is not truly part of either, the 
point of the image must be that 'voluntas' itself has a neutral 
position between good and bad choices, and is not, by its nature, 
committed to a general policy of preferring either the good to 
the bad or vice versa. 
(ii) '[Deus] non solum magna, sed etiam media et minima bona 
esse praestitit... Virtutes magna bona sunt... Virtutibus nemo 
male utitur; ceteris autem bonis, id est mediis et minimis, non 
solum bene, sed etiam male quisque uti potest... Voluntas ergo 
quae medium bonum est...' (dLA 2.50, 2.52) 
The claim that the 'voluntas' is a 'medium bonum' 
does not, 
of course, mean that the ' voluntas' is in the middle, 
neutral, 
(396) 
between good and evil. 'Media bona' are still 'bona'; they are in 
the middle between 'magna bona' and 'minima bona', not between 
'bona' and 'mala'. The claim is rather that the 'voluntas' is the 
kind of good which can be used or misused. Its choices- it seems - 
are in some sense neutral between good and evil. 
(iii) In the dDA, Augustine insists that our having both good 
and evil desires is no evidence for the two souls, one good and 
one evil, which the Manichaeans claimed to discern in the human 
psychology: 
'Cur mihi iam [Manichaei] de ulla re audiendi viderentur? An 
ut discerem hinc ostendi animarum duo esse genera, quod in 
deliberando nunc in malam partem, nunc in bonam nutat assensio? 
Cur non magis hoc signum est unius animae, quae libera illa 
voluntate huc et huc ferri, hinc atque hinc re ferri potest? Nam 
mihi cum accidit, unum me esse sentio utrumque considerantem, 
alterutrum eligentem: sed plerumque illud libet, hoc decet, 
quorum nos in medio positi fluctuamus. Ita enim nunc constituti 
sumus, ut et per carnem voluptate affici, et per spiritum 
honestate possimus.' (Cp. Conf 8.5) 
(iv) 'Interest autem qualis sit voluntas hominis; quia si 
perversa est, perversos habebit hos motus... omnino pro varietate 
rerum, quae appetuntur atque fugiuntur, sicut allicitur 
vel 
offenditur voluntas hominis, ita in hos vel illos affectus 
mutatur et vertitur.' (dCD 14.6) 
(397) 
The claim is clearly enough that the 'voluntas' can be either 
'perversa' or 'recta'. This seems to imply that it is equally 
likely to be either, which again suggests its neutrality. 
Augustine seems also to be positing a cause for its turning 
either way, in the environment in which the 'voluntas' finds 
itself. Cp. dLA 3.74, where he remarks that 'voluntatem non 
allicit ad faciendum quodlibet, nisi aliquod visum', and seems to 
suggest that the causes of sin are, in a sense, in our 
environment: a claim which I shall consider below. 
(v) Most decisively of all, consider dSL 58, where- it might 
seem- the 'directedness' thesis is explicitly rejected: 
'Prius igitur illud dicamus, liberum arbitrium naturaliter 
attributum [esse] a creatore animae rationali, illa media vis 
est, quae vel intendi ad fidem, vel inclinare ad infidelitatem 
potest.' 
2b. Evidence against (2) 
At first sight it seems arguable, too, that Augustine's 
acccount of the origination of 'mala voluntas' 
is not in any 
important sense incomplete. He seems to have plenty 
to say to 
back up the claim that 'mala voluntas' is 
the origin of evil - 
under at least five different heads. 
(a) On at least one occasion he says 
that sin, and with it 
(398) 
presumably 'mala voluntas', arises from two sources, one being 
'spontanea cogitatio', the other 'persuasio alterius' (dLA 3.29). 
In either case, of course, it remains true that what is done is 
'voluntarium' (loc.cit.). Compare dGCPO 2.42: 'Vitii vero auctor 
est diaboli decipientis calliditas et hominis consentientis 
voluntas'. 
(b) Sometimes he describes 'mala voluntas' as arising from 
pride, in particular when he is dealing with the fall of the 
angels: 
'Ille autem angelus magis seipsum quam Deum diligendo 
subditus ei esse noluit, et intumuit per superbiam, et a summa 
essentia defecit, et lapsus est.' (dVR 26) 
'Non enim ad malum opus perveniretur, nisi praecessisset 
voluntas mala. Porro malae voluntatis initium quae potuit esse 
nisi superbia? Initium enim omnis peccati superbia est.' (dCD 
14.13) 
(c) Sometimes he says that 'mala voluntas' originates in a 
choice of a private good by an 'aversio' from a 'communal' good: 
'Veritatem autem atque sapientiam nemo amittit invitus; 
non 
enim locis separari ab ea quisquam potest; sed ea quae 
dicitur a 
veritate atque sapientia separatio, perversa voluntas 
est, qua 
inferiora diliguntur... Habemus igitur qua 
fruamur omnes 
aequaliter atque communiter.' (dLA 2.37) 
(399) 
'Perversa enim est celsitudo, deserto eo cui debet animus 
inhaerere, principio sibi quodam modo fieri atque esse 
principium.' (dCD 14.13) 
This mode of description is readily compatible with the mode 
which describes 'mala voluntas' as being due to pride, as shown 
by a passage in the dCD where the two modes are run together. I 
underline those parts which refer to the 'privacy' mode of 
description, and italicise those which refer to the 'pride' mode: 
'Alii sua potestate potius delectati, velut bonum suum sibi 
ipsi essent, a superiore communi omnium beatifico bono ad propria 
defluxerunt et habentes elationis fastum pro excelsissima 
aeternitate, vanitatis astutiam pro certissima veritate, studia 
partium pro individua caritate, superbi, fallaces, invidi effecti 
sunt.' (dCD 12.1) 
(d) Sometimes, as we have seen, he argues that the origin of 
the 'mala voluntas' is in some sense to do with the environment 
in which the 'voluntas' is placed. dCD 14.6 and dLA 3.7 have been 
quoted already. There is also 83DQ 40: 
[In answer to the question 'Cum animarum natura una est, 
onde 
hominum diversae voluntates ?':] 'Ex diversis visis 
diversus 
appetitus animarum est, ex diverso appetitu diversus 
adipiscendi 
successus, ex diverso successu diversa consuetudo, 
ex diversa 
consuetudine diversa est voluntas.' 
(400) 
Which brings us to (e): Augustine's very frequent 
descriptions of 'mala voluntas' as originating in, or a 
concomitant of, or something connected in one way or another 
with, 'consuetudo', habituation (and/ or 'cupiditas' or 
'concupiscentia'). This is, in fact, perhaps Augustine's 
commonest way of characterising 'mala voluntas', especially in 
the later works. 
The idea is clearly present in the 8300 passage just quoted, 
where it is given unusually precise formulation. Here 'visum' 
leads to 'appetitus', 'appetitus' to 'successus' (cp. NE 
1147a35 -6), 'successus' to 'consuetudo', and 'consuetudo' to 
'voluntas'. Elsewhere, the idea is usually less sharply focused, 
but often seems to be essentially the same: we have the 'mala' or 
'bona' ' voluntas' we have because of our habituation, our 
constitution, the way we are already. 
So in the EEGa1, the stage of unsuccessful struggle against 
sin, 'sub lege', is that stage where the sinner 'trahitur pondere 
temporalis cupiditatis', and (hence) 'relinquit iustitiam' (EEGa1 
46). In the dLA, we read that 
'Nec mirandum est quod vel ignorando non habeat arbitrium 
liberum voluntatis ad eligendum quid recte faciat; vel resistente 
carnali consuetudine, quae violentia morta lis successionis 
quodammodo naturaliter inolevit, videat quid recte faciendum 
sit, 
et velit, nec possit implere.' (dLA 3.52) 
(401) 
Even where good impulses are present, they are smothered by 
the weight of custom and, the suggestion is, contrary bad 
impulses. 
In the later writings, this kind of description of the 'mala 
voluntas' as 'voluntas' under the influence of 'cupiditas' or 
'concupiscentia', the gravity of original sin which drags us away 
from the choice of the good, is the subject of whole books (such 
as de Gratia Christi et Peccato Originali Bk.2). As a proponent 
of the theology of the Fall, it is natural for Augustine to want 
to argue that, in Adam and Eve, 'mala voluntas' led to 'mala 
consuetudo'; and that, in us, 'mala consuetudo' leads to 'mala 
voluntas'. So we read that 
'Per arbitrii libertatem factum, ut esset homo cum peccato; 
sed iam poenalis vitiositas subsecuta ex libertate fecit 
necessitatem.' (dPIH 9) 
And again, that 
'Ex vitiis naturae (non ex conditione naturae) [est] 
quaedam 
peccandi necessitas.' (dNG 79) 
But one begins at times to wonder whether, 
with reference 
strictly to fallen humanity, Augustine 
is arguing that 
'concupiscentia' causes 'mala voluntas', or 
that 'mala voluntas' 
causes 'concupiscentia'. Or is it that 
'concupiscentia' is 'mala 
voluntas'? Or a mishmash of all three? 
For example, the 
(402) 
progression from 'consuetudo' to 'voluntas' noted above in 83DQ 
40 is actually reversed in the Confessions, where the subject of 
the description is not Adam but Augustine: 
'Quippe voluntas perversa facta est libido, et dum servitur 
libidini, facta est consuetudo, et dum consuetudini non 
resistitur, facta est necessitas.' (Conf 8.5) 
So which comes first in fallen humans, 'mala consuetudo' or 
'mala voluntas'? In the later works, the rather vague and general 
upshot of teaching about 'voluntas' and 'consuetudo' tends to be 
that, whichever way round it is, '[sumus] carnales, infirmi, 
peccatis obnoxii et ignorantiae tenebris obvoluti' (dCD 10.24). 
The two states of 'mala consuetudo' and 'mala voluntas' seem to 
become welded together in Augustine's thinking to the extent that 
to talk of one is to talk of the other. (Compare the way in 
which, as noted in Ch.6, ignorance and difficulty became for the 
later Augustine no longer exculpating factors, but the very 
hallmark of culpability.) 'Which comes first ?' is treated by the 
later Augustine as being, at least with reference to fallen 
humans, a chicken and egg question. 
One characteristic argument is that the sinner has freedom 
from righteousness, the righteous person freedom from sin, but 
both are, nonetheless, free: 
'Libertas quidem periit per peccatum, sed illa, 
quae in 
paradiso fuit, habendi plenam cum immortalitate 
iustitiam... 
(403) 
liberum arbitrium usque adeo in peccatore non periit, ut per 
ipsum peccent maxime omnes qui cum delectatione peccant et amore 
peccati et hoc eis placet quod eos libet.' (cDEP 1.5; cp. dLA 
1.37) 
This passage seems to present another version of the old 
chestnut about 'non posse peccare'/ 'posse non peccare'- a 
distinction which I have already considered in Ch.7, g4. 
'Mala voluntas' is not inconsistent with 'libera voluntas'; 
but the range of options for a 'mala voluntas' is limited, and 
different from that available for a 'bona voluntas'. 'Mala 
voluntas', one might almost say, becomes 'peccatum originale': 
'[Peccatum] latet, donec repugnans iustitiae malum eius 
prohibitione sentiatur, cum aliud iubetur atque adprobatur, aliud 
delectat atque dominatur.' (cDEP 1.17) 
3. An Incomplete Account? 
I have amassed a good deal of evidence against my two leading 
claims (1) and (2) about the 'mala voluntas'. How then am 
I to 
defend those claims? I will begin by treating of the 
evidence 
against (2). This treatment, I hope, will show how 
my defence of 
(1) is going to go. 
(2) was the claim that Augustine's account 
of the origination 
(404) 
of 'mala voluntas' is necessarily incomplete. This has suggested 
the retort that, on the contrary, Augustine's account of the 
origination of 'mala voluntas' is full, detailed, and therefore 
perfectly adequate. 
Augustine's account (or rather 'accounts'), as given above, 
may well be full and detailed. But nothing he says under the five 
heads considered above deals adequately with a central problem 
which confronts his doctrine of 'mala voluntas'. There is a 
serious lacuna in his teaching as so far expounded: one which can 
only be remedied by taking (with Augustine himself, in many 
places) a view of the origination of 'mala voluntas' radically 
different from all the above five. This lacuna, I will now argue, 
seriously compromises any attempt to extract from Augustine's 
writings a consistent doctrine of the will in the sense required, 
for example, by Albrecht Dihle as quoted in the epigraph to this 
chapter. What is this lacuna? 
It is one which has already been observed by at least one 
sharp eyed Augustine scholar, Robert Brown, who (in a seemingly 
neglected article in The Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion, 1978) anticipates quite a lot of the argumentative 
strategy I intend to employ here. Let us begin with Brown's 
response to the suggestion that 'Pride is the cause of the fall', 
a suggestion in effect equivalent to (b) above: 
'What a grand solution this is: Satan turned away from God 
because he was proud, and thereby became a self centred rebel. 
(405) 
But just a minute! Why was he proud? Did God create him proud? 
Certainly not, for then God would be responsible for his fall. 
Did he make himself proud by the free exercise of his will? So he 
must have done, if Augustine's intent to defend the initial 
freedom and responsibility of the will is to remain intact. If 
Satan made himself proud, then this act of will is itself the 
fall, and not a "cause" of his falling. Pointing to pride 
therefore cannot constitute an explanation for the fall (an 
account of why the first evil will willed as it did). It is only 
the substitution of a synonym for the inexplicable free act of 
falling itself. This substitution of "becoming proud" for 
"falling" or "first willing evil" is attractive because, by 
drawing an analogy to the everyday human sin of pride, it makes 
Satan's act more vivid... but it explains nothing, it in no way 
renders Satan's fall understandable.' 
(Brown, 1978) 
Brown's point applies in an obvious way to what I am 
considering, the question of what Augustine can tell us about the 
origination of 'mala voluntas'. It won't do to say (b) that pride 
is the source of the 'mala voluntas': for unless there is already 
a 'mala voluntas', how can there be any (culpable) pride? And 
this point, about what a follower of Ricoeur might call 
the 
'already' -ness of sin, can be deployed against the other 
four 
explanations of the origin of 'mala voluntas' offered 
in response 




(a) Action which counts as a case of sin, and so of 'mala 
voluntas', may well originate either through 'spontanea 
cogitatio' or 'persuasio alterius'. But either way, it will not 
be sin (or 'mala voluntas') unless the 'cogitatio' or the 
'persuasio' was not a sufficient and necessary condition of the 
action's occurring. For if either was such a condition, then the 
agent was not free to do otherwise than she did, and so was not 
responsible. Thus, if (a) is an explanation of the origination of 
sin, in the sense of wilful wrongdoing, it cannot be a complete 
explanation; but, if (a) is a complete explanation, it cannot be 
an explanation of sin. 
(c) To say that 'mala voluntas' originates in the turning 
away from the shared good to a private good simply prompts the 
question whether this turning away is itself a bad action. If it 
is not a bad action, then why does 'mala voluntas' result from 
it? If it is a bad action, then mustn't 'mala voluntas' be 
present already when it is performed- in which case the origin of 
'mala voluntas' has not been given? The idea that 'mala voluntas' 
can be characterised as 'aversio' from the 'commune bonum' (or 
(b) as pride) seems all right. The idea that it can be (efficient 
causally) explained in these ways does not. 
(d) As for (a): action which counts as a case 
of sin, and so 
of 'mala voluntas', may well originate through 
the influence of 
factors in the environment which are perceived. 
But if so, it 
will not be sin (or 'mala voluntas') 
unless the environmental 
influence in question was not a sufficient 
and necessary 
(407) 
condition of the action's occurring. For if that influence was 
such a condition, then the agent was not free to do otherwise 
than she did, and so was not responsible. Thus, if (d) is an 
explanation of the origination of sin, it cannot be a complete 
explanation; but, if (d) is a complete explanation, it cannot be 
an explanation of sin. 
(e) is the most interesting of the five accounts; but (as 
noted) it is very unclear precisely what this account comes to. 
If, on the one hand, the point is either that 'concupiscentia' 
originates in 'mala voluntas', or that the two are equivalent 
conditions, then it is patent that the origin of 'mala voluntas' 
has not been explained. If, alternatively, the point is that 
'mala voluntas' originates in 'concupiscentia', then the same 
problem as for (b) and (c) recurs. Is this 'concupiscentia' 
itself bad? If it is not, then why does 'mala voluntas' result 
from it? If it is, then mustn't 'mala voluntas' be present 
already when the ' concupiscentia' arises? Again, in either case, 
the origin of 'mala voluntas' has not been explained. 
I take it that these arguments vindicate at least the claim 
that Augustine's account of the origination of 'mala voluntas' is 
incomplete- if not my stronger claim (2) that Augustine's 
account 
of the origination of 'mala voluntas' is necessarily 
incomplete. 
The lacuna I have indicated is simply this: that 
not one of these 
supposed accounts of the origination of 'mala 
voluntas', is such 
an account. None of them delivers the goods 
required by actually 
telling us where 'mala voluntas' comes from. 
And this does seem 
(408) 
to suggest that there is something incomplete about Augustine's 
account. 
4. A Necessarily Incomplete Account? 
What more is needed, then, for me to move from saying that 
that account is incomplete to saying that it is necessarily 
incomplete? The missing steps- as I shall now argue- are provided 
by Augustine himself. Augustine himself gives us (the makings of) 
a valid argument to the conclusion that such attempts at 
explaining the origination of 'mala voluntas' as the above five 
cannot, in principle, succeed; and indeed, that no attempt 
whatever to explain its origination could succeed. This argument 
which I am going to attribute to Augustine will explain, with 
Brown, why 'the first evil will must be inexplicable'. But the 
argument I propose will give us more reason for saying that than 
Brown's argument does. It will also lead us from the 
establishment of the second claim made at the start of this 
chapter (the incompleteness thesis) to the establishment 
of the 
first claim made there (the directedness thesis). 
That there is this argument in Augustine will allow 
us to see 
(a) -(e) in a rather different light. On the 
best interpretation 
of his work, Augustine is not offering us 
any kind of positive 
explanation of the origin of 'mala voluntas' 
at all. Rather, what 
he means to offer us is an explanation 
of why there can be no 
such explanation. Hence it will emerge that 
neither (a) -(e), nor 
(409) 
anything else in Augustine's writings, count as possible 
ingredients for a 'theory of will' which is to explain the origin 
of evil by reference to the neutrality, relative to good and 
evil, of the will's power to choose. One might, indeed, take the 
failure of (a) -(e) to explain the origin of 'mala voluntas' as a 
kind of reductio ad absurdum: a demonstration of the hopeless 
task which any similar attempt at explanation of 'mala voluntas' 
is, necessarily, setting itself. 
For, sometimes almost in the same breath as he offers us one 
of (a) -(e)- or some other attempt at explaining 'mala voluntas'- 
Augustine also makes remarks like these: 
'Improba voluntas malorum omnium causa est... Tu autem si 
huius radicis causam requiris, quomodo erit ista radix omnium 
malorum? Illa enim erit quae causa huius est, quam cum inveneris, 
etiam ipsius causam quaesiturus es, et quaerendi nullum habebis 
modum. Sed quae tandem esse poterit ante voluntatem causa 
voluntatis ?' (dLA 3.49) 
Augustine says quite clearly here that it is impossible to 
explain the origination of 'mala voluntas'. But why should that 
be? Because 'what is not anything, cannot be known' (dLA 2.54). 
Is Augustine, then, saying that the origin of 'mala voluntas' 
is 
nothing, or nothingness? 
It seems clear that Augustine is indeed 
saying something like 
that. This is a recurring idea in his thought. 
The claim that 
(410) 
there is some sort of connection between wickedness and 
nothingness is first hinted at in the dBV: 
'Etenim ipsam nequitiam matrem omnium vitiorum, ex eo quod 
nequidnam sit, id est ex eo quod nihil sit.' (dBV 8; cp. Cicero, 
Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.18) 
In the dDA, likewise, the origins of evil in general are said 
to be, at best, highly mysterious. The Manichaeans' urge to look 
into the questions of pain and sin is an urge 'res abditas 
intueri' (dDA 9). The Manichaeans' attempts to make problems for 
Catholics by raising unanswerable questions about sin and pain 
are disingenuous: 'Si ab homine, unde homo? Si ab angelo, unde 
angelus? ...quasi per quamdam catenam ad Deum mala connecti. Hac 
quaestione illi regnare se putant, quasi vero interrogare sit 
scire'. Augustine's wry comment is significant: '- Utinam id 
esset! nemo me scientior reperitur' (dDA 9). Against the 
Manichaeans, Augustine is arguing that these are questions 
without answers. 
In the Confessions, Augustine's long meditation on the 
stealing of the pears (Conf 2.4 -10) gives us another question 
which remains unanswered: Why did Augustine steal the pears? He 
says he got a 'kick' out of stealing the pears- because it was 
forbidden (2.4). Was this his reason for stealing them? But 
such 
a motive seems hardly an adequate reason for doing anything! 
Yet 
why else should Augustine have done it? For 
the taste of the 
pears (2.4), for their fairness (2.6), for the 
company of the 
(411) 
'adulescentuli' with whom he did the deed (2.8), for the joke of 
the thing (2.9)? None of these answers seems to satisfy 
Augustine. The action remains puzzling precisely because it was 
so random, so aimless, so lacking in motivation. Once again, this 
suggests to him the link between wickedness and nothingness, the 
idea that wickedness is mysterious because of its essential 
nothingness: 
'Dicat tibi nunc ecce cor meum, quid ibi quaerebat, ut essem 
gratis malus, et malitiae meae causa nulla esset nisi malitia.' 
(Conf 2.4) 
'Quis exaperit istam tortuossimam et implicatissimam 
nodositatem? Foeda est; nolo in eam intendere, nolo eam videre.' 
(Conf 2.10) 
But what does it mean to talk like this? What is gained by 
saying that the origin of 'mala voluntas' is nothing, or 
nothingness? I believe that the answer to this can be given by 
reminding ourselves of what was established in Ch.8 as a 
fundamental principle of Augustine's philosophy of action: the 
'directedness' thesis. 
The 'directedness' thesis, we saw, is the 
claim that all 
voluntary action is rational in the sense of being necessarily 
directed towards some good or other. To put 
it another way: to 
explain an agent A's piece of behaviour B as a voluntary 
action 
is (1) to posit a good G at which B could 
have been directed by 
(412) 
A, and (2) to surmise that B was directed at G by A. 
Now, how might such an account apply to the kind of action 
which is typical of 'mala voluntas': a deliberately wicked 
action, a piece of wilful wrongdoing? The suggestion being 
canvassed here (in the form of claim (1)) is that it is precisely 
in its application to wilful wrongdoing that such an account must 
necessarily break down. We may make a sharp distinction between 
the case in which someone does what is, let us say, 'objectively' 
wrong, but where that action is nonetheless the best action 
available to him (simple wrongdoing); and the case where someone 
does what is 'objectively' wrong even though he knew it was wrong 
and could have avoided it (wilful wrongdoing). 
Simple wrongdoing, so defined, will be perfectly easily 
explicable: the agent had no choice, or the agent at least did 
the best he could. But wilful wrongdoing, so defined, will not 
only be inexplicable: it will be necessarily inexplicable. The 
agent was not compelled; the agent was not ignorant of what he 
was doing; and the agent did not hold that what he did was really 
the right thing to do. And yet he did it. Such an action is, by 
its very nature, inexplicable, simply because the explicability 
of an action can only mean the possibility of relating it 
to some 
good at which it is supposed to aim. But if no good 
whatever is 
aimed at by an action as correctly described, 
then of course we 
cannot specify any good to which it is related; 
and hence it is 
necessarily true that we cannot explain 
it. Our ambitions to 
explain human actions, and to see them as 
cases of wilful 
(413) 
wrongdoing, are ambitions which necessarily, in the nature of the 
case, pull against each other. 
This, I believe, is an argument which Augustine does actually 
make out. Formally, its premisses are (A) that explanation of an 
action can only mean stating what good it aims at, and (B) that 
'mala voluntas', 'wilful wrongdoing' in the strictest sense, 
means action which aims at no good whatever. From these it 
validly derives the conclusion (C) that wilful wrongdoing in this 
sense is necessarily inexplicable. Direct exegetical evidence can 
be found for all three steps of the argument. Plenty of evidence 
has already been given for (A) in Ch.8. I here present the 
evidence for (C) and (B); in that order, since (B) is the more 
complicated of the two. 
(C) 'Nemo ergo ex me scire quaerat, quod me nescire scio: nisi 
forte ut nescire discat, quod sciri non posse sciendum est.' (dCD 
12.7) 
'Unde igitur erit [motus peccandi]? Ita quaerenti tibi, si 
respondeam nescire me, fortasse eris tristior: sed tarnen vera 
responderim. Sciri enim non potest quod nihil est... Quoniam 
defectivus motus est [aversionis], omnis autem defectus ex nihilo 
est, vide quo pertineat.' (dLA 2.54) 
'Quid opus est quaerere unde iste motus existat ?' (dLA 3.2) 
(B) At dLA 2.54, Augustine tells us that ' defectivus 
motus 
(414) 
est [aversionis]'. What does this mean? One way of clarifying it 
is to compare dCD 12.7: 
'Nemo igitur quaerat efficientem causam malae voluntatis: non 
enim est efficiens, sed deficiens, quia nec fila effectio sed 
defectio. Deficere namque ab eo, hoc est incipere habere 
voluntatern malam. Causas porro defectionum istarum... velle 
invenire tale est, ac si quisquam velit videre tenebras vel 
audire silentium, quod tarnen utrumque nobis notum est... non sane 
in specie, sed in speciei privatione.' (dCD 12.7) 
And, again, the analogies which Augustine offers here are 
worth considering. There is no sight at all without light rays; 
no hearing at all without sound waves (and the Psalm says: 'In 
thy light we see light'). The absence of either is something 
which can only be understood relative to the presence of either. 
The Manichaeans' mistake- their dualism of equal and opposite 
good and evil- is like thinking that darkness is a colour; it is 
to think that evil is one of the things which can be explained, 
when in fact its very presence is the negation of explanation. 
But what is it which is absent, in the case of an act of wilful 
wrongdoing, which is present in some other case and there 
makes 
explanation possible? 
Note that Augustine speaks here of the 'causa 
deficiens' of 
wilful wrongdoing, in sharp contrast with the 'causa 
efficiens' 
which some other things have. What other things? 
I suggest, in 
line with (A), that the contrast is between 
actions which are 
(415) 
cases of wilful wrongdoing and actions which are not. Then 
actions other than wilful wrongdoing will have 'causae 
efficientes'. An action which has a 'causa efficiens' will be a 
normal, non -skew, explicable case of action: either a good 
action, or a piece of non -wilful wrongdoing. The case of wilful 
wrongdoing, where there is not so much (as Augustine's pun has 
it) a 'causa efficiens' as a 'causa deficiens', will be the queer 
and inexplicable case. 
This will sound somewhat odd if we translate 'causa 
efficiens' in the obvious way, as 'efficient cause'. Does 
Augustine really mean to talk about efficient causation in this 
context? Or is his choice of this term dictated not so much by 
philosophical considerations as by a rhetorical (and pun- making) 
impulse, by his playing -off of 'deficiens' and 'defectio' and (if 
I am right to bring in dLA 2.54) 'defectivus'? The way this 
passage (at any rate) continues suggests that, if he were to have 
made this distinction, he would have said that here he was 
talking about a presence (or absence) of final causality, not of 
efficient. The defection from God is not here seen as 
underdetermined by efficient causality, so that it would be 
random. Here it is underdetermined by final causality, so that it 
is inexplicable. 
In other places, however, there is clear evidence 
that 
Augustine thought that talk about the causes of 
'mala voluntas' 
did not exclude talk about efficient causes. For 
example: 
(416) 
'Improba voluntas malorum omnium causa est... Tu autem si 
huius radicis causam requiris, quomodo erit ista radix omnium 
malorum? Illa enim erit quae causa huius est, quam cum inveneris, 
etiam ipsius causam quaesiturus es, et quaerendi nullum habebis 
modum. Sed quae tandem esse poterit ante voluntatem causa 
voluntatis ?' (dLA 3.48 -49) 
The point here seems to be that, while a 'mala voluntas' 
exercises efficient causality over other states of affairs in the 
world, nothing else can exercise efficient causality over it. For 
if it were so, it would not be able to do otherwise, and so not 
responsible (cp. my arguments v. (a), (d) and (e) above). 
Likewise, we read that 
'Causa miseriae malorum angelorum [est] quod ab illo qui 
summe est, aversi ad se ipsos conversi sunt, qui non summe 
sunt... Huius porro malae voluntatis causa si quaeritur, nihil 
invenitur. Quid est enim quod facit voluntatem malam, cum ipsa 
faciat opus malum? Ac per hoc mala voluntas efficiens est operis 
mali, malae autem voluntatis efficiens nihil est. Quoniam si res 
aliqua est, aut habet aut non habet aliquam voluntatem; si habet, 
aut bonam profecto habet aut malam. Si bonam, quis ita 
desipiat, 
ut dicat quod bona voluntas faciat voluntatem malam?' 
(dCD 12.6) 
The angels' misery is caused (this is efficient 
causality) by 
their 'mala voluntas'; but their 'mala voluntas' 
is not similarly 
caused by anything, for if it were 
it would not be culpable - 
which (Augustine has already decided) it 
is. 
(417) 
Thus, quite possibly, Augustine would hold that in a universe 
which begins perfect, any deficiency of formal or final cause 
would have to be mirrored by a deficiency of efficient cause. 
That, however, is as may be. My main concern here is with final 
(and formal) causality. The evidence that may be used for (C) may 
also suggest a rather different argument, about efficient 
causality, to the argument (A)(B)(C), about final causality. The 
point here is that that evidence does in any case support the 
final -causal argument. 
If this evidence adds up, then it shows that Augustine does 
indeed teach that actions which are wilful wrongdoings are 
necessarily inexplicable, because to explain a voluntary action 
is to indicate the good at which it aims, and a wilful wrongdoing 
aims at no good. And this in turn shows what I meant by claim 
(2): that his account of the origin of 'mala voluntas' is not 
only incomplete, but necessarily incomplete. For (claim (1)): 
necessarily, there can be no explanation of what is inexplicable. 
And this is (or ought to be) Augustine's final line of defence 
against all comers on the question 'Unde malum ?'. 
Thus there is a fundamental distinction in Augustine's 
thought, not always as carefully drawn by the saint 
himself as 
one might have liked, between what I have 
called 'simple 
wrongdoing' and 'wilful wrongdoing'. There 
is no mystery about 
simple wrongdoing; it is explained by reference 
to the good at 
which the agent is (mistakenly) aiming. 
But there is a mystery 
about 'wilful wrongdoing': because the 
action in question is not 
(418) 
aimed at any good, mistakenly or otherwise. 
5. Manichaean Dualism and 'Privatio Boni' 
To illustrate this remark: consider Augustine's response to 
the Manichaean teaching about the 'two souls', in his important 
anti -Manichaean pamphlet de Duabus Animabus (dDA). In line with 
their dualist metaphysics, the Manichaeans argued for a morally 
dualist psychology. On their view, just as evil was simply the 
mirror image of good, so evil desire was simply the mirror image 
of good desire. The existence of such radically opposed desires 
in each person was taken to be evidence for the existence of two 
souls in each person. The Manichaeans' good soul is perfectly 
good, and their bad soul is perfectly bad: the good soul, which 
is part of the 'ipsa substantia Dei' (dDA 16), pursues the 
greatest available good by the shortest available route. The bad 
soul, which is absolutely nothing to do with the good God ('nulla 
prorsus ex parte ad Deum [pertinet]', dDA 16), pursues the 
greatest available evil with equal assiduity. It is as 
if a 
mediocre chess player's mediocrity were due to 
the evenly 
balanced influence on her of the ghosts of two 
Grand Masters 
haunting her soul. Both urge moves on her; 
but one is playing 
straight chess, the other suicide chess. 
In metaphysics, the Manichaeans were 
centrally committed to 
this claim: 
(419) 
(M) Just as there are substances whose very nature is to be 
good, so equally there are substances whose very nature is to be 
evil. 
In moral psychology, they were centrally committed to this 
claim: 
(P) Explanations of action can just as well have the form: 'A 
does B because A thinks it will bring about C, and A thinks C is 
a good result' as the form: 'A does B because A thinks it will 
bring about C, and A thinks C is a bad result'. 
Now Augustine believes that both these claims are incoherent, 
and for related reasons. (M) He believes that the idea of an evil 
substance is a contradiction in terms. Existence as such is, in 
his view, a good (dNB 17, dVR 44); goodness pertains to 
substances naturally, since they were all made by God (dNB 12): 
'Omnis ergo natura bona est' (dNB 3; dLA 3.22). 
Therefore there is no symmetry between the good and the bad; 
the mirror image idea is exactly wrong. For a substance to be bad 
is not for it to partake of an equal and opposite quality to 
goodness: it is for it to be, somehow, a privation of good 
(' privatio boni'), less than it naturally should be (dNB 17, Ench 
11, dVR 44). As Augustine remarks at dNB 6, any 
nature which can 
be corrupted must have some good in it. 
The existence of evil is parasitic upon 
the existence of 
(420) 
good. Evil is not so much like a bad quality or thing, as like 
the absence of a good quality or thing (dNB 17). Different evils 
have no independent natures of their own, as good things have 
(dDA 1). They take their natures entirely from the good things of 
which they are 'privationes' (dDA 6), just as the sense of any 
negative proposition depends not so much on the negation itself 
as on the affirmative proposition which it negates (dDA 6). To 
assert that 'x exists', where x is evil, is itself to assert 
something which (if true) detracts from x's evil. Hence there can 
exist no perfect evil except non -existence; which (Augustine 
thinks) means the same as 'Perfect evil does not exist' (dNB 9, 
17). 
Here is the relevance of the 'privatio boni' argument to the 
'two souls' hypothesis. All substances, as such, are good (dNB 
17); the soul is a substance (dDA 7); so all souls, as such, are 
good (dDA 1); so there is no evil of souls symmetrical in kind to 
the goodness of souls. 
'Est autem vitium primum animae rationalis voluntas ea 
faciendi quae vetat summa et intima veritas. Ita homo de paradiso 
in hoc saeculum expulsus est, id est ab aeternis ad temporalia, a 
copiosis ad egena, a firmitate ad infirma; non ergo a bono 
substantiali ad 
est; sed a bono 
bonum carnale, 
malum substantiale, quia nulla substantia malum 
aeterno ad bonum temporale, a bono spirituali ad 
a bono intelligibili ad bonum sensibile, 
a bono 
summo ad bonum infimum. Est igitur quoddam bonum, 
quod si diligit 
anima rationalis, peccat, quia infra illam ordinatum 
est. Quare 
(421) 
ipsum peccatum malum est, non ea substantia quae peccando 
diligitur.' (dVR 38) 
(P) Likewise, as has already been pointed out, the idea of 
explaining an action with reference to the bad aim which it 
pursues is also, for Augustine, a contradiction in terms. Wilful 
wrongdoing, 'mala voluntas', cannot be explained symmetrically to 
'bona voluntas', deliberate choice of the good. For it is for 
Augustine something very like a conceptual truth that explanation 
of any voluntary action means relating it to a desired good. To 
perceive something as a bad is, necessarily, to be disposed to 
avoid or avert it, not to pursue it. Someone who (like the 
Manichees) does not believe this has simply misunderstood, or 
misused, the word 'bad'. 
Augustine's response to the Manichaeans is to reject their 
two symmetries. If there were such symmetries, then Augustine 
would indeed be forced to admit that something like the 
Manichaean 'two souls' hypothesis is true. But, Augustine argues, 
there is no such symmetry between good and evil in psychological 
explanations, any more than there is in metaphysics. There 
are, 
rather, two kinds of bad action: wilful wrongdoing, 
where no good 
is chosen, which (as we have seen) is not explicable 
at all; and 
simple wrongdoing, where the wrong good 
is chosen through 
ignorance or compulsion (culpable or 
otherwise), which is 
explicable as a degenerate case of good action. 
'Quare non duas animas hint fateri 
cogor? Possumus enim 
(422) 
melius et multo expeditius intelligere duo genera bonarum rerum, 
quorum tarnen neutrum ab auctore Deo sit alienum, unam animam ex 
diversis afficere partibus.' (dDA 19) 
Augustine's argument is that wrongdoing, at least of the 
simple variety, does not display desire of any evil, but desire 
of some inappropriate kind of good. His examples of goods which 
are often inappropriate tend to be physical goods, 'sensibilia', 
as opposed (usually) to 'intelligibilia'. While both 'sensibilia' 
and 'intelligibilia' are repeatedly affirmed to be good, still 
'intelligibilia' are far better than 'sensibilia': 
'Ut cuncta quae tactu et visu, vel quolibet alio modo 
corporaliter sentirentur, tanto essent inferiora his quae 
intelligendo assequeremur, quanto ipsos sensus intelligentiae 
cedere videremus.' (dDA 2) 
The pursuit of intelligible goods must take precedence in any 
well ordered life over that of sensible goods. As I suggested in 
the last chapter, the right ordering of one's desires reflects 
the real ordering of the cosmos: good desire has as its formal 
cause Reality with a capital r, which is ultimately 
identifiable 
with God Himself (dLA 1.16 -20; cp. dNB 1,3, dDA 2 
-4). 
As justice, for Plato, is 'giving each 
his due', so the just 
life, for Augustine, is giving to each kind 
of good the attention 
which its place in the order of goods 
makes proper. And the 
unjust life, correspondingly, is failing 
to do so (dLA 2.48 -52). 
(423) 
No object of choice is bad, and no act of choice is bad, except 
in the sense in which it could have been better (dVR 78). 
'Peccatum non est appetitio naturarum malarum sed desertio 
meliorum' (dNB 34). In the dDA, the image Augustine uses for this 
'desertio' is that of 'imitatio'; the image also appears in the 
Soliloquies (2.11, on falsity and resemblance), and in the dVR 
(66). The point stressed is that 'imitatio' is not bad because of 
the intrinsic badness of the models which it takes, but because 
of the unfittingness of the 'imitatio' to the nature of the 
creature guilty thereof. 
'Peccando fiunt malae non quia malas, sed quia male 
imitantur... Recte igitur plerumque improbamus imitantem, cum 
autem quem imitatur probemus. Improbamus autem, non quia non sit 
assecutus, sed quia omnino assequi voluit... Lucens luna 
laudatur, suoque cursu placet; tamen si eam sol velit imitati, 
cui non summe ac iure displiceat ?' (dDA 20) 
6. Incompleteness Again 
It may seem that this account works well enough to describe 
'simple' wrongdoing, but does not apply to wilful wrongdoing. The 
above account, emphasising against the Manichaeans the derivative 
nature of sin, applies nicely to those who are already 
in the 
bondage of sin, and cannot help but follow 
their wicked 
propensities. What it completely fails to explain is 
how anyone 
(424) 
not already in that state could get there in the first place. 
'Fieri enim potest ut propria [animae] illae voluntate 
appetendo quod non licebat, hoc est, peccando, ex bonis factae 
sint malae.' (dDA 20) 
Augustine's words are 'fieri potest'; but what he does not 
give us, here or anywhere else, is any indication of how this can 
happen. The notion of simple wrongdoing is a clear and 
comprehensible idea. But the existence of simple wrongdoing, it 
turns out, must always be causally dependent on the prior 
existence of wilful wrongdoing. And this concept is radically 
incomprehensible. Which shows, again, the necessary 
incompleteness of Augustine's account. 
The account, in fact, yields a regress, as is hinted at dCD 
12.6: 
'Quid est enim quod facit voluntatem malam, cum ipsa faciat 
opus malum? ...Si res aliqua est, aut habet aut non habet aliquam 
voluntatem; si habet, aut bonam profecto habet aut malam. Si 
bonam, quis ita desipiat, ut dicat quod bona voluntas faciat 
voluntatem malam?' (dCD 12.6; cp. dLA 3.49) 
If simple wrongdoing is failure to act 
on the right or 
appropriate good desire, this failure to act on the right good 
desire must itself have been either a voluntary 
choice to fail, 
or an involuntary failure. If it was an involuntary 
failure, then 
(425) 
the agent could not help acting on the wrong good desire, and so 
was not culpable for her failure. If it was a voluntary choice to 
fail, then the agent could help it; and so was culpable for her 
choice to fail to act on the right good desire. But if the agent 
was culpable for this choice, then this choice must have been a 
(simple ?) wrongdoing. And the definition of simple wrongdoing is 
'an agent's failure to act on the right good desire'. So the 
agent's choice to fail to act on the right good desire was itself 
due to another failure to act on the right good desire. And 
again: this failure was either a voluntary choice to fail, or an 
involuntary failure... 
To put it another way. Augustine says explicitly that we 
should explain wrongdoing by pointing out the good at which its 
agent aimed: 
'Cum itaque de facinore quaeritur, qua causa factum sit, 
credi non solet, nisi cum appetitus adipiscendi alicuius illorum 
bonorum, quae infima diximus, esse potuisse adparuerit, aut metus 
amittendi.' (Conf 2.5) 
But if I do so explain someone's wrongdoing, then (on 
Augustine's theory) I have not yet completely explained his 
motivation. For in doing the wrong act, he (ex 
hypothesi) 
voluntarily aimed at a lesser good than he might have 
done: that 
was why it was wrongdoing. But why did he so 
aim? To explain this 
is to specify the good at which he aimed 
in so lowering his 
sights. But if he thought there was a 
good to be achieved by 
(426) 
lowering his sights in this way, nonetheless, if his action was 
wrongdoing, he must have been able to choose a better good: so 
why didn't he? Et cetera. 
This regress appears because of Augustine's refusal to allow 
the Manichaeans their symmetry between pursuit of good and bad 
objectives. Wherever it is possible to explain wrongdoing, we 
must necessarily explain it as simple wrongdoing. Now such 
explanation seems to depend upon a prior notion of wilful 
wrongdoing. But , unlike simple wrongdoing, wilful wrongdoing is 
not explicable in terms of a pursued good. But that does not mean 
it is explicable in terms of a pursued evil; for there is no such 
type of explanation. What it means is that wilful wrongdoing is 
not explicable at all. And here, once again, the necessary 
incompleteness of Augustine's account of 'mala voluntas' is 
obvious. My suggestion is that this kind of necessarily 
incomplete account is no mishap; it is what Augustine is aiming 
at. 
7. Augustine and Voluntarism 
I conclude that, for Augustine, wilful wrongdoing 
simply 
cannot be explained: it is a mystery. In the 
case of a piece of 
wilful wrongdoing, the agent sees and 
acknowledges what it is 
right to do, but, somehow, inexplicably, 
reneges on this 
knowledge. That Augustine considers 
this kind of renegation 
inexplicable is his concession to the claims of classical 
(427) 
philosophy; that he admits that it is possible is his concession 
to the doctrine of Scripture. 
That, of course, was the dilemma I mentioned at the outset. 
Revelation says that there is wilful wrongdoing; philosophy says 
that there can't be. Augustine's most adequate view of the origin 
of wilful wrongdoing rather cleverly combines elements of both 
sides. First, analogously to Aristotle's treatment of the problem 
of akrasia, Augustine argues that wilful wrongdoing is rationally 
inexplicable in the sense explored above. Second, however, he 
insists that wilful wrongdoing does occur- the evidence being in 
the revelation of Scripture. The fact of wilful wrongdoing is a 
revelation to faith; to intelligence, it is a mystery. (There is 
even a biblical phrase which, tenuously, Augustine might have 
cited in support of this theory: Td uu6TT1ptov TES óvouloç (2 
Thes.2.7). But for the evidence that he did not take this 
opportunity, see dCD 20.19.) 
So, besides the analogies which I have suggested, there is 
also an important contrast between Aristotle's and Augustine's 
theories about wilful wrongdoing. Aristotle's theory (as I argued 
in Ch.4) suggests the conclusion that the existence 
of full 
akrasia would be a logical impossibility. Augustine's 
theory, on 
the other hand, suggests the conclusion that 
the existence of 
'mala voluntas' is logically inexplicable. 
Aristotle's position 
is that 'There can't be wilful wrongdoing; 
therefore there 
isn't'. Augustine's (best) position is 
that 'Wilful wrongdoing 
makes no kind of sense; yet there it 
is'. In this contrast is the 
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biggest difference between Aristotle's and Augustine's theories 
of action. It is the point at which they decisively part company; 
and it is the point at which one should acknowledge that, if what 
I called Aristotle's rationality condition of voluntary action 
does usually have an analogue in the conditions of voluntary 
action which Augustine assumes, there is a crucial exception to 
this rule. For Augustine thinks that wilful wrongdoing is, in the 
sense I have explored, 'irrational'; but this does not lead him 
to deny that it is voluntary. 
It is also the point at which the commentators start talking 
about Augustine's alleged belief in 'voluntarism', or 
'irrationalism', or in a 'theory of the will'. So Brown, in the 
article already quoted, undertakes to focus on 
'...that primal act in which Adam freely turned his (wholly 
undetermined) "voluntas" away from God...' 
(Brown 1978, p.318: emphasis added). 
So also Dihle writes: 
'The key role attributed to will 
in Saint Augustine's 
corresponding systems of psychology and 
theology resulted mainly 
from self- examination. It is not derived 
from earlier doctrines 
in the field of philosophical psychology 
or anthropology, and 
seems to mark a turning point 
in the history of theological 
reasoning. From Saint Augustine's 
reflections emerged the concept 
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of a human will, prior to and independent of the act of 
intellectual cognition, yet fundamentally different from sensual 
and irrational emotion... It is mainly through this entirely new 
concept of his own self that Saint Augustine superseded the 
conceptual system of Graeco -Roman culture.' 
(Dihle 1982, p.127) 
What I want to argue, in the remainder of this chapter, is 
that it is now evident why this standard view gets Augustine 
wrong. He is not offering us a 'theory of the will' of the kind 
supposed by Brown 1978, Dihle 1982, Maclntyre 1985, Thonnard 1941 
et a7ii. If he has a 'theory of the will' at all, it is about 
'the will' in a much thinner and less general sense than these 
commentators suppose. The key role, in his understanding of 
wilful wrongdoing, is not played by a concept of will at all, but 
by a concept of mystery. 
Contrast these two claims, a specific one and a general one: 
X. For Augustine, the human agent is- somehow- mysteriously 
capable of wilful wrongdoing which is irrational action. In such 
action, and nowhere else, a voluntary choice is made which has no 
rational justification even from the agent's own viewpoint. 
Y. For Augustine, voluntary action in general either has not, or 
does not need, any kind of rational justification. 
(430) 
I believe that (X) is perfectly correct. But (X) is not 
consistent with (Y), which I take it is the claim central to the 
'voluntarist' view of Augustine's theory of action. Nor can (Y) 
itself be sustained as an interpretation of Augustine. 
My reasons for saying this should already be clear. In the 
first place, I have already argued at length- the claim was 
central to the last chapter- that Augustine is committed to the 
theses (i) that voluntary action is, or is usually, rational, and 
(ii) that voluntary action is rational, i.e, explicable, only 
insofar as it is directed towards something good. Therefore (in 
the second place), it is simply untrue that either good action, 
or simple wrongdoing, is lacking in rational justification. And 
hence (thirdly), it is emphatically not the case that Augustine 
believes that voluntary action in general either has not, or does 
not need, any kind of rational justification. 
True, he certainly believes that wilful wrongdoing has no 
kind of rational justification. (Indeed, if we take the efficient 
causal interpretation of dLA 3.49 and dCD 12.6 suggested above, 
he even believes that wilful wrongdoing has no sufficient reason 
for its occurring.) But the whole point of this as a hypothesis 
about wilful wrongdoing is that wilful wrongdoing 
is the 
exceptional case. What makes it so mysterious is 
exactly that it 
breaks an otherwise unexceptioned rule: 
the rule that all 
voluntary action, by nature, necessarily 
has some kind of 
rational justification. 
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It may now be evident how I can answer one important 
remaining question. In §2, I amassed a fair amount of evidence 
for the contradiction of the 'directedness' thesis: the thesis of 
the neutrality of the 'voluntas'. How can I account for this 
evidence? Do I simply have to dismiss it as an inconvenient 
inconsistency? I think not. I take it that these passages are 
affirmations, not of (Y), but of (X). 
That is: Augustine is affirming, in these words, the brute 
fact of our ability to renege on what we recognise as the right 
course of action. Even at his most emphatic in these passages, 
Augustine says no more that the 'voluntas' 'ilia media vis est, 
quae vel intendi ad fidem, vel inclinari ad infidelitatem potest' 
(dSL 58). Need even this affirmation imply any more than 
Augustine's acceptance of the paradox I have already attributed 
to him- that 'mala voluntas' is inexplicable, and yet it happens? 
I suggest not: I suggest that there is, in fact, nothing in these 
passages that shows Augustine supporting any stronger thesis than 
(X). Hence, they are no evidence for the claim that he holds to 
(Y). 
The traditional interpretation of Augustine sees him 
not as a 
'rationalist' (i.e., one who insists that, as such, 
voluntary 
action should normally be in some sense rational) 
but as a 
'voluntarist' (i.e., a subscriber to (Y)). 
But I believe that 
those who follow the traditional interpretation 
are standing 
Augustine on his head. The tradition has 
it that Augustine is a 
thoroughgoing 'voluntarist' who occasionally 
makes remarks which 
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can be misinterpreted as 'rationalist'. I am arguing that, on the 
contrary, Augustine is a thoroughgoing 'rationalist' who 
occasionally makes remarks which can be misinterpreted as 
'voluntarist'. 
Of course, anyone who dissents, as I am doing, from such a 
long and honourable tradition of interpretation as the 
'voluntarist' reading of Augustine has work to do. The onus is on 
him, first, to justify his dissent by exegesis, and second, to 
explain how the traditional explanation arose. 
I hope I have by now fulfilled the first part of this onus in 
this chapter and the last. In closing, I add some remarks in 
fulfilment of the second part of the onus. 
8. From Augustine's Rationalism to Augustinian Voluntarism 
Tracing the sources of what I take to be the mistake of 
classing Augustine, with (e.g.) Ockham, Scotus and Hume, as a 
thoroughgoing 'voluntarist', is no easy matter. To do it properly 
would call for a huge historical study which I have no intention 
of attempting here. But I think one may, at least, legitimately 
point to three errors of exegesis, and one of inference. 
The error of inference is the mistake of supposing 
that, if 
(on Augustine's theory) renegation from any good 
action to wilful 
wrongdoing by 'mala voluntas' is possible, 
then, when any good 
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action is not reneged on but actually performed, a prior 
affirmation of that good action by 'bona voluntas' must be 
necessary. 
The underlying image here (the 'intuition pump', as Dennett 
(1984) would say) is a common one in the philosophy of action 
(thanks to Plato's Republic). It is of the execution of an action 
as a legislative process. It is (we have seen) demonstrable that, 
in the case of a bad action, any process of means -ends reasoning 
which could lead to that action is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for its performance. What is both necessary and 
sufficient, for this bad intention to be promulgated as a bad 
action, is a kind of 'royal assent', a 'numen' or monarch's nod. 
And this, of course, is the contribution of the 'will'- which in 
the case of a bad action is so to speak 'ruling by decree'. 
The inference is that if this 'royal assent' is necessary and 
sufficient in the case of a bad action, then it must be at least 
necessary in the case of any voluntary action at all. But why 
suppose this? To maintain the legislative analogy, there are many 
forms of constitution, and the royal assent is by no means an 
indispensable part of all of them. Why can't the correct analogy 
for good actions be a (republican) democratic constitution, 
where 
what is necessary and sufficient for the enactment 
of a law is 
simply that the constitutive assembly should 
(analogously to 
practical reasoning) debate and pass the 
resolution? In such a 
constitution, the royal assent is clearly 
neither necessary nor 
sufficient; it is irrelevant. And (still 
sticking with Plato!) 
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just because bad action is precisely that case where some tyrant 
desire rules by decree, why should we say that any rúpavvoç at 
all must be given a legislative role in any ideal constitution? 
This idea, that 'voluntas' is involved as an extra component 
in every good or bad action, is suggested by the first error of 
exegesis, a misunderstanding of dCD 14.6: 
'Voluntas est quippe in omnibus [his motibus (sc. the 
emotions)); immo omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt. Nam quid 
est cupiditas et laetitia nisi voluntas in eorum consensione quae 
volumus? Et quid est metus aut tristitia nisi voluntas in 
dissensione ab his quae nolumus?' 
Note, in the first place, that Augustine is not here 
analysing actions, but emotions. More precisely, he is building a 
conceptual bridge between emotions and attitudes. 'Cupiditas', as 
an emotion, is a general wanting; as an attitude, it is a policy 
to obtain what is desired by the emotion. The difference between 
the emotion and the attitude is that attitudes are chosen, 
deliberately adopted, and voluntary, whereas emotions are 
not. So 
I am not (directly) morally responsible for my emotions; 
but I am 
directly responsible for my attitudes. 
It is, in fact, a piece of 
over -enthusiasm which leads 
Augustine to say that 'Omnes [hi 
motus] nihil aliud quam 
voluntates sunt'. For he has 
just distinguished 'motus' 
('emotion') rather carefully from 
'voluntas' ('will'; or 'emotion 
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+ will' (_ 'attitude')): 
'Interest autem qualis sit voluntas hominis; quia si perversa 
est, perversa habebit hos motus.' (dCD 14.6) 
The point is that one can, to a degree, be detached enough 
from one's emotions to choose whether or not to adopt their 
content into one's attitudes. That is why we are responsible for 
our attitudes, in a way in which we are not for our emotions. In 
any case the point, which is first made and then obscured by a 
rhetorical flourish on which far too much has traditionally been 
built, seems to have very little to do with the idea of the need 
for some separately identifiable assent of the 'voluntas' to any 
action. 
The second error of exegesis concerns a passage in dCD 12.9 
which has been misread: 
'Cum ergo malae voluntatis efficiens naturalis nulla sit 
causa... Si dixerimus nullam esse efficientem causam etiam 
voluntatis bonae...' 
The voluntarist interpretation of Augustine seems to me to 
require that this 'si' should be introducing the kind 
of 
rhetorical 'if' clause which is equivalent to an 
affirmative 
statement. The passage would then have Augustine 
saying that 
'bona voluntas' is, just as much as 'mala', 
uncreated and without 
causal antecedents of any kind. But this 
is certainly not the 
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meaning of the passage, as simply reading on quickly shows: 
'...Si dixerimus nullam esse efficientem causam etiam 
voluntatis bonae, cavendum est, ne voluntas bona angelorum non 
facta, sed Deo coaeterna esse credatur. Cum ergo ipsi facti sint, 
quo modo illa non esse facta dicetur ?' (dCD 12.9) 
The passage, in fact, says the exact opposite. The 'bona 
voluntas' of the good angels, unlike the 'mala voluntas' of the 
bad angels, is created, and has a causal antecedent, in that 
creative activity of God. 
This enables us to deal with the third error of exegesis, 
which is the building of doctrines on a famous phrase which has 
already been quoted: 
'Sed quae tandem esse poterit ante voluntatem causa 
voluntatis?' (dLA 3.49) 
Taken on its own, this might well seem to be the claim that 
'voluntas' in general has no antecedents of any sort, and would 
not be 'voluntas' if it had. But (as I have shown in Ch.5) to 
take it this way is to ignore the context of the remark, which 
makes it plain that it is only 'Improba voluntas' which is under 
discussion here. Hence no general theory of what the 
antecedents 
of any 'voluntas' must be is here being established. 
Augustine's 
'Sed quae tandem esse poterit ante voluntatem 
causa voluntatis ?' 
should properly be read as 'Sed quae tandem 
esse poterit ante 
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malam voluntatem causa malae voluntatis ?'. For, as we have 
already seen, Augustine explicitly says that 'bona voluntas' does 
have causal antecedents: in the creative activity of God. Compare 
dCD 12.9, above, with 5.9: 
'Ac per hoc colligitur non esse causas efficientes omnium 
quae fiunt nisi voluntarias... In [Dei] voluntate summa potestas 
est, quae creatorum spirituum bonas voluntates adiuvat, malas 
iudicat, omnes ordinat... Malae quippe voluntates ab illo non 
sunt, quoniam contra naturam sunt, quae ab illo est.' 
The implication is plainly that 'bonae voluntates', which (by 
definition) are not 'contra naturam', are from God. 
That 'bona voluntas' has causal antecedents in the creative 
activity of God is also exactly what we should expect if I was 
right (Ch.8) about the Truth being the formal cause of the good 
will. And a third reason for taking this view is given by the 
clear asymmetry, in Augustine's works on grace, between 
attributions of praise (which are always to God) and attributions 
of blame (which are always to creatures). Again and 
again the 
refrain is: 'What have you that ye did not receive 
?' (v., e.g., 
dSL 58). This, again, is just what we should 
expect if 'bona 
voluntas', so far from being uncaused, 
comes directly from God. 
My conclusion, then, is that 
Augustine is right to argue 
against the Manichaeans that, in 
his terms at least, 'bona 
voluntas' is radically asymmetrical 
to 'mala voluntas'. For 'bona 
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voluntas' is explicable; it conforms to the form of the good life 
delineated in Ch.8; its aim is always some good or other; and it 
is even subject to the efficient causality of the Creator. 'Mala 
voluntas', on the other hand, is a surd in the equation, 'an 
incomprehensible given which steadfastly and in principle resists 
causal explanation' (Brown 1978, p.315); and it is deliberately 
left as such by Augustine (in his best moments). It partakes not 
of formal, nor of final, nor even of efficient causation; it is 
something which we simply cannot account for. 
Moreover, it is to be noted that there is- in spite of the 
literature- no valid inference from the phenomenon of 'mala 
voluntas' as the tyranny of bad desire to a general voluntaristic 
hypothesis. It is a mistake to claim that there is or could be, 
in the anatomy of a 'normal' Augustinian voluntary action, some 
extra job of assenting which always needs to be done by the 
'voluntas', over and above the simple choice and pursuit of a 
good It is not the rational act which is the exception to the 
rule (however rarely that rule may be observed in a fallen 
world). The exceptional case is the irrational, inexplicable 
act 
of renegation which Augustine calls 'mala voluntas', and 
which 
gets the fallen world going in the first place. 
9. Conclusion 
What, then, has been established 
by my examination of 
Augustine's theory of freedom and the 
voluntary, and by 
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comparison of that theory with Aristotle's? 
In the first place, I may hope to have justified my adoption, 
in my study of Augustine's theory, of the methodological axiom 
followed in my study of Aristotle: the axiom, namely, that 
showing the existence of voluntary action is sufficient and 
necessary for showing the existence of free action. If I am right 
about what is involved in voluntary action, on Augustine's best 
account (and in particular if voluntary action involves the 
ability to do otherwise than one does), this axiom has indeed 
been a useful and clarificatory one to follow, not only in the 
case of Aristotle but also in the case of Augustine. Augustine's 
theory of freedom is widely (and rightly) seen as a can of worms. 
If the methodological axiom which I have used is put to work, we 
can, in fact, extract a good deal of coherent and interesting 
theory from the plethora of Augustine's writings on the topic of 
freedom. 
And secondly: it has emerged that there is a parallel problem 
in Augustine's theory to the problem posed by the apparent 
existence of akrasia for Aristotle's theory; a parallel problem, 
with a not quite parallel solution. Aristotle (I suggested 
in 
Ch.4) could have argued for the logical impossibility 
of full 
akrasia, meaning voluntary action which does 
not admit of 
rational explanation in the very strict terms 
of Aristotle's 
theory of practical rationality. Augustine 
has a looser theory of 
practical wisdom (rather than Aristotle's 
practical rationality), 
and a commitment to the teaching of 
Scripture that his analogue 
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of full akrasia, wilful wrongdoing, is nothing less than fully 
voluntary action. Hence it is that Augustine is bound to say that 
wilful wrongdoing- however mysterious, however inexplicable and 
however contrary in its direction to the directedness of 
practical wisdom towards the good- is, nonetheless, voluntary 
action, and therefore culpable even if not explicable. And so it 
turns out that, while voluntary action always and necessarily has 
three conditions for Aristotle- concerning ignorance, compulsion, 
and irrationality- for Augustine there is a counter example to 
these three postulated conditions. In the case of wilful 
wrongdoing we have voluntary action which is nonetheless 
irrational. This is the great difference between Augustine and 
his Classical predecessors. It is a difference which (I have 
argued) has been widely misinterpreted by the alignment of 
Aristotle and other classical writers with 'rationalist' 
understandings of the origination of action, and the alignment of 
Augustine with 'voluntarist' understandings thereof; as if 
Aristotle had been a proto- Kantian and Augustine a proto -Humean. 
But this difference between Aristotle and Augustine is, for all 
that it has been misrepresented, a profound and important one; 
and if the schematism under which I have attempted to analyse 
their theories of freedom and the voluntary has brought out that 
difference in a new and interesting light, that at least is a 
success of a kind. 
(441) 
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